Political Identities: The Miners of the Ruhr and South Wales, 1890-1926

Leighton S. James

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Glamorgan

Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree

Signed L. S. James (candidate)

Date 4·6·2004

STATEMENT 1

This dissertation is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MSc Econ West European Labour Studies.

Signed L. S. James (candidate)

Date 4·6·2004

STATEMENT 2

This dissertation is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated.

Other sources as acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed L. S. James (candidate)

Date 4·6·2004

STATEMENT 3

I hereby give consent for my dissertation, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed: L. S. James (Candidate)

Date: 4·6·2004

Acknowledgements

During the course of writing this dissertation I have accrued many debts. First and foremost, I must thank my supervisors, Prof. Stefan Berger and Prof. Chris Williams. Both have provided invaluable constructive criticism and support throughout. Dr Andy Croll and Dr Nina Fishman also contributed useful advice.

The Institut für Sozialebewegungen provided the base for my research in Germany. I would therefore also like to thank Prof. Klaus Tenfelde, Dr. Peter Friedemann, Dr Benjamin Ziemann, Holger Heith, and Kai Rawe for sharing their knowledge on German archives and providing insights on my work generally. Brian McCook was also kind enough to share his extensive knowledge on the Polish community in the Ruhr and listen to my ideas over a glass of Altbier. The DAAD provided funds for my second research trip to Germany in 2002/3.

I also owe a huge debt to many archivists and librarians in two countries. Diane White and the staff of the Goethe Institut Düsseldorf deserve a mention for they succeeded in teaching a reluctant mind some new tricks.

Finally, my family has provided unstinting support. Without them this work would have been impossible. I would like to dedicate the thesis to my mother, Heather James, and my grandmother, Nest Watkins.

Contents

List of Tables and Graphs

Abbreviations

AL Aberdare Leader
AVCECN Amman Valley Chronicle and East Carmarthen News
BBA Bergbau Museum, Bochum
Bk Bergknappe
BüK Büro Kolpin
BZ Bergarbeiter Zeitung
CCRO Carmarthen County Records Office
CEH Central European History
CG Colliery Guardian
CJ Carmarthen Journal
CNWWGA The Celtic News and West Wales General Advertiser
CWM Colliery Workers' Magazine
DA Deutsche Arbeit
DZ Dortmunder Zeitung
EAZ Essener Arbeiter Zeitung
EHR Economic History Review
EVZ Essener Volkszeitung
FPM Free Press of Monmouthshire
GAZ Gelsenkirchener Allgemeine Zeitung
GCT Glamorgan County Times
GFPRL Glamorgan Free Press and Rhondda Leader
GG The Glamorgan Gazette: Bridgend and Neath Chronicle and Central Glamorgan Gazette, Incorporated
GH German History
GRO Glamorgan Records Office
HZ Historische Zeitschrift
IfSB Institut für Soziale Bewegungen
IRSH International Review of Social History
IWK Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz
IZF Institut für Zeitungsforschung
JCH Journal of Contemporary History
JMH Journal of Modern History
LA Landrat
LV The Labour Voice
ME Merthyr Express
MEP Monmouthshire Evening Post
MMSWA Monmouthshire Merlin and South Wales Advertiser
MS Märkischer Sprecher
NLW National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth
NGMGH Neath Gazette and Mid-Glamorgan Herald
OBA Oberbergamt
PC Pontypridd Chronicle
PG Porth Gazette
PO Pontypridd Observer
PRO Public Records Office
Reg. Regierungspräsident
RD Red Dawn
RL The Rhondda Leader
RS Rhondda Socialist
RWAZ Rheinisch-Westfälische Arbeiter Zeitung
RWZ Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung
SH Social History
SJPE Scottish Journal of Political Economy
STAB Stadtarchiv Bochum
STAD Staatsarchiv Düsseldorf
STAM Staatsarchiv Münster
SWCA South Wales Coalfield Archive
SWDN South Wales Daily News
SWDS South Wales Daily Star
SWDT South Wales Daily Telegraph
SWML South Wales Miners' Library
SWA South Wales Argus
SWW South Wales Worker
T Tremonia
TG Tarian Y Gweithiwr
TUC Trade Union Library
UDC Urban District Council
Vb – Volksblatt
W The Welshman
WHR Welsh History Review
WK Westfälischer Kämpfer
WM Western Mail
WO Welsh Outlook
WVZ Westfälische Volkszeitung

Maps



The Ruhr

Source: Jürgen Tampke, *The Ruhr and Revolution: the Revolutionary Movement in the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial region 1912-1919*, London, Croom Helm, 1979.



The south Wales coalfield

Source: Chris Williams, *Democratic Rhondda: Politics and Society, 1885-1951*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1996.

Abstract

The thesis compares the discursive practices of the trade unions and political parties in the Ruhr and South Wales from 1890 to 1926. It begins from the hypothesis that generally, developments in South Wales were characterised by a process of homogenisation. On the other hand, developments in the Ruhr were characterised by increasing fragmentation.

In order to integrate the historiographies of the two coalfields, this work seeks to account for the different trajectories of union and political development using a tripartite approach. This framework depends on the interrelated concepts of lifeworld, constructed identity and civil society. The use of Jürgen Habermas's concept of lifeworld allows a synthesis of milieux, structural factors and discourse. The lifeworld provides the backdrop against which the activists constructed the identities of their respective organisations. A more synchronous lifeworld in South Wales encouraged a more encompassing, inclusive discourse. The fragmentation of the lifeworld of the Ruhr miners into several milieux or sub-cultures, however, contributed to the development of more particularist discourses and sectionalist identities. These differences were encouraged by the nature of civil society in the two regions. German civil society was comparatively more rigid and segmented than its British counterpart. Trade unions and political parties in the Ruhr desired harmony and were intolerant of dissent. This stymied pluralist debate and encouraged rivals to break away to form their own associations, rather than work from within. In South Wales, by contrast, pluralist debate was tolerated and even encouraged. This helped contain tendencies that could have otherwise led to splinter groups.

Lifeworld and civil society provided the context in which the organisations sought to create their identities. In the Ruhr these identities were more doctrinal than those in South Wales and were often defined as much by what they were not as what they were. This meant that the discursive practices of the unions and parties served to reinforce social divisions and one ideal of the miner was placed in juxtaposition with another. In South Wales, on the other hand, the identity created was more inclusive. There the discursive dichotomy centred on labour vs. capital. This allowed the creation of a more encompassing identity, reinforcing the comparatively cohesive nature of the Welsh mining communities.

Introduction

This dissertation compares how working-class trade unions and political parties in the coal mining regions of South Wales and the Ruhr area of western Germany discursively constructed identities. In the period between 1871 and 1926, South Wales exhibited a working-class political development, whereby a single union, the South Wales Miners' Federation (SWMF) and one party, the Labour Party, were able gradually to overcome sectionalist loyalties, dominate worker politics and enable a broad based working-class identity to emerge. In the Ruhr region, by contrast, unions and parties representing working-class interests became increasingly fragmented. While all worker unions and political parties present in this region shared certain general beliefs regarding the dignity and rights of workers, the sectionalist worker identities of competing socialist, christian and ethnic organisations prevented one dominant concept of working-class identity, and thus one governing form of working-class politics, from emerging. The work begins with the initial hypothesis that, on a comparative level, South Wales and the Ruhr were characterised during this period by divergent trends, the first by increasing homogeneity, the second by increasing fragmentation. The thesis is therefore concerned with explaining these two different trends.

Both South Wales and the Ruhr were major economic powerhouses of their respective nations, themselves the leading industrialised nations in Europe. Dominated by heavy industry the two regions had an unmistakable proletarian character. As such, both areas have enjoyed considerable attention from historians since the 1970s following the upsurge of interest in labour historiography. Indeed the seventies to the early eighties has been described as an almost 'golden-age' for at least Welsh labour historiography.[1] For both areas the amount of material produced, and still being produced, can only be described as voluminous.

While it has been recognised that Wales 'has been a plurality of cultures',[2] much of the historical literature on South Wales produced in the 1970s and early 1980s presented the South Wales miners' movement as a particularly homogeneous entity. Historians such as, Robin Page Arnot, Hywel Francis and Dai Smith focused upon the development of unionism in their histories of the South Wales Miners' Federation. The SWMF was regarded as so 'intimately associated with its society', that to write separate histories of the union and the mining communities was deemed almost a false dichotomy.[3] The account of Francis and Smith seemed especially to

suggest that the union was almost an organic extension of these communities. The force that bound the individual miners together in these accounts was the shared work experience. The danger the men faced underground from rock-falls, gas explosions and flooding and their subsequent need to co-operate to overcome such adversity engendered a sense of solidarity that did not stop when they left the pit. This feeling was transmuted into, and reinforced by, the myriad associations and organisations ranging from the industrial to the sporting to the political that mushroomed in the mining valleys. Migrants from the English border counties and further afield, who might initially be viewed with hostility, were assimilated with relative ease. Thus the initial disruption and disapproval caused by the arrival of Spanish immigrants in Abercrave gave way to respect for their working skills and their commitment to trade unionism.[4] It has also been argued that this solidarity was not only expressed by the Fed, but also found assertion through the Labour Party from 1909 onwards as the union sent its most promising lights to the Central Labour College (CLC) to return as socialist campaigners.[5]

From the late 1980s there has been a change in the trend of Welsh labour historiography. Admittedly, as argued by Croll, the Welsh variant has been somewhat sheltered from the debates and challenges in England that has accompanied the rise of the 'linguistic turn', a feature that Croll sees as having both advantages and disadvantages. These challenges have often questioned concepts that have been largely taken as given by labour historians, such as class.[6] Historians such as Gareth Stedman Jones, and Patrick Joyce have emphasised the role language and discourse played in creating identities like class.[7] However, although Welsh labour historiography may have so far escaped the post-structural storm, there has been an identifiable move away from the encompassing, general histories of trade unionism with their relatively uncomplicated portrait of societal homogeneity. Increasingly smaller, individual communities have become the objects of historical research and study. Micro-studies have become very much in vogue. Chris Williams's study while not disregarding social and economic factors attempts to move away from simple reductionism in accounting for the rise of the Labour Party in the Rhondda valley and its subsequent exercise of power thorough examination of political languages.[8] Other works have moved away from the traditional areas of unionism and party politics. Michael Lieven's popular history, *Senghennydd: The Universal Pit Village*, gives a complex picture of the inter-play of social relations, especially gender relations.[9] Angela V. John, Dot Jones, and Carol White and Siân Rhiannon Williams have

pursued investigations into the role of women in South Wales,[10] while popular culture has also attracted increasing attention.[11]

The historiography of the miners' movement in the Ruhr has followed a different course. Presented with the existence of several miners' unions and various political parties and the lack of long, drawn-out strikes similar to those that characterised South Wales in the 1920s, the unity of the miners' movement in the Ruhr could not be over-romanticised. Instead the level of violence during the strikes of 1919 and the formation of the Ruhr Red Army in 1920 has been taken to demonstrate the radicalism of the miners. This view has been supported by Jürgen Tampke in his *The Ruhr and Revolution*. In a Marxian account, he argues that prior to the Great War the 'immiseration' of masses of miners led to an increasing alienation from the moderate leadership of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Social Democratic Party, SPD) and the socialist *Alter Verband*. Discontent over the lack of improvement in their conditions following the November Revolution led the rank and file to attempt to impose socialisation of the mines. This was coupled with a defection of the workers' political loyalties from the SPD to the leftist *Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Independent Social Democratic Party, USPD), leading to a severe electoral defeat, both in the Ruhr and elsewhere in Germany, in 1920. Following the reunification of the USPD and SPD the workers turned to the KPD to satisfy their radical goals.[12] For other historians the Ruhr Red Army represented 'the last revolt of a henceforth increasingly resigned working-class'.[13]

However, despite these accounts the radical image of the Ruhr miner has never dominated that region's labour historiography in the same way as the idea of the solidaristic Welsh miner has in South Wales. Due to the more diverse occupational structure of the Ruhr, the exact role the miners played in the radical protest is difficult to determine. For example, a micro-study of one of the most radical areas, Mülheim, claims that the hard-core of industrial militants mostly came from the armament factories.[14] More recently Karin Hartewig in *Das unberechenbare Jahrzehnt* has placed the unrest and violence in the context of the deprivation the miners experienced during the War and the following period of economic instability. This material deterioration coupled with the expectation of improvement led to the articulation of grievances through a variety of social protests ranging from food riots and looting to strikes and seizure of the mines.[15] Other accounts have also concentrated on the miners' lack of solidarity and militancy. Klaus Tenfelde, for

example, argues in his seminal work on the miners that changes in working practices, such as the transition to longwall working, led to a de-skilling of the workforce and a subsequent loss of autonomy and solidarity.[16] Finally, Stephen Hickey's structural account of the trade unionism and politics of Ruhr miners in Wilhelmine Germany concentrates on the disunity of the miners and sets out the various obstacles that stood in the way of the creation of a unified labour movement.[17]

Such accounts, however, are faced with the difficulty of explaining the great strike waves that did occur in the Ruhr. Large-scale strikes afflicted the region in 1889, 1905, 1917, and 1919. In an effort to explain the earlier incidences of industrial unrest, David Crew compares the predisposition of miners and metal workers in the city of Bochum to strike. Utilising the concept of occupational community developed by Seymour M. Lipset, Robert Blauner and G. Salaman,[18] Crew concludes that the miners' shared work experience created just such a community. Individual miners carried this sense of community as they moved from mine to mine and underpinned the episodic incidences of industrial action. On the other hand, the more heterogeneous work structure of the iron and steel factories prevented the formation of such a community, resulting in lower levels of industrial militancy.[19]

Franz-Josef Brüggemeier adopts a different approach. He largely endorses Hickey's account of the difficulties that the activists faced in forming trade unions. However, he seeks to explain the various strikes by looking beyond institutions. Brüggemeier's work is representative of the interest in *Alltagsgeschichte* (the history of everyday life), as opposed to *Strukturgeschichte* (structural social history), that emerged in Germany in the 1980s. While *Strukturgeschichte*, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, concentrated on institutions and impersonal forces, *Alltagsgeschichte* aimed to 'examine working-class "cultures" as well as social "structures", popular "experiences" as well as political "processes"'.[20] Brüggemeier uses working-class cultures as the foundation of his argument. Criticising Crew for the lack of detailed investigation devoted to miners' work underground, he nevertheless stresses it as an important factor in the creation of solidarity.[21] For him the co-operative work of the *Kameradschaft* and their autonomy coupled to the pride the miners felt in their physically demanding world of work provided the basis for collective action.[22] Brüggemeier also looks beyond the workplace to the improvised networks the miners formed as a means of self-help. Two particular manifestations of this informal support structure was the system of lodgers (*Schlafgänger*) and drinking clubs (*Schnappskasinos*).[23] These networks provided the necessary solidarity for the

various strike waves between 1889 and 1919. For Brüggemeier the trade unions and SPD, through their disapproval of these activities, imposed themselves between this informal network and miners, thereby hampering expressions of solidarity.[24]

While the debate on the trade unions in the Ruhr has largely focused on trying to reconcile organisational disunity with the evident solidarity of the strike waves, studies of the political history of the region have been exclusively concerned with explaining fragmentation. In South Wales the Liberal party largely dominated on the parliamentary level in the mining valleys before the Great War, while after the conflict the region became a Labour stronghold. Several parties throughout this period, however, contested the Ruhr, yet none was able to achieve dominance. In seeking to explain the particular political formations in the Ruhr the concept of milieu has often been invoked. Although widely employed in Germany, the concept has not been used extensively in Britain. A key figure in its development has been Rainer Lepsius. Lepsius argues that the stability of the Wilhelmine electoral system was conditioned by the existence of socio-cultural milieux. Based on certain ethnic, religious or political groups, these milieux were made up of dense networks of organisations, including political parties and trade unions. The parties were overt political expression of these various milieux and politics became a ritualised exercise in which each group used its ancillary organisations to turn-out their supporters.[25]

William Claggett *et al.* has developed a somewhat similar analysis, although the notion of milieux is not explicitly used.[26] Examining political cleavages in Wilhelmine Germany, they conclude that, while divisions may come from political leadership, those that have a social base are receptive, 'take on a life of their own' and are prolonged beyond strategic actions.[27] Thus lasting re-orientations of the political system were created by top-down pressure from the state. One such example was the *Kulturkampf* (Struggle of Cultures). This term covered a series of laws that discriminated against the Catholic Church in Germany in the 1870s. In Claggett's analysis this helped consolidate the Catholic minority and provided a support base for the Catholic Centre party that endured long after the laws had lapsed. Similarly, the Anti-Socialist Law, which discriminated against the SPD from 1878 until 1889 helped create a lasting left-right split between the SPD and the other parties.[28]

Both Wolfgang Jäger and Karl Rohe have applied the concept of milieux to politics in the Ruhr specifically. Jäger has argued that the concept of occupational community, used to explain collective action during strikes, does not correspond with voting behaviour. He moves beyond the work place to examine the political-cultures

of local communities. In doing so he identifies four distinct types of milieux, Catholic, social-democratic, communist and national. These could also be further sub-divided into those based upon cottage miners, certain ethnic groups and organisations.[29] For Jäger, like Lepsius, it was these milieux, rather than simple class allegiances, which were the decisive factor in determining how miners voted.

Karl Rohe has pursued a similar argument. Rohe differs slightly from Jäger in that he suggests that while the Centre represented the model of the milieu-type party, the Social Democrats, despite their numerous sporting and cultural associations, represented more of a *Sammlungsbewegung*, or protest movement. The entrenched nature of the Catholic milieu in the Ruhr meant that the SPD was at a disadvantage, despite the predominantly working-class character of the region.[30]

The historiographies of South Wales and the Ruhr, therefore, share some similarities in outline, but are also characterised by some distinct differences in detail. From the 1970s interest on both coalfields concentrated on the labour movement. However, while in South Wales emphasis was placed on the unity of the movement, in the Ruhr it was concentrated on explaining its division and weakness. Moreover, the notion of milieux has not been widely used as an explanatory framework in South Wales. Since the late 1980s, however, interest has moved away from the institutions of the labour movement towards more cultural aspects of the two regions. In some respects, elements of *Alltagsgeschichte*, such as the concern with everyday culture, experiences and oral history, have already become well established in Welsh historiography, although without the debate that has accompanied its growth in Germany. On the other hand, the emphasis on language and discourse that Croll has identified since the 'linguistic turn' in England, seems not to have become widespread in either Welsh or German historiography.

None of the foregoing works has attempted to place the two coalfields into a comparative perspective. While comparative history affords historians the opportunity to test explanatory frameworks applied to one national context, it also throws up several difficulties. Some of these are of a logistical nature, such as language and differences in the sources. South Wales, for example, has a rich store of local lodge records, while in Germany they are limited to the annual reports produced by the central executives. On the other hand, the German employers' organisations and regional governments were diligent in their retention of records and reports on the labour movement, while a more haphazard approach seems to characterise the Welsh employers and local authorities.

On a theoretical level, there are difficulties in integrating two very different historiographical traditions. In some respects the present work breaks with recent trends in that it moves away from the local studies and returns to a more general view of the history of miners' movements. While these accounts quite rightly question the old certainties that surround previous works and provide a deeper understanding of the complexity of the mining communities, their usefulness for cross-regional comparisons that seek to find a more comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the development of such movements are more limited. This may disturb some practitioners of micro-history, but a cross-regional comparison requires a regional perspective for both its subjects. While the caveats and the qualifications raised by local studies should be respected, to attempt to account for every difference between every community would risk reducing any work to an atomised account of local peculiarities.

A third problem revolves around reconciling the various theoretical frameworks that have already been used for the South Wales and Ruhr coalfields. Superficially, the concept of milieux as applied to Germany might appear to provide a good explanatory framework for both the Ruhr and South Wales. Such an argument might suggest that socio-political fragmentation in the Ruhr was due to the existence of several milieux, while homogenisation in South Wales was based on a single, dominant milieu. However, as Claggett has emphasised, these political cleavages required state pressure. While Wilhelmine Germany provides a model of how these milieux could be formed, similar top-down pressures are not observable in South Wales in the same period. However, the concept is clearly important for the Ruhr and cannot be lightly abandoned.

On the other hand, the study of miners is replete with theories that can be applied to comparative history. Perhaps the best known is Clark Kerr's and Abraham Siegel's 'isolated mass' hypothesis. The authors explain miners' propensity for industrial militancy by emphasising the supposedly isolated and homogenous nature of mining communities. The lack of mediating forces and social mobility, therefore, predisposes the miners to industrial action.[31] This view has been criticised by G. V. Rimlinger for ignoring the cultural context in which the miners operated. Rimlinger himself agrees that miners tend towards labour solidarity and industrial aggressiveness because of their dangerous work. However, such tendencies are mediated by socio-cultural factors. Replacing the 'isolated mass' with the 'separatist group', he argues that strike propensity and social integration must be examined

within their historical context.[32] Finally, as already noted, the notion of occupational community has been used by several historians of the Ruhr. However, the occupational community theory does not allow for a clear picture differentiation of division within the mining community.[33] As will be shown mining communities in the Ruhr were deeply divided across lines of ethnicity and religion. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches, M. I. Bulmer suggests an eight-point ideal-type for the 'traditional mining community', which combines elements of all three theories. Thus the ideal mining community was characterised by:

1) Physical isolation
2) Economic predominance of mining
3) The nature of the work as dangerous but also a source of pride
4) Occupational homogeneity and isolation
5) Communal leisure activities with workmates
6) Sharp gender segregation/division of labour in the family. Sons tend to follow their fathers into the mines, while daughters marry miners
7) Economic/political conflicts of interest between owners and miners
8) A combination of all the above factors[34]

The above works have been theoretical. David Gilbert in his *Class, Community and Collective Action: Social Change in Two British Coalfields, 1850-1926*, however, has sought to apply some of these theories within a comparative framework. Using three sociological models of collective action, Gilbert examines the link between community and collective action in South Wales and Nottinghamshire.[35] He reaches the conclusion that the 'the nature of collective action is heavily dependent upon the nature of the community'.[36] In the South Wales industrial villages the SWMF lodges effectively marginalised the supra-regional coal-companies in the local community, while in Nottinghamshire the smaller owners retained their power base.[37] Therefore, the development and structure of these local societies were of paramount importance for sustaining the collective action necessary to maintain the lengthy strikes of the 1920s. However, although he includes chapters on the South Wales and the Nottinghamshire coalfields in general, the work remains mainly a micro-study focusing on the communities of Ynysybwl and Hucknall.

The 'isolated mass' hypothesis has been revitalised in modified form by Roy Church and Quentin Outram.[38] Church and Outram utilise Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity and the idea of a constructed solidarity to examine strike action in British coalfields. They argue that constructed solidarity was used at national and local levels to sustain strikes by threatening those who deviated from the aims of the union or community with exclusion.[39] However, although Church and Outram

exhaustively compare strike propensity between British regions, their cross-national comparison is limited to a survey chapter. In the case of Germany they, like Hickey, highlight the heterogeneity of the Ruhr mining workforce in terms of ethnicity and religion to explain the lack of partial strikes.[40]

Robert Fagge and Werner Berg have both attempted explicitly cross-regional and cross-national comparatives. In his *Power, Culture and Conflict in the Coalfields* Fagge investigates patterns of protest in the mining communities of West Virginia and South Wales between 1900 and 1922. The work has some parallels with Gilbert's in that it stresses the importance of the 'nature of culture and community' and the power relations within them as explanations for patterns of protest.[41] He sees the West Virginia communities as culturally fragmented along lines of ethnicity and religion, a feature encouraged by coal owners.[42] On the other hand the issues of ethnicity and religion were not so divisive in South Wales.[43]

Werner Berg, while noting the importance of social factors, focuses more upon the differing patterns of industrialisation as an explanation for the constellation of different interest groups, both of employers and workers.[44] Berg argues that the different industrial formations led to different proletarian formations. The creation of the industrial pit village in South Wales led to a 'purer type of working-class' as various aspects of workers' lives were under the control of the workers themselves, while the more urban communities of the Ruhr miners were subject to 'foreign social (and state) control'.[45] This work shared similarities with Gilbert in that it stresses the control the miners had of the social arena in South Wales, while in the Ruhr they were subject to outside influences, under which the employers can presumably be placed. However, his work leaves less room for individual agency than Gilbert does. The relatively greater influence of the workers themselves in the Welsh pit villages was the result of the distinctive pattern of industrialisation that shaped those communities. In this light his work seems somewhat reductionist. However, it does recognise the influence that institutions that stood outside the labour movement could have upon workers' attempts at combination.

Both Roger Fagge and Berg's work remain, however, anchored in structural explanations of protest and trade union development. While the importance of these structural explanations is apparent, it is the contention of this work that they do not provide a complete picture. The social structures of the mining communities in another American coalfield, Pennsylvania, were as diverse (if not more so) than those of West Virginia and the Ruhr. Yet despite this, one dominant union in the form of the

United Mineworkers of America (UMA) was able to emerge.[46] This suggests that theoretical frameworks that rely on social diversity alone as a means of explanation of trade union and political development do not give a fully rounded picture.

How then can we integrate these theories and the existing historiographies? This work attempts to bring these ideas together through three interrelated concepts: Jürgen Habermas's concept of the lifeworld, constructed identity and civil society. Using the work of Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann,[47] Habermas argues that the lifeworld is made up of 'more or less, diverse background convictions'[48] The lifeworld, therefore, represents a stock of interpretative patterns, a set of common assumptions, of taken-for-grantedness, that cannot be transcended.[49] Moreover this 'cultural tradition shared by a community is constitutive of the lifeworld, which the individual member finds already interpreted. This intersubjectively shared *lifeworld* forms the background for communicative action.'[50] Habermas sees the lifeworld as intersubjective since others inhabit it. The lifeworld provides the set of common assumptions, which provides the background for individuals when they engage in communicative action.

The links between milieux and the lifeworld might at first seem unclear. Habermas has insisted that the concept of lifeworld cannot be used to define social stratification. However, Stefan Berger, in his comparison of South Wales and the Ruhr, has synthesised both the ideas of milieux and lifeworld. He argues that the existence of various milieux in the Ruhr entailed a more fragmentary lifeworld. On the other hand, the more synchronous lifeworld of the Welsh miner encouraged a greater organisational unity.[51] However, this work is based mainly on secondary literature. This thesis seeks to build on Berger's analysis and deepen our understanding through the examination of primary material for both areas. By examining how trade unions and political parties engaged in communicative action as organisations offers a fruitful avenue through which to approach the divergent developmental tendencies in South Wales and the Ruhr. This approach has the advantage of accepting the importance of the structural context in which organisations were formed, but also emphasises the role union and party activists played in their creation and maintenance.

Leading on from the lifeworld, the present work seeks to approach the communicative action of the trade unions through an examination of their discursive construction of identity. Christopher Johnson has examined the link between lifeworld and discourse. This notion of the constructed identity recognises the unions as active

in creating such an identity, an ideal of the miner to which they aspired. Such identities were used as a banner for recruitment and an ideological weapon. In some respects, this concept has similarities to Church's and Outram's constructed solidarity, but while they were mainly concerned with explaining collective action during strikes constructed identity has wider ramifications. These constructed identities often held up an image of the miner as he should be and can be seen as stemming from the wider spheres of both work and community. The extent to which the miners actually identified with these ideological constructions determined the success of their appeal. By utilising the idea of constructed identity the thesis returns some agency to the activists of the political parties and the unions.

In its examination of the political discourses of the trade unions and the political parties in the coalfields, this thesis aims to respond to Croll's appeal for an engagement with the postmodern in Welsh labour historiography.[52] The postmodern historian Patrick Joyce, for example, has recognised the important role organisations played in shaping social identities. Joyce argues that the 'ideology and practice of the unions played a central role in creating popular conceptions of the social order, particularly class perceptions. Union discourse was more than the reflection of the workers' worlds. It actively shaped it.'[53] However, although the present work is concerned with discourses, it does not go as far as Joyce does in disassociating it from materialism. Indeed, Joyce accuses labour history of indulging in a 'fetishisation of "the material"'.[54] More recent work has tried to find a medium between structure and discourse.[55] In fact, even before the publication of Joyce's *Visions*, Donald Reid argued for an integration of the 'linguistic turn' and the older social history.[56] Meanwhile, Christopher Johnson, although writing from a materialist perspective, acknowledges criticisms of economic determinism. However, he also warns of the dangers of the 'linguistic turn'. He suggests that Habermas's concept of lifeworld provides a way of linking workers' culture and the structural forces that shape it.[57] In the thesis, therefore, discourse is seen as an on-going effort to understand and interpret the world. Attempts at 'making sense' raise the possibility of myriad, sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary, interpretations. Thus, organisational fragmentation or homogenisation was not simply a reflection of the social divisions or the lack of them. In fact, there was a more complex relationship between societal structures and organisations.

Habermas also provides the link with the final explanatory factor used in this thesis, that is the nature of civil society in Britain and Germany during this period.

There is an overlap between the idea of civil society and Habermas' public sphere. Both describe the space in which voluntary associations exist. While Habermas used an idealised concept of the public sphere as a means of social critique, Geoff Eley argues that in modified form the idea provides a useful analytical tool for the historian. Instead of the ideal public sphere, where rational communication could be pursued on a free and equal participatory basis, Eley suggests that it was a contested site. Access was denied or restricted on grounds of class, ethnicity, religion and gender. For Eley this competition involved issues of power.[58] The various trade unions and political parties examined in this work can, therefore, be seen as engaged in competition to dominate this public sphere.

However, the trade unions and political parties in the two coalfields were not acting in a vacuum. The way they constructed and expressed identity was influenced by the nature of the civil society in which they operated. Nancy J. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post define civil society as the realm of pluralism, but argue that 'we can in fact range pluralist societies along a spectrum from the fluid to the rigidly segmented'. The crucial feature of a fluid civil society is that membership of more than one group is possible. On the other hand, in a segmented civil society 'groups are more inclined to see membership as mutually exclusive and to be hostile to the idea of plural identities and multiple, overlapping membership'.[59] Significantly, Rosenblum and Post also argue that 'within civil society identity is always specific. Identity springs from contingencies of socialization and from choice; it is not the product of a single and unified design. It comes from participation in particular groups and associations, and is not imposed uniformly upon all by the state.'[60] This emphasis on the role that voluntary group membership plays in forming identity is important in that it avoids the danger of sociological determinism that accompanies the idea of milieu. Rosenblum and Post, therefore, allow for both structural factors and for agency.

Frank Trentmann has applied work on civil society (and the public sphere) to both British and German history. In the introduction to *Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British History*, Trentmann, like Eley, rejects the idea of an idealised sphere of rational communication. Instead, he focuses on issues of exclusion and inclusion in civil society. He also stresses, in contrast to much German historiography, that civil society was not the preserve of the *Bürgertum*, or middle class.[61] Lack of space precludes a discussion of the different civil societies in Germany and Britain. However, the collection of essays in Trentmann's edited volume suggests that Germany tended towards a more segmented

civil society, while in Britain it was more fluid. Daniel A. Macmillan's study of gymnastic associations, for example, stresses how the boundary between civil society and the state were blurred. Parties and associations in Wilhelmine Germany acted under the assumption that the state and civil society should coexist in harmony and that civil society should be harmoniously united behind a single party. Each group's expectation of harmony made organisations intolerant of pluralist debate.[62] Trentmann's examination of the Free Trade movement in Britain, on the other hand, focuses on its belief in the separation of civil society and the political system.[63]

The work aims to show how the discursive practices of the trade unions and political parties was crucial in reinforcing and perpetuating the processes of homogenisation in South Wales and fragmentation in the Ruhr. Using the three-fold explanation outlined here (lifeworld, constructed identity and the nature of civil society) the thesis seeks to integrate both concerns with structure and discourse. The lifeworld provides the cultural background to the discursive construction of identity by trade unions and political parties, while at the same accommodating the greater societal diversity in the Ruhr. The discourse of the trade unions and political parties was moreover mediated through the different nature of civil societies. Two of the subsequent chapters, therefore, concentrate on the issue of lifeworld and civil society. The remaining three chapters examine the discourse of the trade unions and parties. As such they focus mainly on materials published by the organisations, such as newspapers and leaflets, and the speeches made by activists. Since identities are more strongly drawn during periods of conflict, I have focused on literature produced during industrial disputes and elections. Generally, I have concentrated on literature produced within the regions. Unfortunately, the communist newspapers in the Ruhr were often banned, and those that do exist are fragmentary. Therefore, much of the examination of the KPD discourse relies on flyers and handbills. Finally, in the case of the Ruhr the work focuses on discourse of the two main German trade unions and largely excludes the Polish union. This is entirely due to the failings of the author. An examination of the Polish union's discourse awaits a better linguist.

Chapter one provides a brief history of the socio-economic development of the two coalfields up to 1914. It contrasts the synchronous nature of the Welsh miners' lifeworld with the fragmented lifeworld of the Ruhr miners. It also highlights how civil society was more fluid in South Wales, while in the Ruhr, with its various milieux, it was comparatively more segmented. Chapter two examines the development of the various trade unions before 1914. The emphasis here is placed on

how the SWMF was able to create a comparatively inclusive, flexible identity due to its acceptance of internal, pluralist debate. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the attempts to enforce harmony within the trade unions resulted in the creation of exclusive, more doctrinal identities. Chapter three turns to the political sphere and, like the preceding chapter, focuses on the discursive construction of identities. Chapter four returns to the issue of lifeworld and structure and investigates how the war and post-war events impacted upon the it and civil society. It argues that in South Wales there was a greater continuity in the lifeworld, while in the Ruhr increased fragmentation through mechanisation and rationalisation. In general it also shows that the Welsh miners made some significant advances during the war, while the Ruhr miners were unable to capitalise on labour shortages. Chapter five combines an examination of both trade union and party political discourse. Nationalisation and socialisation were key issues in both coalfields after the war. However, while nationalisation received broad support among the Welsh miners, in the Ruhr the idea of socialisation was contested by different sections of the labour movement. The Conclusion brings together the main arguments of this thesis to provide a revised understanding of the nature of trade union and party political development in the two regions, one which accepts the important role of both structural factors and activists' discourse.

---

[1] Andy Croll, "'People's Remembrancers' in a post-modern age: contemplating the non-crisis of Welsh Labour History", *Llafur*, 8, 1, 2000, p. 5.
[2] David Smith (ed.) *A People and a Proletariat: Essays in the History of Wales 1780-1980*, London, Pluto Press, 1980, p. 14.
[3] Hywel Francis and Dai Smith, *The Fed: A History of the South Wales Miners in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd ed., Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998 (first published 1980). p. xvi.
[4] Ibid. pp. 11-12
[5] R. Page Arnot, *South Wales Miners, Glowyr De Cymru: A History of the South Wales Miners' Federation, 1898-1914*, vol. 1, London:, George Allen & Unwin, 1967, p. 375.
[6] Croll, 'Remembrancers', p. 5.
[7] Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; Patrick Joyce, *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
[8] Chris Williams, *Democratic Rhondda: Politics and Society, 1885-1951*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1996, pp. 7-9.
[9] Michael Lieven, *Senghennydd: The Universal Pit Village, 1890-1930*, Llandysul, Gomer, 1994.
[10] See Angela V. John (ed.) *Our Mothers' Land: chapters in Welsh Women's History, 1830-1939* Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1991; Angela V. John 'A miner struggle? Women's protests in Welsh mining history' *Llafur*, 4, 1, 1984; Dot Jones 'Serfdom and slavery: women's work in Wales 1890-1930' in Deian R. Hopkin and Gregory S. Kealey (eds.) *Class, Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada*, Aberystwyth, Llafur/CCLH, 1989, pp. 86-100 and Carol White and Siân Rhiannon Williams (eds.) *Struggle or Starve: Women's Lives in the South Wales Valleys Between the Two World Wars*, Dinas Powys, Honno, 1998.
[11] In fact Dai Smith has also been a prominent figure in the study of popular culture in South Wales. See Dai Smith, *Wales! Wales?* London, Allen & Unwin, 1984; Dai Smith, *Aneurin Bevan and the World of South Wales*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1993; Gareth Williams, *1905 and All That: Essays on Rugby Football, Sport and Welsh Society*, Llandysul, Gomer, 1991. See also Andy Croll,

Civilizing the Urban: Popular Culture, Public Space and Urban Meaning in Merthyr, c. 1870-1914, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000.

[12] Jürgen Tampke, *The Ruhr and Revolution: The Revolutionary Movement in the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Region, 1912-1919*, Croon Helm, London, 1979, pp. 160-1. See also Jürgen Tampke, "Die Sozialisierungbewegung im Steinkohlenbergbau an der Ruhr" in Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf, (eds.), *Glück auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, Bund-Verlag, Köln, 1979, pp. 225-248.

[13] Hans Mommsen, *Aufstieg und Untergang der Republik von Weimar, 1918-1933*, Propyläen Taschenbuch, München, 2001, p. 115.

[14] Irmgard Steinisch, "Linksradikalismus und Rätebewegung im westlichen Ruhrgebiet. Die revolutionären Auseinandersetzungen in Mülheim an der Ruhr" in Reinhard Rürup (ed.), *Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet. Studien zur Geschichte der Revolution 1918/1919*, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1975, pp. 217-19.

[15] Karin Hartewig, *Das unberechenbare Jahrzehnt: Bergarbeiter und ihre Familien im Ruhrgebiet 1914-1924*, München, Beck, 1993, pp. 318-321.

[16] Klaus Tenfelde, *Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr im 19. Jahrhundert*, Bonn, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1977. See also Klaus Tenfelde, 'Der bergmännische Arbeitsplatz während der Hochindustrialisierung 1890-1914 in W. Conze and U. Engelhardt (eds.) *Arbeiter im Industrialisierungsprozeß*, Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1979, pp. 283-335.

[17] Stephen Hickey, *Workers in Imperial Germany: The Miners of the Ruhr*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1985.

[18] See Seymour M. Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, *Union Democracy: The Inside Politics of the International Typographical Union*, New York, Free Press, 1977; Robert Blauner, 'Work Satisfaction and Industrial Trends in Modern Society'. In *Labor and Trade Unionism: An Interdisciplinary Reader*, ed. Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset, New York, London, John Wiley and Sons Inc, 1960, 339-60; G. Salaman, 'Some Sociological Determinants of Occupational Communities', *Sociological Review* 19, no. 1 (1971), 53-77.

[19] David F. Crew, *Town in the Ruhr: A Social History of Bochum, 1860-1914*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 186-93.

[20] David F. Crew, '*Alltagsgeschichte*: A New Social History "from Below"?', *CEH* 22, no. 3/4 (1989), p. 395. For more on the debate between *Strukturgeschichte* and *Alltagsgeschichte* see Roger Fletcher, 'History from Below Comes to Germany: The New History Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany', *JMH* 60, no. 3 (1988), 557-68; William L. Patch, 'German Social History and Labor History: A Troubled Partnership', *JMH* 56, no. 3 (1984), 483-98; Peter Schöttler, 'Historians and Discourse Analysis', *History Workshop* 27, spring (1989), 37-68; Geoff Eley, 'Labor History. Social History, *Alltagsgeschichte*: Experience, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday - a New Direction for German Social History', *JMH* 61, no. 2 (1989), 296-343.

[21] Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort: Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau, 1889-1919*, München, Verlag C. H Beck, 1984, p. 79.

[22] Ibid. pp. 136-41. See also Detlev Peukert, 'Industrialisierung des Bewußteins? Arbeitserfahrugen von Ruhrbergleuten im 20. Jahrhundert' in Klaus Tenfelde (ed.) *Arbeit und Arbeitserfahrung in der Geschichte*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1986.

[23] See Franz Josef Brüggemeier and Lutz Niethammer, 'Schlafgänger, Schnapskasinos und schwerindustrielle Kolonie. Aspekte der Arbeiterwohnungsfrage im Ruhrgebiet vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke & Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, pp. 135-76; Franz Josef Brüggemeier, 'Soziale Vagabundage oder revolutionär Heros? Zur Sozialgeschichte der Ruhrbergarbeiter 1880-1920'. In *Lebenserfahrung und kollektive Gedächtnis. Die Praxis der >>Oral History<<*, ed. Lutz Niethammer, Franfurt am Main, Syndikat, 1980, pp. 193-213.

[24] Brüggemeier, *Leben*. For a concise overview of these various accounts of miners' unionism in the Ruhr see Geoff Eley, 'History' *JMH*, 61, pp. 328-35.

[25] Rainer Lepsius, 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der Deutschen Gesellschaft'. In *Die Deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter, Köln, 1973, pp. 56-80.

[26] William Claggett, Jeffrey Loesch, W. Phillips Shively and Ronald Snell, 'Political Leadership and the Development of Political Cleavages: Imperial Germany, 1871-1912', *AJPS* 26 (1982), pp. 643-64.

[27] Ibid, pp. 652-3.

[28] Ibid, pp. 657-9.

[29] Wolfgang Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus und Parteien im Ruhrgebiet: Zum Wahlverhalten des katholischen Bergarbeitermilieus bis 1933*, München, C. H. Beck, 1996.

[30] See Karl Rohe, Wolfgang Jäger, Uwe Dorow, 'Politische Gesellschaft und politische Kultur' in Wolfgang Köllmann *et al.* (eds.) *Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter: Geschichte und Entwicklung*,

vol. 2, Düsseldorf, 1990, Karl Rohe, 'Katholiken. Protestanten und Sozialdemokraten im Ruhrgebiet vor 1914. Voraussetzungen und Grundlagen 'konfessionellen' und 'klassenbewußten' Wählens in einer Industrieregion' in Karl Rohe, *Vom Revier zum Ruhrgebiet: Wahlen, Parteien, Politische Kultur*, Essen 1986, pp. 43-59.

[31] Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, 'The Interdisciplinary Propensity to Strike - an International Comparison'. In *Patterns of Industrial Conflict*, ed. Robert Dubin, Arthur Kornhauser and Arthur M. Ross, New York, Toronto, London, McGraw Hill, 1954, pp. 189-212.

[32] G. V. Rimlinger, 'International Differences in the Strike-Propensity of Coal Miners: Experience in Four Countries', *Industrial and Labour Revolutions Review* (1959), pp. 389-405.

[33] M. I. Bulmer, 'Sociological Models of the Mining Community', *Sociological Review* 23, no. 1 (1975), p. 83. Bulmer also provides a general overview of the isolated mass and separatist group theories.

[34] Bulmer, 'Models', pp. 85-8.

[35] David Gilbert, *Class, Community and Collective Action: Social Change in Two British Coalfields, 1850-1926*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992. The theories considered are Kerr and Siegal's isolated mass theory, Mancur Olson's theory of small groups and Craig Calhoun's communal collective action. He provides a full discussion of these approaches in chapter 2.

[36] Ibid, p. 258.

[37] Ibid, pp. 247-51.

[38] Roy Church and Quentin Outram, *Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in Britain, 1889-1966*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 132-5.

[39] Church and Outram, *Strikes*, p. 115

[40] Ibid, p. 247.

[41] Robert Fagge, *Power, Culture and Conflict in the Coalfields: West Virginia and South Wales, 1900-1922*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 6.

[42] Ibid, pp. 66-72.

[43] Ibid, pp. 77-83.

[44] See Werner Berg, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland und Großbritannien im Übergang zum 'organisierten Kapitalismus': Unternehmer, Angestellte, Arbeiter und Staat im Steinkohlenbergbau des Ruhrgebietes und von Südwales, 1850-1914*, Berlin, Duncker und Humblodt, 1984, and ibid 'Zwei Typen industriegesellschaftlicher Modernisierung: Die Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet und in Südwales im 19. Jahrhundert und frühen 20. Jahrhundert' in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), *Bergbau in Großbritannien und im Ruhrgebiet. Studies zur vergleichen Geschichte des Bergbaus 1850-1930*, Bochum, Bockmeyer, 1985, pp. ?.

[45] Berg, 'Zwei Typen', p218.

[46] Perry Blatz, *Democratic Miners: Work and Labour Relations in the Anthracite Coal Industry 1875-1925*, Albany, University of New York Press, 1994; Harold Aurand, *From Molly Maguires to the United Mineworkers*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1971.

[47] Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Lifeworld*, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristam Engelhardt, London, Heinemann, 1974.

[48] Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984, p. 70.

[49] Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, pp. 131-3.

[50] Habermas, *Theory*, 1984, pp. 82.

[51] Stefan Berger, 'Working-class Culture and the Labour Movement in the South-Wales and the Ruhr Coalfields: A Comparison', *Llafur*, 8, no. 2, 2001, pp. 5-40.

[52] Croll, 'Remembrancers', pp. 14-17.

[53] Joyce, *Visions*, p. 137.

[54] Patrick Joyce, 'Refabricating labour history; or, from labour history to the history of labour', *LHR*, 62, 2, (1997), pp. 147-52.

[55] See Neville Kirk, 'In Defence of Class: A Critique of Recent Revisionist Writing upon the Nineteenth-Century English Working Class', *IRSH*, 32 (1987), 2-47; Neville Kirk, 'History and Post-Modernism: A Materialist View', *SH*, 19, no. 2 (1994), 221-40; John Belchem, 'Reconstructing labour history', *LHR*, 62, 3, (1997), pp. 318-23; Neville Kirk and John Belchem (eds.), *Languages of Labour*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997; Jon Lawrence, *Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England 1867-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; James Vernon, *Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, 1815-1867*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. For an overview see Andy Croll, 'The Impact of Postmodernism on British Social History', *Mitteilungsblatt*, 27, (2002), pp. 137-52.

[56] Donald Reid 'Reflections on Labor History and Language'. In *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis*, ed. Lenard R. Berlanstein, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1993, 39-54.
[57] Christoher H. Johnson, 'Lifeworld, System, and Communicative Action: The Habermasian Alternative in Social History'. In *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis*, edited by Lenarch R. Berlanstein, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1993, pp. 55-89.
[58] Geoff Eley, 'Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century'. In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Cambridge, Mass. and London, MIT Press, 1992, pp. 289-339.
[59] Nancy J. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post, 'Introduction'. In *Civil Society and Government*, ed. Nancy J. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 4-5.
[60] Ibid, p. 7.
[61] Frank Trentmann, 'Introduction'. In *Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives on Modern German and British History*, ed. Frank Trentmann, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2000, pp. 3-46.
[62] Daniel A. Macmillan, 'Energy, Willpower and Harmony. On the Problematic Relationship between State and Civil Society in Nineteenth-Century Germany'. In *Paradoxes*, ed. Frank Trentmann, pp. 176-98.
[63] Trentmann, 'Civil Society, Commerce, and the "Citizen-Consumer". Popular Meanings of Free Trade in Modern Britain'. In *Paradoxes*, ed. Frank Trentmann, pp. 306-31.

Chapter One

The Growth of the Coal Industries, 1850-1914

> 'you could look at every door, and you'd see a miner coming out. And that miner and his family would know every person that lived in the village. They went to the same chapels, or to the same pub, and they always met in the pub and in the chapel'
> Thomas Nicholas[1]

> 'Everywhere one sees Slavic faces and hears [Slavic] voices beat against one's ear.'
> Lorenz Pieper in his examination of the mining communities in the Ruhr.[2]

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the coal industries in both the Ruhr and South Wales up to 1914. It aims to investigate the social structures that provided the backdrop against which the trade unions and political parties worked. By examining the social context in which activists operated it also seeks to throw light on the nature of the lifeworld in the two areas. First, it examines the growth of the industries through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, where the necessary capital investment came from, the markets that production supplied and the organisation of the employers. Secondly, it investigates the miners' experiences of work and the potential that existed for conflict and for expressions of solidarity. Finally, the social structures of the mining communities and the types of civil societies are examined and compared with reference to the degree of cohesiveness they exhibited.

King Coal: The Expansion of Mining

The period after the revolutions of 1848 has been regarded as one of almost unrestrained capitalist growth. Even those obstacles that remained were to be overcome by the inexorable advance of economic and industrial growth.[3] Among this frenetic activity the opening of the coalfields of South Wales and the Ruhr stand out as paragons of industrialisation. The latter formed part of Germany's generally swift industrialisation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, although Britain as a whole experienced a far longer period of industrialisation, the growth of the South Wales coalfield was remarkable in that, from its beginnings in the 1850s, it was to achieve a dominant position in the world coal trade. Its exports alone constituted almost 33 percent of total world coal exports between 1890 and 1910.[4]

Small-scale coal mining had been pursued in South Wales and the Ruhr prior to the massive investment of capital that the second half of the nineteenth century introduced. In South Wales, coal production in the first half of the nineteenth century largely fuelled the growth of the metal industries centred on Merthyr.[5] Similarly, early Ruhr coal production fuelled the small iron industries along the Ruhr and the growing industrial empire of the Krupp dynasty in Essen.[6]

Advances in technologies prompted the growth of the coal industry as they allowed access to deeper seams through deep mines. In South Wales this precipitated a movement from the slopes of the valleys to concentration on the valley floors, while in the Ruhr capitalists were able to begin exploitation of the seams in the Emscher basin, north of the river Ruhr owing to advances in ventilation and drainage.[7] Wilhelm Brephol divides the Ruhr into several zones, the oldest running along the banks of the river Ruhr itself. From the 1840s, as new mines were opened, the coalfield advanced northwards to embrace the Hellweg, Emscher and Vest.[8] In the 1850s there were several pits sunk around the town of Bochum following initial sinking of the *Präsident* pit in 1841.[9] In South Wales the sale-coal industry initially developed in Aberdare between 1837 to 1862, but it was really from the 1860s onwards that it really took off with sinkings in the Rhondda, followed by the Ogwr in the late sixties and the Garw in the seventies. 1900 saw the Sirhowy, Bargoed, Rhymney and Maesteg areas as the frontiers of the industry.[10] By 1913 the number of mines in South Wales had reached 485 and the workforce numbered 233,134. In the Ruhr there were 167 mines with a workforce of 394,569 in the same year.[11] Comparison of the regions' total output of coal demonstrates the expansion of the industry.

Table 1.1: Average Output of Coal in the Ruhr and South Wales per annum

Ruhr		South Wales	
Year	Output (in 000 tons)	Year	Output (millions of tons)
1888-92	35,511	1891-95	31.5
1908-12	88,317	1911-14	52.8

Source: N. J. G. Pounds, *A Historical Geography of Europe, 1800-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 362; Walters, *Economic*, p. 6.

The figures reveal that South Wales led the Ruhr in coal production through most of the nineteenth century, but gradually the latter region challenged and overtook this lead. By 1912 Britain and Germany together overwhelmingly dominated European production of coal.[12]

In both areas the expansion of the industry was left in private hands. In Britain the doctrine of *laissez faire* economic activity was firmly established by the time the South Wales coalfield was opened. On the other hand, in the Ruhr government control over the coalmines was only relinquished in 1865. Previously, the mines had been run under the principle of the *Direktionsprinzip*, whereby the state officials controlled conditions and wages. Liberalisation, however, should not suggest that the new generation of capitalists were left with an entirely free hand in the running of their industries. In Britain, Acts of Parliaments limited the use of child and female labour in the mines.[13] Furthermore, the Mineworkers' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), to which the South Wales Miners' Federation (SWMF) had affiliated in 1899, successfully pursued a campaign for an eight hour day, which was introduced on 21 December 1908, despite the resistance of employers.[14] Similarly, in the Ruhr in 1905, the German Government accepted appeals made by striking miners to amend the mining laws so as to limit the length of shifts and introduce compulsory workers' committees.[15] However, despite instances of interference by the state the coalowners were generally left to be 'masters in their own house', or 'Herr im Haus', a position that they were to guard jealously against any incursion by trade unions throughout this period.

The capital investment necessary for the sinking of new pits came from a variety of sources. In South Wales solo enterprises where individuals invested resources accumulated in other operations were relatively rare. Samuel Thomas's mining concerns represents an example of this type of capital formation as he raised his money from shopkeeping interests. More common were consortia or partnerships of wealthy individuals, one example being the Ocean Coal Company. Meanwhile, in the Ruhr, capital was largely raised during the first half of the nineteenth century from small, local investors. The abolition of the *Direktionsprinzip* and the new technologies required to exploit the deeper seams led to increasing capital demands. This led to a shift away from the resident *Mittelstand* to the banks as a source of investment and a consequent growth of banking influence in the industry. In both areas increasing costs led joint-stock companies (*Aktiengesellschaft*) gradually to displace family concerns although some, such as Krupp, retained large coal interests.[16] The establishment of these companies has been regarded as vitally important for the emergence of Germany as a major European economic force during the nineteenth century, as they facilitated the modernisation of certain sectors, including coal and

iron production.[17] However, the sale of shares to create these joint-stock companies should not be regarded as creating some form of share-holding 'democracy'. 'Public subscription', that is the purchasing of shares by the public at large, was rare, as shares were sold and bought in large denominations beyond the reach of small investors.[18] Both Welsh and German industrialists also generated investment by ploughing back profits into their enterprises.[19]

Despite the parallels in their growth the coal produced by these two industries generally found its way to different markets. The expansion of the industry in South Wales marked a departure from previous production as coal came to be regarded as an export commodity in itself. When John Nixon, a man who later became a major coal owner in his own right, arrived in Nantyglo in 1839 seeking an appointment at the combined ironworks and colliery of Mr Crawshay Bailey, he found that the output of the mine was a mere 250 tons a day.[20] On his second visit to South Wales Nixon came specifically seeking coal, 'a supply of black diamonds' for which he was convinced he had found a market in France.[21] Thus the mines increasingly moved away from production for the local ironworks to enterprises based on sale-coal, although some firms, such Guest, Keen and Nettleford of Dowlais, continued to operate mines to serve the fuel requirements of their iron and steel works. As an exporting region the South Wales industry benefited from its proximity to the Bristol Channel and favourable freight rates. While Welsh coal needed only to be transported 25 miles to reach the point of export, Ruhr coal had to travel some 150 miles.[22] The Ruhr coal companies had access to river transport, but shipments of coal on the River Ruhr actually decreased from the 1860s onwards.[23] Furthermore, although both geological areas contained different types of coal, much of South Wales' production was 'steam' coal. The industry capitalised upon the increasing use of steam power and was given a further boost when it became the favoured fuel of the British Admiralty.

The export of Welsh coal was facilitated by the growth of Newport, Cardiff and Barry docks.[24] The construction of these docks provides an example of how the coal industry in Wales ushered in and supported a host of ancillary industries such as shipping and railways. Table 1.2 demonstrates the dependence of the South Wales coal industry upon exports.

Table 1.2: Percentage of South Wales Coal Output as Export

Year	Output (millions of tons)	Export (millions of tons)	Percentage
1895	33	14.7	44
1905	43.2	20	47
1913	56.8	29.9	53

Source: Asteris, 'Rise', p. 27.

By 1913 some 41.8 percent of total British exports originated from Bristol Channel ports.[25]

By contrast the Ruhr coal industry was far less export-oriented. Overseas export amounted to only about half a million tons by 1913, largely due to fierce British competition, although there was trade with neighbouring countries such as France and Belgium.[26] Instead production largely served other German heavy industries. More than 85 percent of production was destined for internal markets.[27] For the industrialists of the Ruhr the export market only really became significant when domestic prices slumped.[28] The growth of the iron and steel industries in the Ruhr paralleled that of the coal industry from the middle of the nineteenth century. Initially, companies constructed forges next to mines that produced both coal and iron ore. Later ore was imported from Sweden. By 1914, iron and steel production had risen to 8.2 and 10 million tons respectively.[29] These mines owned by metal producers were referred to as *Hüttenzechen*. The close relationship between the two industries in the Ruhr can be illustrated through the example of Bochum, a town that became heavily reliant upon the fortunes of heavy industry. A crisis was precipitated in the coal industry by a fall in the price of coal in the 1850s and again in the 1870s. On both occasions it was revitalised by an upturn in the iron trade. Furthermore, the Bochumer Verein acquired its first coal mine in 1868 and went on to purchase several more between 1882 and 1900. Similarly, the Krupp firm had bought several small mines in the eighteenth century. After the company passed into the hands of energetic entrepreneur Alfred Krupp it expanded rapidly and extended its coal interests in order to fuel its production of railroad parts, machinery, shipping and armaments.[30] In the Ruhr, therefore, iron and coal production was closely associated and many of the region's great industrialists presided over both industries.

In both areas there was an increasing tendency throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries towards concentration and integration of the industry. In South Wales one outstanding example of vertical concentration was that of the Cambrian Combine headed by D. A. Thomas, which through the acquisition of other enterprises

came to control by 1918 nine other colliery companies, apart from its own.[31] Meanwhile the Powell Duffryn and Ocean Coal Companies also pursued a course of expansion through new sinkings and the purchasing of smaller companies. The former was producing just over 3 million tons in 1910, while the latter consistently produced between 2.3 and 2.6 million tons per annum between 1894 and 1913.[32] However, the tendency towards both vertical and horizontal concentration of industry was even more evident in the Ruhr. In 1885 seven companies owned more than one mine, by 1910 nine were producing almost two-thirds of the region's total output of coal. Table 1.4 reveals the much larger scale of mining operations in the Ruhr compared with South Wales. Three of the largest, the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG, the Harpener Bergbau AG and Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia, had an output of 5 million tons each.[33] In both areas the number of small owners was shrinking number, but with greater rapidity in the Ruhr as shown in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3: Output and Number of Employers in South Wales and the Ruhr, 1886-1916

Output per year in thousand tons	Number of Employers			
	South Wales		Ruhr	
	1886	1916	1893	1911
1-10	9	1		
10-100	27	24	12	
100-500	24	45	71	22
500-1 million	4	18	9	19
Over 1 million	3	14	6	26
Total number	68	101	98	67
Average Output	202,481 t	436,103 t	368,457 t	1,153,044 t

Table 1.4: Output in tons and size of the workforce of the four largest colliery companies in the Ruhr and South Wales in 1913

Company	Output	No. of Workers Employed
Ruhr		
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Akteingesellschaft	10,353,050	36,821
Harpener Bergbau-Aktiengesellschaft	8,635,577	30,987
Hanielische Zechen	6,677,621	21,539
Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia	5,697	19,314
South Wales		
Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Ltd	3,873,780	13,611
Consolidated Cambrian Ltd	3,000,000	12,035
Ocean Coal and Wilsons Ltd	2,500,000	9,496
Guest, Keen and Nettlefords Ltd	2,000,000	10,487

Source: Berg, *Wirtschaft*, pp. 81 and 135.

Furthermore, as the examples of the Bochumer Verein and Krupp firms illustrate, there was a high degree of vertical integration of industry in the Ruhr. The growth of the joint-stock company in Germany coupled with the industry's links to the banks encouraged both vertical and horizontal concentration. Firms like the

Dortmunder Union, which could 'build railways both at home and abroad entirely from its own resources, from the mining of the coal to the manufacture of track and the financing of the entire project' were typical.[34]

The degree of cartelisation and syndication was also higher in the Ruhr than in South Wales. The German employers seemed to enter into associations far more readily than their Welsh counterparts. Even before the liberalisation of the economy there existed associations of employers in the west of the region such as the *Magerkohlenverband* in 1854.[35] Employers combined in 1858 to form the *Verein für die Bergbaulichen Interessen im Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund* (Association for Mining Interests in Dortmund Mining District). Generally known as the Bergbau Verein, it acted as the spokes-body for the industry and was recognised as such by the government in 1893. The Bergbau Verein was followed, in 1893, by the formation of the Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat (RWKS) or Coal Syndicate. Members agreed to sell their coal to the RWKS who then handled the marketing of the product. It also imposed coal production quotas upon its members in an attempt to keep prices up and moderate fluctuations in the market. These constraints encouraged larger firms to buy up smaller enterprises so that they could increase their own quotas for production, thereby contributing to the trend towards concentration. A total of twelve mines had bought up by 1904 for this reason, eleven in the older, southern portion of the coalfield and one in Oberhausen.[36] The power of the RWKS is revealed by the fact that between 1893 and 1913 its members were responsible for almost 90 percent of total output between them.[37] However, its operation was not without problems as the Hüttenzechen were not covered by the quotas and could sell their surplus upon the market, uncontrolled by the RWKS. It was only in 1903 that they agreed to limit the output of coal destined for the market to the RWKS quotas.[38] Finally, the Zechen-Verband was founded in 1908, after the experience of the 1905 miners' strike, in an attempt to gain greater control over the labour market. It drew up blacklists of troublesome employees, tried to ensure that a miner could not change collieries without the required notice and introduced company controlled labour exchanges.[39]

In comparison the organisation of the employers of South Wales was rather weak. In 1913, South Wales did have the third longest surviving owners' association in the form of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coalowners' Association (MSWCOA). It had begun life in 1864 as the Aberdare Steam Collieries Association and was reformed as the latter body in 1873. Initially its members were responsible

for 70 percent of the region's coal production, but its membership suffered badly from fluctuations. Membership fell by 45 percent when coal prices fell after 1876, only to rise again prior to the 1893 Hauliers' Strike.[40] Furthermore there was no equivalent in South Wales to the RWKS although there were schemes suggested that would have established such an organisation. John Nixon had attempted between 1860 and 1885 to establish some sort of quota system for steam coal. An independent engineer produced a report on the amount each colliery should produce, while a second scheme aimed at the formation of an association for fixing minimum prices. These attempts failed due to the resistance of other employers.[41] In 1893 Sir George Elliot, in a plan that foreshadowed the National Coal Board created decades later, proposed the creation of a coal trust headed by nine men.[42] Later D. A. Thomas suggested a scheme reminiscent of the RWKS in that it advocated the allocation of quotas to colliery companies. However, neither scheme came to fruition. L. J. Williams has suggested that the failure of cartelisation was due to the fact that it offered little advantage to the Welsh coalowners rather than their individualistic attitudes or attachment to *laissez-faire* economics. The price of their exports was determined by the price of coal from other coalfields despite internal competition. The MSWCOA, therefore, concerned itself mainly with labour relations, which largely meant resistance to any cost rises.[43] In this respect the MSWCOA can be regarded as broadly fulfilling the same functions as the Zechen-Verband.

Management and Work

In both areas early management was mainly the work of one or more major shareholders. With the expansion of the industry and the growth in size of individual mining operations there was a trend for these owners to become increasingly involved with the general management of the company, while a stratum of salaried professional managers dealt with production at the pithead.[44] In this respect developments in South Wales and the Ruhr paralleled each other, although in the latter region a high proportion of mine managers came from the civil service.[45] Despite the economic liberalisation laws of the 1860s there remained close personal links between industry and government. Aristocrats, bureaucrats and politicians could, and did, have active roles within the industrial sphere.[46] The authoritarian stance of management, noted above, was often coupled with a paternalistic attitude. For example, Otto Faust, an

official at Neumühl, recalled that the company built its own club for managers since all the local pubs catered for miners.[47]

There were also comparatively more supervisory personnel in the Ruhr mines. In 1891 Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for the South Wales District reported that there existed in 1890 205 managers and 177 undermanagers for 299 out of 354 mines,[48] while by 1893 the number of managers (*Betriebsführer*) and undermanagers (*Obersteiger und Fahrsteiger*) in the Ruhr numbered 214 and 94 respectively.[49] However, by 1913 the Ruhr coal industry was employing an average of 233 officials per employer, an average of one technical official (*Angestellte*) per 28 workers, while by 1914 the average in South Wales was roughly one per 40.[50] Furthermore, as suggested by comparison of the output of the leading mining concerns in both areas, the German mines tended to be deeper and have a larger workforce. Between 1875 and 1912/14 the average depth of mines in South Wales and the Ruhr increased to roughly 350 and 577 metres respectively. In 1913 the average number of men working at one installation was 383 and 1,815, while the size of total workforce per employer averaged at 560 for South Wales and 4,365 for the Ruhr.[51]

Although advances in technology had facilitated the exploitation of deeper seams of coal in both South Wales and the Ruhr, corresponding advances in the actual process of coal 'getting' were much slower. The mining industry of both areas remained very labour intensive. Mechanisation was slow to have any significant impact upon either region. By 1908 there were 27 coal-cutting machines in use in collieries in the Cardiff and Newport District and 24 in the Swansea District. However, it had to be admitted that they 'had not made much headway' in the Cardiff area,[52] while only four were recorded as having produced an appreciable output in the Swansea District.[53] In fact, in South Wales a meagre one percent of total coal produced was cut by machine in 1913. In comparison there were 237 machines (*Schrämmaschinen*) in 49 mines in the Ruhr by 1905.[54] There the power hand drill was introduced in 1906, but by 1914 there were fewer than 600 in use and, although the number of coal-cutting machines had risen to 449 by the previous year, they accounted for only 2.2 percent of total production.[55] Uwe Burghardt has suggested that this low level of mechanised production in the Ruhr was due to uncoordinated investment and that the employers' reaction to adverse economic conditions was cartelisation rather than mechanisation.[56] Meanwhile, in South Wales, geological conditions also militated against the use of machinery.[57] Bert Coombes, who moved

from Herefordshire to South Wales in search of work, first encountered coal-cutting machinery during the First World War and wrote that they were 'rare in South Wales then, and there were none working in our valley or anywhere quite near.'[58] Therefore, while production in the Ruhr was clearly more mechanised than in South Wales, in neither area was mechanisation a major feature of coal winning prior to the Great War.

This should not suggest that employers and managers in both areas were insensible to the benefits of machinery. Articles advocating the benefits of machinery often appeared in the industry journal *Glückauf*.[59] It was even suggested that the greater use of machinery would obviate the need for so many Polish workers. This viewpoint was, however, rejected.[60] The new manager of the Lockets Merthyr Collieries reported that 'from the amount of face opened out, the output should be larger than present; to attain the desired increase, more colliers are needed, and coal cutting machines should be used in the new Seam where the coal is thin but apparently suitable for cutting the dirt band about 4 inch thick above the bottom coal.'[61] However, it is symptomatic that the expansion of the workforce took priority over the introduction of machinery and two years later the issue was still under discussion, despite the fact that visits to other mines had revealed the benefits of machine production.[62] The production of coal, therefore, relied heavily upon the physical capabilities of the workers, on the muscle power of men and horses. Of the latter there were 8,008 in the Ruhr and 16,744 in South Wales in 1913.[63] In 1906 the Lockets Merthyr Collieries still had 150 horses working in its three pits.[64] A year later, although they were making preparations to install machinery in the No. 3 pit, they still aimed to increase output by signing on a further 50 to 80 men and 6 to 8 horses.[65] As this example shows the principal means of increasing output was to increase the workforce. To compete companies had to expand their individual workforces. Table 1.5 indicates the increase in the mining labour force throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.

Table 1.5: Estimates of Numbers of Miners Employed in South Wales and the Ruhr

South Wales		Ruhr	
Year	Number of Miners	Year	Number of Miners
1871	57,000	1870	51,391
1891	115,600	1890	127,794
1913	232,400	1913	394,569

Source: Church, *History*, p. 189, and Hickey, *Workers*, p. 13.

The actual underground work generally followed the same lines in both regions. The miner would rise in the early morning and proceed to the mine with his packed lunch. There he would receive his lamp, wait for his turn to enter the cage and descend the shaft. From the shaft bottom he would proceed to his working-place (*Arbeitsstelle*) once the firemen (*Wettermänner*) had checked that the area was free from gas. In each working place the miners would work in small groups (*Kameradschaft*) of between three and five individuals. Generally, the miner would begin by undercutting the coal, an activity that was overwhelmingly performed by hand with a pick or a mandril. Where necessary the overhanging coal would be supported by wooden sprags. When ready they would be withdrawn allowing the undercut coal to fall. In some areas the coal was particularly prone to sticking to the top and had to be freed by the use of explosives. The coal would then by loaded in to the trams, ready to be transported by the hauliers. For this work the hewers were paid on a piecework (*Gedinge*) system dependant on the amount of coal they produced.[66]

This brief description of the hewer's work obscures several differences. The hewer of the South Wales coalfield was more involved in deadwork, that is throwing the stone debris into the 'gob' and setting the supports as the roadway extended as a result of his labours. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, another class of older workers (*Zimmer- and Reparaturhauer*) was responsible for this work and they were paid a fixed wage.[67] There were also differences in the structure of the miners' working lives. In the Ruhr only youths over the age of sixteen were permitted to work underground. This rule had survived the economic liberalisation of the industry and the Oberbergamt, the body responsible for ensuring that the mining regulations were observed by the private companies, continued to resist employers' arguments for a reduction of the age limit. Younger boys could only be employed on surface jobs. After their sixteenth birthday the youths, and older immigrants new to the work, would enter the pit as hauliers (*Schlepper*). After an unspecified length of time that usually depended on economic conditions the haulier could become an apprentice hewer. He would then work under an experienced man in order to learn the skills necessary for coal getting. A full hewer had to be at least twenty-one years old and have had three years experience underground, including one as an apprentice hewer.[68]

In South Wales youths generally entered the pit at a younger age. Most seem to have had their first experience of underground work at around fourteen. The number of youths between 14 and 16 employed in the Welsh industry formed a

substantially greater proportion of the total workforce than in the Ruhr. In 1914 this age group composed 11 percent of the workforce in South Wales, while in 1913 in the Ruhr they formed only 3.7 percent.[69] Furthermore, rather than progressing through systematic stages, Welsh miners often began their working lives as either trainee hauliers or hewers. Therefore, the occupational grade of haulier was not composed of a distinctive adolescent age group as in the Ruhr. In 1906 only 3.4 percent of hauliers were aged under-sixteen, compared with 14.5 percent of face workers in South Wales.[70] Often the apprentice and his mentor would be related to each other. In both areas the task of the haulier was considered to be the inferior to that of the hewer. In tangible terms the superiority of the latter was demonstrated by higher wages. In the Ruhr the haulier earned around 60 percent of the hewer's wage, while in South Wales it was around 69 percent.[71]

Three methods were used in the process of coal getting, the pillar and bord, the pillar and stall and the longwall system. The pillar and bord involved driving the headings to the boundary of extraction and cutting the coal into rectangular blocks or pillars. Once the boundary had been reached the pillars were worked back or 'robbed'. The pillar and stall system was similar in that the coal was again cut to the boundary, but the extraction of the coal left as pillars was worked before the whole area had been worked out. The longwall system, as its name suggests, entailed one continuous face with headways driven from the shaft bottom into the coal.[72] In the Ruhr the former system was the dominant method of production accounting for almost half of total output in 1901, but by the 1890s both the longwall and pillar and stall systems were being increasingly used.[73] Employers in South Wales, on the other hand, had moved away from the two earlier systems to longwall mining much earlier and by the 1890s it was already the predominant method used. This earlier change may have been due to the specific geology of the South Wales coalfield. The pressure the pillars supported tended to render the coal friable. When worked the pillars therefore produced less profitable small coal. This led employers such as John Nixon to adopt the longwall system to prevent wastage.[74]

Working conditions could be extremely unpleasant. Miners often had to work in cramped positions, sometimes being forced to lie on their sides to cut under the seam. Temperatures could rise above 30 degrees and under these conditions miners often worked wearing as few clothes as possible. If not soaked in sweat, the miner might also have to contend with water in the mines. Dust also threatened the their

health by entering their lungs. Apart from these nuisances mining was a dangerous occupation and South Wales and the Ruhr were no exceptions. Falls from the roof or sides, flooding and explosions of gas could all cause great loss of life. On 10 March 1889 87 men were killed at an explosion at the Morfa colliery,[75] in 1893 290 men died at the Albion mine,[76] while 439 lost their lives in the most famous Welsh disaster at Senghennydd in 1913. The Ruhr too had its major disasters. In 1898 116 died in an explosion at the Carolinenglück, while 114 were killed at Lotheringen in 1912. The worst explosion occurred at the Radbod mine in November 1908 where 348 workers lost their lives.[77]

These large-scale disasters, while temporarily awakening to the wider world the danger of the job, only contributed a small proportion of all those killed. Far more common were the small accidents that crippled or killed one or two men. Bert Coombes in his memoirs remembered several incidents that cost the life of work colleagues or very nearly killed him.[78] In 1910 there was a total of 1,390 accidents reported to the Inspector of Mines. Of these 302 resulted in 313 deaths, while a total of 1,170 men were injured.[79] The most common injury sustained in non-fatal accidents were bone fractures, with general lacerations and contusions coming second.[80] Even seemingly trivial incidents could lead to death.[81] Falls were also a problem in the Ruhr with 45 percent of accidents thought to be due to falls in 1885/6, decreasing to a third by 1901.[82] Similar causes were identified for the high number of accidents. Both HM Inspector of Mines and a Coal Commission established by the German Government in 1897 identified the insufficient use of props as a major danger.[83] However, these complaints largely fell on deaf ears. An attempt by the Oberbergamt to persuade the mine managers to introduce a more systematic approach was countered by arguments that the variable conditions underground militated against such a system and that it should be left to the hewer to set props 'where it appears necessary for security.'[84] Later the Ministry of Trade and Commerce (*Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe*) tried to enforce this systematic approach but without much success.

Chris Williams has suggested that more consideration needs to be given by historians to the nature of mine work itself. How, for example, did the miners regard issues of craftsmanship and the introduction of machinery?[85] Unfortunately, for South Wales there seems a paucity of primary evidence, although Coombes' autobiography conveys a sense that, by the time he was employed in the mines, there had been an

intensification of the work process, to the detriment of the miners' skills. Interestingly, for the Ruhr we are given some insight to these questions by Adolf Levenstein's 1912 survey. When asked if they enjoyed their work 507 miners claimed they did not, compared to 171 who did.[86] When asked what work they would do should they be able to do anything, only 68 out of 596 respondents answered mining.[87] Moreover, it appears that in South Wales mining was often a hereditary occupation. Sons followed their fathers down the pit, even when parents would have preferred them to continue their education.[88] Lorenz Pieper, however, noted that since 1893 the hereditary nature of mining in the Ruhr had been broken by the influx of immigrant labour.[89] This tendency was no doubt accentuated by the various other industrial jobs available in the Ruhr. Klaus Tenfelde has argued that the increasing number of officials, coupled with the introduction of longwall working, entailed a loss of autonomy for the Ruhr miners.[90] Continuing this theme, Irmgard Steinisch and Tenfelde have argued that the miners of the Ruhr felt themselves de-skilled and encouraged their children into other sectors.[91] Although many Welsh miners undoubtedly also encouraged their children to seek better work, it is revealing that many miners who obtained the qualifications to become an official, refused to accept such posts.[92] In South Wales then mining seems to have retained a higher status than in the Ruhr, if only due to a lack of alternatives.

There existed many possible points of conflict between the management and the workforce. One of the most obvious was the piece-rate for hewing. It was obviously in the miners' interests to obtain as favourable a rate as possible. To this end miners in both areas would point to the specific geological conditions of the working places which affected the quantity of coal that could be won when negotiating with management. In the Ruhr bargaining would be held at the start of every month between the leader of the Kameradschaften (*Ortältesten*) and the undermanager, while in South Wales a price list would be set for a particular seam and subject to re-negotiation for 'abnormal' places.[93] Since labour formed the greatest proportion of the cost of production in the industry it was in the management's interests to keep rates as low as possible, placing themselves and the workforce in direct opposition, offering much scope for conflict. For example, in South Wales the industrial unrest of 1910 originated in a dispute over the rate of pay for the Bute seam at Ely, part of the Cambrian Combine. Failure to reach agreement between the management and workforce led the former to post lockout notices precipitating a

bitter, drawn-out struggle.[94] The Ruhr miners were also very conscious of their earnings. A report from the district of East Dortmund to the Oberbergamt claimed that 'the worker himself knows exactly how much work in his stall or pillar is needed to fill a wagon...Should the mine management introduce larger wagons, the worker would immediately demand a rise in his wages.' The report claimed that the workers could also judge the veins and the size of coal produced.[95] Meanwhile, Welsh miners compared their earnings with those at neighbouring mines working the same seams. Miners at the Plymouth works sought an advance in May 1883 on the basis that workers at the Powell Duffryn works were getting more for working the same lode.[96]

Another related point of conflict was deductions from wages. In both areas there existed a system whereby trams deemed by officials to contain too much small coal or rubbish were deducted from the hewer's earnings. Known as 'cropping' in South Wales this system was ultimately replaced by the use of screens that sorted the small coal from the large.[97] Furthermore, concerns that companies were underpaying for large coal led to the institution of checkweighers who saw to it that the correct weight of large coal was recorded and paid for. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the system of deductions, or Nullen, survived until 1905 and proved a major source of discontent, its abolition being among the miners' demands in the strike of the same year.

The use of piecework and the system of deduction and coal screening can be regarded as means by which the employers could exercise some element of control over their workforce. Piecework ensured a reasonable output in a physical environment that precluded total supervision of the work. Within this system the miners were left with a great deal of autonomy over their own work. This issue of control at work was a further potential point of conflict within the mining industry. It was most obviously illustrated when disputes arose over long-established customs. Francis and Smith have argued that this lay at the root of the unrest of 1910 as, almost simultaneous with the Cambrian Combine dispute, a strike broke out in the Aberdare valley over the company's attempt to abolish the miners' customary right to take home spare pit wood.[98] Challenges could also be more direct. On 21 January 1886 colliers working on the 9 foot seam at the Plymouth colliery refused to enter the mine citing the presence of gas as the reason, although the General Managers believed the real issue was the unpopularity of another workman.[99] A strike began despite the fact that an investigation of the mine had revealed that it was clear. A few days later

Bailey recorded in his diary, 'David Morgan (the local miners' agent) came to see me...with three resolutions which he said I must comply with and this I flatly declined to do telling him that I should not allow him or anyone else to interfere with my management.'[100]

The protection of customary rights also drove the Ruhr miners to action as illustrated by the 1876 strike at the Borussia mine. According to the works contract the workers should have performed eight hours work at the face. However, over time the winding time had come to be included in those hours, thereby reducing the actual time spent winning coal. The management decided to enforce the provisions of the contract and put up a poster to this effect. Finding their proclamation ignored by the workers the management tried a more forceful approach, precipitating a strike.[101] The director behind this strike, Grau, was involved in an almost identical dispute seven years later at the Germania mine. Here the previous manager, Kracher, had 'possessed the trust of the workers to the greatest degree' and his departure was 'much regretted by the whole workforce.' Grau did not command such sympathy and his attempt strictly to enforce working time again caused a strike.[102]

Strikes, however, were only one way by which the miners could register their discontent. More often miners in the Ruhr sought amelioration of their grievances by moving to another mine. In fact labour turnover was exceptionally high in the area. Roughly forty percent of miners changed their working places every year in the Ruhr.[103] Often the move to a different mine was simply motivated by the promise of increased wages, although conflict with the officials could be a reason. One miners' wife recalled that her father was 'a free spirit (*Wandervogel*). When he had a bust up with the undermanager he demanded his papers. That happened every once in a while, then he'd move on and, after fourteen days, write to my mother, "come"'.[104]

As these examples show, miners in both areas were very protective of what they regarded as their customary rights. The view that the Ruhr miners in particular had lost their solidarity and autonomy as a result of the liberalisation of the industry was noted.[105] However, the examples given here would seem to qualify that view. The experience of underground work and the great potential for conflict with management generated a great degree of solidarity among the working groups. Such a view has been expressed before, but however much underground work might 'naturally' incline individuals to solidarity, there is no guarantee that such feelings retained their force after the miners had passed through the works' gates.

The Miners and their Communities

The massive expansion of the coal industry had a comparable effect upon the demographics of both regions. The promise of good wages combined with the desire to escape the drudgery of farm work acted as a suitable lure for many men. Such was the attraction for Bert Coombes who sought 'good clothes, money to spend'.[106] Higher wages also attracted migrants from other industries, such as H. Marchwitza. Having already worked underground in Upper Siliesia he left for the Ruhr after hearing that the pay was better and the hours shorter.[107] Other migrants left their home regions wanting to see more of life. J. L. Williams, for example, had a sense of a 'wider life' than on the North Wales farm he grew up on,[108] while, in a similar vein, a Polish miner in the Ruhr claimed to have left his agricultural background for work in the mines because of 'higher aspirations.'[109]

The population of Wales increased by 400,000 between 1901 and 1911.[110] To place this within a national perspective the increase in the Rhondda was 34.3 percent, while the average increase in England and Wales was 10.9 percent.[111] In the Ruhr the population increase was even larger. It increased by 75 and 102 percent in the Rhineland and Westphalia respectively, while the average for Germany was 44 percent.[112] The region was one of five areas in Germany that showed the most rapid growth towards the end of the nineteenth century.[113]

The pattern of migration into the two regions was the same. The industry first drew workers from the neighbouring areas (*Nahwanderer*). Later, when these regions could no longer satisfy demand, migrants from further afield were employed. That the industry tapped the human resources of the more rural regions can be illustrated by the decrease in the numbers engaged in agricultural work. In South Wales those involved in agricultural work fell from 35 percent in 1851 to 12 percent by 1911,[114] while many left agriculture for the growing industry in the Ruhr owing to poor harvests in the 1840s.[115] In communities such as Steinfeld there was a change in the traditional occupational structure as the young men entered the pit rather than taking up the agricultural work of previous generations.[116] Towards the end of the nineteenth century migrants from further afield (*Fernwanderer*) were increasingly employed in the mines. In the Ruhr, while the Ruhr and Hellweg zones drew most of their labour from the existing population, the Emscher area was more thinly populated and, therefore, attracted the most immigrants.[117] These immigrants were often from the

Junker estates of East Germany. In the Rhineland and Westphalia immigrants from this region formed 12.4 and 15.1 percent of total immigrants respectively, by 1907 they constituted 27.3 and 44.9 percent.[118] On a microscopic level, in 1907 49 percent of the Essen's population had been born there,[119] while in Bochum only 23 percent of the workforce were native to the city.[120] That many of these migrants found their way to work in the mines of the Ruhr is made clear in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6: Percentage of Mining Workforce born in Eastern German Provinces and Abroad

	1893	1904	1912
Eastern Provinces	25.5	32.2	36.8
Foreign Countries	2.8	6.5	8.3

Source: Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 241.

In some areas the migrants and their descendants came to form a majority as villages exploded into towns. By 1893 foreign speaking migrants accounted for 45 percent of the mining workforce of Bottrop and by 1920 they formed 75 percent of the population of the town of Bottrop, the largest single group being the Poles, who mostly originated from Upper Silesia and Posen.[121]

Similarly, while the first waves of migration to industrial South Wales came from the Principality's rural counties, a trend that may have actually strengthened the Welsh language, subsequent waves came increasingly from England.[122] The number of Rhondda inhabitants who had been born in England rose from 7,328 to 10,728 between 1891 and 1911.[123] Coombes, when he attended a lodge meeting, noted the mix of regional dialects and languages, 'Yorkshire and Durham men, Londoners, men form the Forest of Dean, North Welshmen...two Australians, four Frenchmen, and several coloured gentlemen' were represented.[124] However, despite this mix of dialects and languages, it is clear that there was a lower degree of diversity between the migrants in South Wales than in the Ruhr. The vast majority of migrants entered the Glamorgan coalfield from either Wales or England, as shown in Table 1.7.

Table 1.7: Origin of Migrants to Glamorgan

	1871-81	1881-91	1891-1901	1901-11
England	42, 300	56, 700	42, 000	78, 600
Wales	31, 400	47, 200	44, 600	44, 300
Scotland	1, 000	1, 600	1, 200	1, 800
Ireland		3, 000	6, 600	3, 800
Total	74, 700	108, 500	94, 400	128, 500

Source: Brinley Thomas, 'The Migration of Labour into the Glamorganshire Coalfield, 1861-1911' in W. E. Minchinton (ed.) *Industrial South Wales 1750-1914: Essays in Welsh Economic History*, London, Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1968, p. 293.

The industrial communities of the Ruhr, where it was believed 'some twenty languages and idioms' were spoken,[125] had a greater degree of diversity. Among the migrants the Poles stood out as the largest and most cohesive group. In 1903 Pieper identified 19 'Polish' mines, at which more than half the workforce was made up of Polish workers. At the Pluto mine in Gelsenkirchen they made up almost three-quarters of the workforce.[126] While the early Polish immigrants to the area had been largely assimilated into the existing Catholic community through common religious bonds, this integration became increasingly difficult from the 1890s as the number of migrants mushroomed. Low level discrimination by the indigenous population and the Government's 'Germanisation' policy forced this second wave of immigrants to establish their own distinct sub-culture. A Polish language newspaper, *Warius Polskie*, founded in 1890, served this milieu. Initially intended to integrate the Poles, the paper actually played a significant role in consolidating the Poles as a distinct section of the community.[127] This sub-culture was made of a plethora of Polish associations.[128] In Bochum there were nine Polish associations with a total membership of 754 in 1893, plus another two organisations in the city itself.[129] Meanwhile, the District President for Arnsberg reported 191 such organisations for the area as a whole in 1906.[130] These associations ranged from the educational to workers' associations.

Among the latter was the Polish miners' union, *Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie* (ZZP). Established in 1902, the founders believed that the interests of Polish workers were not being adequately protected by the existing trade unions, the *Alter Verband* (Old Association) and the *Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter* (Trade Association of Christian Miners). This view was strengthened by the old unions' support for the Mining Language Ordinance. An example of the Government's 'Germanisation' policy, the ordinance effectively restricted immigrants' mobility within the workplace.[131]

Although the Poles were the largest single group, other migrants also formed subcultures. The Masurians, for example, who also came from East Prussia, differed from the Poles in dialect and religion. The police reported that the Masurians were proud to be called Old Prussians. They regarded any confusion of themselves with the Poles as an insult,[132] although the two groups were often lumped together in official statistics.[133] There are also examples of even smaller groups, such as migrants from Hesse, forming various kinds of association.[134]

Apart from the greater ethnic diversity of the migrants to the Ruhr, the settlement of the migrants also differed. The Ruhr underwent a much greater degree of urbanisation than South Wales. Older centres like Essen and Bochum expanded rapidly, while others, such as Gelsenkirchen, which only came into being in 1903, can be regarded as literal creations of the German industrial revolution.[135] It has been suggested that the growth of urban centres in Germany was due to its federal political structure, which encouraged development of the seats of government of the various states, as well as its industrial evolution.[136] Furthermore, owing to the greater industrial diversity of the region, the towns and cities would accommodate different occupational groups. Miners, although they may have congregated in certain residential areas,[137] would be able to rub shoulders with iron and factory workers. For example the Krupp steel and armaments factories dominated the town of Essen.[138] However, the industrial pit village also existed in the Ruhr, especially in the northern region. Examples of the latter type of settlements included communities such as Gladbeck, Buer and Herten.[139]

The geography of South Wales, on the other hand, was prejudicial to the development of large towns and cities. Building tended to be high-density terraced housing in ribbons along the valley sides and the emergence of the pit villages was more common than the large conurbation.[140] The latter tended to develop beyond the coalfield at the points of export, examples being Barry and Cardiff. The Welsh mining communities were, unlike those of the Ruhr, more geographically isolated. As the valleys were virtually mono-industrial the South Wales miners also had less opportunity to mix with other types of worker.

A further difference between the growth of the mining communities was the amount of company housing built by the industrialists. This form of building had been present in South Wales, but had gradually decreased towards the end of the nineteenth century. Simultaneously there was a growing trend towards home ownership facilitated by building clubs.[141] It has been estimated that these building clubs were responsible for twenty-three percent of all house construction in the Rhondda in the 1890s.[142] In 1895 in the month of June alone the Aberdare Urban District Council (UDC) approved plans for a total of 96 houses from the Cwmdare Fechan and the Glancynon building clubs, followed by another 17 from the Trecynon club the following month.[143] Between 1900 and 1911 they produced fifteen and thirty-six percent of all building plans sent for approval by the Urban District Council in the

Rhondda Fach and Fawr respectively.[144] In his memoirs Walter Haydn Davies records that his family was a member of such a club and, through their 'frugal, hardworking', lifestyle, they were able to acquire two properties, one of which they rented out.[145]

Welsh employers were not insensible to the benefits of company housing. The manager of the Lockets Merthyr Collieries reported that houses in Mardy were often very overcrowded. Families as large as eleven occupied three bedroom houses. He linked these conditions to the quality of the workers:

> It will be clearly understood from this how we are unable to keep the best class of workmen: in fact, I may say that we have lost a considerable number of our best workmen during the last six months owing to the fact that we are unable to supply them and their families with houses to live in. It is a very common saying here that the beds have not time to cool.[146]

The Powell Duffryn Company also recognised the 'urgent necessity which exists for providing further Cottage accommodation for the Company's workmen and...the benefit which would result to the Company there from.'[147] The directors planned the construction of several houses and seemed to have been involved in some of the building clubs themselves.[148] However, such housing did not always guarantee a stable and loyal workforce. The manager of Lockets Merthyr bemoaned the fact that 'the hold we had upon the Mardy Cottage Co.'s houses is now lost, and the result is that several tenants are now working at Ferndale, to the detriment of our Collieries.'[149] Furthermore, some thirty company houses were found abandoned in 1894 after a dispute at the South Dunraven colliery, Blaenrhondda.[150]

Welsh coal owners were, however, largely disinclined to build housing as they usually held only short leases for mineral rights.[151] The high proportion of workers' home ownership suggests that the Welsh mining labour force was more stable than that in the Ruhr. Speculative builders carried out much of the rest of the house building, aided by the low costs of such construction. Berg estimates that in 1900 a family house in the Ruhr cost between 5,000 and 6,000 M compared with 2,400 to 2,800 M in South Wales.[152]

On the other hand, company housing (*Kolonie*) was a major feature of the Ruhr coal industry and was seen as a means of offering the industrialists some social control over their workforce. Dick Geary has convincingly argued that such paternalistic practices were not a sign of the 'feudal' character of the German employers, but a rational response to specific problems.[153] The mining industry in the Ruhr had a particularly high turnover of labour and housing was seen as one method

of establishing a stable workforce. By 1913 there were only three coal owners without any works accommodation.[154] The Helene and Amalie mines alone owned 347 houses and 1,199 flats.[155] Often accommodating Fernwanderer, colonies could undermine the formation of community solidarity and ties by isolating their residents from the other workers.[156] In fact, some housing was advertised on the basis that only certain ethnic groups would be included. One of the selling points of a Kolonie linked to the Victor mine in Rauxel was that the Masurian immigrants could remain together and 'have nothing to do with Poles and East Prussians.'[157] Such housing was often much sought after as it was larger than that available on the open market and the rent was roughly 50 percent cheaper. As a result the proportion of miners who found lodgings in this type of accommodation grew from 4 percent in 1872 to between 35 and 38 percent in 1914.[158]

Alongside the Kolonie resident, who was often an immigrant, another type of miner has been distinguished. In the older mining areas of the Ruhr there existed families in which the occupation of miner had been handed down through generations. These families often had their origins in the pre-capitalist period. Referred to as *Kötterbergleute* (cottage miners) these miners were often small home and landowners, combining agricultural work with their work in the pit.[159] Heinrich Imbusch, who rose to become leader of the Christian Gewerkverein, seems to have come from such a background, as his family owned some livestock and even employed a housemaid.[160] Often Kolonie accommodation also came with gardens and allotments by which the miners could supplement their diet and many mining families owned some form of small livestock such as pigs, sheep and goats.[161] Such livestock rearing was less common in South Wales, although in the anthracite region of the coalfield, an area characterised by small mines of between 100 to 500 men, miners often engaged in both industrial and agricultural work.[162]

Relations between the older, established miners and the immigrant Kolonie residents varied from hostility to solidarity. The indigenous inhabitants of Steinfeld regarded the Kolonie inhabitants as lower class citizens. Tensions were intensified by religious differences. Inhabitants of the Kolonie were largely Protestant while villagers were Catholic. The former regarded the latter as 'black to the heart', the colour being associated with Catholicism.[163] Meanwhile, the community of Gladbeck exhibited a greater degree of solidarity between the locals and Kolonists, a feature reinforced by the shared Catholicism of both groups.[164]

Despite the variety of accommodation there was simply not enough to cope with the massive migration into the two areas in the latter half of the nineteenth century. To some extent this problem was overcome by the system of lodging, a feature that was common to both areas. Brüggemeier has distinguished a 'half-open family structure' among the Ruhr miners, an arrangement whereby lodgers were accepted into the family home. He argues that it was an attempt to organise everyday life and underlay the solidarity of the Ruhr miners during the strikes of 1889 and 1905.[165] In these terms the concept seems equally applicable to the South Wales coalfield. Lodging could be mutually beneficial, supplying the family with an extra source of income and the newly arrived immigrants with necessary social support. Immigrants to the Ruhr, for example, often found lodgings with families from the same region who spoke the same language.[166] This served to strengthen ethnic identities in the region and whole quarters of towns could become dominated by one ethnic group.[167]

The taking in of lodgers could also mean an increased burden of work for the miner's wife. This would seem to be especially the case in the South Wales valleys as, besides the normal round of washing and food preparation, they were also responsible for heating the bath water for the returning men. If the household included several lodgers on different shifts the process would have to be repeated several times a day. The German miners' wives enjoyed the comparative luxury of pithead baths, an innovation that was only introduced in South Wales after the Great War. The role of women in both regions was largely restricted to the home. The dominance of heavy industry meant that there were few opportunities for paid female employment outside the home, although women could supplement the familys' income through some form of 'penny capitalism' such as making treats or taking in washing.[168] Outside the home both mining regions were very much masculine worlds.

The preceding description of the growth of the mining communities reveals that the two areas differed greatly in their degree of ethnic diversity. The ethnic composition of the Ruhr was much more variegated than South Wales. These differences in the diversity of in-migration and the degree of urbanisation affected the cohesiveness of the miners' communities. The relative lack of ethnic diversity coupled with their isolation, both geographically and industrially, meant that the mining communities of South Wales were more cohesive than those of the Ruhr. Brinley Thomas has suggested that the early English migrants into the region were

assimilated without great difficulty. However, the greater number of English migrants towards the end of the nineteenth century made this more difficult.[169] Moreover, Tim Williams claims that this increasing in-migration from England undermined the Welsh language, but also suggests that the Welsh mining communities chose English as the medium through which to conduct their growing conflict with capitalism. Moreover the Welsh turned increasingly to English as a means of social mobility.[170]

The South Wales mining valleys were not, however, immune to ethnic tensions. In 1882, for example, the houses of Irish workers were burnt in Tredegar.[171] Four years later extra police had to be drafted into Blaenau Gwent because of fighting between the native Welsh and English immigrants from the Forest of Dean.[172] In 1911 rioters turned on Jewish owned shops.[173] Referring to a court case involving an Italian miner, the *Porth Gazette* reported in 1902 that 'the employment of foreigners in the Rhondda coal mines has been strenuously objected to by the local colliers.'[174] Yet, unlike the Ruhr, there was no translation of ethnic tensions into organisational rivalry. When the issue of foreign workers was raised at a meeting of the Rhondda miners, their agent William Abraham commented 'that a man was a Frenchman or an Italian was no reason why he should not work at the pits, but if they were unskilled workmen he advised the skilled workmen not to work with them.' He claimed it was hardly fair to punish foreigners for breaking rules when they did not understand. Instead, it was the duty of the management to post the rules in a language they could understand.[175] This is a marked contrast to the official support the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein gave to the Mining Language Ordinance, which placed the onus on the immigrants to learn German.

In South Wales occupational and community solidarity was fostered by the dominance of coal mining as the sole occupation coupled with the comparative isolation of the pit villages. In the Ruhr assimilation was more problematic. Local inhabitants often looked down on immigrants, who often spoke little or no German. The immigrants were also often physically segregated from the indigenous population through company housing. These two pictures, one of comparative integration and cohesiveness, the other of fragmentation, was reflected and reinforced by a further factor, religion.

The dominant religious creed in South Wales was Nonconformity. Although the actual power of the chapels should not be overestimated[176] and while they could be conservative in their views on cultural and scientific developments, they did

provide a form of social cement by contributing to the communal life of the mining communities.[177] For example, one ex-miner commented that 'the chapel was very powerful in the Rhondda Valley for the simple reason there was no other entertainment,'[178] although by the twentieth century there were alternatives in the form of organised sport, music halls and, somewhat later, cinemas. Despite this the chapels provided a form of social cement in towns and villages that had sprung up with an astonishing rapidity, often from nothing, the chapel provided the community with a centre. The Temple Baptist Chapel at Graig, Pontypridd, for example, was established to serve the mining communities that grew up around the Maritime Collieries. In an illustrative example of the changes that swept the coalfield during this period it changed its sermons from Welsh to English in order to minister to the large influx of English in-migrants.[179] Other in-migrants found it necessary to establish their own centres of worship such as the Primitive Methodist chapel Ebenezer in Gilfach Goch. Its trustees were all employed in the local mines.[180] In fact it appears that the chapels had a difficult time keeping up with the pace of change. As early as 1877 a delegate at the annual meeting of the Society for Establishing and Supporting English Congregational Churches in South Wales moved a resolution:

> that the present state of the population of the towns and manufacturing districts of Wales urgently demands the serious attention of the Congregational Churches and that the establishing of English Interests in those localities whose number of the English speaking population requires it is essentially necessary to prevent the utter extinction of the Denomination in the course of a few years in such places.[181]

Events held by the chapels encompassed the intellectual and the physical. The Calvinistic Methodist chapel Penuel in Ebbw Vale hosted meetings of the Young People's Temperance and Literary Societies ranging from simple musical evenings with recitations to discussions on topics such as 'is ritualism consistent with the Christianity of the New Testament?'[182] Meanwhile the English Congregational Church at Pontypridd held a gym class for the young men of the community.[183]

Religion in the Ruhr was a more divisive issue. The area contained significant numbers of both Protestant and Catholic denominations. The distribution of Catholics and Protestants varied between localities. For example, in 1912 the city (*Stadt*) of Bochum had an almost equal proportion of both denominations, while the surrounding area (*Landkreis*) Protestants accounted for 61 percent of the population, Catholics for 37 percent. A closer look at the coal mining areas, which lay mainly in the Landkreis, reveal that some were dominated by Catholics (Riemke), others by Protestants

(Harpen and Bergen), while some were roughly equal divided (Hordel).[184] Although the Ruhr like other industrial regions, including South Wales, was undergoing a slow process of secularisation, religious identity remained an important defining feature among the miners. Religious divisions between Catholicism and Protestantism manifested themselves in social provisions such as schools and hospitals.[185] In 1900, Bochum's four Catholic churches and eight Catholic schools were matched by four Protestant churches and seven Protestant schools. There was also a synagogue, a Jewish school and a small Baptist community.[186]

The Catholic Church was hierarchically organised - a trend that increased from the formation of the Empire.[187] The Catholic adherents themselves were over-represented in the working and lower middle classes of German society. The coal owners of the Ruhr were largely Protestant, Thyssen being a notable exception.[188] The proportion of Catholics among the miners was increased by the arrival of the immigrants as the Poles especially tended to be Catholic. The Catholic population of Bottrop, for example, rose to 91 percent by 1900.

This Catholic community was consolidated during the 1870s by the state-initiated *Kulturkampf* (Struggle of Cultures), which discriminated against the Catholic Church. This consolidation produced a distinctive Catholic milieu,[189] and the Ruhr, with its unique confessional structure provided one of its strongholds.[190] Most obviously this milieu was symbolised by the Catholic Centre Party.[191] However, it was also made up of a dense network of ancillary organisations. For example, in response to the liberalisation of the industry *Knappenvereine* and *Arbeitervereine* (Workers' Associations) were established. Often led by priests, these organisations sought to provide their members with sickness and burial benefits, while also maintaining the sense of privileged status the miners had enjoyed under state control.[192] By 1897 there were 91 Catholic Arbeitervereine in the bishopric of Essen.[193] At the end of 1912 the *Verbands katholischer Arbeitervereine Westdeutschlands* (Association of Catholic West German Workers' Associations) reported that 44.4 percent of its membership in the Ruhr were miners.[194] From 1894 the Gewerkverein joined the Arbeitervereine, but the Catholic sub-culture was also made up of various other religious and educational societies. This dense network was to provide an integrative function for many of the early immigrants to the region.[195]

However, shared religion was no guarantee of assimilation. As noted above, discrimination or a lack of facilities meant that the growing number of Polish

immigrants found it necessary to found their own organisations. For example, the Polish immigrants to Bottrop found that their spiritual needs were not well served. There was only one church and no services in the Polish language. The Poles held meetings and signed a petition demanding better provision for their needs in 1885, but it was only in 1902 that a priest fluent in Polish arrived to administer to the Herz Jesu church.[196] Such complaints became more common as the Polish communities became more established. In the 1890s the reports of the District Presidents (*Regierungspräsidenten*) for the Düsseldorf, Münster and Arnsberg areas, all of which included parts of the Ruhr began to include sections on Polish organisations in their reports to the Minster of the Interior. In 1904 the Regierungspräsident for Düsseldorf saw as noteworthy 'the increasingly audacious demands for greater consideration of the Polish language in Church and School.' He also commented on complaints made to the Bishops of Münster and Paderborn that nowhere in their dioceses were there Polish services more than twice a month and that confession was exclusively in German.[197] In fact many Poles believed that they were regarded by the German Catholics as somehow inferior Catholics, a view that sometimes led the Poles to a rejection of German control:

> We live worse than a sect here, although we're eager Catholics. Most of the blame has to be attributed to the priests, there's no way that a worker can kneel before the altar and hold mass, that's what the priests are here for and they're obliged to do this. I recommend and request you not to go to Church until we have a Polish priest here.[198]

More often the Poles established organisations to support candidates seeking election to Church boards. In Bottrop the Poles had succeeded in capturing nine out of ten seats on the Church executive, but rather than encouraging closer co-operation this seemed to heighten the mistrust between the German locals and Polish migrants.[199] Furthermore the state's Germanisation policy of the late nineteenth century, much like the Kulturkampf of the 1870s, served to consolidate the Polish sub-culture, rather than aid assimilation.[200]

Social democratic organisations co-existed alongside these Catholic and Polish associations. Like the Catholics, the Social Democrats had been the victims of a state-led policy of repression. However, following the lapsing of the Anti-Socialist Law and the miners' strike of 1889, social-democratic party organisations, which had often been disguised as choral groups in the 1880s,[201] quickly reappeared in the Ruhr.[202] The SPD also sought to create its own network of clubs. Philip Sommerlad, a SPD

activist in Bochum, recalled that the first cells of the local movement were made up of educational societies, while in Riemke there was a choral group *Morgenrot*.[203] Among these clubs were the social-democratic *Konsumvereine* (Co-operatives) and *Schnapskasinos* (members drinking clubs).[204] The District President for Düsseldorf reported that the Citizens and Workers Co-operative founded in Essen in 1902 swelled to 1,724 members by 1904.[205] Meanwhile, the Oberbergamt estimated that there were 117 *Schnapskasinos* in its area of jurisdiction, although the definition of what constituted a *Schnapskasino* often varied.[206] Not all the *Konsumvereine* and *Schnapskasinos* were social-democratic organisations and the party's attitude to the latter was especially complicated. Often they were condemned as a distraction and a drain on wages, but they also offered a place to hold political meetings.[207] Former members of SPD sporting associations also recalled them as having a strong working-class ethos.[208]

Vernon L. Lidtke has described these associations as representing an attempt to create an alternative culture.[209] However, Karl Rohe, in applying the concept of the milieu to the Ruhr, argues that, although it is difficult to quantify the degree to which the SPD were able to build a social-democratic milieu through the foundation of *Vereine*, this construction was generally weak. While the Centre represented 'the milieu party *par excellence*', the SPD was more of a *Sammlungsbewegung* (protest movement). Yet Rohe does believe that it possessed a certain milieu foundation. Significantly, he sees it as based mainly upon the Protestant cottage miners.[210] In 1890 the District President for Arnsberg noted that some 46 percent of the SPD activists in his area were, or had been, miners.[211]

This picture of milieux and sub-cultures can be overdrawn. Lynn Abrams has argued the working-class leisure organisations did become divided into socio-cultural milieux. Yet these associations helped the workers to integrate into industrial society and create a broader working-class culture.[212] Moreover, an increasing commercialisation of leisure from the 1900s tended to break down barriers based on religion and ethnicity.[213] Generally, however, South Wales represents a contrast to this picture of milieux and sub-cultures. There were, of course, countervailing forces in the South Wales mining communities. Nonconformity was divided into various sects, while Conservative workingmen's clubs jostled with classes held by former Ruskin, and later Central Labour College, students.[214] However, there were two key differences between associational life in South Wales and the Ruhr. First, the political

and religious organisations in South Wales did not equal the attempts made by Catholics, Poles and Social Democrats to create a club-life that could virtually cater for an individual's every need. Secondly, in South Wales plural group membership was accepted, whereas in the Ruhr it was often exclusive. This difference is illustrated by the relationship between the SWMF and Labour. Although the SWMF eventually affiliated to the Labour party, its members were free to join other political parties. For a Catholic to join the SPD, however, entailed a rejection of the Catholic milieu and possible excommunication. Moreover, in South Wales both rugby and football provided a focus for the community as a whole, rather than a particular political or ethnic group.[215] Although apolitical sporting clubs, such as Schalke 04, also existed in the Ruhr, many clubs demonstrated their political loyalties by affiliating to the social-democratic *Arbeiter-Turn und Sportbund* (Workers' Gynastic and Sports Union) or the middle-class, Protestant *Deutsche Turnschaft* (German Gymnastic Assoiciation).[216] Similarly, although Welsh employers often provided funds for workmen's halls and libraries they seem to have rarely have used them as a means of social control. The committees of many libraries and halls later fell into the hands of the labour movement, but meeting rooms remained open to various causes and books ranged from non-political fiction to socialist works.[217] By contrast, the trade unions in the Ruhr built meeting halls and libraries specifically for their own members.[218] Therefore, civil society in South Wales, although pluralistic, was not so rigidly segmented by ethnicity, religion and politics. On the other hand, the establishment of distinct milieux in the Ruhr meant civil society was more rigidly divided.

Summary

This 'snapshot' of the two coalfields has attempted to illustrate some of the long-term structures and trends within the development of the two coalfields prior to the outbreak of the Great War. There were clear differences between the two regions, which suggests that the lifeworld of the Welsh miners was more synchronous than those in the Ruhr. For example, South Wales experienced a longer, less rapid process of industrialisation, which was already well established in some areas, such as Merthyr. Industrial communities were therefore already well established in some areas before the expansion of the coal industry. On the other hand, industrialisation in the Ruhr was a much more rapid phenomenon and was accompanied by a sense of dislocation as miners lost their old privileges and village communities were

transformed into towns. In both coalfields, a major impetus for this expansion came from the advances in technology, which allowed access to deeper seams of coal. The production of coal in the Ruhr was closely linked to the growth of domestic iron and steel industries, while much Welsh coal was destined for export.

The comparison also reveals that the South Wales coalfield more closely fitted Bulmer's eight-point ideal-type of the 'traditional mining community' than the Ruhr.[219] In terms of economic predominance, the Ruhr developed a more diversified industrial structure and there was a strong trend towards both horizontal and vertical integration. This meant that the Ruhr was more occupationally heterogeneous than South Wales. Although South Wales also had its metal industries they were on a much smaller scale. Mining was economically predominant and the pit seemed to impinge on every aspect of life, providing a common feature in the lifeworld of the Welsh miners. Physically, it loomed over the villages, while its dust entered the houses at the end of every shift. Occupationally, it was the largest employer. Organisationally, it provided the basic unit for miners' unionism. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the pit did not dominate the lifeworld of the workers to the same extent. The winding gears shared the skyline with the factory smoke-stakes, and the unions based themselves on ethnicity, religion and politics rather then the pit.

Generally, the nature of work underground was similar in both areas. The longwall method of working was extensively used. However, the extent of supervision was greater in the Ruhr, suggesting that the German miners had somewhat less autonomy in the workplace. Moreover, Levenstein's study revealed widespread discontent with the job among Ruhr miners. In South Wales, on the other hand, mining was an occupation likely to passed on from father to son, if only because of lack of other opportunities. Many South Wales miners rejected the chance of promotion even when they had passed the necessary exams. On the other hand, the 'hereditary' nature of mining was declining in the Ruhr during this period. Miners there felt that the liberalisation of the industry and the introduction of new methods of working had undermined their status. This feeling, coupled with greater opportunities for factory work and rapid expansion of the coalfield, meant that the mining workforce became increasingly made up of immigrants. Initially the population in the local areas fed this demand. Later migrants from more distant areas formed an increasing proportion of the workforce. Of the two regions, the Ruhr was the most ethnically diverse, with Polish migrants forming a substantial section of the labour

force. Migrants to South Wales were assimilated far more easily, making linguistic and ethnic divisions far less evident.

The settlement of these migrants in the two areas also differed. There was a far greater degree of urbanisation in the Ruhr. The geography of that region was more favourable for the development of cities and towns than the valleys of South Wales. Former market towns, such as Essen and Bochum, found their populations massively expanded by the influx of migrants, while others, such as Gelsenkirchen, were formed by the amalgamation of villages. The narrow Welsh valleys, on the other hand, promoted the emergence of the pit village as the predominant mode of settlement. Furthermore, while a trend towards home ownership has been identified among the Welsh miners, the Ruhr saw more extensive company housing. While company housing was a decreasing phenomenon in Wales as the nineteenth century reached its end, in the Ruhr the opposite seems true. It offered the German industrialists a degree of social control over the mining communities that their Welsh counterparts did not enjoy. Residents of the company Kolonie were often isolated from the rest of the workforce and had to abide by a set of regulations or face eviction. To the cleavages of ethnicity and residence in the Ruhr can be added religion. While Nonconformity dominated the South Wales valleys, the Ruhr miners were divided between Catholicism and Protestantism. Further complications arose with the Polish community's demand for its own Catholic priests and clubs.

Divisions on ethnic, religious and political grounds influenced, and were in turn reinforced by, the various associations the miners of the Ruhr established. Pressure from the state in the form of the Kulturkampf, the Anti-Socialist Law and the 'Germanisation' policy served to consolidate particular groups. A distinctive Catholic milieu was formed, which was at first able to integrate the newly arrived Poles through the bond of common religion. However, from the 1890s the Poles increasingly formed their own separate associations as a reaction to a combination of discrimination and indifference. Able to act more freely after 1890, the SPD also sought to establish its own network of clubs, although the party was unable to establish the same deep roots the Catholics had.

It would not seem possible to apply the same concept of the milieu to South Wales. The theoretical literature on milieu stresses that its formation is dependent on some 'top-down' pressure. The Ruhr provides a prime example on how milieux could be formed, but similar examples are difficult to find for South Wales in the same

period. As will be shown, issues such as Disestablishment, the Welsh language and Home Rule, could be effectively used to rally support. But the organisations created to pursue these aims represented the impulse to reform, rather than the defensive consolidation of an existing group in the face of state repression. Moreover, many associations, especially sporting bodies, provided a focus for the community as a whole, rather than a particular group. Lacking this 'top-down' pressure and building on a comparatively more homogeneous social base, there developed in South Wales a comparatively more diffuse, flexible civil society, which was better able to assimilate new arrivals than the fragmented environment of the Ruhr. The subsequent two chapters will show how the different nature of the civil society in the Ruhr and South Wales influenced their attempts to form organisations to articulate their interests.

---

[1] Thomas Nicholas, Local Leaders Study, SWML, AUD 97.
[2] Lorenz Pieper, *Die Lage der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrrevier*, Stuttgart and Berlin, J G Cotta'sche, 1903, p. 245.
[3] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1848-1875*, London, Abacus, 1975, p. 13.
[4] Fagge, *Power*, p. 15.
[5] Michael Atkinson, 'The Supply of Raw Materials to the South Wales Iron Industry, 1800-60' and M. V. Symons, 'Coal-Mining in the Llanelli Area – Years of Growth, 1800-64' in Colin Baber and L. J. Williams, *Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1986, pp. 24-42 and pp. 43-52 respectively.
[6] Eric Weitz, 'Conflict in the Ruhr: Workers and Socialist Politics in Essen, 1910-1925', (Boston University School Ph.D.), 1983, pp. 32-3.
[7] For the beginnings of the South Wales and the Ruhr coal industries see Werner Berg, *Wirtschaft*, pp. 34-158. See also Gilbert, *Class*, p. 57; Hickey, p. 13 and E. D. Lewis, *The Rhondda Valleys: A Study in Industrial Development 1800 to the Present Day*, London, Phoenix House, 1958, p. 47.
[8] Wilhelm Brephol, *Der Aufbau des Ruhrvolkes im Zuge der Ost-West-Wanderung. Beiträge zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Recklinghausen, Bitter and Co, 1948, pp. 38-130.
[9] Hickey, *Workers*, pp. 13-14.
[10] R. H. Walters, *The Economic and Business History of the South Wales Coal Industry*, Arno Press, New York, 1977 pp. 49-50.
[11] See K. O. Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 60; Chris Williams, *Capitalism, Community and Conflict: The South Wales Coalfield, 1898-1947*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998, p. 89; Hickey, *Workers*, p. 13.
[12] Pounds, *Geography*, p. 508.
[13] For details of the Coal Mines Act of 1842 and Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1860 see Roy Church, *The History of the British Coal Industry 1830-1913: Victorian Pre-eminence*, vol. 3, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 191-200.
[14] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 1, pp. 127-137.
[15] Hickey, *Workers*, pp.183-186. See also Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 217.
[16] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, pp. 84-8 and pp. 138-43; Rhodri Walters, 'Capital Formation in the South Wales Coal Industry, 1840-1914' in *WHR*, 10, 1980, pp. 69-92; Hickey, *Workers*, p. 14; Gustav Stolper, *The German Economy 1870-1940*, London, Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1940, pp. 44-47; Lewis, *Rhondda*, p. 47.
[17] Martin Kitchen, *The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914*, London, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 95.
[18] Ibid, p. 96, Walters, 'Capital', pp. 69-92.
[19] See L. J. Williams, 'The Coalowners', in Smith (ed.), *People*, pp. 94-113; Hickey, *Workers*, pp. 14-15.
[20] James Edmund Vincent, *John Nixon: Pioneer of the Steam Coal Trade in South Wales*, London, John Murray, 1900, pp. 48-9.
[21] Ibid, pp. 121-5.

[22] Michael Asteris, 'The Rise and Decline of South Wales Coal Exports, 1870-1930', *WHR*, 13, 1986, p. 27.
[23] Pounds, *Geography*, p. 45 and pp. 439-440.
[24] Asteris, 'Rise', p. 25. The Barry docks were built in 1889 and 1898 when the Marquis demanded an increased levy on coal tipped at the existing docks and a new one to be built.
[25] Church, *History*, p. 35.
[26] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 89.
[27] Ibid, p. 90.
[28] Crew, *Town*, pp. 28-29.
[29] Pounds, *Geography*, pp. 375-6.
[30] Eric Weitz, Conflict, pp. 32-5.
[31] Williams, *Capitalism*, p. 32.
[32] Trevor Boyns, 'Growth in the Coal Industry: the Cases of Powell Duffryn and the Ocean Coal Company, 1864-1913' in Baber and Williams (eds.), *Wales*, pp. 153-170.
[33] Hickey, *Workers*, p. 15.
[34] Kitchen, *Economy*, pp. 134-5.
[35] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 92.
[36] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 85.
[37] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 94.
[38] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 84.
[39] See Paul Osthold, *Die Geschichte des Zechenverbandes 1908 - 1913. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte,* Berlin, Elsner, 1934; Stefan Prizgoda, *Unternehmerverbände im Ruhrbergbau. Zur Geschichte von Bergbau-Verein und Zechenverband 1858-1933*, Bochum, Deutschen Bergbau-Museums, 2002, p. 96.
[40] Church, *History*, pp. 665-6.
[41] Ibid, pp. 234-6.
[42] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 1, p. 42.
[43] Williams, 'The Coalowners', pp. 104-5. Furthermore he suggests that the formation of the MSWCOA was problematic. See chapter 6, 'The South Wales Coal Owners, 1873-80: Problems of Unity' in L. J. Williams, *Was Wales Industrialised? Essays in modern Welsh History*, Llandysul, Gomer, 1995, pp. 123-50.
[44] See Williams, 'The Coalowners'.
[45] Bernd Weisbrod, 'Entrepreneurial Politics and Industrial Relations in Mining in the Ruhr Region: From Managerial Absolutism to Co-determination' in Gerald D. Feldman and Klaus Tenfelde (eds.), *Workers, Owners and Politics in Coal Mining: An International Comparison of Industrial Relations*, Oxford, Berg, 1990, p. 131.
[46] Kitchen, *Economy*, pp. 135-7.
[47] Otto Faust, *Vom Bremsjungen zum Betribesinspektor. Ein Leben im Ruhrbergbau (1867-1914)*, Essen, Klartext, 1989, p. 194.
[48] HM Inspector of Mines, South Wales District, 1891, p. 4, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/7. The South Wales District comprised the whole of Carmarthenshire, Pembrokeshire, most of Glamorgan and part of Brecknock.
[49] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 226.
[50] Ibid, pp. 226-8.
[51] Ibid, pp. 162-3.
[52] HM Inspector of Mines, Cardiff and Newport District, 1909, p. 17, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/15.
[53] HM Inspector of Mines, Swansea District, 1909, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/15, p. 57.
[54] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 49.
[55] M. J. Daunton, 'Down the Pit: Work in the Great Northern and South Wales Coalfields, 1870-1914', *EHR*, 24, 1981, p. 583; Hickey, *Workers*, p. 112; Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 49.
[56] Uwe Burghardt, *Die Mechanisierung des Ruhrbergbaues 1890-1930*, München, Beck, 1995, p. 61.
[57] Walters, *History*, p. 206.
[58] B. L. Coombes, *These Poor Hands: The Autobiography of a Miner Working in South Wales*, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1939, p. 8 and p. 103.
[59] See *Glückauf*, 5 July 1902, pp. 633-44; ibid, 25 March 1911, p. 455.
[60] See 'Zur Frage der Verwendung der Schrämmaschine im Ruhrkohlenbergbau', *Glückauf*, 3 July 1909, pp. 969-76.
[61] Reports of the Manager of the Locket Merthyr Collieries to the Chairman and Directors, 21 July 1906, GRO, D/D NCB 16/35, p. 24.
[62] Ibid, see reports for January and February 1908 and 20 April 1908, GRO, D/D NCB 16/35, pp.199-200 and pp. 209-214.

[63] Werner, *Wirtschaft*, p. 163.
[64] Reports of the Manager of the Locket Merthyr Collieries to the Chairman and Directors, 1 October 1906, GRO, D/D NCB 16/35, pp. 47-8.
[65] Ibid, 8 January 1907, GRO D/D NCB 16/35, p. 92.
[66] See H. Stanley Jevons, *The British Coal Trade*, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. Ltd, 1915, pp. 608-17 and pp. 209-11; Brüggemeier, *Leben*, pp. 92-4; Berg, *Wirtschaft*, pp. 218-21 and Daunton, 'Pit', pp. 578-97.
[67] Jevons, *Trade*, pp. 611-2; Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 93.
[68] See Brüggemeier, *Leben*, pp. 96-102 and Hickey, *Workers*, pp. 109-15.
[69] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 537.
[70] Daunton, 'Pit', p. 590.
[71] See Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 99 and Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 545.
[72] Jevons, *Trade*, pp. 203-8; Daunton, 'Pit', pp. 580-1.
[73] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, pp. 105-12.
[74] Vincent, *Nixon*, pp. 182-3.
[75] Reports of HM Inspector of Mines, South Wales District, 1890, p. 6, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/15.
[76] Ibid, 1894, p. 5.
[77] Hickey, *Workers*, p. 118.
[78] See Bill Jones and Chris Williams (eds.) *With Dust Still in His Throat: A B. L. Coombes Anthology*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, pp. 44-51.
[79] Reports of HM Inspector of Mines, South Wales District, 1911, p. 5, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/16.
[80] Ibid, 1895, p. 6.
[81] The Mines Inspector for the South Western District reported the case of a man who received a innocuous cut from a falling stone only to die later from blood poisoning. Report of HM Inspector of Mines, South Western District, 1888, p. 7, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/1.
[82] Hickey, *Workers*, p. 119.
[83] See Reports of HM Inspector of Mines, SW District, 1888 and 1892, p. 7 and p. 11 respectively, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/1 and D/D NCB 67/2/9. Stein- und Kohlenunfallkommission, 1897, p. 197.
[84] Directors of the Harpener Bergbau AG, 21 September 1903 quoted in Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 120.
[85] Chris Williams, 'The South Wales Miners' Federation', *Llafur*, 5, 3, 1990, pp. 53-4.
[86] Adolf Levenstein, *Die Arbeiterfrage. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der sozialpsychologischen Seite des modernen Grossbetriebes und der psycho-physischen Einwirkungen auf die Arbeiter*, München, Ernst Rheinhardt, 1912, p. 59. Levenstein collated information from questionnaires received from miners, metalworkers and textile operatives. All respondents were politically active or Free Trade Union members. Of the miners, respondents from the Ruhr formed the largest single group, numbering 810.
[87] Ibid, p. 161.
[88] Alun Burge, 'Miners' Learning in the South Wales Coalfield 1900-1947', *Llafur*, 8, 1, 2000, p. 78.
[89] Pieper, *Lage*, p. 14.
[90] Tenfelde, 'Arbeitsplatz', in Conze and Ulrich Engelhardt (eds.), *Arbeiter*, pp. 328-1.
[91] Irmgard Steinisch and Klaus Tenfelde, 'Technischer Wandel und soziale Anpassung in der deutschen Schwerindustrie während des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', *AfSG*, 28, 1988, p. 43.
[92] Burge, 'Learning', pp. 90-1.
[93] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 220.
[94] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 1, pp. 176-267.
[95] Bergamt Östlich Dortmund to the Oberbergamt, 12 March 1884, STAM 1392.
[96] Plymouth Colliery Co. Diaries of Mr T H Bailey, 5 May 1883, GRO D/D NCB 16/37.
[97] Vincent, *Nixon*, pp. 189-196.
[98] Francis and Smith, *Fed*, p. 13.
[99] Diaries of Mr T H Bailey, 21 January 1886, GRO D/D NCB 16/37.
[100] Ibid, 25 January 1886, GRO D/D NCB 16/37.
[101] Bergamt Westlich Dortmund to Oberbergamt, 12 April 1876, STAM 1778.
[102] Ibid, 21 December 1883, STAM 1390.
[103] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 123.
[104] Cited in Helmuth Croon and Kurt Utermann, *Zeche und Gemeinde: Untersuchungen über den Strukturwandel einer Zechengemeinde im nördlichen Ruhrgebiet*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Moheer (Paul Siebeck), 1958, p. 20.
[105] See Tenfelde, *Sozialgeschichte*.
[106] See Coombes, *Hands*, p. 8.
[107] Quoted in Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 18.

[108] J. L. Williams interviewed by David Egan, 'South Wales Coalfield History Project', SWML, AUD 396, p. 3.
[109] Quoted in John J. Kulczycki, *The Foreign Worker and the German Labour Movement: Xenophobia and Solidarity in the Coal Fields of the Ruhr, 1871-1914*, Oxford, Berg, 1994, p. 23.
[110] John Williams, 'The Move from the Land' in Trevor Herbert & Gareth Elwyn Jones (eds.), *Wales 1880-1914*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, p. 11.
[111] Lewis, *Rhondda*, pp. 231-2.
[112] Hickey, *Workers*, p. 22.
[113] Pounds, *Geography*, p. 169.
[114] Williams, 'Land', p. 24.
[115] Pounds, *Geography*, p. 82.
[116] Croon and Utermann, *Zeche*, p. 28.
[117] Brephol, *Aufbau*, p. 80.
[118] Pounds, *Geography*, p. 84.
[119] Eric Weitz, Conflict, p. 47.
[120] Crew, *Town*, p. 60.
[121] See Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 86 and Richard C. Murphy, 'Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet: Das Beispiel Bottrop', in Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf (eds.), *Glück auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, pp. 91-2.
[122] Brinley Thomas, 'The Migration of Labour into the Glamorganshire Coalfield 1861-1911' in W. E. Minchinton, *Industrial South Wales*, London, Frank Cass and Co., 1969, pp. 81-99.
[123] Lewis, *Rhondda*, pp. 238-239.
[124] Coombes, *Hands*, p. 88.
[125] Hickey, *Workers*, p. 33.
[126] Pieper, *Lage*, p. 20.
[127] Christoph Kleßmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1945,* Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978, p. 58. See also ibid, 'Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet: Soziale Lage und gewerkschaftliche Organisation', in Mommsen and Borsdorf (eds.), *Glück auf,* pp. 111-30.
[128] Kleßmann, *Bergarbeiter*, pp. 96-138.
[129] Stadt Bochum to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 18 October 1893; Landrat Bochum to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 19 October 1893, STAM, 14045.
[130] Regierungspräsident Arnsberg to Minister des Innern, 10 December 1906, STAD, 9041.
[131] John J. Kulczycki, 'A Trade Union for Polish Miners in the Ruhr: Alter Verband, Gewerkverein and Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie', in Klaus Tenfelde (ed.), *Towards a Social History of Mining in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Papers presented to the International Mining History Congress Bochum*, München, Beck, 1989, pp. 610-17; Kleßmann, 'Bergarbeiter', pp. 118-9.
[132] Bezirkspolizeikommissar Dortmund to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 23 February 1908, STAD 16019.
[133] Claudia Schmidt, '"Dieses einst so verlockende Ruhrland". Migranten und Migrantenkultur der Polen und Masuren in Gelsenkirchen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', Stefan Goch and Lutz Heidemann (eds.), *100 Jahre Bismarck. Ein Stadtteil 'mit besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf'*, Essen, Klartext, 2001, pp. 55-66.
[134] Krus-Bonazza, '"Da waren die Hessen, die Polen und noch eine Sorte.." (Arbeits)-Einwanderer in Bochum-Dahlhausen zur Zeit des Kaiserreichs und der Weimarer Republik', in Peter Friedemann and Gustav Friedemann (eds.), *Struktureller Wandel und kulturelles Leben Politische Kultur in Bochum 1860-1990*, Essen, Klartext, 1992, pp. 178-8.
[135] Wolfgang Köllmann, 'The Process of Urbanisation in Germany at the Height of the Industrialisation Period', *JCH*, 4, 3, July 1969, pp. 63-64.
[136] Pounds, *Geography*, p. 169.
[137] See, for example, Pieper's examination of the Ueckendorf community in Gelsenkirchen, Pieper, *Lage*, pp. 252-66.
[138] Johann Paul, *Alfred Krupp und die Arbeiterbewegung*, Düsseldorf, Schwamm, 1987.
[139] See Frank Bajhor, '"Kampf ums altes Recht?" Bergbau und Bergarbeiterschaft im Industriedorf Gladbeck 1871-1889' in Karl Ditt and Dagmar Kift (eds.) *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik und Wilhelminische Gesellschaft*, Hagen, Westfälisches Industriemuseum, 1989, pp. 33-53, and Werner Hoffman, 'Politik in der Provinz: Kommunale Politisierung dargestellt an den sechs Industriedörfen im Landkreis Recklinghausen vom Beginn der Industrialisierung bis 1914', *Bochumer Historische Studien*, Neuere Geschichte, 16, 1996.

[140] Philip N. Jones examines the factors that shaped the construction of housing in the South Wales valleys in *Colliery Settlement in the South Wales Coalfield, 1850-1926*, Occasional Papers in Geography, No 14, University of Hull Publications.
[141] David Gilbert, *Class*, pp. 67-8; M. Daunton 'Miners' houses: South Wales and the Great Northern Coalfield, 1880-1914', *IRSH*, 25, 1980, pp. 143-175.
[142] Malcolm J. Fisk, *Housing in the Rhondda, 1800-1940*, Cardiff, Merton Priory Press Ltd, 1996, p. 55.
[143] Minutes of the Aberdare UDC, 14 and 28 June 1895 and 12 July 1895, GRO AB/UD 1.
[144] Fisk, *Housing*, p. 55.
[145] Walter Haydn Davies, *The Right Place, The Right Time: Memories of Boyhood Days in a Welsh Mining Community*, Swansea, Christopher Davies, 1975, pp. 66-7, GRO D/D NCB16/35.
[146] Report of the manager of the Lockets Merthyr Collieries to the Board of Directors, 8 Jan 1910
[147] Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co., 13 May 1890, GRO D/D PD 1/3.
[148] Ibid, GRO D/D PD 1/5. For plans for housing see minutes for 12 April and 14 June 1910, 1 April 1911 and 8 July 1913. On 9 January 1906 the directors resolved to take shares in the Workingmen's Building Club as several individuals had withdrawn and the agreement with the building contractors was in danger of being broken.
[149] Manager of Lockets Merthyr Collieries to Directors, 9 July 1909, GRO D/D NCB16/35.
[150] Fisk, *Housing*, p. 47
[151] Ibid, p. 39.
[152] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 562.
[153] Dick Geary, 'The industrial bourgeoisie and labour relations in Germany 1871-1933', David Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans (eds.), *The German Bourgeoisie. Essays on the social history of the German middle class from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century*, London and New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 142-4.
[154] Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 273.
[155] Werksgeschichte – Gewerkschaft des Steinkohlenbergwerks vereinigte Helene und Amalie während des Krieges und der Revolution bis zu Reichsmark, 1914-1924, 1924/25, p. 13, BBA, Bestand 20, 565.
[156] S. Hickey, 'The Shaping of the German Labour Movement: Miners in the Ruhr' in Richard J. Evans (ed.), *Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, London, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 217.
[157] Cited in Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 27.
[158] Ibid, pp. 50-1. Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 272.
[159] Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, pp. 99-100.
[160] Michael Schäfer, *Heinrich Imbusch: Christlicher Gewerkschaftsführer und Widerstandskämpfer*, München, C. H. Beck, 1990, pp. 11-12.
[161] Between 1893 and 1914 the number of pigs and sheep kept by miners increased by 168 percent and 303 percent respectively, Berg, *Wirtschaft*, p. 268.
[162] See Ioan Matthews, 'The World of the Anthracite Miner' in *Llafur*, 6, I, 1992, pp. 96-7, and James Griffiths 'The Miners' Union in the Anthracite Coalfield' in Goronwy Alun Hughes (eds.) *Men of No Property: Studies of Welsh Trade Unionism*, Caerwys, Gwasg Gwenffrwd, 1971, pp. 60-7.
[163] Croon and Helmuth, *Zeche*, pp. 22-24.
[164] Bajhor, 'Kampf'.
[165] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, pp. 62-4.
[166] Ibid, p. 65.
[167] See Murphy, 'Bergarbeiter', p. 102.
[168] See Deirdre Beddoe, *Out of the Shadows: A History of Women in Twentieth-Century Wales*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, p. 18; Alis Parker, 'What Mam Said Went: A Study of Women in Mining Families in South Wales Before the Second World War and their access to power in the home', Unpublished MSc (Econ), 1996, pp. 41-2.
[169] See Brinley Thomas, 'Wales and the Atlantic Economy' *SJPE*, 6, 3, 1959, pp. 169-92; ibid, 'A Cauldron of Rebirth: Population and the Welsh Language in Nineteenth Century', in Geraint H. Jenkins, (eds.), *A Social History of the Welsh Language: The Welsh Language and its Social Domains 1801-1911*, Cardiff, Cardiff University Press, 2000.
[170] Tim Williams, 'Language, Religion, Culture', in Herbert and Jones (eds.), *Wales 1880-1914*, pp. 78-9; ibid, 'The Anglicisation of South Wales,' in R. Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism*, vol. 2, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 193-203. See also the Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest 1917, p. 15.
[171] Jon Parry, 'The Tredegar Anti-Irish Riots of 1882', *Llafur*, 3, 4, 1983 pp. 20-3.
[172] *SWDN*, 29 July 1886
[173] Geoffrey Alderman, 'The Anti-Jewish Riots of August 1911 in South Wales', *Llafur*, 6, 2, 1972, pp. 190-200.

[174] *PG*, 12 July 1902
[175] *RL*, 27 October 1900
[176] Tim Williams estimates that about 75 percent of the Welsh population visited the chapels between 1880 and 1914. However, he qualifies this by pointing out that they often had to compete for working-class attention with more secular pursuits, such as sport, and they had no formal power of enforcement, 'Language', pp. 80-83.
[177] Morgan, *Rebirth*, pp. 17-18.
[178] Rees Davies, SWML, AUD 207.
[179] Peter Elwood, *A History of Temple Chapel*, 1987, GRO D/D Bap 44/1.
[180] Meirion Davies, *Glynogwr and Gilfach Goch: A History*, Cowbridge and Bridgend, D. Brown & Sons Ltd, 1981, p. 97.
[181] Minutes of the Society for Establishing and Supporting English Congregational Churches in South Wales, AGM 13 September 1877, GRO D/D E Cong 1/1.
[182] Revd Evan Price, *The History of Penuel: Calvinistic Methodist Church Ebbw Vale*, Wrexham, Hughes and Son, 1925, pp. 84-94.
[183] Minutes of Committee Meetings, English Congregational Church, Pontypridd, 17 July 1906, GRO D/D X rx 1.
[184] Claus Schwaderer, 'Die Reichstagswahlen und die Wahlen zur Nationalversammlung im Landkreis und der Stadt Bochum 1912–1920', Hausarbeit der ersten Staatsprüfung für das Lehramt an Gymnasien, Bochum, February 1980, p. 67 and pp. 108-24.
[185] Hickey, *Workers*, pp. 70-80.
[186] Max Seippel, *Bochum einst und jetzt. Ein Rück- und Rundblick bei der Wende des Jahrhunderts*, Bochum, Schürmann und Klagges, 1901/1991, pp. 60-82.
[187] Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918: Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist*, vol. 1, München, Beck, 1998, p. 432.
[188] Ibid, p. 449; Elaine Glovka Spencer, *Management and Labor in Imperial Germany: Industrialists as Employers, 1896-1914*, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1984, pp. 151-6.
[189] Rainer Lepsius, 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft', Gerhard A. Ritter (ed.), *Die deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, Köln, 1973, pp. 56-80; Claggett, Loesch, Shivley and Snell, 'Leadership', pp. 643-64.
[190] See Wolfgang Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus und Parteien im Ruhrgebiet. Zum Wahlverhalten des katholischen Bergarbeitermilieus bis 1933*, München, Beck, 1996.
[191] See Ellen Lovell Evans, *The German Center Party, 1870-1933: A Study in Political Catholicism*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1981.
[192] Evelyn and Werner Kroker, *Solidarität aus Tradition. Die Knappenvereine im Ruhrgebiet*, München, Beck,1988, pp. 11-47.
[193] Heiner Budde, *Christliche-Sozial an der Ruhr. Eine Volksbewegung im Zentrum der Industrie. Dokumentation eines 150jährigen Wegen*, Köln, Orthen Druck, 1988, pp. 65-7.
[194] Claus Haffert, *Die katholishen Arbeitervereine Westdeutschlands der Weimarer Republik*, Essen, Klartext, 1994, p. 244.
[195] Michael Schäfer, 'Das Milieu der katholischen Arbeiter im Ruhrgebiet (1890-1914)', Dagmar Kift (ed.), *Kirmes-Kneipe-Kino. Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet zwischen Kommerz und Kontrolle (1850-1914)*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1992, pp. 198-9.
[196] Murphy, 'Bergarbeiter', pp. 98-9.
[197] Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Minister des Innern, 15 November 1904, STAD, 9041
[198] Report on a Polish meeting held on the 15 January 1905, Oberbürgermeister Essen to Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, 18 January 1905, STAD 9056.
[199] Murphy, 'Bergarbeiter', pp. 98-9.
[200] Kulczycki, *Workers*, pp. 38-40.
[201] Antionette Hellkuhl, *Empor zum Licht. Arbeitergesangvereine im westfälichen Ruhrgebiet 1878-1914*, Stuttgart and Witten, Bertold Marohl Musikverlag, 1983, pp. 29-33.
[202] See Stefan Goch, *Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel Gelsenkirchen, 1848-1975*, Düsseldorf, Dorste Verlag, 1990, pp. 81-146; Ralf Lützenkirchen, *Der sozialdemokratische Verein für den Reichstagswahlkkreis Dortmund-Hörde. Ein Beitrage zur Parteigeschichte*, Dortmund, Historischen Vereins Dortmund, 1970.
[203] Philip Sommerlad, *Vom 'Hessebud' zum 'Bochumer Jungen': 70 Jahre sozialistische Bewegung in Bochum (1878-1948)*, edited by Peter Friedemann and Edgar Heinevetter, Essen, Klartext, 1990, p. 50.
[204] Gerhard Huck, 'Arbeiterkonsumverein und Verbraucherorganisation. Die Entwicklung der Konsumgenossenschaften im Ruhrgebiet 1860-1914', Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber (eds.), *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, pp. 215-46; Joerss, Ralf, 'Moralisch Verkommen und politisch Gefährlich?

Die Schnapskasinos im Ruhrgebiet am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts', *Beiträge zur Geschichte Dortmunds und der Grafschaft Mark*, vol. 92/93 (2001/2002), pp. 133-74; Franz Josef Brüggemeier and Lutz Niethammer, Lutz, 'Schlafgänger, Schnapskasinos und Schwerindustrielle Kolonie. Aspekte der Arbeiterwohnungsfrage im Ruhrgebiet vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in Reulecke and Weber (eds.), *Fabrik*, pp. 135-76.

[205] Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Minister des Innern, 15 November 1904, STAD 9041.

[206] Oberbergamt to Regierungspräsidenten Arnsberg, Düsseldorf and Münster, 11August 1894, STAM 1834.

[207] Joerss, 'Verkommen', pp. 159-63.

[208] Volker Schmidtchen, ''Arbeitersport - Erziehung zum sozialistischen Menschen? Leitwiese und Jugendarbeit in zwei Ruhrgebietsvereinen in der Weimarer Republik', Reulecke and Weber. (eds.), *Fabrik*, pp. 364-6.

[209] Vernon L. Lidtke, *The Alternative Culture: Socialist Labor in Imperial Germany*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.

[210] Karl Rohe, 'Die Ruhrgebietssozialdemokratie im Wilhelminischen Kaiserreich und ihr politischer und kultureller Kontext', Gerhard A. Ritter, *Der Aufstieg der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung: Sozialdemokratie und Freie Gewerkschaften im Parteiensystem und Sozialmilieu des Kaiserreichs*, München, R. Oldenburg, 1990, pp. 328-44.

[211] Cited in Arno Herzig, 'Organisationsprobleme der Sozialdemokratie im Ruhrgebiet im 19. Jahrhundert', Ludiger Heid and Julius H. Schoeps, *Arbeit und Alltag im Revier. Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterkultur im westlichen Ruhrgebiet im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik*, Duisburg, Walter Braun Verlag, 1985, p. 19.

[212] Lynn Abrams, 'Zur Entwicklung einer kommerziellen Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet (1850-1914)', in Dagmar Kift, *Kirmes - Kneipe - Kino. Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet zwischen Kommerz und Kontrolle (1850-1914)*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1992, pp. 47-9.

[213] Lynn Abrams, *Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany: Leisure and Recreation in the Rhineland and Westphalia*, London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p.171.

[214] On the Conservative Workingmens' clubs see F. J. Harries, *History of Conservatism in the Rhondda*, Pontypridd, Glamorgan County Times Office, 1912.On independent working-class education see, Richard Lewis, *Leaders and Teachers: Adult Education and the Challenge of Labour in South Wales, 1906-1940*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1993, pp. 49-97.

[215] See Gareth Williams, *1905 and All That*, Gomer Press, 1991, p. 17 and Martin Johnes, 'That Other Game: A Social History of Soccer in South Wales, c1906-1939', (Unpub. University of Wales, Cardiff PhD), 1998, p. 299.

[216] See Siegfried Gehrmann, 'Fußball in einer Industrieregion. Das Beispiel F. C. Schalke 04', in Reulecke and Wolfhard (eds.) *Fabrik*, pp. 377-98; ibid, *Fußball, Vereine, Politik. Zur Sportgeschichte des Reviers, 1900-1940*, Essen, Reimar Hobbing, 1988.

[217] See Christopher M Baggs, "Well Done, Cymmer Workmen!" The Cymmer Collieries Workmen's Library, 1893-1920', *Llafur*, 5, 3, pp. 20-5; Jonathen Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 237-55.

[218] See Heinrich Imbusch, *25 Jahre Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter*, Essen, Verlag des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1919.

[219] For the eight-point model see the introduction.

Chapter Two

Trade Union Discourses, 1890-1914

> ''But you can't be in theirs and ours at the same time!'' Schneider, Alter Verband member, to Hans Marchwitza on his dual membership of the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein.''[1]

> 'It was both an industrial and a social institution...It differed from the normal functions of trade unions because of its more intimate involvement in the domestic and social life of the people'. Will Paynter on the SWMF. [2]

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the trade unions sought to construct miners' identities through discourse Between 1889 and 1902, the miners in both regions were successful in forming trade unions that were to survive up to the Great War and beyond. Yet, despite a similar trend towards successful combination, it soon became apparent that trade unionism was to take very different courses in the two regions. While the South Wales Miners' Federation (SWMF) assumed a hegemonic position in terms of miners' organisation before the Great War, the movement in the Ruhr was progressively split along religious, political and ethnic lines. So while trade unionism in South Wales was characterised by homogenisation, in the Ruhr the overall impression is of fragmentation.

This chapter seeks to shed some light on the reasons for these divergent trends. The focus will be upon the discursive practices of the trade unions. As will become apparent three strands, Christian-socialism, socialism (or social democracy) and syndicalism, played important roles in the discourses of the trade unions covered here. However, the intention is not totally to disassociate discourse from material structures. Instead, incidences of unemployment, wage reduction or intensification of work practices were all subject to interpretation by trade union activists. These interpretative frameworks then formed the basis of both the discursive practices of the trade unions and their actions. At the same time, actions were conditioned by the unions' own organisational resources. However, the way in which they conceived and developed their own discursive identities was to have an important impact upon their success in organising the workforce.

Ideological Conflicts: Christian-socials and Social Democrats, 'Federationists' and 'Scalites'

Both the South Wales and the Ruhr coalfields had a history of miners' organisation that predated the 1890s. Attempts had been made to organise the Welsh miners in permanent associations since the 1830s.[3] Thomas Halliday and the Amalgamated Association of Miners (AAM) made the most successful attempt in the first half of the 1870s. Ultimately, this organisation fell victim to employer intransigence, unfavourable economic conditions and defeat in a large strike in 1875.[4] In the Ruhr, the initial spur to organisation came somewhat later. The liberalisation of the mining industry entailed the loss of privileges that the miners had previously enjoyed under the system of state control. The *Knappenvereine* aimed at salvaging something of the miners' status by providing benefits for their members, while also seeking to maintain the professional pride of the miners. In the 1870s there were two attempts to establish trade union organisations in the Ruhr. The first followed the 1872 Essen strike and took the form of the *Grubenarbeiterverband*, the second, the *Rosenkranzverband*, came six years later. As an augur of subsequent events, the latter organisation foundered on differences between the Social Democrats and the christian-social miners.[5]

The 1880s represented a lull in trade union organisation in both regions. However, organisation was not at a complete standstill. *Knappenvereine* continued to be established and reached their high point in this decade. In South Wales, the establishment of a Sliding Scale followed the dissolution of the AAM. This system linked wages directly to prices. Price fluctuations were to be followed by a corresponding rise or reduction in wages.[6] Organisation of a sort survived in the form of local unions, such as the Cambrian Miners' Association.[7] However, since the Scale obviated the need for genuine negotiation over wages, these associations have been termed 'quasi'-unions, whose principal function was to raise the funds necessary to support the miners' representatives on the Sliding Scale Committee.[8]

These organisational efforts formed the background to the eventual establishment of permanent trade unions in the 1890s. What is striking about the Ruhr is the role Christian thought played, first, in providing legitimisation for the activists' efforts at organisation, and, secondly, in forming an interpretative framework through which to criticise the employers. The Bishop of Mainz gave the movement an

intellectual and moral basis in a pamphlet entitled 'The Worker Question and Christianity.'[9] Furthermore the early Knappenvereine were predominantly priest-led, Catholic organisations. Their statutes often called upon a member to be a 'genuine Christian' and lead a life of propriety.[10]

Christian-social thought was spurred to further action by the 1889 strike. During the 1880s discontent over wages and conditions had been simmering. In March and April 1889 meetings in Essen had formulated a list of demands regarding wages, the introduction of the eight hour shift and restriction of over-time. The strike itself, however, was a spontaneous movement. Beginning at the Präsident mine in Bochum on 25 April, it quickly spread to other areas. A central strike committee was eventually established on 10 May and, five days later, a delegation presented the miners' case to the Kaiser. Without a strike fund and in the face of the VbI's intransigent attitude, the miners had already began to drift back to work. On 19 May the strike was officially ended.[11]

The Catholic press regarded the strike as the result of the lack of dialogue between the owners and the workers. *Tremonia*, edited by Lambert Lensing, emphatically rejected claims the strike was caused by a mixture of laziness and social democratic agitation. Instead, it argued that the employers had a false image of the worker as a 'human machine', that needed only to work, eat and sleep. Religion was placed at the centre of the Christian-social critique. If 'one has the religious requirement to visit the Church on Sunday and Monday, that is already, in the eyes of many employers, a disagreeable, disruptive luxury, which hinders the organisation of the works and the worker in his work.'[12] The implication was that if the employers accepted that their workers required leisure time for their full spiritual needs, then a better understanding would develop between them. Lensing further set out this conviction that religion was the key to mediating conflict between employers and employees in a pamphlet. He claimed:

> only on the basis of Christianity will the social question be solved or it will not be solved...Employer and worker must be led to a better relationship by the principle of Christian charity...The employer should not be the tyrant of the workers, who exploits their strength like a machine, he should rather appear as a caring owner (*Fürsorger*) and regard the workers as human and an equal partner, who is sooner approachable through a friendly word, than crude reprimands...The worker on the other hand should consider the employer as his provider (*Brodherrn*), respect him, he should joyfully do his duty, whilst not stealing the day from the Lord (*wegstehlen*).[13]

Mediation of conflict between capital and labour would only be achieved through the establishment of this dialogue. Following the 1889 strike the employers attempted to introduce a system that would prevent the workers from changing workplace (*Sperre*). Along with the fines that accompanied the end of the strike, this action caused great discontent. A further strike was only avoided by the intervention of District President Berlepsch, who held talks with both miners and owners, finally persuading the latter to drop the system.[14] *Tremonia* seized upon this as a positive example of better communication. 'It has been repeatedly emphasised by experts, that with respect to an excited workforce, a friendly word is often more effective than factual concessions from the employers. That the workforce is a factor with which one must reckon has actually been recognised by the employers in their sacrifice of the *Sperre*. Why do they uphold the empty appearance of inflexibility, when they have nothing to lose, but much to gain, through the acceptance of direct negotiations?'[15] The ultimate goal of the Christian-social movement was recognition of the workers as partners in the mining industry. Strikes like that of May 1889 could be avoided through communication predicated on a shared understanding of Christian values and recognition of the importance of both employers and miners to the running of the industry.

Christian thought played a less clear role in industrial relations in South Wales, although religious allusions certainly formed a part of trade union rhetoric. Thomas Halliday was fond of referring to the 'good old Book' in his speeches,[16] while the *Workman's Advocate* lambasted the employers as 'Pharasaical hypocrites' during the lockout of 1875.[17] However, to talk of a Christian-social movement along the same lines as that of the Ruhr before the 1890s is erroneous. In comparison to the Ruhr, South Wales lacked such a self-conscious Christian-social movement with a sound intellectual and organisational base. Instead, religious references by trade union activists in South Wales reflected a general desire for legitimacy in a religious society, rather than the product of a thought-out ideology. In fact, Keith Burgess has argued that Methodism, with its emphasis on self rather than collective help, was a hindrance to trade union development.[18] In this interpretation secularisation encouraged organisation.

However, nonconformist theology did provide legitimacy for the Sliding Scale. Many of the miners' leaders who supported the Scale, such as William

Abraham and David Morgan, were also actively involved in the religious life of the valleys and had participated in the AAM. Abraham, the staunchest supporter of the Scale and famous for his ability to quell unruly meetings through song, was especially deeply embedded in the Nonconformist ethos of South Wales.[19] E. Evans has argued that Mabon saw the Scale as holding 'the promise that there should be no more strife in the coalfield, and clearly envisaged an era of peace and justice.'[20] His support for the Scale was, in fact, an attempt to apply his Christian precepts to industrial relations.[21]

In fact, the idea of the Scale dovetailed well with Methodist ideas of self-help, as it, in theory at least, ensured that the worker was able to earn as just a wage as possible under the prevailing economic market conditions. In effect the employers and the employees would share the fortunes of the industry. Both would suffer the hardships of a downturn, or the prosperity of a boom. Mabon shared with the Christian-social movement in the Ruhr a desire to cultivate an understanding between capital and labour. This in no way entailed a complete subordination of the workers' interests. Nonconformity's emphasis on compassion and social responsibility provided a basis for criticism of employers.[22] The workers were the responsible co-partners of the employers, sharing in the losses and success. When the latter erred, the miners were justified in taking action. Thus Mabon's support for the eight-hour movement was predicated on the idea that restriction of output would raise prices, thereby improving the lot of the men. It was in this vein that he addressed a meeting in Porth in 1894. He claimed that 'capital and labour, when in intelligent co-operation, should have identical interests, but unfortunately they were not always in harmony, because as a rule capital was not willing to give to labour a fair share of the results of their joint production.'[23]

This preoccupation with a fair share of production was common to both the Christian-socials in the Ruhr and the Sliding 'Scalites' of South Wales. Within the discursive practice of both the 'fair share' formed the basis for accommodation between employers and employees. Each side complemented the other. Thus the position of the capitalists was secure. Neither Mabon nor the Christian-socialists challenged the mineowners' right to the profits of the industry, but merely sought a more just distribution of that wealth between miners and employers. At the same meeting at which he advocated restricted production, Mabon also stressed that the profits should not be so reduced so as to leave the capitalists with no inducement for

investment.[24] In both regions, notions of Christian justice and fairness underpinned ideas of co-operation and compromise in industrial relations.

In the 1890s, however, both these co-operative discourses faced challenges from more confrontational interpretations of industrial relations. In fact, in the Ruhr there already existed a long-standing conflict between the Christian-social and social-democratic movements. As already noted, tensions between the two ideological orientations had undermined a previous attempt at organisation in the 1870s. Klaus Tenfelde traces the struggle back to differences between the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein* (ADAV) and the Catholic Knappenvereine in the 1860s.[25] In 1889 this conflict was submerged by the strike wave that engulfed the Ruhr. The experience of the strike had clearly demonstrated the need for a permanent organisation to represent the miners. Miners' meetings in May resolved that 'the unity of the workers has disappeared and it is now necessary for an organisation to strive for the same'.[26] A delegate conference in Dorstfeld, attended by both Christian-social and social-democratic representatives founded the *Verband zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännisches Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen*, later known as the Alter Verband, on 18 August 1889. In an effort to maintain unity, the new association explicitly excluded political and religious matters. By March 1890 the Alter Verband had 5,000 members in the Bochum area alone.[27]

This attempt to transpose strike solidarity into organisational unity ultimately proved short-lived. The miners' movement again split into Christian-social and Social democratic camps. The split between the two had less to do with their concrete goals, than with the specific discourses they applied to industrial relations. For while the Christian-socials continued to seek accommodation between the interests of the owners and the workers, the Social Democrats propagated a more confrontational identity that challenged the authority of management. Instead of being seen as co-operative partners, the miners and the owners were depicted in social-democratic discourse as locked in a struggle for control of the industry.

The ideological strife between these two discourses was soon demonstrated by a dispute over the political inclination of the Verband's organ, the *Bergarbeiter Zeitung*.[28] The mouthpiece of the association, the newspaper was an especially important means of constructing and disseminating an organisational identity. This made it an in-built point of conflict for the two orientations. The newspaper, dominated by the Social Democrats, promoted a Marxist reading of industrial

relations and insisted on the importance of the class struggle (*Klassenkampf*). Improvement for the workers would only come 'through the elimination of the hitherto existing lordship of the mine owners' (*bergwerkliches Herrentum*).[29]

As early as January 1890 complaints over the direction of the organ were raised. A letter in the *Rheinisch-Westfälischer Volksfreund* complained "that the executive attempts to impose on us, at our own cost, an organ, which in every issue betrays its social democratic character."[30] At a delegate meeting of the Alter Verband in March 1890 the Christian-social deputies from Buer, Hamme and Wattenscheid 'declared themselves decisively against the political viewpoint of the association's organ' and threatened to cede from the Verband. A further conference was promised to consider the problem.[31] However, this failed to erase the perception that the Alter Verband was dominated by Social Democrats. A meeting of Christian delegates in Bochum demanded that the statutes of the Verband be changed so as to exclude Social Democrats from the organisation. The prevailing attitude was 'we want to be a united people in brotherhood, but not under social-democratic leadership...Our solution must be Front against the Verband.'[32] On 4 May 1890 a Christian, counter association, *Rheinisch-Westfälischer Bergarbeiter Verein Glückauf zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännischen Interessen* was founded.

Although Glückauf remained comparatively weak, the secession of the Christian-social activists and the ensuing organisational rivalry sharpened the discursive conflict. The Marxist tone of the organ became ever more explicit and attacked the principles upon which its rival was based. Here is an article from May 1890:

> There exists among the working class, and especially among the miners, a mass of people, who sing maniacally of the sorrowful nature of their own work and that of their comrades, without reference to economic and political mechanisms, and yet, despite the ever more vehement conflict of interest between them and the antagonistic employer (capitalist) class, they dream of a peaceful existence. That might be possible, but then these dreamers (sleepers) are nothing more than the anvil upon which the hammer strikes often and heavily. 'The struggle for existence' will in time be conducted by the industrial circles with greater severity and ruthlessness, and whoever does not devote himself to the same, whoever withholds his energy from his class, perpetrates the class sin of omission, whose consequence will be borne first by himself and his comrades and later by their descendants...The value of labour will be depressed little by little by capitalist production and will not stop until financial ruin.

This ruin could be countered by organisation, but first 'every miner must grasp the knowledge...that he belongs to a class, which is ruthlessly exploited by capital, and out of whose clutches the individual cannot escape. In other words: class-consciousness must be supported, must be fostered, otherwise the energetic and successful advocacy of interests will lack the true and only socially relevant mainspring: class camaraderie is a must, a categorical imperative.'[33]

This Marxist reading of capitalism excluded the possibility of co-operation between the miners and the owners leading to an enduring improvement in the living standards of the former. The mechanism of capitalist economics would inevitably cause conflict. Far better to accept this and prepare for the clash of interests. Therefore, while the Christian-socials sought a commonality of interests, the Alter Verband perceived them as mutually exclusive. As Walter Neumann argues, 'each of them had found a crystallisation point, which was already ideological, in the one case in the sense of Christian-Catholic confession, in the other in the sense of an intellectually free, socialist world view, which they could apply to the further development of their organisation.'[34] It was these crystallisation points that formed the basis of legitimacy for action. An example of how these interpretations contributed to action is revealed by the January 1893 strike in the Ruhr. Meetings of the Alter Verband called to discuss its response to a strike in the Saar coalfield were overwhelmingly in favour of a sympathy strike. This was despite warnings from their leader Fritz Bunte that the economic conditions were unfavourable and that they risked punishment for breach of contract. Feelings of class solidarity and empathy were running high. Recommendations regarding financial support were swept aside by cries of 'we have no money' and 'strike'. It was claimed that 'if the comrades in the Saar had the right to strike, then we have the duty to support then'[35] and 'if the local miners do nothing for the Saarbrücker, then one would rightly complain of a lack of solidarity among the miners.'[36] The conviction that 'between capital and labour no harmony is possible' was reiterated.[37] Despite Bunte's scepticism a sympathy strike was announced.[38]

The Christian-socials were extremely critical. *Tremonia* claimed 'we find it absolutely outrageous, that comparatively well paid workers with secure jobs should pick a quarrel during a time of economic decline, without knowing what they actually want, without exactly establishing their demands and without exhausting all other means for their realisation.'[39] It saw the sympathy strike as merely a cynical attempt

by the Social Democrats to cause unrest among the miners and their families, which could then be turned to political purposes. The incident merely further revealed the need for an organisation based on a 'Christian basis' to counter the 'agitators and screamers' (*Hetzer und Schreier*).[40] The Catholic organ was also concerned that the strike would cost the miners the sympathy of the middle class, thereby stalling efforts at social reform.[41] In contrast, the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Arbeiter Zeitung*, a social-democratic organ, claimed that the workers were more than ready to accept reform, but it must be genuine, rather than mere window dressing. Genuine reform, however, could not be expected from the class state.[42] As it was the strike proved to be a total failure and cost the Alter Verband dearly. Only 21,000 out of a total workforce of 145,000 participated. Many of the Verband's activists were arrested and the strikers punished for breach of contract.[43] For the Verband's organ this merely unmasked the naked class struggle between capital and labour. Protestations of the inevitable victory of the proletariat did little however to ameliorate existing circumstances.[44] By 1894 membership had sunk to 5,144.[45]

In contrast the Christian-social movement made a renewed attempt at organisation the following year. On 28 October 1894 the *Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund* was founded under the leadership of August Brust. The son of a miner, Brust was deeply rooted in the Catholic milieu. Following his move to Altenessen in search of work he joined the Catholic Knappenverein *Bergmannsglück*. He used the association's library to educate himself and also joined the local branch of the *Vinzenzverein*, a Catholic charity organisation.[46] His Catholic socialisation contributed to his vision for the Gewerkverein. Ideologically it was committed to maintaining 'peaceful agreement between employers and workers', and, like its predecessor Glückauf, a member professed 'himself an opponent of social-democratic principles and aims.'[47] In fact, Brust regarded the organisation as a bulwark against Social Democracy.[48] The Christian-social ideal of harmonic co-operation between socio-economic groups that lay behind the ideological position of the Gewerkverein was expressed through its organ, *Der Bergknappe*. Through the newspaper it also promoted a united stance against the rise of socialism. 'It is the task of all well-disposed workers, but also not least – and this we greatly emphasise – the task of all other well-meaning citizens (*Bürger*), especially the industrialists, to see to it that socialist tendencies are ever more repressed and indeed that the Christian workforce is united and their unification

protected, elevated and allowed for.'[49] The socialists were then the 'other' to be countered by joint action from employers and Christian miners. By 1894 the unity of the 1889 strike had completely vanished. The trade union movement among the Ruhr miners had split into two camps each armed with an effective means to disseminate their conflicting discourses. This served to reinforce the heterogeneity and milieux in the Ruhr.

While discontent fermented in the Ruhr and the trade union movement began to fragment, South Wales seemed in comparison a paragon of industrial peace. Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for South Wales commented in 1890 that 'a noteworthy feature appears to be the harmony and community at large, it is sincerely to be hoped that this good feeling will long continue, for it would be an evil day for South Wales that ushered in a general and protracted struggle in the coal trade, which now exceeds one-ninth of that for the United Kingdom.'[50] These might have been famous last words for in the early 1890s cracks were to appear in the dominance of the Sliding Scale. However, the divisions beginning to emerge in South Wales did not run along religious/social-democratic fault lines. Instead, differences focused on the approach to industrial relations. Ideas regarding collective agreements promoted by the Minerworkers' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) had begun to penetrate the coalfield, and were able to make headway due to growing dissatisfaction with the Scale since the abandonment of the minimum rate in 1880.[51] In the early 1890s the Monmouthshire and South Wales Miners' Association was formed under the leadership of William Brace, which actively criticised the Scale and advocated affiliation to the MFGB. In 1892 a lodge of the MFGB was established in Mabon's own stronghold, the Rhondda.[52]

The first major challenge to the Scale came in August 1893 with an unexpected hauliers' strike. Michael and Richard Keen characterise the strike as a conflict between 'two rival unions, two union leaders and two diametrically opposed attitudes.'[53] The strike starkly revealed the divisions, both occupational and ethnic, that had lain hidden behind the apparent unity of the Scale. Occupational divisions were revealed by the hauliers' exclusion of other types of workers from their meetings. Furthermore, in an effort to protect the legitimacy of the Scale and isolate his opponents Mabon characterised the strikers as trouble-making English in-migrants and placed these in juxtaposition to the moderate, diligent, native Welsh miners. At a tumultuous meeting in the Rhondda on 11 August 1893 Mabon was interrupted and

insulted by the crowd. In reply he claimed that 'such conduct was something new in a Welsh audience. Welshmen gave fair play (loud cheers). They had never known an Englishman being refused a hearing in Wales but their friend Daronwy had been refused a hearing on the previous day at Tonypandy.'[54] The implication was that an English element with foreign ideas had tainted the normally moderate Welsh miners. Less obliquely, Mabon issued a threat, when he claimed that 'the present strike is not due to Welsh colliers, but a minority of Englishmen at the collieries who have coerced the majority, and the owners should consider the position of these afterwards.'[55]

The strike did, however, stimulate debate over the effectiveness of the Scale in protecting the miners' interests. Mabon, David Morgan and other older miners' leaders were forced to defend the Scale. At a meeting of miners at Merthyr, Mabon and Morgan presented their case to the miners. The presentation played upon the idea of the uniqueness of the Welsh coalfield. Morgan claimed that the view of the MFGB was 'sit down Morgans, close your eyes and accept what's good for you.' Notions of Welsh nationalism and pride were also pandered to. Morgan believed, for example, that the English leaders were actually jealous of the success of the Welsh trade and, therefore, sought to control it. The main concern was with bread and butter issues and the Welsh leaders 'could not agree with the foundations of the Federation', for the Welsh coalfield was primarily export rather than domestically driven. But underlying these economic differences were two different approaches towards industrial relations. Mabon argued along 'with the members who supported the Sliding Scale, that principle of measuring wages to the price of coal was a fair and just principle...The opposition, or the members of the Federation of Great Britain believed wages should control the price of coal...they differed over the question of principle that was an essential foundation for a common union.' This difference of principle also extended to industrial disputes, for Mabon argued that in Wales they sought to solve quarrels, whereas in England they adhered to the notion of 'paralysing trade' in order to force the employer to give them what they believed was right. Such an attitude was self-defeating as it was not concerned with the justice of a demand but was merely a trial of strength and all would suffer the consequences of lost trade.[56]

Mabon perceived Brace's interpretation of industrial relations as having a more confrontational basis. By putting wages before prices the 'Federationists' were impinging on the employers' right to profit. Rather than both owners and miners co-operating to ensure the health of the industry, as in Mabon's philosophy, in Federation

discourse they were now in competition. By referring to these ideas as 'foreign' and 'English', Mabon was implicitly depicting them as somehow alien to the Welsh ethos, which was conversely portrayed as conciliatory and co-operative. This dichotomy lay at the centre of his discursive defence of the Scale. Unlike the MFGB, 'the Welsh leaders did not believe in everything for me and the rest for my brothers. They believed in John Stuart Mill's saying that capital and labour should be balanced.'[57]

The MFGB case in South Wales was perhaps most cogently expressed in the pamphlet *The Miners' Evangel.* Written by M. Severn, a Social Democratic Federation (SDF) organiser in Pontypridd and later SWMF activist, the pamphlet was published two years after the hauliers' strike. It is a particularly good example of the mixture of both socialist and Christian thought that underpinned the ideological stance of the MFGB towards industrial issues.

The first chapter of the tract introduced the ideas of socialism through a conversation between father and son. In chronicling the development of socialism, Severn moved effortlessly from Jesus and the disciples as the first socialists through St Simon to Lassalle and Marx.[58] Perhaps more importantly, and in direct contrast to Mabon, Severn explicitly rejected Mill's theory of wages. Instead labour was regarded as the sole creator of wealth.[59] From this basic principle Severn criticised the Sliding Scale as wrong as it 'inculcates that miners' wages must be wholly at the mercy of supply and demand, and places Labour under the heel of Capital. That principle which is wrong, fully sets forth that miners' wages must be entirely governed by selling prices, instead of that selling prices of coal must be governed by miners' wages.'[60] As in MFGB policy, wages should come first. Dependency between the miner and coalowner was also rejected.[61] In fact, Severn believed that organisation of both the employers and employees would eventually lead to unification of both. However, this union involved the gradual elimination of capital for 'when labour is nationally organised then will labour be competent to compel the instruments of work not to be the monopoly of capitalists, but the common property of society.'[62]

Severn, along with Brace and other Federationists, was, therefore, attacking the key theme within Mabon's discourse. Common interest between owners and miners was rejected in favour of competition over the fruits of the industry. Although this discourse had some similarities with that of the Alter Verband, more striking are the differences. For while in the Ruhr religious and Marxist conceptions of industrial relations remained relatively hermetically sealed, in South Wales there was a less

doctrinaire blending of the two. This was both encouraged and reinforced by a more open discursive structure, while in the Ruhr boundaries between ideological currents were comparatively closed.

New Unionism and New Course, 1895-1909

The year 1895 represented something of a caesura for the Alter Verband. As a result of its failed strikes its membership had declined precipitously and it was facing increased competition from the Gewerkverein. The District President of Arnsberg reported in 1896 that 'while the social democratic association shows a decrease in membership, the Christian Gewerkverein has steadily and significantly increased.'[63] The Alter Verband was dealt a further blow by the Essen perjury case (*Essener Meineidsprozess*), which resulted in the imprisonment of many of its leaders, such as Johann Meyer and Ludwig Schröder.[64]

From 1895 the Alter Verband embarked on a period of reconstruction under the new leadership of Heinrich Möller. This new course also included a modification of the organisation's ideological standpoint. The earlier confrontational tone of the association was diluted and a greater emphasis placed upon working towards practical reform. The most prominent and, from his position as editor of the Verband organ, influential proponent of this new discourse was Otto Hue. Through articles and pamphlets Hue continually promoted the idea of neutral trade unions. The most cogent expression of this discourse was his booklet, *Neutrale oder parteiische Gewerkschaften?* The central theme was the exclusion of party politics and religious questions from the association. Through this strict adherence to purely economic goals, Hue hoped to provide a common basis upon which the trade union movement could unite. Although he repeatedly accused the Christian-socials of fanaticism, Hue freely admitted that earlier the *Bergarbeiter Zeitung* had been avowedly socialist, even anarchist. Therefore, he claimed that the historian 'must hold the leadership of the Verband newspaper responsible for some of the confusion in the organisation and its decline.'[65] Reconstruction, however, coupled with a deeper study of economics had placed the Alter Verband firmly in the bounds of neutrality.[66] To strengthen his case for co-operation, Hue indicated that the practical demands of the two unions were virtually the same. Both aimed at a decent standard of wages, an eight-hour shift including winding time, workers' safety inspections, workers' committees, the prohibition of female work and changes to the Knappschaft.[67] By focusing on the

economic interests of the miners Hue attempted to create an identity of the miner as just that, rather than as a social-democratic or Christian variant.

The new emphasis on practical gains and co-operation bore some fruit in the late 1890s. In April 1899 the Bergknappe reported on the Alter Verband's general meeting in a positive manner. 'In general we must admit that, this time, the tone of discussion was rather quieter, the usual insults directed at our organisation were omitted and every effort made to deal with pure trade unionist issues.'[68] During the Knappschaft elections later the same year both unions stood successfully on a joint platform of reform.[69]

Underpinning this example of co-operation was not only a change in attitude within Alter Verband discourse, but also a development of a more confrontational stance in Gewerkverein thought. The Gewerkverein aimed, in keeping with Christian-social thought, at constructing a co-operative and peaceful relationship with employers. In the eyes of the Gewerkverein leadership this distinguished it from the Alter Verband. The *Essener Volkszeitung*, another Catholic organ, deplored the fact that, 'one now knows that unfortunately in many areas the Christian and the 'red' miners are still being thrown into the same pot. This is, in our opinion, also the mistake of the Executive of the Mining Association. The Executive can be assured, that in the present case, it deals with, in the Executive of the Gewerkverein, peaceful, level-headed, and moderate men with whom it is not difficult to manage.'[70]

The employers, however, were largely unmoved by this attempt to create a dichotomous relationship between the dangerous "reds" and the practical Gewerkverein leadership. From the beginning the employers regarded the two movements in much the same light and would not allow themselves to be misled 'by the word "Christian", which glosses over Socialism here.'[71] This attitude towards the Gewerkverein was made plain by the Piesberger strike of 1898 over the issue of Catholic holidays. Just as radical class discourse had contributed to the Alter Verband's support for the Saar miners five years earlier, the Gewerkverein now found itself compelled by its religious sentiments to come to the aid of the Piesberger workers, which it did through financial aid.[72] The uncompromising attitude of the management demonstrated to the Gewerkverein leadership the obstacles their conception of industrial co-operation faced. Brust commented:

> The strike and its history shows us a picture of audacity and ruthlessness, with which certain employers seek to destroy the legally guaranteed rights

> of the workers. The idealistic property of humanity, Christian feeling and Christian conviction is sacrificed to the capitalist god, Mammon. On the one hand it is said: 'one should preserve the religion of the people', and in consideration of the signs of the time, 'people of Europe, protect your holiest interests', while on the other hand, the religious sentiment of the worker is destroyed through Sunday and holiday work, for the sake of the ever fuller moneybag.

Brust also argued that the strike showed the need for the sympathy of the middle class and the need for a stronger organisation.[73]

Hue, in line with most contemporary historians, regarded the strike, as have more recent historians, as a stage post in the development of the Gewerkverein from a 'non-fighting' to a strike association (*Nichtkampfverein zum Streikverein*).[74] Undoubtedly, the Gewerkverein was beginning to realise that appeals to Christian sentiments alone were not enough to bring the employers to the table. Heinrich Imbusch, editor of the Gewerkverein organ, rejected the idea that the Gewerkverein had ever been a 'Nichtkampfverein'. 'It recognised that the employers and the workers have in fact parallel interests, but also that their interests not infrequently stand in opposition...The strike was for it the last resort...'[75] Religion, however, remained the centrepiece of the Gewerkverein identity, as did the desire to establish dialogue. Brust claimed that 'it is an important lesson, which the employers should draw; that it is much better to negotiate with peace-loving workers or their organisations, than to direct them from above.'[76]

The unions were forced into closer co-operation by the 1905 strike.[77] A spontaneous action it began, like the 1889 strike, at an individual mine, this time the Bruchstraße pit, and quickly spread to other mines. Since initial attempts to contain the strike failed, the union leadership eventually established a 'Commission of Seven' to direct the movement and pooled their strike funds.[78] Sympathy also was forthcoming from other sections of society. The District President of Düsseldorf reported on 'so-called *Bürgerversammlungen*' and noted that in Mülheim an evangelical priest even spoke at a social-democratic meeting.[79] This sympathy coupled with the disciplined conduct of the miners meant that employers' calls for the military were rejected,[80] and contributed to the introduction of reform. The subsequent mining law of 14 July 1905 abolished Nullen and introduced compulsory workers' committees to the mines, although the discussion of wages was expressly excluded from their functions.[81] Hopes for unity were maintained by the continued

existence of the 'Commission of Seven' and the Prussian miners delegate conferences of 1905 and 1906.

In South Wales ideas of peaceful co-operation were also put to the test in 1898 by a six month long strike. The causes lay in discontent over the level of wages under the Sliding Scale.[82] For the owners the men were the 'aggressors'.[83] The *Colliery Guardian* commented that 'the obstinacy of the workmen in refusing to come to any terms that the coalowners can possibly accept with any pretensions to self-respect, and without entirely giving away the control of their own collieries - always a very prominent feature of strikes in Wales - was never more exemplified than on the present occasion.'[84] In this atmosphere of mutual antagonism Mabon's language of co-operation seemed untenable. Furthermore, the refusal of the strikers to grant Mabon and his colleagues plenary powers to negotiate a settlement suggested that his perspective on industrial relations had lost currency among the workers. In fact some of Mabon's peers had become convinced of the need for a new form of organisation, among them David Morgan. Signs of his conversion came as early as 1894 when he co-operated with Brace in the Society of Colliery Workmen of the South Wales Coalfield.[85] Morgan became more critical of the notion of a co-operative relationship between different classes in society, suggesting that others supported the Scale to the detriment of the miners. The 'landowners, colliery owners and managers, shopkeepers, publicans and 75 percent of the preachers wished to keep the Sliding Scale for the sake of peace, but had it brought peace to the workmen in the past? (Cries of No, no!).'[86]

Mabon recognised that there was a new feeling abroad among the men, although he still tried to draw a distinction between the natives and the 'foreigners'. At Penygraig he claimed 'a new generation had arisen, and strangers had come among them prejudiced against it (the Scale).'[87] But the experience of defeat convinced Mabon himself of the need for a new organisation. The loss of Mabon's Day, which the employers regarded as a 'valuable point',[88] represented a symbolic defeat for his discourse. He wrote that:

> the settlement is, to my mind, the most unsatisfactory one that has ever been concluded in the district. I don't mean in its intrinsic monetary value, but it fails in the one essential thing for this district -- it will not bring the peace necessary for this district to bring it to its full state of prosperity. It is not based on either justice or goodwill. It fails in this important element because the employers insisted upon demanding their 'pound of flesh.'[89]

Let down by his 'partners', Mabon accepted the 'foreign' principles and became the first president of the SWMF, while his erstwhile opponent Brace became vice-president.

Mabon's abandonment of his attempts to 'other' the 'English' element was a large step. Undoubtedly, on one level, Mabon simply sensed the way the wind was blowing and adapted accordingly in an effort to protect his position. More subtly, however, the viability of his initial strategy was limited owing to the extent of in-migration into South Wales. As noted in the preceding chapter, English migrants to South Wales were comparatively easily assimilated into the mining communities and consequently influenced their development. Unlike the Ruhr, where milieux and trade union discourse were mutually reinforcing, the more cohesive structure of the South Wales mining communities made it difficult to construct a specific identity based on ethnicity or religion through discourse. South Wales was certainly not free from ethnic tensions, but they were less divisive than in the Ruhr. Mabon himself represents this more successful assimilation. Well known for his ability to quell angry crowds through Welsh hymns, he was also just as eloquent in English. On the other hand, few of the leading officials in the Gewerkverein and Alter Verband were able to speak Polish. Finally, the duration of the strike and the intransigent attitude of the owners emphasised differences between workers and employers. Ultimately, it was the idea of the 'miner' and his relationship to the owners that took precedence over any perceived cultural differences. Whereas trade union discourse in the Ruhr remained milieu-fixated, in South Wales it sought to represent the whole community of miners.

During the late 1890s and early 1900s there seemed, therefore, to be a convergence of the various discourses on trade unionism in South Wales and the Ruhr. However, while the SWMF successfully united both the supporters of the Sliding Scale and the MFGB, co-operation between the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein remained the exception rather than the norm. Periods of joint action were invariably followed by a break down in relations and more intense efforts to distinguish one from the other through discourse. This conflict reached a high point during the 1904 Knappschaft elections. The Alter Verband made its bid for representation of the 'free' miners by terming the Gewerkverein a *Zechengewerkverein*, effectively a yellow union. The slogan was 'down with the friends of management and their helpers.' Furthermore the Alter Verband argued that

it now represented the old Christian-social demands (i.e. reform of the Knappschaft).[90] A booklet on the Knappschaft elections published six years later recalled the 1904 elections as 'a decisive turning point in the struggle of the miners over their Knappschaft rights. The field of battle was cleared, there was no longer three parties on the Knappschaft, but only two: the real opposition under the leadership of the [Alter] Verband and the mines' party under the leadership of Brust.'[91] The Gewerkverein, meanwhile, focused on the links between the Alter Verband and the SPD, a task made easier by Hue's election to the Reichstag as a SPD deputy for Bochum in 1903.[92] Their counter-slogan was 'down with the Social Democrats across the board.' They claimed the election of Alter Verband candidates would merely make the employers more 'obstinate' with regards to reform (i.e. of the Knappschaft).[93] Similarly, while there was agreement on most issues at the first delegate conference of Prussian miners in 1905, at the second the following year political differences between Alter Verband and Gewerkverein representatives began to surface.[94] The unions were focused on the same goal, but approached it from different directions predicated on their own ideological reading of industrial relations, which underpinned their discursive practices.

In 1902 the establishment of a Polish organisation, the *Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie* (ZZP), further fragmented the trade union movement in the Ruhr. Both the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein attempted to organise the Polish immigrants, which by the 1900s made up a significant proportion of the mining workforce. However, the Poles believed that their interests received inadequate attention from the existing trade unions. The Gewerkverein, for example, resisted pressure to produce Polish language literature until 1902. The Alter Verband, due to its more internationalist outlook, was less adverse to such methods, but it also exhibited a patronising attitude towards the Polish migrants. In 1899 a strike occurred in Herne accompanied by violence and rioting. The main protagonists were young, migrant workers.[95] Commenting on the strike, Otto Hue referred to the migrants as a 'flood-tide of refuse'.[96] The Alter Verband organ portrayed them as the unwitting defence troops of capitalism, while at the same time claiming them as the brothers of the German workers.[97] Furthermore, both trade unions supported the Mining Language Ordinance of 1899, which effectively restricted immigrants access to higher positions in the mine. The Gewerkverein position on the ordinance was that the Poles

'will have to accommodate themselves to existing conditions, whether they want to or not.'[98]

Such attitudes underpinned the decision to form a separate Polish union. The initial call to organisation came from *Wiarus Polski*. The call to organisation played upon the issue of nationalism, requesting Poles not to join any German associations for fear of Germanisation.[99] The union formed part of the Polish subculture in the Ruhr as much as the Gewerkverein formed part of the Catholic one.[100] Its statutes excluded religious questions and social-democratic agitation.[101] Its activists claimed that 'the Poles in foreign parts also have the duty to organise. Everyone should affiliate to the union organisation and not let themselves be misled by the old Social-democratic association. You can neither join the Christian Gewerkverein. The Polish working class can not belong to such unions, which cannot tolerate each other and conduct a mutual war'.[102] A former leader, Mankowski, recalled that 'when we left our fatherland we took two great pearls with us, the language and the beliefs of the fathers.' These pearls were endangered by both the socialist and religious trade unions both of which 'would like to draw the Polish worker in – not to protect them, but to take their money and to tear out from them the ideas of the fathers. That was the essential inducement to the foundation of our trade union organisation.'[103] Another competing identity had emerged to challenge those of the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein. Unlike the latter it was predicated on a distinct Polish nationalism, rather than on a political or religious ideology.

John Kulczycki, however, argues that focus upon the role of the paper and its editor, Jan Brejski, in the formation of the ZZP emphasises its nationalist tendencies at the expense of its class character.[104] Certainly, the ZZP soon began to develop a more confrontational identity. Imbusch darkly warned after the 1912 strike, in which the ZZP co-operated with the Alter Verband, that 'only the inflamed nationalism holds them apart. As soon as the nationalist tension eases, they will fall inescapably into the arms of the Social Democrats...The Polish association and also the Polish Party stand at a turning point. That has again been shown by the strike. Either they will turn back, or they will go under the red flood in the Ruhr.'[105]

The solidarity the 1905 strike generated between the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein proved short-lived. Soon after the strike Heinrich Imbusch warned the miners 'against Social Democrats, since they only wanted to spread hate among the masses.' He also focused on the co-operative element in Gewerkverein discourse,

claiming that, 'had the Social Democrats had the upper hand in the strike, the Government would not have conceded anything and the middle classes (*Bürger*) would not have stood on the workers' side.'[106] The Gewerkverein also called a closed meeting to impress upon its members that 'they belong to a separate trade union and should not allow themselves to be influenced by members of other organisations under the cloak of unity.'[107]

The Alter Verband also sought to distinguish itself from the Gewerkverein by emphasising its oppositional role vis-à-vis the employers. The Bergarbeiter Zeitung happily reported Emil Kirdorff's statement, 'I do not recognise the Christian trade unions as representatives of the workers, I do not negotiate with them.' However, to his claim that the Christian unions were more dangerous than the Social Democrats, the paper retorted that 'obviously Herr Kirdorff does not mean to say the Christian trade union endanger the employers' profit. We have often seen that management and Gewerkverein candidates go hand in hand against the Verband's candidates during the Knappschaft, mining courts and similar elections...From this it is apparent which organisation the owners actually consider more dangerous.' This attempt to maintain the integrity of its identity as the sole opponent of the employers was coupled with an explanation of the differing interpretations of industrial relations. The Alter Verband, it was claimed, did not hold the employers personally responsible for social problems, as did the Gewerkverein. Rather they saw them as the effect of a false system (*verkehrtes System*).[108]

That their doctrinaire ideological viewpoints were the obstacles to co-operation was fully recognised by the unions themselves. The leadership of the Gewerkverein claimed that the organisation had, since its founding, struggled 'not only against the employers but also against the Social Democrats and their trade union movement, especially the social-democratic miners' association. This struggle between the two orientations corresponds not so much to actual economic goals, than the difference of ideology which each represent.'[109] For Imbusch amalgamation of the unions was impossible as the Alter Verband stood on a materialistic basis, the Gewerkverein on a religious one.[110]

Despite Hue's emphasis on neutrality and reform, his conception of industrial relations was still framed in Marxist terms, the very materialism that Imbusch was so critical of. He saw it as a natural consequence of the capitalist system that two antagonistic classes would emerge,[111] and ridiculed the idea of common interest

predicated on Christian feeling.[112] In this respect, Hue's discourse failed to transcend that of the earlier editions of the *Bergarbeiter Zeitung*. Furthermore, Hue had a blind spot concerning the role that religion played within Gewerkverein ideology. He was deeply critical of the capacity of religion to provide solutions to social problems.[113] Religion, however, was the keystone of Gewerkverein thinking. Georg Werner, during his attempt to establish a fireman's union (*Steigerverband*), participated in classes held by the Christian union. 'In this way I got to know the religious bonds and reasons, which formed the basis of the...Christian trade union movement.'[114]

The importance of trade union classes and other organisational factors should not be overlooked. The Alter Verband introduced courses on opposition trade unions, in which the Gewerkverein was listed alongside the company unions.[115] Although figures are not available for other areas, and bearing in mind the economic incentive of strike pay, in Recklinghausen at least it seemed that the Gewerkverein did have cause to worry after the 1905 strike. During the strike the local membership of the Alter Verband increased from 250 to 1000, while that of the Gewerkverein had stagnated at around 400. Similarly, out of 29 meetings between 14 January and 4 February, 45 speakers had been Social Democrats compared to 14 Christian-socialists.[116] No doubt fears of being overwhelmed by the Alter Verband spurred the Gewerkverein to remind its members of their obligations to its own association. The Gewerkverein was placed in the difficult position of avoiding the label of being a yellow union, while at the same time maintaining its independence from the Alter Verband.[117]

The specific form of trade union organisation also contributed to the Ruhr unions' inability to overcome their ideological rivalry. The basic unit of organisation, the *Zahlstelle*, was based in the residential districts and members could come from up to 40 different mines.[118] Both the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband were also committed to becoming centralised organisations early on.[119] An increasing bureaucratisation paralleled this centralisation. The number of Alter Verband officials rose from four in 1894 to 94 by 1914.[120] The individual *Zahlstellen* were given little latitude and the need to educate the members in trade union practices was constantly reiterated.[121] The SWMF, on the other hand, was a federal organisation and proposals for centralisation were resisted.[122] This allowed the districts a great degree of freedom and provided a fertile ground for the development of new ideas. Furthermore, the pit lodge system based organisation around individual pits, placing activists in a better

position to exert pressure on non-unionists. One means was the show-card day. This method clearly identified non-unionists to their organised colleagues in the mines, although the former could even be visited at home.[123] Within both the workplace and the community then pressure could be placed upon individuals to join the union. The siting of the *Zahlstelle* in the residential districts, on the other hand, strengthened ties to the individual milieux, be they Catholic, Polish or Social Democratic. They became strands in the dense web that made up those milieux. In South Wales the concentration of organisation on the workplace helped strengthen the SWMF's claim to be representing the miners as a whole, rather than a particular religious or ethnic group. It was therefore possible to forge a more direct and organic link between workplace and organisational solidarity.

The position of checkweigher in South Wales also provided a natural point of leadership for a workforce. Directly elected by the workforce and paid for from their wages, the checkweigher was, at least in theory, largely independent from managerial control. The importance of this office was fully recognised by employers.[124] The manager of Locket's Merthyr Collieries reported approvingly of one checkweigher, 'he is not a...demagogue or busybody'. Later he deplored the election of T. Isaac Jones to the No. 3 pit because he was 'an ex-student of Ruskin College, Oxford - a great opponent of Mabon; a gentleman who, I fear, will cause considerable uneasiness amongst the men and annoyance to the company and its officers.'[125] The mines of the Ruhr lacked an equivalent position. Admittedly, the workers' committees and elected safetymen (*Grubenkontolleure*), introduced in 1905 and 1909 respectively, could have provided an organisational focus.[126] Initially, however, the Alter Verband was critical of both. In fact, the Alter Verband boycotted the first committee elections, complaining that they had no power to discuss wages. Later it participated on the committees, although doubts about their effectiveness as a means of representing the worker's interests remained. Only a strong union organisation could make them truly effective.[127] Furthermore, the office of safetyman was criticised as mere palliative (*weisse Salbe*), subject to pressure from the management to find 'everything in order.'[128] The Gewerkverein, on the other hand, approached them more positively. The safetymen were regarded as a genuine 'step forward to the improvement of miners' protection' rather than *weisse Salbe*.[129] While aware of the limitations of the committees and the fact that employers regarded them 'with mistrust, if not bitterness', the Gewerkverein hoped that they would provide a basis for better

relations. 'The lost feeling will be re-established. The workers and the employers will again get to know and understand each other. Then the employers will have to realise that the workers are better and more moderate than they have until now imagined and the workers will come to see that the owners are not so consistently unreasonable (*grundschlecht*) as they often believe...The result is a mitigation of class antagonism'. It was precisely because of this that the Social Democrats were said to oppose the committees.[130] For the Alter Verband the committees and safetymen were merely decoration that left intact the power of the owners, while for the Gewerkverein they were the potential means of establishing a co-operative relationship between the workers and the employers.

Ultimately, rather than providing foci for mine-based organisation the committee and safetymen elections became another level of competition between the trade unions. The Alter Verband claimed that only the election of its members could prevent the safetymen from becoming *weisse Salbe*.[131] It even produced a booklet instructing the safetymen of their duties. It was hoped that through inspections they could influence wages.[132] The *Bergämter* also received complaints of preferential treatment meted out by safetymen of one union to fellow members.[133] Interest in this position soon began to wane however, as it carried the double risk of both ostracism from their colleagues and pressure from management.[134] Furthermore, the two unions' attitude towards the works' councils and safetymen were directly linked to their discursive interpretations of industrial relations. While the Alter Verband eventually came to see these offices as a chance to exert some form of influence on the management of the mines, the Gewerkverein regarded them as a step towards genuine co-operation between miners and owners. While the first union hoped to use them in a combative manner, the latter believed they could be used to encourage dialogue. Unsurprisingly, during the works committee elections each union took the opportunity to campaign for its own members and denigrate its opponents.[135]

Organisational differences alone, however, cannot account for the differences between the two trade union movements. Ultimately, the discursive identity created by the SWMF proved more flexible than that constructed by the unions in the Ruhr. This flexibility was evident from its very inception. By giving the presidency and vice-presidency to 'Mabon, as the most successful of the older regime of leadership, and... to Mr Brace, the leader of the Federation campaign,'[136] the miners were not so much breaking with the past as signifying the coexistence of different identities within

the organisation. Mabon himself continued to describe himself as a 'conciliatory' spirit,[137] but his religious metaphors were now employed in the service of the SWMF. Fears that the Revival which swept South Wales in 1904 would damage the SWMF, were refuted by Mabon, who claimed:

> that the men that are as a rule prepared to stand out for labour rights are the men in our churches who stand out for religious rights...godly men – good men – are convinced that although God in a sense provides for all, that ungodly men take more than their fair share of what He has provided, and we believe that God Himself really blesses those who provide for themselves...we [must] have good and godly men as mainstays to our organisation.[138]

Through his study of strike statistics, Deian Hopkin has identified an increasing militancy among the South Wales miners from 1898,[139] and this was reflected by the development of a harder edge to Mabon's language. Co-operation might have remained his preferred policy, but the intransigent attitude of the owners during the 1898 had also convinced him of the need for force. During agitation for the Eight Hours Bill Mabon claimed that 'we (the miners) can appeal, if necessary, to our Father, Who is in Heaven, to defend the right, and we ask you, the public, to defend His children while they are seeking this measure of right and justice.' Meanwhile, Brace struck a more prosaic, yet nonetheless confrontational tone.

> Now that we have carried this agitation to this point, we are not going to allow the enormous power of vested interest to drive us back. If the coalowners of Britain, backed by interested consumers who do not recognise that, after all, underlying this great reform there is a great principle of high humanity - if they allow us to be defeated on this occasion, so far as I am concerned - and I think I am speaking on behalf of my colleagues - we shall dedicate no more portion of out time to get it from Parliament, but we shall be parties in using the power of our great combination (loud cheers) to force the recognition of this much too long delayed reform.[140]

Both religiosity and humanism acted as a justification for the Eight Hours' Act, even to the point of a strike, although the union did not resort to industrial action. This double legitimacy provided it with the widest possible appeal. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the unions were based on ideological 'crystallisation points'. Each crystallisation point, be it Christian-socialism, social democracy or ethnicity, was linked to specific milieux or sub-cultures. Since membership of these milieux was generally mutually exclusive (i.e. membership of one precluded membership of another), it was difficult for trade union activists to combine different discourses. By

adopting a certain discourse they were seeking to mobilise a specific group of miners. Unions in the Ruhr focused on the Christian, or Polish, or social-democratic miner. To blend discourses risked alienating their original members and the unions attempted to impose harmony in their organisations by restricting pluralistic debate. Therefore, in terms of discourse, it became a case of one or the other. Meanwhile, the lack of rival milieux in South Wales meant that activists could attempt to unite various discourses without fear of potentially alienating a significant section of the workforce. The leadership's acceptance of pluralistic debate allowed the creation of a more inclusive, elastic discourse that sought to represent the miners as a whole.

Table 2.1: Membership of the main trade unions in the Ruhr, 1898-1913

Year	Total Employed	Alter Verband		Gewerkverein		ZZP	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1898	191,847	17,974	9.4				
1900	226,902	12,945	5.7				
1910	345,136	76,418	22.7	33,000*	9.6	26,309	7.6
1912	393,879	69,648	17.7	40,000*	10.2	30,354	7.7
1913	394,569	62,487	15.8			28,936	7.3

Figures compiled from Hickey, *Workers*, p.234; Kulczycki, *Worker*, p.218; Brüggemeier, p. 283. * Approximate figures.

Table 2.2: Membership of SWMF, 1898-1913

Year	Total Employed	South Wales Miners' Federation	
		No.	%
1898	128,313	60,000	47
1900	147,652	127,894	87
1910	213,252	137,553	65
1912	225,535	114,208	51
1913	233,134	153,813	66

Source: Williams, *Capitalism*, pp. 88-9.

Syndicalists and Anarchists, 1909-1914

Towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century syndicalist thought began to make an impact on the industrial policy of the union movement in both the Ruhr and in South Wales. Contemporaries regarded strikes around 1910/11 in both regions as influenced, if not caused by, syndicalist ideas. Syndicalist influences and currents have been identified within both the British and German labour movement from the 1890s.[141] The precise role that syndicalists and their ideas played in industrial relations is, however, notoriously difficult to pin down. In Germany the movement had a more concrete organisational base in the *Freie*

Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften (Free Association of German Trade Unions, FVdG), which explicitly adopted the general strike doctrine in the 1904,[142] around about the same time the mass strike debate was involving the social-democratic movement.[143] Syndicalism's role in Britain is comparatively more nebulous and undefined. Although syndicalist bodies were certainly formed, for example the Industrial Syndicalist Educational League, they tended to exercise influence through the existing trade union structures rather than acting as an organisational challenge.[144] That they were able to do so again illustrates the comparative elasticity of trade union discourse in Britain.

These national patterns were replicated in both South Wales and the Ruhr. The Cambrian Combine dispute formed the background to the emergence of the Unofficial Reform Committee (URC), a loose body of individuals representing different political and industrial ideologies.[145] Significantly the URC was not an organisational alternative to the SWMF, but rather a platform for reform. At its earliest meetings older members of the SWMF such as Vernon Hartshorn and James Winstone were present.[146] Furthermore, William F. Hay, one of the staunchest syndicalists, advised men at several Rhondda collieries who had ceded from the SWMF due to discontent over the 1910 Conciliation Agreement to rejoin the organisation, while at the same time acknowledging that it could be criticised.[147] On the other hand, the *Freie Vereinigung der Bergarbeiter* (FVB), founded in 1910, was an independent trade union with its own statutes. It was also affiliated to the FVdG and subscribed to its organ, *Die Einigkeit*. As such it represented an alternative to the Alter Verband and Gewerkverein, albeit a numerically unimportant one.[148]

In South Wales the issue at stake in 1911 was the minimum wage rate. Marxist, syndicalist and industrial unionist thought influenced many graduates of Ruskin College, and later the Central Labour College (CLC). Upon their return to the valleys they sought to spread these ideas through evening classes on industrial history and economics.[149] Charlie Gibbons, a protégé of Noah Ablett, wrote of his time at the CLC, 'I was taught...that the interests of the workers are absolutely opposed to the interests of the employers...[and] a fight must be waged until the employers are eventually wiped out.'[150] While the older MFGB supporters had placed the workers and owners into competition, they did not necessarily foresee the actually elimination of the employers. The URC went a step further in challenging not only the employers'

share of profit, but also their control of the workplace and of the industry as a whole.[151]

In the Ruhr syndicalist and anarchist traditions more decisively influenced the left-radical (*linksradikal*) current. Marxist discourse was still monopolised by the Alter Verband and the SPD, although there were affinities between left-wing supporters of the mass strike and the anarchosyndicalists. Unlike the URC, the FVdG rejected politics, although not individual membership of parties, in favour of the economic struggle conducted through the general strike, direct action, sabotage and passive resistance.[152] Also, while the Welsh syndicalists and industrial unionists sought a centralisation of the SWMF to make it more effective, the anarchosyndicalists of the Ruhr actually advocated a move away from central to local organisations.

Despite these organisational and ideological differences the critique of the existing trade union movement shared certain affinities. Chief among these was the lack of fighting spirit. Hay and Ablett stressed the divisive effects of differing minimum rates upon the workers' movement. They stressed that any minimum rate was the common goal of all grades of workers in the mines. This underlying theme of unity was then bound up with recurrent metaphors of struggle.

> Remember, in this work, all petty pride and prejudice has to be dropped. It is a case of each for all, and all for each. The collier or hewer, the timberman, putter, labourer, etc. have all to *fight* for it...Let us go into battle, then, united at last in one common demand, with one unifying demand, with all the solidarity which that common cause can give. Or demand one, our members as one, our fight as good as won, since we are united.[153]

The Miners' Next Step was effectively a blueprint to transform the SWMF into a more effective fighting organisation. The 'old policy of identity of interest between employers and ourselves be abolished, and a policy of open hostility installed,'[154] predicated on the recognition of 'the war of interest between workers and employers.'[155] Similarly, the FVB claimed that the true policy of the unions should be 'Struggle, struggle! Inexorable struggle in all its forms must be the slogan. To prepare for large economic conflict and to enforce it at the given time, that is the purpose of the workers' organisations.' The policy of the central trade unions was criticised as being too conciliatory and cautious. In contrast to the FVB emphasis on conflict, Sachse, the then leader of the Alter Verband, was quoted as seeing the purpose of the

unions as to 'avoid large economic trouble.'[156] The FVB complained that every time the decisive moment for action drew near a central executive appeared to beat it down.[157] In both cases the notion of the class war was more explicitly drawn and the miners placed in the vanguard of that conflict, seeking the destruction of the existing economic system and the establishment of workers' control of the mining industry.

Linked to this more confrontational approach was a critique of the inertia of the existing trade union executives. FVB focused on 'mismanagement, despotism, autocracy and bureaucracy in the present day central associations.' It argued that the development of the trade union movement showed that it could never lead to the freedom of the workers, but 'leads them from the servitude of capital into the servitude of the central association and [SPD] party popes.'[158] *The Miners' Next Step*, while admitting that leadership had its good points, also attacked the tendency for power to be removed from the rank and file workforce and concentrated in the hands of executive members. Furthermore leaders hindered the emergence of solidarity based on interests common to all,[159] a prerequisite for the success of the trade unions. Mainwaring launched a scathing attack on trade union policy through the recently created working-class organ *The Rhondda Socialist*.

> We thus see our desired end in an Organisation of the Working Class, which will be strong to fight. So strong, that the opposing Capitalists will be driven to see the futility of fighting. Let it be remembered that the Capitalists fights to-day, not because he loves fighting; far from it, but fight he must if he wished to maintain his profits. Hence his desire for Conciliation, because he always hopes to show the Labour Leader – that epitome of ineptitude – that he cannot afford to pay a wage on which a man can live. One could never frame a more scathing indictment of Conciliation than that of a Brace, whining for a peep at the balance-sheets of the employers, in order to salve his conscience for being a party to accepting starvation wages on behalf of those whose interests he is so well paid to defend. No! An Organisation which exists to continually accommodate its members stomachs to its opponents' pass-book can never serve as the medium for Labour's final emancipation! *Yet it is the property of its members*! As such they should seize it! Renovate it! Transform it! Shape it into a weapon to wrest control of Industry from the Capitalist, later to afford a medium for administering the Industry by the Workers themselves. In a word, to make of it an Industrial Union, with the definite objective of establishing *Industrial Democracy*![160]

Although both syndicalist movements remained small, they did have an effect upon the trade unions. Admittedly, the URC plans to reform the SWMF were rejected by a ballot vote.[161] However, the election of three socialist (but not syndicalist)

leaders to the executive and the replacement of Mabon by the coalfield firebrand C. B. Stanton on the executive committee of the International Miners' Federation indicated that the miners were certainly willing to countenance a more confrontational policy than hitherto pursued.[162] Mabon himself believed that his 'policy - the policy of conciliation and arbitration failing conciliation - a policy that I have lived for forty years to carry out, and also to serve to the best of my ability in the interest of my fellow-workmen - has been rejected unmistakably.'[163] Furthermore, the issue of the minimum wage was taken up by the MFGB. Although the Minimum Wage Act hastily passed by the Government left many unsatisfied, in comparison to the action of the same year in the Ruhr, the 1912 national coal strike can be regarded as at least a partial success.[164] The strike also revealed the potential pressure that could be brought to bear on the Government by united action by the miners, something that was to be of significance during the Great War. Although debate on policy could degenerate into personal recriminations, it is significant within terms of the comparison that ideological differences did not split the SWMF. Vernon Hartshorn argued that it was natural that different policies should emerge. The SWMF should show toleration and that only very compelling reasons could justify an attempt to remove an official from his post.[165] Therefore, the more radical discourse of URC filtered into that of the SWMF. Rather than standing in direct opposition, this discourse worked from within to modify existing discursive practices, making them more combative, but not replacing them in entirety.

In the Ruhr, the Alter Verband was fiercely critical of the anarchosyndicalists claiming that a return to local organisation would be playing into the employers' hands by weakening the power of the miners. Only highly organised miners could counter highly organised employers. 'Whoever wants to help the workers must advise the organisation, which alone can line up against the employers, that is the large, stalwart, well disciplined central association.'[166] Although both movements saw themselves as engaged in a class struggle, the manner in which it was to be conducted and the role the individual miner was to play was essentially different. While the FVB saw the miner as the potential perpetrator of direct action, the Alter Verband discourse idealised him as the disciplined foot-solider of the organisation.

Despite their small numbers, Brüggemeier argues that the anarchosyndicalists contributed to pushing the Alter Verband into the wage movement that underpinned the 1912 *Dreibundestreik*.[167] Unlike the 1889 and 1905

strikes this was a planned action. However, it was fatally crippled by the refusal of the Gewerkverein to participate. Out of three areas, Essen, Bochum and Dortmund, only in the latter did a majority of the workers strike.

Table 2.3: Number of strikers and total mining workforce in Bochum, Dortmund and Essen 19 February 1912

	Total Workforce	No. of Strikers
Bochum	24,489	7,513
Dortmund	69,413	42,401
Essen	46,170	12,633

Source: Köngliche Bergwerksdirektion to Minister für Handel und Gewerbe, 19 March 1912, STAM OBA 1857.

Relations between the strikers and those who continued to work were strained,[168] further souring the trade union discourses. Accusations of strike breaking were countered by claims it was a duty not to strike.[169] The Gewerkverein action was predicated on their more conciliatory identity. It pointed out that the owners were already considering a wage increase and there was, therefore, no need to provoke a dispute, which could only end in a struggle. Instead it was better to wait for the employers response and use this as a basis for co-operation. Provocation could only serve to alienate the public.[170] This peaceful stance was contrasted with the conduct of the Alter Verband, which demonstrated its desire for a struggle under any circumstances.[171] The strike was also portrayed as essentially politically motivated and designed to destroy the Gewerkverein.[172] The common interest of the German miners and owners in the health of the industry also meant that the British strike offered the opportunity to improve Germany's competitive edge in the world markets.[173]

The Alter Verband, on the other hand, argued that the time had never been so favourably for a strike. They argued that the owners had enjoyed increased profits from rising prices for some time, but that this had not filtered down to the workers. Through their 'ruthless profit policy' the owners had upset both consumers and workers. The employers' assurance that the miners would participate in the upswing in the industry was condemned in that it did not offset the wages already lost. 'The workers would be fools if they were content with that.'[174] Meanwhile Imbusch's notion that the British strike should be exploited in the interests of German economic interests was fiercely condemned. 'Therefore these "workers" representatives' stood for the interest of German capital and wanted to strike at the interests of the English comrades. With justification, therefore, has the organ of the yellow [unions] written,

that the principles of the Christian Gewerkverein during the strike movement were completely yellow sentiments, completely yellow principles.'[175]

In the case of both unions their discursive practices acted as the basis of legitimacy for action. Since the Gewerkverein regarded the employers' and workers' interests as generally the same they were content with a statement that a wage increase would be forthcoming if the economic conditions allowed. This notion also lay behind Imbusch's attitude towards the British strike. The Alter Verband view that the two sides were necessarily in competition meant, on the other hand, that such assurances of increases were merely window dressing, designed to distract the miners from the huge profits the owners had already made. Finally, while supporting the British miners was not a primary motive behind the Ruhr strike, inter-linked notions of class identity and the international war against capitalism hardened the Alter Verband attitude towards the employers. Moreover, this more combative attitude provided a means of differentiating the Alter Verband from the Gewerkverein.

The influence of syndicalist ideas upon the trade union movements in both regions differed substantially. Both British and German syndicalist critiques focused on similar aspects on trade unionism, such as bureaucratisation. Both also sought to propagate a more confrontational identity to mobilise the miners. However, the former seems to have been more integrated into the existing movement. Discursive differences did not lead to organisational separation. The URC members did not advocate a new organisation, but reform of the existing association. As such they exerted pressure from within. The anarchosyndicalists of the Ruhr, on the other hand, formed their own organisations and pressurised the Alter Verband from without. Undoubtedly, this was partly a consequence of the relative strength of the unions at the time. However, the Welsh syndicalists, like the SWMF generally, were also firmly rooted in the comparatively broader and more cohesive culture of the communities they inhabited. On the other hand, in the Ruhr trade union discourse was closely connected to a particular milieux or sub-culture. The trade unions sought to mobilise these milieux through their discourse, while at the same time making clear distinctions between themselves and their rivals. As a consequence of this desire for clear self-identification, trade union discourse tended to be more inflexible in the Ruhr than South Wales.

Summary

This chapter has tried to how the discursive identities created by the trade unionists in South Wales and the Ruhr differed. It is clear that the three discourses highlighted here (Christian-socialism, socialism or social democracy, and syndicalism) were in different relationships in the two regions. In South Wales the SWMF was able to combine these three strands to create a more inclusive identity. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, each discourse was the preserve of a different union. And each union sought to distinguish its discourse by placing it in juxtaposition with the others. The result was more exclusive identities that were defined by what they were not as much as by what they were.

In part this was due to the nature of the civil societies in which the trade unions operated. As noted in the preceding chapter, there was a 'pillarisation' of civil society in the Ruhr into several milieux. The trade unions were an integral part of this segmented civil society in which group membership was mutually exclusive. The Gewerkverein, with its provision that members openly accept Christianity and reject social democracy, represented a particularly extreme example of how multiple and overlapping memberships were regarded with hostility. Such an assertion naturally limited the number of miners that the Gewerkverein could hope to organise. It also meant that the Gewerkverein was unable to utilise aspects of social-democratic discourse to forge its own identity. Indeed, the Gewerkverein was careful to distinguish its Christian-socialist ethos from social democracy. It therefore contrasted its desire for peaceful co-operation between workers and employers with the Alter Verband's idea that industrial relations essentially represented a conflict of interests. Similarly, Hue's conviction that religion was, at best, irrelevant to industrial relations meant that he could not create an identity that encompassed Christian-socialism. He was unable to understand the extent to which religion was the foundation stone of the Gewerkverein. In any case to attempt to use Christian thought risked alienating the committed Social Democrats that formed the core of its membership. In order to legitimise its claim to be the only true miners' union the Alter Verband repeatedly characterised the Gewerkverein as a 'yellow' union. In their different ways the leaders of both organisations consistently sought through their rhetoric to differentiate themselves from their rivals, while the centralised structure facilitated the executives imposition of an accepted viewpoint. Thus, although the unions claimed to be

speaking for the miners as a whole, each was in effect presenting an identity that upheld a certain constituency, a 'particularist' ideal of the miner; the one Christian, the other social democratic. Occasionally, a truce would be called, as during some of the Knappschaft elections, or co-operation would be forced on the unions by spontaneous industrial action, as in 1905. Significantly, however, these incidences encouraged joint action rather than amalgamation. In fact, the mere hint that one or other of the unions was threatened with losing its distinctive identity led to a renewal of their rivalry. It was such fears that galvanised Imbusch to pen his pamphlet rejecting amalgamation in 1906.

South Wales, on the other hand, suffered comparatively little in terms of religious or ethnic tensions. The mining communities were not divided into various milieux, consolidated by state pressure and hostile to membership of other groups. The result was a more fluid civil society. Admittedly, Mabon had attempted to generate tensions between the native Welsh miners and the in-migrant English in the early 1890s to safeguard the Sliding Scale. But this attempt lacked the same resonance which Christian-socialism and social democracy had with subcultures in the Ruhr, while the six-month strike revealed the weaknesses inherent in such a course. Instead, pluralist discourse was accepted, if not always welcomed, within the miners' movement. For Hartshorn it was only natural that policy differences should emerge within a large organisation. This toleration of pluralism allowed the accommodation of different ideologies and enabled the SWMF to dominate miners' organisation in South Wales. Religiously inclined miners, socialist miners and committed syndicalists could all find their own niche with the SWMF's discourse. Furthermore, the federal and pit-based organisation of the trade union helped it to portray itself as the representative of all miners, irrespective of religious beliefs or ethnic origin and allowed space for the continued existence of local differences within an overarching framework. The SWMF amalgamated various elements all committed to the shared goal of improving the miners' lot. Tensions between the different ideologies certainly existed and were played out in the press, often becoming personal in nature. But these did not lead to a split, for, unlike the Ruhr, there was no fundamental disagreement in South Wales as to who was represented. The activists, whatever their own ideological position, sought to represent the miners in their entirety. What was at question was the means to improvement, rather than who or what the miners should be.

In summary, the trade union discourses that did emerge were not simple reflections of milieux. Over time the identities of all the trade unions underwent modification. The Gewerkverein and SWMF became more aggressive, while the Alter Verband played down its anti-religious aspects. In both South Wales and the Ruhr, discursive identities were as much the product of individuals as they were of social structures. Figures such as Brust, Mabon, Hue, Imbusch, Brace and Hartshorn were crucial to forging these identities. Ultimately, the trade unions in the Ruhr created identities that were comparatively doctrinaire. The miner was not just a miner. He was a Social Democrat, or a Christian or a Polish miner. It was difficult to move beyond these identities to forge a new one. The different approaches to industrial relations were tightly bound up with who the miner was perceived to be. Was he the religious miner co-operating with the owners in the spirit of Christian brotherhood or the class warrior preparing for the moment when the capitalist system ultimately collapsed? Knappschaft, workers' committee and safetymen elections all offered a stage upon which this rivalry could be played out. Only the crisis of war was to push the Alter Verband and Gewerkverein together.

---

[1] Hans Marchwitza, *Meine Jugend*, Berlin, Tribüne, 1976, p. 241.
[2] Will Paynter, 'The SWMF' in Goronwy Alan Hughes (ed.), *Men of No Property: Studies in Welsh Trade Unionism*, Caerwys, Gwasg Gwenffrwd, 1971, p. 68.
[3] Ness Edwards, *The History of the South Wales Miners*, The Labour Publishing Company, London, 1926, pp. 19-21.
[4] Ibid, pp. 40-71.
[5] See Tenfelde, *Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 470-86 and pp. 514-521; Heinrich Imbusch, *Arbeitsverhältnis und Arbeiterorganisationen im deutschen Bergbau: Eine geschichtliche Darstellung,* Berlin, J. H. W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH, 1980.
[6] J. H. Morris and L. J. Williams, 'The South Wales Sliding Scale, 1876-79: An Experiment in Industrial Relations', in W.E. Minchinton, *Industrial South Wales 1750-1914: Essays in Welsh Economic History*, London, Frank Cass and Co. 1969.
[7] E. W. Evans, *The Miners of South Wales*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1961, pp. 133-8
[8] Lewis, *Rhondda*, p. 167.
[9] Imbusch, *Arbeitsverhältnis,* pp. 190-3
[10] Jahresbericht, Verein der Belegschaft der Zeche Ver. Hannibal, 14 April 1855, cited in Kroker, *Solidaität*, p. 63.
[11] Gerhard Adelman, *Die soziale Betriebsverfassung des Ruhrbergbaus vom Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Industrie- und Handelskammerbezirks Essen*, Bonn, Ludwing Röhrscheid, 1962, pp. 100-8. See also Ditt and Kift (eds.), *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik.*
[12] *Tremonia*, 29 July 1889
[13] Lambert Lensing, *Der große Bergarbeiter-Streik des Jahres 1889 im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlenrevier. Ein Wort zur Abwehr*, Dortmund, 1889, p. 82
[14] Hans Georg Kirchhoff, *Die Staatliche Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau 1871-1914*, Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1957, pp. 91-4.
[15] *T* 11 December 1889.
[16] *WM* 1 June 1871.
[17] *The Workman's Advocate* 15 January 1875.

[18] Keith Burgess, *The Origins of British Industrial Relations: The Nineteenth Century Experience*, London, Croom Helm, 1975, pp. 170-6. Robert Pope also claims that the Welsh chapels' focus on individual salvation restrained their involvement in social questions. See Pope, *Building Jerusalem: Nonconformity, Labour and the Social Question in Wales, 1906-1939*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998, pp. 241-9.
[19] See E. W. Evans, *Mabon: William Abraham1842-1922: A Study in Trade Union Leadership*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1959; E. W. Evans, 'Mabon and trade unionism in the South Wales Coalfield' in Hughes (ed.), *Men*, pp. 51-9; and David A. Pretty, 'David Morgan (Dai O'r Nant), Miners' Agent. A portrait of leadership in the South Wales Coalfield', *WHR*, 20, 3, 2000, pp. 495-531. William Abraham was better known by his bardic name Mabon. He will be referred to as such from here on.
[20] Evans, *Mabon*, p. 15.
[21] Ibid. pp. 100-1.
[22] See Alastair J. Reid, 'Old Unionism Reconsidered: The Radicalism of Robert Knight, 1870-1900', in Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid, *Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914'*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 214-45.
[23] *SWDN* 1 October 1894
[24] Ibid.
[25] Klaus Tenfelde, 'Bergmännisches Vereinswesen im Ruhrgebiet während der Industrialisierung', in Reulecke and Weber (eds.), *Fabrik,* pp. 323-4.
[26] Cited in Imbusch, *Arbeitsverhältnis*, p. 307.
[27] Hickey, *Workers*, p. 228.
[28] The *Bergarbeiter Zeitung* experienced several name changes during its lifetime. Here it will be referred to as the *Bergarbeiter Zeitung* throughout to avoid confusion.
[29] *BZ* 15 February 1890.
[30] *Rheinisch-Westfälischen Volkszeitung* 30 January 1890, cited in Imbusch, *Arbeitsverhältnis*, p. 320.
[31] *Bottroper Volkszeitung* 11 March 1890.
[32] Ibid, 13 March 1890.
[33] *BZ* 17 May 1890.
[34] Walter Neumann, *Die Gewerkschaften im Ruhrgebiet. Voraussetzung, Entwicklung und Wirksamkeit*, Köln, Bund-Verlag GMGH, 1951, p. 56.
[35] *Dortmunder Zeitung* 9 January 1893.
[36] Ibid. 8 January 1893.
[37] *RWAZ*, 11 January 1893.
[38] *BZ* 7 Jan 1893.
[39] *T* 7 January 1890.
[40] Ibid, 9 January 1890.
[41] Ibid, 8 January 1890.
[42] *RWAZ* 18 January 1890.
[43] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 196
[44] *BZ* 18 February 1890
[45] Neumann, *Gewerkschaften*, p. 78.
[46] See Claudia Hiepel, *Arbeiterkatholizmus an der Ruhr. August Brust und der Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter*, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1999, pp. 34-39.
[47] Statutes reproduced in Imbuch, *Arbeitsverhältnis*, p. 716. See also H. J. Wallraff, 'Die Belastung einer Gewerkschaft durch ideologischer Differenzen – Spannungen innerhalb der christlischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den Jahren 1900-1914', in H. O. Vetter (ed.), *Vom Sozialistengesetz zur Mitbestimmung. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Hans Böckler*, Köln, Bund Verlag, 1975, pp. 135-152.
[48] Heinrich Imbusch, *August Brust. Ein Lebensbild des Gründers der ersten christlichen Gewerkschaft*, Berlin, Christlicher Gewerkschafts-Verlag, 1924, p. 8.
[49] *Bk* 23 November 1895.
[50] HM Inspector of Mines South Wales District No 13, p. 1, GRO D/D NCB 67/2/6.
[51] Morris and Williams, 'Scale', p. 230
[52] *WM* 9 November 1892.
[53] Michael Keen and Richard Keen, 'The Coal War in South Wales, 1893', *Glamorgan Historian*, 10, 1974, p. 39. See Robin Page Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 1, pp. 32-8 for the course of the strike.
[54] *SWDN* 12 August 1893. Daronwy Isaac was an associate of Mabon. He had been refused entrance to a miners' meeting the previous day.

[55] Edwards, *Miners*, p. 115.
[56] *TG* 3 August 1893.
[57] Ibid.
[58] M. Severn, *The Miners' Evangel. A Text Book for all Manual Workers*, Pontypridd, John W. Ford, 1895, pp. 13-14
[59] Ibid, p. 11.
[60] Ibid, p. 52.
[61] Ibid, p. 69.
[62] Ibid, p. 65.
[63] Regierungspräsident Arnsberg to Minister des Innern, 28 April 1896, STAD 9039.
[64] The incident is described in Hue, *Bergarbeiter*, pp. 477-80.
[65] Otto Hue, *Neutrale oder parteiische Gewerkschaften? Ein Beitrage zur Gewerkschaftsfrage zugleich eine Geschichte der deutschen Bergarbeiterbewegung*, Bochum, Möller, 1900, p. 67.
[66] Ibid, pp. 93-4.
[67] Ibid, p. 83.
[68] *Bk* 29 April 1899.
[69] Hue, *Bergarbeiter*, pp. 503-4. See also *Bk* 12 and 22 July 1899 and *BZ* 12 and 29 July 1899.
[70] *EVZ* 16 March 1897, clipping, STAD 9046.
[71] Gustav Natorp, secretary of the VbI, to a meeting of industrialists in Düsseldorf, 24 June 1878, cited in Johann Paul, *Krupp*, p. 253.
[72] For details on the cause of the strike and Brust efforts to mediate see *Bk*, 1 May 1898.
[73] *Bk* 15 July 1898.
[74] Hue, *Bergarbeiter*, pp. 491-500. Also expressed in Otto Hue, *Mehr Bergarbeiterschutz*, Bochum, Möller, 1900, pp. 35-6. Brüggemeier adopts Hue interpretation of the effect of the strike, *Leben*, p. 198.
[75] Heinrich Imbusch, *Die Tätigkeit und Erfolge des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands*, Essen, Verlag des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter, 1915, pp. 11-12.
[76] *Bk* 15 July 1898
[77] Protokoll der 16. Generalversammlung des Verband deutscher Bergarbeiter, 10 to 15 June 1905, p. 45
[78] Otto Hue, *Unsere Taktik beim Generalstreik*, Bochum, Hansmann & Co., 1905, p. 15
[79] Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Minster des Innern, 30 January 1905, STAM OBA 1846.
[80] See Albin Gladen, 'Die Streiks der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet in den Jahren 1889, 1905 und 1912' in Jürgen Reulecke (ed.), *Arbeiterbewegung am Rhein und Ruhr*, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, pp. 134-9; Dieter Fricke, *Der Ruhrbergarbeiterstreik von 1905*, Berlin, Rütten & Loening, 1955; Brüggemeier, *Leben*, pp. 211-7.
[81] Gerhard Adelman, *Die soziale Betriebsverfassung des Ruhrbergbaus vom Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Industrie- und Handelskammerbezirks Essen*, Bonn, Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag, 1962, pp. 122-5; Kirchoff, *Sozialpolitik*, pp. 151-9.
[82] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. I, pp. 45-60
[83] *SWDN* 7 July 1898.
[84] *CG* 24 June 1898.
[85] Pretty, 'Morgan', p. 518
[86] *SWDN* 6 July 1898.
[87] *PC* 24 June 1898.
[88] MSWCOA meeting 1 September 1898, NLW MG 7.
[89] *PC* 9 September 1898.
[90] *BZ* 13 August 1904.
[91] *Die Kämpfe um Knappschafts-Reformen im Allgemein Knappschaftsverein Bochum*, Bochum, 1910, p. 30.
[92] *Bk* 16 and 23 January 1904.
[93] Ibid, 6 August 1904.
[94] See Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Bergarbeiter-Delegiertentegen für Preußen, 28 March to 30 March 1905, Berlin, p. 5, and Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des II. Bergarbeiter-Delegiertentegen für Preußen, 11 to 12 February 1906, pp. 20-22.
[95] Klaus Tenfelde, 'Die Krawalle von Herne im Jahr 1899', *IWK*, XV, 1979, pp. 71-104.
[96] Hue, 'Die Krawalle von Herne', *Die Neue Zeit*, 1898/99, 43, p. 535.
[97] *BZ* 8 July 1899.
[98] Kulczycki, *Foreign*, p. 93.

[99] Reproduced in *Bk* 5 April 1902.
[100] On Polish subculture see Christoph Kleßmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1945*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978, pp. 83-92
[101] Christoph Kleßmann, 'Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet: Soziale Lage und gewerkschaftliche Organisation', in Mommsen and Borsdorf (eds.), *Glückauf*, p. 120.
[102] Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Landrat Essen, 15 December 1902, STAD 238.
[103] Cited in Kleßmann, 'Bergarbeiter', p. 111.
[104] John Kulczyki, 'A Trade Union for Polish Miners in the Ruhr: Alter Verband, Gewerkverein and Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie', in Klaus Tenfelde (ed.), *Towards a Social History of Mining in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Papers presented to the International Mining History Congress Bochum*, München, Beck, 1989, p. 615.
[105] Heinrich Imbusch, *Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet in Frühjahr 1912*, Köln, Christl. Gewerkschaftsverlag, 1912, p. 44.
[106] Polizeiverwaltung Hamborn to OBA 26 February 1905, STAM OBA 1845.
[107] Bezirks Polizeikommissar Essen to Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, 18 February 1905, STAM OBA 1846.
[108] *BZ* 28 October 1905.
[109] Geschäftsbericht des Vorstandes des Gewerkvereins christliche Bergarbeiter Deutschlands für die Jahre 1905 und 1906 und Protokoll der 11 Generalversammlung, 29 June to 1 July 1907, Essen, 1907, pp. 42-3.
[110] Heinrich Imbusch, *Ist eine Verschmelzung der Bergarbeiterorganisationen möglich?*, Essen, Fredebeul, 1906, pp. 61-2.
[111] Hue, *Neutrale*, pp. 8-9.
[112] Protokoll der 17. Generalversammlung des Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 5 to 9 May 1907, p. 60.
[113] Hue, *Neutrale*, pp. 114.
[114] Werner, *Kumpel*, p. 149.
[115] Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1911/1912, p. 84.
[116] Regierungspräsident Münster to Minister des Innern, 5 February 1905, STAM OBA 1846.
[117] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 199.
[118] Berg, *Wirtshcaft*, p. 298.
[119] See Klaus Schönhoven, *Expansion und Konzentration. Studien zur Entwicklung der Freien Gewerkschaften im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890 bis 1914*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1980, pp. 264-9; August Erdmann, *Die Christlichen Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, J.H.W Dietz, 1908, p. 451; Michael Schneider, *Die Christlichen Gewerkschaften 1894-1933*, Bonn, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1982, pp. 55-67.
[120] Schönhoven, *Expansion*, p. 229.
[121] Hue, *Gewerkschaften*, p. 52.
[122] Francis and Smith, *SWMF*, p. 19.
[123] Blaenavon Lodge Minutes, 1 November 1906, MNA/NUM L/11/A3.
[124] Ibid. pp. 579-80.
[125] Reports of the Manager of Locket's Merthyr Collieries Ltd to the Directors, 6 May and 8 June 1907, GRO D/D NCB16/35. T.I. 'Mardy' Jones was later elected as a Labour MP for Pontypridd.
[126] The unions had supported the latter for some time. See for example, Otto Hue, *Bergarbeiterscutz*, p. 18.
[127] See Otto Hue, 'Arbeiterausschüsse als Arbeitervertretungen', and 'Die Arbeiterausschüsse in der Praxis', in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, January and June 1907, Bd. 1, pp. 15-24 and pp. 489-63 respectively.
[128] Otto Hue, 'Weisse Salbe', in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, April 1909, Bd. 1, p. 472. Later the Gewerkverein also claimed that employers placed pressure on safetymen to record '*Alles ist in Ordnung*' (everything is in order), *Bk*, 27 June 1914, clipping, STAM OBA 1853.
[129] *Bk* 3 February 1912.
[130] Hermann Vogelsang, *Der Arbeiter-Ausschuss im Bergbau*, enclosed STAD OBA 1849.
[131] *BZ* 18 June 1910.
[132] *Welche Aufgabe haben die Sicherheitsmänner?*, 1910, STAM OBA 1852.
[133] Oberbergamt to Minister des Innern, 2 January 1911, STAM OBA 1850 and *BZ* 17 December 1910.
[134] Adelman, *Betriebsverfassung*, pp. 145-9. See also *BZ* 21 May 1914, clipping, STAM OBA 1853.
[135] *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 4 July 1910, clipping, STAM OBA 1850.
[136] *RL* 14 July 1900.

[137] *RL* 20 May 1905 and 9 July 1910.
[138] Monthly Report of the No 1 Rhondda District of the South Wales Miners' Federation, 1 May 1905, p. 27.
[139] Deian Hopkin, 'The Great Unrest in Wales 1910-13: A Question of Evidence', in Deian R. Hopkins and Gregory S. Kealey (eds.), *Class, Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada, 1850-1930*, Llafur/CCLH, 1985, pp. 249-75.
[140] South Wales Miners' Federation Open Session on the Eight Hours' Bill, 17 March 1908, SWCC MNA/NUM/3/10/19.
[141] Hans Manfred Bock, 'Anarchosyndicalism in the German Labour Movement: A Rediscovered Minority Tradition', in Marcel von der Linden & Wyne Thorpe (eds.), *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective*, Aldershot, Scolar Press, 1990, pp. 59-80 and Joseph White, 'Syndicalism in a Mature Industrial Setting: The Case of Britain', in ibid, pp. 101-118.
[142] Bock, 'Anarchosyndicalism', p. 62.
[143] Gerhard A. Ritter, *Arbeiterbewegung. Parteien und Parlamentarismus. Aufätze zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976, pp. 41-4. (Will be referred to as Ritter, *Arbeiterbewegung* from here on).
[144] White, 'Syndicalism', pp. 101-118.
[145] David Egan, 'The Unofficial Reform Committee and the Miners' Next Step: Documents from the W. H. Mainwaring Papers with and introduction and notes', *Llafur*, 2, 1, 1978, pp. 64-80. For the different viewpoints represented by two members of the URC see Keith Davies, 'Rival Prophets? Williams Ferris Hay, Noah Ablett and the debate over working class political action in the South Wales Coalfield 1910-1914', ibid., 7, nos. 3 & 4, 1998/9.
[146] Egan, 'Unofficial', pp. 67-8.
[147] *RL* 9 July 1910.
[148] Its initial membership amounted to just twenty, Polizeikommissar Gelsenkirchen to Regierungspräsident Münster, 11 February 1910, STAM Reg. Mü VII 82. By the end of 1910 the FVdG organised 450 miners, 250 of which came from the Alter Verband, Tenfelde, 'Linksradikale Strömungen in der Ruhrbergarbeiterschaft 1905 to 1919', in Mommsen and Borsdorf (eds.), *Glück auf*, p. 216.
[149] For the influence of the independent working-class movement upon the trade union activists in South Wales before World War One see Richard Lewis, *Leaders and Teachers: Adult Education and the Challenge of Labour in South Wales, 1906-1914*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1993, pp. 49-97.
[150] *SWW* 5 July 1913. See also Robert Pitt, 'Educator and Agitator: Charlie Gibbons 1888-1967', *Llafur*, 5, 2, pp. 72-83.
[151] Francis and Smith, *SWMF*, p. 13.
[152] Freie Vereinigung deutsches Gewerkschaften, *Das Programm des freien Vereinigung deutsches Gewerkschaften*, Berlin 1906, p. 10-15.
[153] *The Industrial Syndicalist*, February 1911, p. 35. Italics in original.
[154] *The Miners' Next Step*, URC, 1912, reprinted with introduction from R. Merfyn Jones, Pluto Press, Shoreditch, p. 29.
[155] Ibid. p. 21.
[156] *An die Bergsklaven*, enclosed Bezirks Polzeikommissar to Regierungspräsident Münster, 11 February 1910, STAM Regierung Münster VII 82.
[157] *Bergarbeiter des Ruhrrevier*, ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] *Step*, pp. 18-20.
[160] *RS* 1 March 1913.
[161] Francis and Smith, *SWMF*, p. 22.
[162] An example of this more radical, but not syndicalist, leader is Vernon Hartshorn. Peter Stead regards him as occupying an ideological position somewhere between Mabonism and syndicalism. Peter Stead, 'Vernon Hartshorn: Miners' Agent and Cabinet Minister', *Glamorgan Historian*, 6, 1969, p. 86.
[163] Cited in Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 1, p. 322.
[164] George Barker, miners' agent for Abertillery and member of the MFGB executive, directly linked the two strikes. See *RS*, March 1912.
[165] *SWW* 21 June 1913.
[166] Sachse, Protokoll der 19. Generalversammlung des Verband deustcher Bergarbeiter zu Bochum, 1911, p. 89.

[167] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 229. The *Dreibund* consisted of Alter Verband, ZZP and Hirsch-Duncker unions.
[168] For examples of intimidation of working miners see STAM OBA 1857 and 1858.
[169] See *BZ* 30 March and *Bk* 23 March 1912 respectively.
[170] *Bk* 2 March 1912.
[171] Imbusch, *Bergarbeiterstreik*, p. 19.
[172] Ibid, pp. 32-7.
[173] Ibid, p. 23.
[174] *BZ* 10 February 1912.
[175] Huseman, Protokoll der 20. Generalversammlung des Verband deutscher Bergarbeiter zu Hannover, 1912, p. 103.

Chapter Three

Political Languages, 1890-1914

> 'Devotion to Liberalism is a Welsh national trait; it is inherent in the Welsh national character', *South Wales Daily News*, 12 January 1906.[1]

> '...still in the hands of the clerics, who, at every opportunity, more or less explain the Social Democrats and the free trade unions as Beelzebub and his followers...So that today the political as well as the trade union movement is still, as for ten or twenty years, almost exclusively sustained from the foreign elements.' *Arbeiter-Sekretariat* Bochum on the SPD and free trade union movement in the area, 1905.[2]

Introduction

This chapter examines the discourses employed by political parties to appeal to the miners of South Wales and the Ruhr. The pattern of homogenisation and fragmentation identified in the examination of the miners' trade unions had parallels within the political sphere. While the parliamentary representation of the South Wales miners remained largely the preserve of the Liberal Party up to 1918, there was fierce competition in the Ruhr between the German Centre Party, the National Liberals and, later, the Social Democratic Party for the votes of the miners. Therefore, the dual trends of homogenisation and fragmentation applied as much, if not more so, to the political as to the industrial arena.

As with the trade unions, the various political parties reinforced these trends. As such, this chapter poses similar questions to its predecessor. How did the parties construct a discursive identity with which to appeal to the miners? What were the constitutive features of these identities? How did they relate to the milieux highlighted in chapter one? On the one hand, the chapter will focus on the Liberal discourse in South Wales and examine how the party sought to deal with the growing concern with labour as a political entity. On the other, it will question why the SPD, despite the overwhelmingly industrial character of the region, was ultimately unable to turn the Ruhr into a political stronghold.

Before examining the discourses of the various parties some attention must be given to the institutional background. As shown in the previous chapter institutional factors both limited and offered opportunities for the expression of discourse. Given

the different electoral systems of Britain and Germany, this was even more the case in the political sphere. These systems provided the framework within which discourse was played out. Furthermore, between the individual acceptance of a particular discourse and the casting of the vote there lies a whole gamut of intermediate factors. Results can be, and were, massaged and distorted by gerrymandering, ballot stuffing, coercion, treating, plural voting, limited or unequal suffrage, the banning of party meetings, and agreements between parties to 'deliver' their electorate. The first section therefore briefly considers the implication that the electoral systems had for the transmission of discourse.

The Political Systems of Germany and Britain

In both Germany and Britain 1867 represented something of a political watershed. During that year both countries experienced significant reform of their electoral systems. In Britain Disraeli's 1867 Reform Act expanded the electorate from 1.4 million to 2.52 million. Later the 1884 Franchise Act introduced by the Gladstone government extended the vote to every householder in the counties, increasing the electorate to 5 million. In Prussia there was a more dramatic change. Bismarck introduced universal male suffrage for the Reichstag elections, a provision that was adopted in the Reich Constitution after the Franco-Prussian War. In both cases it was pragmatic political considerations that motivated the legislators to extend the vote. Disraeli needed the support of radical Liberals to keep his minority Conservative government in power, while Bismarck sought to out-manoeuvre the German liberals, believing that the elections would provide a conservative majority.[3]

Apart from the different size of their electorates there were other significant differences between Germany and Britain. Not only did more Germans enjoy the vote; they also had greater opportunity to vote.[4] The federal structure of the German Reich meant that there was another representative tier between the local and national levels. However, universal male suffrage did not apply to the Prussian Landtag, within whose boundaries the Ruhr lay. The franchise for the Prussian Landtag was divided into three classes according to the level of tax the voters paid. This pattern also applied to local elections. Under this system each class elected a third of the representatives, a feature that worked to the advantage of the industrialists. Werner Hoffmann's study of six industrial communities in the Ruhr reveals that the mineowners, as the highest tax-

payers, were often the only voters in the first class, allowing them to determine a third of representatives directly.[5]

Britain lacked an intermediate elective layer between the local and national. Furthermore, until the passage of the 1888 Local Government Act, the un-elected Justices of the Peace and piecemeal sanitary authorities governed the counties. The Local Government Act established elected county councils. The counties were further sub-divided into rural and urban district councils, although different franchises obtained in different areas. Finally, while voting in Britain was on a 'first past the post' basis, in Germany, should no one achieve an overall majority, a second run-off round would be held between the two leading candidates.

Two important consequences of these different electoral systems for party political development and discourse can be identified. First, the run-off system in Germany encouraged a plurality of parties. Should a party lose the first run they could also strike a deal with one of the parties going into run-off, delivering their vote in return for certain concessions. Margaret Anderson puts this point succinctly:

> Experience soon taught political groups to hold onto their separate identities, even in districts where they had no hope of winning, in order to deny the absolute majority to the strongest party, since advantages that eluded the minority in the first ballot (*Hauptwahl*) might still be attained through bargaining away their votes at the time of a runoff. The multiparty system that ensued – not just at the level of parliament, but eventually replicated in election districts throughout the country – reinforced the initial advantages of separation.[6]

In this way Germany's electoral system promoted a multiplicity of parties and, since every party needed to distinguish itself from its opponents, of discourses.

On the other hand, the first-past-the-post system in Britain did not offer these opportunities. Instead, it was more advantageous to build up alliances of interests prior to the election as division could cost a party victory. Therefore, several interests were contained within the 'broad church' of one of the two main parties for much of the late nineteenth century. For example, the Newcastle Programme, produced by the National Liberal conference in October 1891 and adopted by Gladstone, included a wide range of reforms covering temperance, agriculture, religion and labour issues. It has been argued that the varied nature of this programme revealed the sectarian divisions within the party itself, of which the Welsh group was but one.[7] On the other hand, the Welsh contingent has been regarded as a vigorous and positive force within

the party, able to unite 'Old Liberal' concerns with religious issues and the focus of 'New Liberalism' upon social and labour questions.[8]

Second, universal male suffrage in Germany meant that a self-declared working-class party had at least a chance of winning votes. There existed a specific electorate at which they could aim their appeal.[9] The disenfranchisement of a large section of the British working class meant that, during the nineteenth century, labour interests were more often expressed through the existing parties. Perhaps the clearest expression of this was the emergence of the so-called 'Lib-Lab' MPs, who combined traditional Liberal concerns with an interest in policies directly affecting labour. Mabon, the leading Lib-Lab MP in the South Wales coalfield following his election in 1885, summed up this point of view by claiming that 'I am pledged to vote for Labour reform, whatever Government brings in the Bill, but as an individual I am a Liberal.'[10] These institutional and structural factors contribute to explaining why, in Britain, the Liberals were largely able to accommodate labour demands up until the twentieth century, while specifically working-class parties were formed in Germany at a comparatively early date.[11]

Political Discourses, 1890-1900

This examination of the discourses of the various political parties mainly focuses on several key constituencies and individuals that were paradigmatic of discursive trends. For the Ruhr, the electoral districts are Dortmund-Hörde, Bochum-Gelsenkirchen and Essen. The SPD ultimately managed to win Dortmund from the National Liberals and turn it into a SPD stronghold. Essen, on the other hand, remained firmly under the domination of the Centre Party throughout the Kaiserreich, except for the period between 1893 and 1898. Finally, Bochum swapped hands between all the parties, but by the late 1890s it had become a battleground for the SPD and National Liberals. In South Wales the constituencies are the Merthyr Boroughs, Glamorgan (Rhondda) and Glamorgan East. The Merthyr Boroughs had a reputation for radical politics. The Rhondda was held by that epitome of 'Lib-Labism' Mabon, and East Glamorgan repeatedly returned the Liberal Alfred Thomas for much of this period.

As already noted the real breakthrough for the SPD in the Ruhr came in 1890, its political importance having being negligible in the area during the time of the Anti-Socialist Law. Once permitted to campaign freely its percentage share of its vote rose

steeply from 2.5 percent in 1887 to 11.5 percent in 1890.[12] Unsurprisingly, the issue of class featured strongly in SPD discourse. In much of the Ruhr, and in Dortmund in particular, one of the party's primary means of disseminating its discourse was through its organ *Die Rheinische-Westfälische Arbeiterzeitung* (RWAZ). Generally, but especially during election campaigns, the paper sought to construct a dichotomous identity based on the perceived conflict of interests between the working class and the employers. In 1893 Carl Wilhelm Tölcke, a long-standing member and influential figure within the social-democratic movement, opposed the incumbent National Liberal candidate Theodor Adolf von Möller, a factory owner and co-founder of the Central Association of German Industry (*Centralverbandes deutscher Industrieller,* CdI). During the campaign a series of articles appeared under the title '*Volk der Arbeit aufgewacht*' (People of Work Awake). Within these articles the National Liberals were portrayed as the party of the capitalist owners, whose interests were necessarily opposed to those of the working class.

> What is a party? A party is an interest group, in other words: people, who have the same interests towards the economic and political institutions of the state, join together in a party. Now since the interests of the factory owners, the coal barons, the big businessmen, etc. of all exploiters in general, are diametrically opposed to the interests of the workers, it is clear that every worker who votes for a candidate of the capitalist parties commits an act of treason against his own interests.[13]

Möller himself was characterised as a representative of 'mobile capital', an employers' candidate. On the other hand, a vote for the SPD was seen as a 'protest against the prevailing system of exploitation.'[14] By implication Tölcke and the SPD represented the true interests of the working class. Only by voting for the SPD would a miner be faithful to his own interests, which were indivisible from those of the working class as a whole.

However, the SPD in Dortmund, as elsewhere in the Ruhr, was fighting on two fronts. The Centre Party, although weaker in Dortmund than in other constituencies, still offered a challenge to the SPD. Its reluctant candidate in 1893 was Lambert Lensing, founder and editor of the Catholic organ *Tremonia.*[15] In its 'othering' of the Centre, however, the SPD took a different tack than it did towards the National Liberals. A discursive construction of the Centre as merely an employers' party was not entirely convincing. Stanley Suval's examination of Dortmund shows that, while the SPD drew its support from those in blue-collar

occupations, the National Liberals relied on white-collar workers. The Centre Party, on the other hand, received roughly equal support from both occupational groups.

Table 3.1: Estimated Party Strength in Dortmund by Class (by percentage)

Class	Socialists	National Liberals	Centre
White-collar occupations	21	91	44
Blue-collar occupations	79	9	55
Total	100	100	99

Source: Stanley Suval, *Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, London, University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 83.

The Centre Party, after all, had links to a dense network of workers' organisations in the form of the Catholic Arbeitervereine. Furthermore, the Centre itself drew distinctions between the Catholic working class and the predominantly Protestant owners. Therefore, rather than portraying the Centre as solely a party of the employers, the SPD laid more emphasis upon the way it split the miners' movement. Thus, in the same address in which he condemned Möller as the puppet of the employers, Tölcke blamed the Centre for weakening working-class interests by dividing the movement against itself.[16]

However, class identities were also imposed on the Centre Party by the SPD. An election declaration that appeared in the paper on the day of the election called on the workers to reflect upon the interests that the various parties represented. While the National Liberals represented the 'chimney and mine barons', the Centre represented the 'estate owners, counts, barons, factory owners, doctors and chaplains. These people belong to the propertied middle class, or are rich aristocrats and well-paid Church officials; they will therefore only represent their interests, which are in opposition to those of the working class.' In some respects the Centre was seen as being made up of feudal and backward elements, but these were just as intent on exploiting the workers as the industrialists. Finally, the small Freisinnige and Democratic parties were characterised as representatives of the lower middle class (*Kleinbürgertum*), who could only impotently dream of power. On the other hand, the

> social-democratic party consists of workers, is the party of the worker. Social Democracy must therefore represent the interests of the workers, in contrast to all the other parties of the propertied middle-classes. The division is sharply drawn. On one hand stand the propertied classes, to be sure split between various conflicts of interest, but completely united against the 'covetous' workers, united so that the present exploitation of the workers through the capitalist employers shall be maintained. On the other side stands the waged worker (*Lohnarbeiter*) as an independent

> class, represented by Social Democracy, which will bring the exploitation of the waged workers through the capitalist employers to an end.[17]

Thus, while SPD discourse had certain nuances and established links between various opposition parties and certain socio-economic groups in Wilhelmine society, it ultimately conflated these differences to produce an essential dichotomy between the 'propertied' and the workers. The SPD regarded the political sphere as a direct extension of the social sphere. The fundamental conflict between capital and labour was reflected in the political parties. There existed no autonomous space for politics. This discursive interpretation of society was entirely in keeping with the Marxist theory that the party had accepted as its ideological basis at the 1891 Erfurt conference,[18] and propagated through both its more radical (*Die Neue Zeit*) and reformist journals (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*). The experience of state repression through the Anti-Socialist Laws was instrumental in allowing a whole generation of Social Democrats to endorse Marxism. Although Lasallean ideas remained an undercurrent within the party, the essential conflict at the root of Marxist ideology seemed to correlate better to the discrimination Social Democrats experienced under Bismarck.[19] The Anti-Socialist Laws also reinforced the earlier split between the labour and liberal movement in Germany. The SPD view that religion was backward and an obstacle to full working-class solidarity was closely bound up with this acceptance of Marxism. For the SPD class solidarity should be the sole interest of the workers. This 'totalising' conception of socialism rigidly defined the contours of SPD discourse, limiting its ability and willingness to work with the Christian-Socialists.

The labour-capital dichotomy remained the core theme in SPD discourse throughout this period. Admittedly, there did exist internal differences within the SPD and three groups can be distinguished. The orthodox Marxists, represented by Kautsky, awaited the revolution, which would be the inevitable result of capitalism. The *Jungen* sought to precipitate the revolution. Finally, the revisionists rejected revolutionary tactics in favour of practical reform within the existing system.[20] It was ultimately this latter group that began to gain the upper hand in the movement before the war. Yet, despite these differences, the perception that the interests of workers and owners were essentially in conflict was common to all.

In subsequent elections in Dortmund the *RWAZ* used the same kind of rhetoric as it had in 1893. In a by-election in October 1895 the SPD was actually successful in

returning its deputy for Dortmund. However, Dr Lütgenau's hold on the constituency was tenuous. During the 1898 elections the paper complained bitterly that:

> numerous workers are still not yet awoken to class consciousness, that means, they have not yet clearly recognised the conflict of interest between the great owners, the small owners and the proletariat and they have therefore not gained the insight that [Reichstag] deputies, which belong to the owners' parties, could not possibly observe both the interests of the workers and the middle-classes at the same time, where the interests of both sides are in opposition.

Furthermore, the article called upon the workers to look to what the party stood for rather than concentrating on the personality of the candidate.[21] Here again working-class interests, notions of class consciousness and voting for the SPD were conflated into one and the same thing. Only by voting SPD could the miner express the fact that he had fully realised his true identity as a member of the working class. Ultimately, the Dortmund party's fears over the underdeveloped sense of class consciousness in the constituency seemed to have been realised, as Lütgenau lost the seat to the National Liberal candidate Alexander Hilbck in the run-offs. However, the paper placed much of the blame upon 'the surprise of the Centre electorate by the leaders', who would rather throw their support behind the Protestant, possibly anti-Catholic Hilbck than let an irreligious Social Democrat win.[22]

Parallel discourses to that of the SPD are difficult to discern in South Wales during the 1890s. Britain as a whole lacked a large, self-consciously working-class party on the same lines as the SPD. Admittedly, the SDF and Socialist League had been active in South Wales in the 1880s. In the late 1890s the ILP also sought to extend its organisation into the Principality. These associations carried out agitation tours on the back of the industrial unrest that disturbed the region during that period.[23] However, their membership remained small and they did not stand for elections for much of this period.[24] Furthermore, as will be discussed later, ILP discourse in South Wales owed much to pre-existing Liberal traditions.

However, common motifs can be identified within the discursive constructions of the British Liberals, National Liberals and Centre. One such common theme was that of religion. All three parties used this as a basis upon which to build a political identity. In South Wales, the Liberal Party was widely regarded as the party of Nonconformity and disestablishment was one of the key planks in its platform. The discourse of Alfred Thomas, Liberal MP for East Glamorgan, was illustrative of the

important role Nonconformity played within Liberal discourse in South Wales. At a rally in support of Alfred Thomas's candidature held at Pontypridd during the 1885 election, Thomas Williams, President of the East Glamorgan Three Hundred, challenged the audience to be true to their beliefs. 'If you are a Conservative, vote for the Tory; but if [you are] Liberals and Nonconformists vote for Mr Alfred Thomas as the representative of your principles.'[25] In subsequent elections, all of which Thomas won, the same Anglican-Tory/Nonconformist-Liberal dichotomy was used time and again. Ten years after he was first elected, during the 1895 elections, Thomas faced a challenge from the Conservative, Henry Jackson. One musically inclined Liberal supporter placed the discursively constructed identity into song.[26]

Should old acquaintance be forgot
And thrown away for new
What good would Jackson do for us
That Thomas will not do

Chorus: For Thomas is man of men
A Liberal good and true
A Cymro pure we'll send again
Our battle to renew

Where Lewis failed shall Jackson will?
As Tory democrat
No! East Glamorgan answers plain
There is no fear of that

For Jackson stands for privilege
For wealth he stands, and class;
But Thomas stand for liberty
The welfare of the mass

Jackson would keep an Alien Church
To weigh our nation down
But Thomas means equality
Our freedom yet to crown!

Say what have Tories done for us
Where should we stand to-day
If Tories and their Alien Church
Had their own sweet way

Again would liberty be dumb
Again would hide her head
No never will we yield the faith
For which our fathers bled

For Liberty means no man's wrong
Its mission is to bless
To shield the helpless from the strong
To succour all distress

If East Glamorgan but unite
As she had done before
Then Thomas need not fear to fight
And Jackson fight no more.

Its musical merits aside, this election song neatly summed up some of the main features of Liberal discourse. Again the Tories were linked to the interests of the Anglican Church, the song carrying the implication that the Liberals would naturally represent Nonconformity. However, to the religious imagery was added a nationalist tone. By 'othering' the Anglican Church as 'alien', the Liberal discourse depicted it as something foreign to the Welsh 'nation' and its people. The intermingling of

nationalism and religion was furthered in the sixth verse by reaching back to a supposed history of Wales, in which Nonconformist forefathers made sacrifices for their faith. This dichotomy between Welsh/Nonconformist and English/Anglican was capped by the description of Thomas as a 'Cymro'. Thus Thomas was represented as the natural choice for the Welsh-Nonconformist voter, while Jackson was characterised as the unnatural, 'foreign' candidate. Within this discourse Nonconformity was being linked not only to Liberalism, but also to Welsh national identity.[27] True Welshmen were Nonconformists and vice versa. A distinction was drawn between these values and Toryism, which represented their negation. Voters could give physical manifestation to their Welsh identity by the relatively simple expedient of voting Liberal.[28]

Kenneth O. Morgan has argued that around 1892/3 there was a divergence between Liberalism and nationalism and points to the failure of the Cymru Fydd movement to find widespread support.[29] However, the issue of Welsh identity continued to be used within Liberal discourse as a means of mobilising the voters against their Conservative supporters. The combination of religion and nationalism played an important role in the myth of the *gwerin*, which can be roughly equated with the German conception of the *Volk*. Within this conception the Welsh were idealised as 'a cultivated, educated, often self-educated, responsible, self-disciplined, respectable but on the whole genially poor or perhaps small-propertied people, straddling groups perceived as classes in other, less fortunate societies.'[30] This independent, dissenting and generally Welsh-speaking populace had a rural character. Neil Evans and Kate Sullivan have shown how the Liberal Party used the Welsh language itself as a means of fostering this identity and as a weapon against the Tories when electioneering, although it sometimes proved double-edged.[31] The Welsh peasantry was the ideal of the *gwerinol* discourse and in Liberal discourse they were placed in juxtaposition to the anglicised, Church of England supporting, landowners, whose interests were seen as embodied by the Tory Party.

Indeed, although miners dominated the East Glamorganshire constituency by the end of the nineteenth century, Thomas continued to pitch an appeal that focused on this *gwerin* ideal. At a meeting at Cilfynydd Thomas's speech contained three main points: Irish Home Rule, Disestablishment and the Welsh Land Bill. On the situation of the farmers Thomas claimed 'the poor farmer was under the thumb of the landlord. This should not be so. So long as the farmer was prepared to pay a fair rent

for his holding he ought to be secure in his farm as the landlord was in his castle.'[32] Similarly, during the 1900 campaign Thomas moved seamlessly from religious to agricultural issues when criticising the achievements of the Tory Government.

> They had the Conscience Clause, but, of all frauds, there was no greater fraud than that. How could they expect a little child to say 'I am a Nonconformist' and refuse to join the catechism, and then have the finger of scorn pointed at him. He was surprised at the Nonconformist parents (suffering as they had) allowing their children to be taught by ministers who did not belong to the Church of their fathers. The Conservatives had also remembered the landlords. They had taken off half the Poor Rates from the tenants. Had not the tenants had the advantage? Before that had come about they had heard of such-and-such a landlord giving back 20, 30 or 40 per cent to their tenants; but now, that that law had been passed they never hear of that kind of thing. Who has benefited by that law? The landlords. The poor man who bought tea at 1s 4d per pound paid the same duty as the rich man who paid four or five times the amount for his tea. That was only one small matter, but it showed the principle.[33]

The extent to which this nationalist, *gwerinol* discourse was used by the Liberals of South Wales can be illustrated by a brief comparison with the political discourse of one of the most successful Conservative politicians in the region. Colonel Frederic Courtney Morgan, son of Viscount Tredegar, represented the South Monmouthshire constituency from 1874 until 1906, three years before his death. Within his election speeches during this time there is virtually no mention of Wales as a distinct nation. In fact, following his 1880 victory he even declared that 'the electors of the county had taught the rest of England a great lesson, stick to Conservatism.'[34] His only reference to Wales seems to have been as a result of a direct question during the 1895 election campaign. When asked if he was a 'Welsh member [of Parliament]' he replied, 'No I am not. I am a Welshman, but I was the member for Monmouthshire, or a portion of it.'[35] Admittedly, Monmouthshire was the most anglicised of the Welsh constituencies and was not necessarily considered part of Wales. But the complete lack of any sense of Welsh nationalism is striking when considered alongside Alfred Thomas's discourse. Instead, Morgan, along with other Conservative candidates for the Monmouthshire seats, focused upon a sense of 'Britishness' and the Empire. He declared in 1895 that if returned to Parliament he would work so that 'our beloved country may again be one of the brightest spots in the whole civilized world.'[36] Similarly, in 1900 he pledged 'to uphold the integrity of the Empire, the welfare of the people, and the interests of the district I represent.'[37] Notions of Empire and the welfare of the people were elided. The Empire was portrayed as something that would

bring prosperity to Britain. For example, Morgan's counterpart in the north Monmouthshire constituency, de F. Pennefather, sought to link the interests of Empire to those of the workers. He claimed 'as a practical man he knew the greatness of the Empire depended upon the workers.'[38] The example of Colonel Morgan would then seem to bear out Matthew Cragoe's argument that the Conservative Party in Wales used the issue of Empire as a counterweight to Home Rule.[39]

Morgan and the other Conservative candidates for Monmouthshire regarded the county as part of England rather than Wales. Legally, they may have been correct in this assumption, but it is apparent that not all of their constituents felt the same way. During the 1895 election a journalist for the *South Wales Daily Star* reported on a debate between the Liberal and Unionist candidates for North Monmouthshire. The Liberal R. McKenna was supported by 'a contingent from the hills [who] sang a party song to the strains of 'Men of Harlech', [but] this was broken into by the English portion singing 'Rule Britannia', and both parties kept it up, amid much cheering.'[40]

Although Morgan's lack of concern with 'Welshness' may be explained by the ambiguous position of his constituency, the same rejection of a Welsh national identity in favour of a British one is found elsewhere. Conservatives at the opposite end of the coalfield also emphasised the Empire and Britain over Wales. In 1906 the Conservative candidate for Carmarthen was a Mr Ponsonby. He campaigned almost exclusively on the issue of Tariff Reform, stressing the benefits duties would bring the Empire and the working class, but did not mention Wales once.[41] Similarly, four years later a whole page in the *Carmarthen Journal* was devoted to a Conservative election notice in support of Mervyn Peel for East Carmarthen and Lord Tiverton for Carmarthen Boroughs. It consisted of four questions, each of which began 'Are you, as Britishers.'[42] The contrast is even more striking when placed alongside Liberal discourse in the constituency. The Carmarthenshire Liberals played extensively on their Welsh credentials. The incumbent, Major Jones, declared in 1895 that 'what he was chiefly concerned about was the solidarity of Wales. The question for them was not what would happen in Manchester or Derby, but what was to happen in Wales. The very essence of freedom was at stake, and it was for the people of Wales to say whether the principality was again to return 31 Liberals out of the 34 representatives which she was entitled to return.'[43] Fifteen years later Liberal supporters claimed that it was their ideal 'all along that they in Wales at any rate should get men who were in entire sympathy with their aspirations as a country and as a nation. Their ideals and

aspiration were national, and characteristic of themselves as a nation, and they liked to get a man who was one of them.'[44]

It is notable that there is little mention of class in any of the above examples of Liberal or Conservative discourse. In fact, there is scant mention of the working class in any of Alfred Thomas's election speeches during this period. Where class is mentioned, as in Thomas' election song, it is imbued with negative connotations and refers to the landowners. The contrast between the 'classes' and the 'masses' implies that the former represent sectional interests. The concept of the *gwerin* was elided with the 'masses'. In fact, in much of Liberal discourse there was a juxtaposition between 'the people' and the landowners, rather than between classes as in SPD discourse. In 1895 an article appeared in the *Glamorgan Free Press* supporting the candidatures of Thomas, for East Glamorgan, and Arthur J. Williams, for South Glamorgan. It was comprised of three sections appealing to farmers, workers and Nonconformists respectively. The section on the workers concentrated upon the Liberals as the party of labour reform. However, in the whole piece there was no mention of class. Instead, emphasis was placed upon 'the people' and their opposites were once again the landowners rather than the employers.

> If you want men to represent the landlords and the landlords' institution vote for Major Quinn [the Conservative candidate for South Glamorgan] and Mr Jackson, but if you want men who will vindicate the rights of the House of Commons as the mouthpiece of the people's wishes and claims, do not forget to vote for Messers Arthur Williams and Alfred Thomas, and the truth of the old adage, Trech gwlad nag arglwydd.[45]

The tone of the piece is inclusive, attempting to unite farmers, workers and Nonconformists against a perceived 'oligarchy' represented by the landowners.[46]

Within Liberal discourse then the workers were subsumed within this conception of the people. In effect Liberal discourse sought to transcend class. If classes were recognised at all it was in a co-operative sense.[47] Differences between certain groups were recognised, but, just as the SPD did with the German upper- and middle-classes, these were conflated to present the people as an essentially homogeneous group, whose interests were in opposition to the landlords. In doing so the Liberals presented a communitarian ethos. Their MPs represented the communities as a whole, rather than certain occupational groups. Therefore, the 'politics of personality' suited Liberal discourse as it emphasised notable individuals from within the community, who were ostensibly products of the same.[48] Thus,

candidates emphasised their local origins or connections. When D. A. Thomas stood for Merthyr in the March 1888 by-election he was quick to point out that 'he was a native of this borough, and a Welshman on both sides (cheers). In addition to that he was closely associated with one of the staple industries of the district and, as his prosperity depended to a great extent upon theirs, he was likely to safeguard their interest in the House of Commons.' Welsh identity and Liberal credentials again served as the crux of Liberal discourse. He spoke 'in the vernacular' to convince his audience of his knowledge of Welsh and sharply attacked the Church. 'The people were alive to the fact that their national property, in the shape of tithes, was going into the coffers of an establishment entirely out of sympathy with their sentiments and feelings.'[49] The recurrent theme of nationalism and religion aside, it is notable that the fact that D. A. Thomas was a coalowner was not of prime importance. What was important was the implied interdependent relationship between his works and the miners. The two were indivisible and by electing D. A. Thomas the miners would have an MP who represented the whole community.

A similar combination of community, religion and nationalism was evident in the discourse of the National Liberal and Centre parties in Germany. However, while the British Liberal Party in Wales was able to articulate a specific nationalism within Britain, the National Liberals and Centre parties' discourse was concerned with placing themselves within the context of a German identity. The National Liberals continually played on this nationalist motif. The election declaration for the 1890 campaign called upon the voters to ensure that a government-friendly majority was elected to the Reichstag.

> To ensure the election of such a majority is today more than the duty of all friends of the Fatherland. Not in the interest of the party, but for the Fatherland we call to our friends that everyone does his duty. It is yours, and the affairs of the German Empire, which are dealt with. Allow yourselves to be led by the great national point of view, not the differences of opinion and conflicts of interest.[50]

Specific issues such as the *Militärvorlage* (military submission) provided a basis for the nationalist propaganda of the National Liberals.[51] At a rally on 4 June 1893 the National Liberal candidate for Bochum Dr. Haarmann, the Bürgermeister of Witten, concentrated on the dangerous position that Germany was in and appealed to patriotism. To undermine the SPD and the Centre party he pointed out:

> If the speakers of the opposition claim that France does not think about war, then the question must be put, why is [France] continually and to the extreme arming itself. France has nothing to fear from Germany. Only thoughts of revenge, already fostered in the school, form the driving force. The opponents point out the high costs, which acceptance of the submission will bring. Admittedly the costs are high, but they are not prohibitive and they must be affordable, if we can only turn away the threat of war or be victorious through a strengthening of the army.[52]

By focusing on the danger posed by France and thoughts of revenge Haarmann was also reaching back to the very foundations of the German Empire and able to play on feelings of national pride. Furthermore, he was able to 'other' the opposition by presenting their refusal to support the bill as at least misguided, if not unpatriotic. Haarmann was especially critical towards the Centre as they too sought to appropriate nationalism as a feature of their discourse. 'They always speak as if no sacrifice is to great for the honour and the greatness of the Fatherland and when the time arrives, then they refuse the means for the execution of the *Militärvorlage* necessary for Germany's security.'[53] Similarly, Möller in Dortmund appealed to the voters 'on election day only to give their vote to a patriotic thinking and feeling man, a man, who is primarily concerned with upholding the security of the Fatherland.'[54] Thus within National Liberal discourse identification with government policy often constituted the measure of one's patriotism. This notion of German identity was a recurrent theme in National Liberal discourse throughout the Kaiserreich.

However, the National Liberals were unable to appropriate this entirely. A multi-polar ideology, nationalism could be filled with a variety of meanings. Thus, the Centre Party was also able to claim the mantle of nationalism. For Centre Party activists, however, this could encompass a more critical stance. Within Centre discourse 'the true patriotism is not shown by saying yes and amen to all government proposals, but that we are of the opinion that the government must listen to the people. If we have people's representation we also want to send men who do not merely say "yes", but who can also pronounce a decisive "no".'[55] This allowed them the latitude to attack certain policies such as the continued ban on the Jesuits. During the 1893 the party attacked the *Militärvorlage* in a leaflet, declaring that it would be injurious to the interests of the artisans.[56]

At the same time, however, the party was sensitive to accusations of being un-German and sought constantly to reaffirm its loyalty to the Kaiser. The combination

of monarchism and Catholic sentiment evident in the poem 'Pope and Kaiser' was typical of Centre discourse.[57]

Holy Father, to you,
Leo, we devote to you
The devotional greeting!
For you we sing with delight
Always from happy breast,
We think about you today,
Hail, to you

Hail to you in the crown,
Ruler of the Fatherland,
Hail to you Kaiser!
Feel in the throne,
The lofty bliss,
Of being the darling of the people
Hail, to you, Kaiser

Hear in Heaven high,
Lord, the supplication of your people
And bless them,
That they with wise hand,
Church and Fatherland,
In unity lead
To tranquillity

Both the National Liberal and the Centre parties used this nationalist discourse to 'other' the SPD. For both the SPD represented the party of revolution and internationalism, threatening the established social order. It was due to this shared perception that, in many of the constituencies in the Ruhr, alliances, sometimes formal, sometimes informal, were formed to keep the SPD out. A prime example was the 1898 Dortmund election. The local Centre Party, having lost the first round, advised its members to vote for the National Liberal candidate, Hilbck, in the run-offs, in order to unseat the SPD incumbent Dr Lütgenau.[58] Interestingly, and perhaps as a reflection of the party's knowledge of their position in the constituency, *Tremonia* had been advocating support for Hilbck in the run-offs before the main election had actually taken place. A table was even printed mapping the various options for the run-offs depending on the results of the main election.[59] Furthermore, the Centre still supported Hilbck against Lütgenau, despite complaining that, during the first round, some mining officials had used their influence on their workers, apparently sitting outside a pub directly in front of one of the voting halls and handing out ballots for Hilbck.[60] The legitimisation for supporting Hilbck, despite these

alleged underhanded tactics, was the SPD's revolutionary nature. 'Social Democracy is not only the most dangerous nemesis of the Church and the Christian family, but also the existing social and civil order.'[61]

In fact Hilbck had deliberately sought to exploit the religious and nationalist concerns within both National Liberal and Centre discourse by adopting a broad approach. Throughout his campaign Hilbck had sought to depict the National Liberals as a *Volkspartei*, a people's party. His election declaration claimed that he would represent Protestants, Catholics, industry, agriculture, tradesmen and artisans, officials and workers all under the black-white-red flag.[62] At a rally in Lütgendortmund he declared his hope that 'this party (the Centre) will gradually develop from an ultramontan to a national [party].' This was in sharp contrast to his characterisation of the SPD, which was un-national. 'It had been proved how the daze of internationalism haunts only the head of the German Social Democrats, while the socialists of other lands always stand on the side of their country in national questions.'[63] During the run-offs he played this nationalist card to its full extent to draw out the Centre voters. 'No patriotic man can be in doubt over what he has to do.'[64]

Krupp too took a non-confessional stance in his 1893 campaign in Essen, previously a Catholic stronghold. In fact, the Krupp campaign represents the best example of how the politics of personality functioned in the Ruhr. This was especially so since Krupp himself did not directly involve himself in the campaign. His sole contribution appears to have been a letter published in the *RWZ*. In this he concentrated on the fact that, as an employer of both Catholic and Protestant workers, he was not interested in any religious conflict. 'I demand, as my father did, that in the interest of my works and its affiliates that Protestant and Catholics work in friendship alongside each other.'[65] Supporters of Krupp's candidature in Essen furthered this inclusive tone.

> Catholic voters can also vote without reservation for the selected candidate of the national parties, Herr Krupp, since Herr Krupp, although Protestant, would likewise represent the interests of the Catholic citizens as well as the Protestants. What Krupp has done for his officials and workers is known worldwide and is recommended as exemplary both domestically and abroad. Even now the Krupp works celebrate, through its products, great triumphs at the World Exhibition in Chicago, as the American and English corespondents have found themselves forced to emphasise. The name Krupp has such an outstanding importance for Essen and the area, that there could be no more natural or better representative than Herr Krupp.

Krupp was therefore being characterised by his supporters as not only the representative of Essen in Germany, but of Germany in the wider world. Much like D. A. Thomas in the Merthyr constituency, Krupp's interests were portrayed as indivisible from the interests of the community as a whole. Finally, as for candidates in other Ruhr seats, the *Militärvorlage* was used to add a nationalist tone. In this case it was presented as something above party politics, necessary for the defence of Germany.[66]

However, religious differences, and the related issues of national identity, could often place the National Liberals and Centre in sharp conflict. This was the case in Bochum in the 1890s. Just before the 1893 run-off the Centre had produced a leaflet apparently signed by leading local Social Democrats, which advised their supporters to vote for the Centre candidate Fuchs. The *RWAZ* later denied this as a forgery, but only after Fuchs had won.[67] The 1898 election was marked by particularly robust discourse based on religion as the National Liberals sought to mobilise the Protestant community in Bochum against the Centre. Just before the run-off election the Protestant pastors of the district produced a pamphlet aimed at the faithful. Once again Protestantism was elided with nationalism and fear of the enemy without.

> You, who have loved our Fatherland, you, who perhaps once waited willingly to sacrifice property and blood in the struggle for unity and the greatness, you, who live quietly and happily in shelter and protection under our beloved, truly solicitous, Protestant Kaiser, do you want be complicit through laxity, that our great industrial district should be represented by a foreign, Cologne merchant, who belongs to the great, ultramontan party which would like to place Germany again under the crooked rod (*Krummstab*) of the Roman Pope.

The pamphlet ended with the obligatory call to duty for the Protestant, German man.[68] The Centre, meanwhile, invoked the sentiments of the Kulturkampf in support of Fuchs. At a meeting on 2 June 1898 it was claimed that 'the Centre is also necessary in order to build a bulwark for the defence of the rights of the Church. The Kulturkampf is finished, however its fighters (*Kulturkämpfer*) wait only for the chance, where the Centre loses its crucial power, to give their feelings undisguised expression.'[69] Thus, while the National Liberals tended to focus upon monarchist sentiments and the memory of the creation of Germany, the Centre were able to play upon fears that a renewed Kulturkampf could be just around the corner.

During the 1898 election campaign in Bochum it was also claimed that Franken paid low wages at his factory, an accusation that was refuted by his Catholic workers in a counter leaflet.[70] This concern with presenting themselves as interested in the welfare of the workers was common to the South Wales Liberals, the National Liberals and the Centre. In 1893 the Fuchs campaign had produced a pamphlet reproducing a speech the politician made regarding an accident at the Carolinenglück mine in which he supported workers' councils and celebrated the victims as 'knights of work, fallen on the field of honour.'[71] In 1898 the National Liberals adopted a similar stance and stressed that their candidate was the workers' friend. Fuchs had done nothing for the miners but, 'Herr Franken, who, as a workers' child, grew up in work, is no friend of hollow phrases, but a man of action.'[72]

This 'friend of the worker' theme was common to the British Liberals, National Liberals and Centre. This was implicit in the importance attached to representing the community. It was believed that candidates, who were often industrialists or businessmen, would by pursuing their own interests naturally produce benefits for their employees. However, within British Liberal and Centre Party discourses currents existed which identified more directly with the working class. Perhaps the best examples are those of Mabon in the Rhondda and Gerhard Stötzel in Essen. Both these men came from working-class backgrounds and both were elected as workers' candidates in opposition to middle-class opponents from their own parties.[73] In their subsequent election campaigns neither was shy of using this identification to their advantage.

In the case of Stötzel this was particularly evident in 1890 when he faced a challenge to his monopoly of working-class identity in the shape of Ludwig Schröder, Alter Verband leader, miners' delegate to the Kaiser and SPD candidate. Stötzel's working-class credentials were continually emphasised at rallies. Matthias Weise, member of the Centre's provincial committee, presented Stötzel as:

> a man, who came from workers' circles, who knows the circumstances of the workers like hardly anyone else. If Herr Stötzel does not now work by hand, he has however not stopped working with head and heart. Herr Stötzel knows the circumstances of the workers as well as the best miner. In Bochum they have selected a miners' candidate, but there are also other interests to be represented in the Reichstag. We have also iron and steelworkers, who could also use the same right and name a candidate from their midst. We would be making a great mistake, if we separate ourselves from Herr Stötzel and are not loyal to him, because he is a strong-minded man respected by all parties.[74]

Stötzel himself noted that in meetings in Bochum and Recklinghausen he had been accused of not being a working-class candidate. In reply he emphasised that his 1877 victory over a middle-class Centre candidate had been due to the Christian workers. In a foreshadowing of the differences that were to afflict the miners' trade union movement, Stötzel also rejected the republicanism and atheism of the SPD, arguing that social reform could only be achieved on the basis of Christian thought.[75] Stötzel and his supporters were then propagating a general working-class identity aimed at appealing to the numerous factory workers of Essen as well as the miners. On the other hand, Schröder was portrayed as representing only a particular group among the working class. Furthermore, by indicating that he had been selected in Bochum for the Essen seat, Schröder's credibility as a representative of the locale was undermined.

It is interesting to note that Stötzel also faced a simultaneous working-class challenge from an obscure miner called Pohlmann, who had been nominated by the Protestant Arbeiterverein. Like other national candidates Pohlmann played on feelings of loyalty to royalty and based his appeal upon the Kaiser's proposed social reforms.[76] Weise ridiculed claims that the Centre was somehow not nationalist. 'The Centre voters, to which the workers number, could for once ask whether they are considered not national but un-German workers.' Furthermore, the Kaiser's social reforms were seen as already part of the Centre's own platform.[77] Therefore, by constructing an identity that played on class, national and religious sentiments Stötzel was able to effectively occupy the ground that his opponents sought to use. This coupled with his existing prominence and the overwhelmingly Catholic structure of the district, with its numerous organisations, ensured that he was comfortably returned for the constituency for the sixth consecutive time.

Chris Williams has shown how Mabon played upon his labour credentials in 1885 to defeat another Liberal candidate. At subsequent elections he repeatedly emphasised the fact that he represented the 'rights of labour.'[78] In 1892 Mabon faced the prospect of campaigning against a Liberal Unionist. During the election campaign Mabon spoke at Mardy. A leaflet depicting Mabon was distributed among those present. It specifically referred to Mabon as a 'Labour member' honoured by appointment to two Royal Commissions, one on Mining Royalties, and the other on Labour. Yet, despite this emphasis on labour, the class collaborative tone of Liberalism was represented by the presence of Griffiths Thomas, member of the

Ystrad Local Board and manager of Mardy Collieries. A guest speaker from Cardiff, Sir Edward J. Read, deplored the fact that Mabon was being challenged. Read's language mixed both the nationalist and labour sentiments that became characteristic of Lib-Labism in South Wales.

> He had come to ask, in the name of Mr Gladstone and the Liberal party of Cardiff, and the Labour party of Cardiff, and in the name of common sense, what was meant by opposition in such a constituency as that with a man such as they had to represent them? They were Welshmen, he presumed. Where were they going to get a Welshman who could stand up more nobly for Wales than that candidate had done? They were labouring men - where could they pick, from one end of the land to the other, a man more worthily representative of the labouring classes than was Mabon? They were miners - where could they find a man anywhere who had done the real work which Mabon had done in Parliament and on Commissions on behalf of the miners of that country?[79]

Mabon was presented as a capable representative of both Wales as a nation and the working class. It is noticeable here that class was not being used with pejorative connotations as in Thomas's election song. As early as 1885 Mabon had claimed that the miners wanted 'class representation'.[80] Mabon had begun to introduce a new element to the language of the people used by the Liberals; one which recognised the importance of labour. Welshman and worker, Mabon represented a compound of class identity with the other political ideals of Liberalism.[81] The Liberal Unionist nominee eventually withdrew from the contest. Indeed, so secure seemed Mabon's position in the Rhondda that at the next election thought was given to whether it was necessary for him to campaign at home, when his influence might be better used to help in other contests.[82] Williams has indicated how Mabon could alternately appear as a champion of Labour and of Liberalism.[83]

Yet there were tensions within Mabon's Lib-Labism. At a meeting of the Cambrian Miners' Association in 1892 he supported the issue of a parliamentary fund, arguing it was better not to be dependent on outside aid. He complained 'I tell you where I have been bound a little. Not by Tories - they would not ask me, but by Liberals [who by] contributing think that on that account they have a claim on me. They may send £10 or £5, but they expect a meeting for every pound sent.'[84] This desire for some degree of independence extended to policy. Where the interests of labour and Liberalism seemed to clash, the former often took precedence. Mabon, for example, had little to do with Cymru Fydd, believing that the type of Home Rule supported by this movement would damage the labour cause.[85]

During the January 1910 election campaign in South Wales an article appeared in the *Merthyr Express* that praised politicians such as Mabon, William Brace and Tom Richards, while castigating Keir Hardie. It claimed that 'there is absolutely no difference of a vital nature between Liberalism and Labour today. Liberals are friendly to the general programme of Labour, and nothing is more certain than that this programme will never be forwarded or realised without the sympathetic co-operation of a Liberal Government and the Liberal party.' Mabon, Brace and Richards were commendable because they understood this. 'They are men who frankly recognise how much Labour owes to Liberalism, and how much it has yet to gain from Liberal co-operation.' Hardie, on the other hand, failed to understand this. The article drew a distinction between Labour and Socialism and accused Hardie of trying to turn the former into the latter.[86]

But was this hard and fast distinction between Hardie and Mabon entirely justified? A look at Hardie's discourse suggests that he too owed much to Liberal traditions. During the December 1910 election, for example, Hardie's election address played on old Liberal shibboleths. Hardie declared 'Home Rule for Ireland, and for Wales, Temperance Reform, Disestablishment, and a thorough overhauling of our Educational System have all my heartiest support, and Protection, or, as it is called, Tariff Reform, my most strenuous opposition.'[87] Hardie's support for that centrepiece of Liberal discourse, disestablishment, was unequivocal. During the January 1910 campaign he stated at Aberdare 'that he had been advised that it would be a wise policy on his part to say as little as possible about Disestablishment. He has been during the past session working in Parliament for the recognition of Wales as a distinct nation.'[88] Therefore, just as in Liberal discourse, Hardie sought to combine the issues of religion and nationality to create an identity that would mobilise the workers.

However, the issue of religion could be problematic for Hardie. His opponents, specifically Pritchard Morgan, the incumbent that Hardie had unseated in 1900, sought to use the perceived atheistic nature of socialism to de-legitimise Hardie's representation of the Merthyr constituency. A handbill produced by Morgan quoted thirteen reasons not to vote for Hardie. Four dealt with religion. 'Socialism means death to the religious life of the community – Socialism is irreligious and

unscrupulous – Socialism teaches no Religion, no King, no Law, no God – Keir Hardie's preaching supporters are not Christians, but Pantheists.'[89]

The last point suggests that Morgan's attempt to portray Hardie as un-Christian was largely unsuccessful. In an open letter to Merthyr ministers in 1911 Hardie stated that 'socialism is not only not antagonistic to Christianity, but is the embodiment of everything which Christ taught concerning the life that now is.'[90] This put succinctly Hardie's view of the relationship between socialism and Christianity and represented a constant theme in all his discourse.[91] Perhaps more important than this was the support he received from a small group of socialist, or at least socialist-friendly, ministers.[92] The Revd J. Nicholas, for example, sought to link the spiritual goals of the Chapels and the material aims of the socialist claiming that 'Christianity needs the Labour Party and the Labour Party needs Christianity.'[93] Meanwhile, the Revd George Neighbour openly regretted that the ILP faced religious prejudice and hoped through his efforts to ease that.[94] Furthermore, articles linking Christianity, socialism and Welsh nationalism also appeared in Welsh language journals,[95] although generally there was a paucity of pro-socialist Welsh literature.[96] It has been rightly pointed out that the majority of Nonconformist ministers were generally hostile to socialist ideas.[97] The miners' agent Vernon Hartshorn blamed his defeat in the 1910 elections for Mid-Glamorgan on the intervention of the local ministers. Standing as a Labour candidate, Hartshorn believed that the ministers had made it seem that 'every vote given to [him] was a vote for Atheism.'[98] A particularly vocal opponent, although interestingly a one-time ILP supporter, was W. F. Phillips, who contributed articles against socialism to the Nonconformist journals.[99] However, when compared to the attitude of the Protestant and Catholic Churches towards socialism in the Ruhr, the whole tone of Nonconformity seems more ambiguous. The fact that some ministers were supportive of socialist policies is of significance as it illustrates how the more fluid nature of civil society in South Wales meant that associations were able to accommodate a plurality of viewpoints. Protestant and Catholic ministers in the Ruhr did not produce articles entitled 'Why I am a Socialist',[100] and socialist ministers were a comparative rarity in Germany. Where they did engage with social issues their intervention was seen as a means of preventing the working class from being seduced by social democracy. The less than monolithic antipathy to socialism of the Nonconformist ministers, their failure to produce any effective counter-measures and the open support of a minority provided socialism in Wales with some legitimacy.

This allowed it to be largely elided with older themes by the Welsh labour movement.[101]

Hardie successfully 'blended Radical and Labour appeals'.[102] But while Hardie undoubtedly adopted several of the themes evident in Liberal discourse in South Wales, he was also careful to maintain an independent identity. Although he supported Liberal initiatives, such as the budget in 1909, he was careful to emphasise that co-operation was 'not to be taken as an indication of that [the Labour Party] had merged their independence or identity in the Liberal party.'[103] In his personal life too he seems have tried to maintain a certain distance from the Liberals.[104] Where his discourse differed from that of the Liberals was in its emphasis upon the working class. As Peter Stead has argued, by maintaining his independence, Hardie was able 'to capture the very word "labour".'[105] Yet, the way in which he combined this class with a nationalist identity is evident in this speech he gave at Dowlais.

> The Nationalist Party that I have in mind is this; the people of Wales fighting to recover the possession of the land of Wales, the working class of Wales acquiring possession of the mines, of the furnaces, and of the railways, of the great public works generally, and working these as comrades, not for the benefit of shareholders, but for the good of every man, woman and child within your borders. That is the kind of Nationalism I want to see brought about. And when that comes the red dragon [will be] emblazoned on the red flag of Socialism, the international emblem of the world.[106]

This first part, with its emphasis on 'the people' and 'the land', had strong resonance with the *gwerin* image supported by the Liberals. However, the rest of the speech was in sharp opposition. As already noted, much of Liberal discourse in the 1890s had little to say about class. The rural *gwerin* were placed in juxtaposition to the landowners, while the working class was subsumed within the wider community, their interests seen as coterminous with those of the employers. Hardie was effectively denying this identity of interest between employers and workers, while replacing the *gwerin* with the Welsh working class. Admittedly, elements of the communitarian ethos of Liberalism remained. Commenting on the Aberdare dispute he deplored the effects that it had upon the valley communities. 'An industrial Crisis like the one now prevailing in the Aberdare Valley and elsewhere, shows how dependent the entire community is upon the working class. Shopkeepers in the Strike Area are being ruined, and all classes are suffering inconvenience and loss. The working man is the foundation upon which the whole superstructure of Society rests.' The working class

was now being characterised as the most important group within society rather than a part within the interdependent whole. Furthermore, the 'other' within Hardie's discourse included not only the landowners but also the capitalists. 'The Labour Party, whose candidate I am, is giving the working class a new feeling of hope and confidence in themselves. If all will combine and Vote Solid for Labour, the day will soon come when there shall be neither Landlord or Capitalist left to grind the faces of the poor, when in fact there shall be no more poor amongst us.'[107]

This consistent 'othering' of the employers marked the fundamental difference in the discursive practice of Hardie and his Liberal counterparts. However, during the 1900s, Liberal discourse became increasingly concerned with labour issues. The *Rhondda Leader* noted in 1903 that there appeared to be a change in political currents with title 'Lab-Lib' increasingly replacing 'Lib-Lab'. Indeed, at the annual demonstration of the SWMF No. 1 district Mabon called upon Liberal representatives to become representatives of Labour first.[108] Alfred Thomas's electoral poem for 1910, in contrast to 1895, made no mention of religion or nationalism. Instead it was focused firmly on the economic benefits that the workers could expect under free trade.[109]

For whom will you vote?
Is it a Liberal or a Tory
That will lead John Bull to glory?
This simple question is answered at once.
Since the Tory is such a dunce.

If the Tories get in first,
Then our Parliament will be the worse;
They will put tax on bread,
And hit the workman on the head.

If the Liberals win the day,
Then we'll certainly have fair play;
They'll help the poor and tax the rich,
They'll pull the workman from the ditch.

Sir Alfred Thomas, Brace and Mabon
Are not the men for the Lords to tread on;
Mabon fights on behalf of labour,
Despite the strenuous tones of Balfour.

If we speak of old age pensions,
Tories say, 'We had the same intentions',
They promised them long years ago,
The Liberals had to give them though.

Sir Alfred Thomas is the man,
If he doesn't triumph then who can?
Vote for him and Labour too,
And you'll be paid, and we paid too.

Something of a shift is therefore identifiable within Liberal discourse. More emphasis was now being placed upon the industrial working class. It is clear then that the Liberals could, up to a point, adapt the language of class to their own needs. However, unlike Hardie, they were unwilling to accept the labour-capital dichotomy as a basis of their discourse. Older notions of the people remained strong and the conflict between the Lords and the Commons in 1910 provided an excellent

opportunity for the Liberals to exploit the discursive dichotomy they had created in the nineteenth century. At the massive demonstration at Victoria Park, Swansea on 18 September 1909 in support of the 'People's Budget' the common theme was 'the People vs. the Lords'. Alfred Mond claimed that the landlords wished 'to make the people subservient to their charity and their doles, while the Liberals wanted to make them free and independent men and women, not relying on charity and doles, but on their rights as citizens.' Mond also emphasised the communitarian ideals of Liberals by the juxtaposition of the industrialist and the landlord. 'The man who created the works gave employment to hundreds, increased the rateable value, and added wealth to the community, the man who owned the land was creating nothing. [The Liberals] wanted the burden shifted from industry to indolence, taken off the backs of the workers and put on the shirkers.'[110]

That Mond should stress the importance of the industrialist to the well-being of the community is not surprising since he was a prominent employer himself. However, Mabon, who, since the affiliation of the MFGB to the Labour Party on 1 January 1909, had officially been a Labour MP, also used the same dichotomy.

> [The Lords] wished at all cost to reserve their power to plunder the people. Every Labour representative and every Liberal and Radical citizen in the realm must be of the opinion that the feudal age should in fact and practice come to an end. Our present system of land ownership had devastated the countryside, it had imposed heavy burdens upon industries, and cramped the development of towns and villages – simply crippled capital and impoverished labour. The House of Lords must either be mended or ended, the question being 'Who is to govern, the Peers or the People?'

Yet Mabon prioritised his Labour identity and it was to this that he coupled notions of patriotism. He claimed that 'he was prepared to place before them the views of the people which he hoped to represent from a Labour standpoint, and he would be prepared to add everything that appertained to Welsh nationalism and every progressive measure, wherever it might come from.'[111]

Mabon's stress on Labour, however, did not go far enough for some. During the second 1910 election Mabon was severely criticised by the Mid-Rhondda Socialist Propaganda Committee. Their speakers, such as Ben Tillett and George Edbury, cast doubts on Mabon's Labour credentials, pointing to his lack of support for the Cambrian strikers. The election itself was 'fake' since the Liberals could be relied upon to support the capitalists. Working-class interests were both independent from

and in opposition to those of the Liberals. 'It did not matter whether Tory or Liberal, they were both alike, and at the next election this class must cut the political bonds which were tying them down to slavery.' However, ultimately the Committee did not run its own 'working-class' candidate due to lack of funds to pay the returning officer.[112]

By the end of the 1900s a political discourse predicated on a specifically working-class identity and with some affinities to SPD language in the Ruhr was beginning to emerge during general elections. As Chris Williams has shown in his study of the Rhondda, this discourse existed at a lower level from an earlier date,[113] and influenced the campaign to affiliate the MFGB to the Labour Party. Workers elsewhere were also attempting to place members of their own class on local authorities. In Ammanford, for example, meetings of workmen decided to field ten candidates, among them five colliers, for the Ammanford Urban District Council.[114] But it was by the late 1900s that this discourse based on the working class began to make a wider impact at the national level in Wales. Two reasons can be identified as contributing towards this growth. First, the industrial disputes of 1910 and 1911 placed pressure on the Liberals' *gwerin* discourse. The strikes and the introduction of troops undermined a discourse based on co-operation and community. The Liberals, however, remained wedded to their old discourse based on co-operation between classes and were unable to accept one predicated on conflict between labour and capital. Instead, they sought to paper over the cracks. John S. Ellis has argued, for example, that the pomp surrounding the Prince of Wales's investiture in 1911 was a deliberate attempt to create a new identity, which encompassed both elements of the *gwerin* and the Anglican Church.[115] Second, during the 1900s there was a growth in Labour and Socialist organisations. Although these may have disagreed over the means they shared a common commitment to advancing the interests of the working class.[116] They were also willing to tie the social directly to the political, as Hardie did with the Aberdare strike. They used strikes and unrest to reinforce their demands for independent working-class representation. However, the discourse used by Labour MPs in this period still owed much to Liberal traditions. The *gwerin* image was not wholly abandoned. Many Labour MPs, after all, had been Lib-Labs. Rather than a clean break between Liberal and Labour discursive practice, there was a more fluid shifting of accent. Political organisations and trade unions were placing increasing stress on a specific working-class identity. This impacted on politicians' discourse,

contributing to a growing emphasis on 'labour'. Consequently, Labour was in a better position to seize on the industrial unrest of the late 1900s and tie the social more explicitly to the political. However, rather than abandoning Liberalism's communitarian ethos, Labour was able to realign it. The community was being made synonymous with the working class, while employers replaced the landowners as the 'other.' This realignment did not reach fruition until after the war, but was underway before 1914.

The fluidity of discourse evident in South Wales, at least between Liberalism and Labour, was in marked contrast to the comparative rigidity of political languages in the Ruhr. The split between the German labour and liberal movements had occurred much earlier and by the 1890s the SPD had established its own distinctive political identity, and, unlike the British Labour Party in the 1900s, did not draw much from other political currents within the region. In the years before the war it continued to predicate an identity largely based upon the working class and began to notch up more successes with Hue being elected for Bochum and Theodor Bömelburg for Dortmund in 1903 and 1907. However, during the 1900s the revisionist wing of the party did begin to utilise a more patriotic language.[117] Hue, for example, was keen to stress the reformist nature of the SPD. '[The Party] is the real reform party, although the radical reform party, in our parliament'.[118] He complained that during election campaigns the opposition accused the SPD of seeking to overthrow the state when in actual fact thousands of members and activists were diligently working for reform of the system rather than its destruction.[119] In a later article he defended Bebel's claim that, should Germany be threatened, Social Democrats would take up arms in defence of the country. Hue maintained that 'one cannot stress enough: patriotism (*Nationalbewusstsein*) – not nationalism – is not anti-social democratic'.[120] Despite this patriotic element the language of class remained central. Reformist action was meant to benefit the working class and overcome the twin obstacles of 'conservative and clericalism'.

By the 1900s the Polish community had also began to make an independent impact in electoral contests. The network of Polish associations now included electoral committees and in 1903 Polish candidates stood for the Essen, Bochum and Dortmund seats. In no seat did the Polish vote rise to more than seven percent.[121] However, as Suval argues, the Polish vote in Dortmund-Hörde was not about winning the election, but had everything to do with expressing a certain identity. 'Since the

Poles could not hope to reach the run-off, most of their ballots were just to affirm their separateness. The Polish candidate did not live in the district; he did not even have to campaign. Polish votes were designed to show the other social groupings that the Poles had arrived and were to be reckoned with.'[122] Voting for the Polish candidate was, therefore, a means of affirming a specific ethnic identity and the party's discourse was consequently predicated on that ethnicity.

Despite the emergence of this Polish there was little change in the discourses of the older parties. Bömelburg, a leading figure in the bricklayers' union, used the same discursively created dichotomy in his 1907 campaign as Tölcke had used in 1893. The National Liberals were once again castigated as the 'party of the great, industrialist, German bourgeoisie.'[123] The Centre, on the other hand, was once more accused of splitting the workers.

In fact, the Centre had actually dropped their usual candidate, Lambert Lensing, for one with stronger working-class credentials for the 1907 election. This probably represented the local party's acceptance that they needed a more working-class image. Since 1890 they had been squeezed out of the run-offs, which became a struggle between the National Liberals and the SPD. Furthermore, from 1900 onwards the increasing professionalisation of the Christian trade unions led them to shake off non-worker direction and establish their own control.[124] Johann Effert was a prominent figure in the Christian trade union movement and had been leader of the Commission of Seven during the 1905 strike. However, while Effert claimed to be an *Arbeiterkandidat* (workers' candidate), the Centre Party itself continued to be depicted as a *Volkspartei.* Effert was both 'a man of the people, a man of severe work.' He would represent both the workers and middle-classes. In fact, the very emphasis of the SPD upon the working class was seen as a weakness within Centre discourse. 'Social Democracy, the patented "workers' party", wants to follow a "pure workers' politics", they show no interest for the remaining estates (*Stände*).' Effert agreed that the working class outnumbered the others in society, but argued that if they tried to pursue a purely working-class type of politics the other estates would come together to defend themselves. The workers would inevitably fail 'because capital is not on our side.' Finally, the usual stick of Christianity was used, as in every election, to beat the SPD. 'Because Christianity and Socialism stand in opposition like fire and water, therefore a practising Christian cannot be a Social Democrat.'[125]

Other Centre candidates, such as workers' secretary Giesberts in Essen, also stressed their working-class origins.[126] However, the discourse used in Effert's candidature demonstrates that, although the Centre Party was becoming increasingly aware of the potential advantage to be gained from selecting working-class candidates, the rhetoric used by the party remained fundamentally unchanged. Emphasis was still placed on the *Volk* and the community, of which the workers were just one, albeit, a sizeable part. The workers' interests could only be furthered through co-operation with others, an explicit rejection of the class conflict that lay at the heart of SPD discourse.

The SPD, on the other hand, rejected the idea that Effert would be able to do anything constructive for the workers in the Reichstag precisely because his party had a middle-class wing. 'First the Centre lets working-class deputies (*Arbeiterabgeordneten*) be elected, then they will neutralise them. The Centre was a middle-class party and had now become a capitalist party.' The Centre's social and economic policy was regarded as no different from that of the National Liberals. An example was made of their support for tariffs, which directly affected workers through higher prices for bread. 'If the Catholic workers want their workers' interests represented in the Reichstag, they must attach themselves to the workers' party, Social Democracy.'[127]

Pamphlets and leaflets also depicted this working-class SPD/non-working-class Centre dichotomy. Although few of the thousands of leaflets that were printed for elections have survived, one illustrates well the discursive practice of the SPD towards the Centre. Entitled 'Who should we believe?' it attacked the Centre's claims that it was the most socially active party in Germany. Accusations of splitting the labour movement mainly revolved around the issue of Christian trade unions.

> The Centre founded Christian trade unions. If these really sought to fulfil their purpose, i.e. to represent workers' interests, then they affect them like a spanner in the works (*Knüppel zwischen den Beine*). Where is there a case recorded in which the Centre took the side of the workers in a wage dispute? Nowhere! It is neutral – in favour of the employer. The Christian trade union leaders will be described – when it's in the interests of capitalism – exactly like the free trade unionists as liars, troublemakers and unscrupulous agitators, who bring down misfortune and despair on the workers.

The interests of the workers were placed in opposition to those of the counts, lawyers and prelates within the party. 'The demands of the workers' interest simply mean a

damaging of their own interests.' Worse, however, were the Christian trade union leaders who actually betrayed the interests of their own class.[128] Therefore, not only was the Centre in opposition to the working class, it actually undermined them from within.

Class was placed above religious identity. The pamphlet criticised the Centre's continual claims that religion was in danger, arguing that this was simply a cover for the interests of the capitalists and the landowners. 'Christian duty for the workers, Christian rights from the Lords. Why are the Catholic workers forbidden to unite with their class comrades to improve their material conditions? Because that would endanger religion!'[129] The SPD, on the other hand, had raised the expectations of the workers.

> It taught the worker, that he already has a higher goal in this world than simply serving the pleasures of a handful of people. It taught him to respect himself, but at the same time his obligations as one human being to another and, most valuably, it taught him to recognise the world of work. Social Democracy ennobled the worker; it raised him to the proper position as the bearer of the prosperity of the nation.[130]

Interestingly, there was an echo of the religious justification used by the British Labour movement, when it claimed that the SPD represented the 'true spirit of Christianity.'[131] However, this is not nearly as extensively developed as it was in Hardie's political language and the impression is of something tagged on rather than central to Social Democratic discourse. The view of religion the SPD continually reiterated was that it was a private matter,[132] something that largely limited its use in constructing a collective identity.

SPD discourse in the twenty-two years between 1890 and 1912 appears not to have changed much. Admittedly there were attempts to reach out to other groups, such as white-collar workers. During the 1907 run-offs in Essen, for example, an appeal was made to make every effort to win both 'workers and the small officials.'[133] In 1903 Leimpeter, while criticising the other parties for abandoning the workers as soon as the elections were over, claimed that the representation of the SPD as 'un-national' was unjust. But ultimately he referred back to the workers, stating that such accusations were unjustified 'because only [the Social Democrats] care for the well-being of their voters.'[134] Just as religion remained the centre point of Centre discourse so class remained the central pillar of SPD rhetoric.

Summary

The striking difference between the political discourses of the Ruhr and South Wales was the comparatively 'fixed' nature of the former compared with the fluidity of the latter. Crucially political languages in the Ruhr were largely 'milieu-fixated' while in South Wales they were 'community-fixated'. In the former discourse was concerned with mobilising a certain constituency or subculture which consistently provided it with a core of support. Although the parties claimed to represent the community in its entirety, they invariably tried to mobilise their followers by placing one group in juxtaposition to another. In this manner, Catholics were contrasted to Protestants, Social Democrats to Christians, and so on. In South Wales, on the other hand, parties sought to encompass the whole of the community. The juxtaposition of identities in South Wales was between those perceived as belonging to the community (in Liberal discourse the workers and industrialists) and those who did not (the landowners).

The Liberal party was able to dominate the political field through its successful linkage of nationalist and religious concerns. This found a certain resonance in the predominantly Nonconformist mining valleys. Although, when compared with the activities of Catholic priests in Germany, Nonconformist ministers may not have been so intimately involved in electioneering, their seemingly ubiquitous presence on the platforms of Liberal candidates was symptomatic of the links between Liberalism and Nonconformity.

Within Liberal political language the workers did not really emerge as a distinctive group, but were subsumed within the broader idea of the community. It was believed that what was good for the community would inevitably benefit the workers. The *gwerin* image itself was mainly rural, but it seems that its nationalist and religious components were enough to tie the majority of the miners to Liberalism until the 1900s.

Liberal discourse also showed a certain degree of elasticity in accommodating the growing language of labour. The emergence of the Lib-Lab MPs can be regarded as strengthening the appeal of Liberalism generally by placing a greater emphasis on the needs of the working class. Indeed, the Lib-Lab MPs introduced a shift in the connotations associated with the term 'class'. In earlier Liberal language it was used pejoratively and contrasted to 'the people' or 'masses'. Mabon, however, used the

concept positively, especially when he spoke of the 'labouring classes'. This positive usage became more widespread from 1900. But to claim that Lib-Lab discourse proved a stepping stone to the political language of Labour is perhaps too simplistic. Keir Hardie's discourse, for example, owed much to Liberal traditions. What was occurring in South Wales was a re-alignment of emphasis. Gradually notions of the community and the working class were being elided, becoming synonymous. At the same time the industrialists, who had been considered part of the community by Liberalism, were being excluded and aligned with the landowners. While Liberal ideas continued to have force, labour issues were becoming more and more prominent. This was not a completely linear process, but nevertheless there seems a general tendency towards Labour. The fact that Labour did not represent a complete break with South Wales's Liberal past and actually inherited much of its progressive mantle was to lay the basis for its successes in inter-war Wales.

In the Ruhr, on other hand, there was less interchange between political discourses. Each party had largely established its discursive identity by the 1890s, if not earlier. Both the Centre and National Liberal parties shared certain affinities with the Liberals in South Wales in the way that they combined nationalism with religion and attempted a cross class appeal. Both parties hoped through this mixture to form the basis of a *Volkspartei*, although in reality they were delimited by religion. However, depending on the political circumstances, this could be either inclusive or exclusive. In Dortmund, for example, the National Liberals sought to develop a general religious identity to counter the growth of Social Democracy. In Bochum in the 1890s, however, the National Liberals used the *Volk* in a more exclusive manner, seeking to 'other' the Catholics through their perceived divided loyalties. Ultimately, although both parties considered themselves representative of the German nation, one was closely linked to Protestantism, while the other saw its explicit goal as the protection of the Catholic Church. This, coupled with the organisational structures that they had built, meant that they had a strong head start over the SPD when that party finally emerged from the wilderness of the Anti-Socialist Law.

Once able to campaign freely the SPD constructed its own identity explicitly around the working class. While the Centre and National Liberals characterised themselves as representatives of the whole community, the SPD portrayed the workers as the community and in inevitable opposition to the other classes owing to the workings of capitalism. Unlike the other parties in the Ruhr and the Labour

movement in South Wales, it had no real religious element within its appeal, something that weakened attempts to encompass all the workers.

Over time there were slight changes and modifications made to these identities. As the example of Effert shows, the Centre Party became aware of the advantages of more identifiably working-class candidates in this overwhelmingly industrial region. However, Effert's candidature remained firmly bound to the traditional discursive practices of the Centre. There was no interchange with either the SPD or the National Liberals. So while there were some changes in political discourse in the Ruhr it occurred within parties rather than between, as was the case in South Wales.

---

[1] Cited in Neil Evans and Kate Sullivan, 'Yn Llawn o Dân Cymreig (Full of Welsh Fire): The Language of Politics in Wales 1880-1914' in Geraint H. Jenkins (ed.), *The Welsh Language and its Social Domains 1801-1911*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, p. 569. The *South Wales Daily News*, the main liberal daily in South Wales, was commenting on the landslide victory for the Liberals in the 1906 general election.

[2] Cited in Willy Buschak, '"Vergessen wir keinen Augenblick, daß wir in Bochum sind." Gewerkschaften und Sozialdemokratie vor 1914' in Friedemann and Seebold (eds.), *Wandel*, p. 130. The *Arbeiter-Sekretariat* was commenting on the nature of the social-democratic movement in the run up to the 1905 Reichstag elections.

[3] See Maurice Cowling, *1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. The passing of the second Reform Bill*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 288-310; Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 4-8.

[4] Anderson, *Democracy*, p. 9.

[5] Werner Hoffman, 'Politik in der Provinz: Kommunale Politisierung dargestellt an den sechs Industriedörfen im Landkreis Recklinghausen vom Beginn der Industrialisierung bis 1914', *Bochumer Historische Studien, Neuere Geschichte*, 16, 1996, p. 230.

[6] Anderson, *Democracy*, p. 226.

[7] D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Parties in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972, pp. 173-4.

[8] Kenneth O. Morgan, 'Gladstone, Wales and the New Radicalism', in Peter J. Jagger (ed.), *Gladstone*, London and Rio Grande, Hambledon Press, 1998, pp. 132-3.

[9] Gerhard A. Ritter, 'Die Sozialdemokratie im Deutschen Kaiserreich in Sozialgeschichtlicher Perspektive', *HZ*, 249, 1989, p. 296.

[10] *RL* 8 August 1903.

[11] In Germany Lassalles' General Union of German Workers was formed in 1863, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht's German Socialist Workers' Party in 1868/9. In 1875 these merged to form the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). In Britain the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and Socialist League were founded in 1884, the ILP in 1893, and the Labour Representation Committee in 1900. For the ideological and organisational reasons behind the German workers early break from liberalism see Breuilly, *Labour*, p. 115, Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte*, pp. 352-3; W. L. Guttsman, *The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933: From Ghetto to Government*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 28; and Ritter, 'Sozialdemokratie' p. 296.

[12] See Chapter 1.

[13] *RWAZ* 11 April 1893.

[14] Ibid, 13 April 1893.

[15] Initially Schorlemer-Alst and Lensing had both refused the seat, possibly due to doubts over their chances of success, *T* 4 April 1893.

[16] *RWAZ* 13 April 1893.

[17] *RWAZ* 3 May 1893, cited in Arno Herzig, *Carl Wilhelm Tölckes Presseberichte. Zur Entwicklung der duetschen Sozialdemokratie 1848-1893*, Munich, Dokumentation, 1976.
[18] Ritter, *Arbeiterbewegung*, p. 32.
[19] For the Lassallean and Marxist trends with the early social-democratic movement see Thomas Welskopp, *Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz*, Bonn, Dietz, 2000, pp. 668-705.
[20] Gerhard A. Ritter, *Die Arbeiterbewegung im wilhelminischen Reich. Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die freien Gewerkschaften, 1890-1900*, Berlin-Dahlem, Colloqium Verlag, 1963, pp. 128-34. (Will be referred to as Ritter, *Die Arbeiterbewegung* from here on).
[21] *RWAZ* 7 June 1898.
[22] *RWAZ* 25 June 1898. Hilbck was a member of the virulently anti-Catholic Evangelical Union, Suval, *Politics*, p. 217.
[23] See Deian Hopkin, 'Labour's Roots', pp. 54-7; John Parry, 'Trade Unionists and Early Socialism in South Wales, 1890-1908', *Llafur*, 4, 3, 1985, pp. 43-54.
[24] Hardie's election at Merthyr will be dealt with latter.
[25] *PC* 20 November 1885.
[26] It was sung to the tune of 'Auld Lang Syne'. *GFP* 20 July 1895.
[27] Thomas tabled National Institutions (Wales) Bills in 1891/2 which proposed the devolution of several administrative functions to Wales, such as a Secretary of State, national council, Welsh education department, local government board and National Museum. See J. Graham Jones, 'Alfred Thomas's National Institutions (Wales) Bills of 1891-92', *WHR*, 15, 2, 1990, 218-39.
[28] Evans and Sullivan, 'Dân Cymreig', p. 569.
[29] Morgan, *Wales*, pp. 120-65.
[30] Gwyn A. Williams, *When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985, p. 237.
[31] Evans and Sullivan, 'Dân Cymreig', pp. 564-8.
[32] *GFP* 13 July 1895.
[33] *PO* 29 September 1900.
[34] *MMSWA* 9 April 1880.
[35] *SWDS* 11 July 1895. The question was in response to Morgan's claim that Welsh members had themselves defeated a recent Disestablishment Bill by adding too many amendments. A Welsh member was considered as someone who supported specific Welsh interests and was, therefore, most commonly applied to Liberal MPs from the Principality.
[36] Ibid, 15 July 1895.
[37] *SWDT* 27 September 1900.
[38] Ibid, 28 September 1900.
[39] Matthew Cragoe, 'Conservatism and Empire', unpublished paper given at *Llafur* conference, Wales at War and Peace, 6 October 2001.
[40] *SWDS* 18 July 1895.
[41] See *CJ* 5 and 12 January 1906.
[42] Ibid, 14 January 1910.
[43] *W* 19 July 1895.
[44] Ibid, 7 January 1910.
[45] *GFP* 20 July 1895. 'Trech gwlad nag arglwydd' means, 'The country beats the lord'.
[46] Joyce, *Visions*, pp. 62-3.
[47] Ibid, pp. 55-6.
[48] On the politics of personality see Williams, *Rhondda*, pp. 50-6.
[49] *ME* 17 March 1888.
[50] *RWZ* 28 January 1890.
[51] The bill, aimed at increasing the strength of the army, sprung from military concerns following the lapsing of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. See Gordon A. Craig, *Germany, 1866-1945*, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 257-8.
[52] *MS* 5 June 1893.
[53] *RWZ* 6 June 1893.
[54] *DZ* 2 May 1893.
[55] *EVZ* 3 February 1890.
[56] 'An die rheinische Handwerker', printed in ibid, 31 May 1893.
[57] Clipping, STAD 9046.
[58] Suval, *Politics*, pp. 217-8.

[59] *T* 4 June 1898
[60] Ibid, 18 June 1898.
[61] Ibid, 23 June 1898.
[62] *DZ* 9 June 1898.
[63] Ibid, 14 June 1898.
[64] Ibid, 21 June 1898.
[65] *RWZ* 9 June 1893.
[66] *RWZ* 15 June 1893. Krupp himself did not actively engage in the election campaign.
[67] 'Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel', STAB, I 1 b/29.
[68] 'Theure evangelische Glaubengenossen', STAB, I 1 b/27.
[69] *MS* 3 June 1898.
[70] Ibid. 13 June 1898
[71] 'Bergleute, Kameraden', STAB, I 1 b/26.
[72] 'Arbeiter! Kameraden', STAB, I 1 b/28.
[73] See Williams, *Democratic Rhondda*, pp. 32-6; Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, pp. 68-75.
[74] *EVZ* 3 February 1890.
[75] Ibid, 4 February 1890.
[76] *RWZ* 20 February 1890.
[77] *EVZ* 18 February 1890.
[78] Williams, *Rhondda*, pp. 32-45.
[79] *GFP* 9 July 1895.
[80] *PC* 6 November 1885.
[81] Chris Williams, 'Democracy and Nationalism in Wales: The Lib-Lab Enigma', in Robert Stradling, Scott Newton and David Bates (eds.), *Conflict and Coexistence. Nationalism and Democracy in Modern Europe. Essays in honour of Harry Hearder*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1997, p. 111.
[82] *GFP* 20 July 1895.
[83] Williams, *Rhondda*, p. 45.
[84] *GFP* 2 July 1892.
[85] See Williams, 'Democracy', pp. 118-25; ibid, *Rhondda*, p. 45.
[86] *ME*, 15 January 1910.
[87] Election Address, 3 December 1910, SWCC SC 491.
[88] *AL* 8 January 1910.
[89] Handbill, GRO D/D Vau 25/10a.
[90] *MP* 13 May 1911.
[91] For the religious motifs within Hardie's discourse see Robert Pope, *Building Jerusalem: Nonconformity, Labour and the Social Question in Wales, 1906-1939*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998, pp. 8-14.
[92] See handbill addressed to the SWMF in which it was claimed 'Mr Keir Hardie has the support of leading Minister of the Gospel of all Denominations', GRO D/D Vau 24/15 and the handbill entitled 'Church Socialist League Manifesto', GRO D/D Vau 24/13.
[93] *RL* 18 May 1907.
[94] Ibid, 14 September 1907.
[95] See for example 'Sosialaeth Gristionogol', *Y Geninen*, April 1908, vol. 26, pp. 107-112 and 'Y Ddraig Goch a'r Faner Goch: Cenedlaetholdeb a Sosialaeth', ibid, October 1911, vol. 29, pp. 10-12.
[96] Evans and Sullivan, 'Dân Cymreig', p. 581.
[97] Pope, *Jerusalem*, p. 59.
[98] Peter Stead, 'The Language of Edwardian Politics', in Smith (ed.), *People*, p. 156.
[99] See 'Y Ddraig Goch ynte'r Faner Goch? Sosialaeth a Chenedlaetholdeb', *Y Geninen*, 29, 1911, pp. 254-8 and 'Y Perygl oddiwrth Sosialaeth yng Nghymru', ibid, January, 30, 1912, pp. 7-9.
[100] 'Why I am a Socialist' by Reverend G. Jones, *RS* 7 December 1912.
[101] On this conflation of religion and socialism see Christopher B. Turner, 'Conflicts of Faith? Religion and Labour in Wales 1890-1914', in Hopkin and Kealey (eds.), *Class*, pp. 67-85.
[102] David Howell, *British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888-1906*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983, p. 253.
[103] *NGMGH* 2 October 1909.
[104] Hardie wrote to D. A. Thomas in response to an invitation to dine with leading Liberals in the Merthyr constituency - 'My position in the Labour movement is such that I feel the need for great caution and so deeply am I convinced of the need of keeping the movement clear of any taint of Party

politics that I have for years past made it a rule not to accept such invitations', enclosed with letter from D. A. Thomas to Mr Rice, 10 April 1902, GRO, D/D Xes 5/2.
[105] Stead, 'Language', p. 152.
[106] *MP* 14 October 1911.
[107] Election Address, 3 December 1910, SWMA SC 491.
[108] *RL* 19 September 1903.
[109] *GFP* 28 January 1910.
[110] *NGMGH* 25 September 1909.
[111] *RL* 8 January 1910.
[112] *RL* 10 December 1910.
[113] Williams, *Rhondda*, pp. 72-81.
[114] *CJ* 20 March 1903.
[115] John S. Ellis argues that the pomp surrounding the Prince of Wales's investiture in 1911 was an attempt to create a new identity, which encompassed both elements of the *gwerin* and the Anglican Church. See Ellis, 'The Prince and the Dragon: Welsh National Identity and the 1911 Investiture of the Prince of Wales', *WHR*, 18, 2, 1996, pp. 272-94.
[116] Williams, *Rhondda*, p. 68.
[117] Lützenkirchen, *Verein*, pp. 45-6.
[118] *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, September 1906, p. 725.
[119] Ibid, p. 726.
[120] Ibid, September 1907, p. 699.
[121] Hans-Werner Tiedtke, 'Die Reichstagswahlen und die Reichstagwahlkämpfe im Südlichen Teil des Ruhrgebietes von der Gründung des Nord-Deutschen Bundes bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs', (Hausarbeit der Fachprüfung für das Lehramt am Gymnasium, Bochum, 1976).
[122] Suval, *Politics*, p. 213.
[123] *RWAZ*, 3 January 1907.
[124] Schäfer, 'Milieu', pp. 215-218.
[125] *T* 2 January 1907.
[126] See *EVZ* 7 and 23 January 1907.
[127] *RWAZ* 10 January 1907.
[128] '"Wenn sollen wir glauben?" Eine Flugschrift für das Volk in Stadt und Land von einen Arbeiter', IZfD, M11. The pamphlet is undated but was edited by Max König SPD Bezirkssekretär for Dortmund-Hörde and printed in Dortmund sometime after 1907.
[129] Ibid, pp. 7-8.
[130] Ibid, p. 11.
[131] Ibid, p. 13.
[132] Ibid, p. 12.
[133] *Arbeiterzeitung* 1 February 1907.
[134] Amt Weitmar to Landrat Bochum, 8 May 1903, STAB, LA 1323.

Chapter Four

The Great War and the Post-War Years, 1914-1926

> 'The threats of the trenches and the drafting to the army...created a psychological state, which was everywhere favourable to the Spartacist agitation.' Reichskommissar Carl Severing on how the bad experiences of the miners during the war fed the extreme left.[1]

> 'the circumstances of the war intensified the men's convictions that they were being exploited by their employers and by the Government. They believed that they were morally and legally entitled to a share in the boom of prosperity which, as they alleged, the war had brought to their employers.' Revd. J. Vyrnwy Morgan commenting on the Welsh miners who were determined to use their bargaining position to enforce higher wages.[2]

Introduction

In 1914 the pattern of trade unionism in the mining industries of both areas presented very different pictures. Apart from several small craft associations, the SWMF had incorporated the local unions that had existed under the Sliding Scale. The Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband, on the other hand, had been driven even further apart by the acrimony surrounding the failure of the 1912 strike. For the moment the following chapter leaves aside the issue of discourse and identity and examines how the Great War impacted on lifeworld of the miners and civil society in the two areas. It argues that the conflict accentuated the process of fragmentation and homogenisation that previous chapters have identified. The strength of the SWMF allowed the South Wales miners to win substantial concessions from the Government and the employers. On the other hand, the stronger position of the Ruhr industrialists, coupled with the divisions in the German miners' movement, meant the unions in the Ruhr were unable to take advantage of their better bargaining position to force substantial concessions.

The war also impacted upon politics. The chapter shows that it not only gave fresh impetus to organisation for the labour movement in South Wales, but it also provided an opportunity for activists to demonstrate their competence and credibility. In Germany, however, the issue of support for the war was extremely divisive and split the SPD. This split laid the foundations for the emergence of the Communist party, which challenged the SPD's claim to represent the workers. Underpinning these political changes in the Ruhr was the fragmentation of the social milieux, which had

characterised Wilhelmine Germany. It will be shown that the experience of strikes, lockouts, unemployment and political violence tended deep divisions between the Ruhr miners. On the other hand, in South Wales positive experience of the war consolidated support for the Labour party's case for nationalisation and strengthened the appeal of the SWMF. Moreover, the common experience of unemployment and industrial action general helped reinforce the more cohesive social structures and strengthened support for Labour.

The Great War and the Miners

The declaration of war appeared to be greeted in South Wales and the Ruhr with the same jingoistic fervour that it received elsewhere. A few days after the outbreak of the conflict the pro-war *Western Mail* claimed that 'patriotic fervour characterises the whole of the Welsh nation in the present crisis.'[3] This was despite the fact that anti-war feelings were evident immediately before 4 August 1914. Vernon Hartshorn, for example, defended the SWMF's refusal to call off its holiday, pointing out that it was in accordance with resolutions passed by the Miners' International Congresses, which committed the miners to preventing hostilities.[4]

The picture of the war being enthusiastically endorsed by the peoples of Europe has recently been questioned. The reaction to the outbreak of war has been re-examined revealing a far more complex set of attitudes obscured by the general account of ardent nationalism.[5] In fact the jubilant scenes that were eagerly reported by the British and German press concealed a more apprehensive attitude. This usually manifested itself through the hoarding of goods. The SWMF Executive felt compelled as early as 6 August to issue a resolution to 'discourage the practice adopted by workmen and other people of laying in large stocks of necessaries.'[6] Similarly, in the Ruhr, the editors of the *Westfälische Volkszeitung* appealed to suppliers not to introduce arbitrary price rises for goods[7] and blamed the 'stampede' of women to the shops for increases.[8] Furthermore, the initial dislocation of trade caused a rise in unemployment leading mining unions in both areas to provide relief for the unemployed and soldiers' dependants.[9]

Yet despite the previous anti-war sentiments of the labour movement and the less than encompassing nationalist fervour there was little immediate resistance to the conflict. In both countries the war was portrayed as one of national defence.

Hartshorn's defence of the SWMF ended with a call for the labour movement to give 'its complete solidarity to the support of the British Government' in the battle between democracy and 'reactionary Prussian military autocracy.'[10] Meanwhile, both the SPD and Catholic press in the Ruhr supported a defensive war against Tsarist absolutism.[11] For the SPD support for war credits was consistent with the patriotic note which had emerged in its political language in the 1900s. Later the issue was to seriously damage the unity of the SPD. But in 1914 those who continued to oppose the war, such as Keir Hardie, found themselves isolated, threatened and roughly treated.[12]

The belief that the war was defensive helped create a sense of national unity in both countries. However, this found more concrete expression in Germany through the *Burgfrieden* (literally Peace of the Fortress). The sectionalist claims of all classes of society were to be shelved to allow the successful prosecution of the war. In industry this was symbolised by the union's decision to give up their right to strike.[13] In Britain, on the other hand, the union's announcement of an industrial truce lacked the conviction of their German counterparts. In fact, the British unions only agreed to give up their right to strike in March 1915 following talks with Lloyd George, then Minister of Munitions. The MFGB refused to be bound by the Treasury Agreement, but made a guarantee to seek arbitration in disputes. The SWMF even stood aside from this guarantee. This refusal, however, should be seen with the context of the wages dispute it was already involved in.

The different attitudes of the British and German unions should be seen in the context of their status prior to the war. The British unions were well established within society and recognised by employers and state alike. Many of the German unions, on the other hand, were still struggling to achieve recognition on the eve of the war.[14] Through full co-operation the German trade unions hoped to win the recognition that had until now eluded them and were therefore willing to give up more than their British counterparts.[15] The *Bergarbeiterzeitung* estimated in December 1914 that 30,000 of its members were at the front fighting for the Fatherland and claimed that after the war they could never again be regarded as enemies of the Reich.[16] This hope also extended to the SPD. Hue, who toured the region explaining Government policy and the need for continued production to the miners, exemplified this attitude. At Bochum he justified SPD support for the war.

> From one side the behaviour of the SPD concerning war credits is criticised. But on this matter the party had only held to its programme,

> because the living leaders, as well as the dead, had always said that they would always stand by their Fatherland and take up arms when the borders are threatened. Before the war the Social Democrats were accused of being unpatriotic fellows and revolutionaries. After the war [the Social Democrats] will not tolerate such suggestions and will demand equality with other parties.[17]

At a miners' meeting in Altenbochum in 1917 it was claimed that 'the organisations [the miners' unions] must behave perfectly. After the war the Alter Verband members will hopefully not be treated as third and fourth-class citizens anymore.'[18] Similarly, Hermann Vogelsang's pamphlet *Der Weltkrieg: Deutschlands Bergarbeiter im Kriege* (The World War: Germany's Miners at War) dwelt on the sacrifices the miners were making for the Fatherland both at the front and at home.[19]

The British and German states reacted differently to the outbreak of the war. While the British government centralised power through the Defence of the Realm Act of 8 August 1914, which allowed intervention into any aspect of military and civilian life, the German government decentralised power through the Prussian Law of Siege of 4 June 1851. This law divided the country into a series of military districts each under the command of a Deputy Commanding General. The view that the German organisation of the home front was mismanaged, while the British state adapted well, has been justifiably questioned.[20] Yet the Law of Siege clearly complicated the working of the wartime administration, creating as one contemporary commented 'twenty-odd shadow governments...and in this manner work is duplicated, not in collaboration, but rather alongside or even against each other.'[21] There was a lack of communication between the German military districts and no provision for co-ordination was contained within the law. Furthermore, the military districts did not correlate with the municipal boundaries, increasing the possibility for confusion in the application of ordinances.[22]

The initial unemployment soon became a labour shortage. An estimated 17 percent of the British mining workforce had enlisted by February 1915, representing the youngest and fittest of the workforce.[23] Roughly 40 percent of the 19 to 38 age group enlisted in the first seven months of the war. Unsurprisingly, this led to a fall in coal production of about 11 percent.[24] Some of these young miners saw enlistment as a way out of the mines.[25] In Germany, about a quarter of the workforce was called up.[26] The Hibernia mining company lost 30 percent of its pre-war labour force.[27] The Helene and Amalie pits lost 108 workers and 8 officials in the war. Its workforce fell

from 3,173 in 1913 to 2,789 in 1914. Output per man and shift correspondingly fell from 1,114 tons to 1,083 tons.[28] Although the German mobilisation may have been more successful than previously suggested, the loss of miners to the army did cause difficulties for the companies, which had often gone to great lengths to form a stable, reliable workforce.[29]

We need not be detained by the details of the British and German Government's intervention in the industry.[30] Generally the British Government proved more willing to intervene in the coal industry and where they did it was usually to the benefit of the miners. Three examples can be highlighted as demonstrating this point. First, on 23 February 1915 the Coal Mining Organisation Committee (COMC) was established. Made of up three representatives each from the Mining Association of Great Britain (MAGB) and the MFGB and chaired by the Chief Inspector of Mines, Sir Richard Redmayne, its object was to 'secure the necessary production of coal during the war.'[31] The importance of the COMC should not be overestimated, as it lacked powers of enforcement. However, it did illustrate that the British government recognised that union co-operation was essential to the war effort. Its proposals were based upon the 'harmonious co-operation between employers and employed.' At local level, for example, it suggested that 'coal-master and miners...should confer together and themselves determine to what extent...the Act should be suspended in individual districts.'[32] Admittedly, such negotiations were about deciding how much the working day should be increased, but they did grant the unions a voice in deciding the terms of change.

Second, in July 1915 the Government intervened to end a strike in South Wales over wages. Feelings of exploitation were rife among the Welsh miners and were openly expressed in the press by Hartshorn.[33] Frustrated over deadlocked negotiations, the miners ignored the advice of the leaders and went on strike on 15 July 1915.[34] J. L. Williams indicates the feelings of solidarity among the miners during this strike, which earned the condemnation of the press. While noting that the Bedlinog ILP was anti-war, feelings in the lodge were divided. However, 'everybody agreed pretty well that we had to get better wages and conditions.'[35] After five days the strikers accepted an agreement brokered by Lloyd George, which granted most of their demands. The employers, on the other hand, had to be content with letters from Walter Runciman of the Board of Trade praising their 'patriotic spirit.'[36]

Third, at the end of 1916 the Government established control of the South Wales coalfield. Despite the 1915 wage increase, industrial relations in the coalfield continued to be acrimonious. The conciliation procedure established after 1915 regularly saw demands for wage increases by the miners, decreases by the employers and prevarication by the chairman. Another wage increase was granted in June 1916 to avert a strike. The owners initially refused to be a part to it, but later grudgingly withdrew their refusal.[37] Eventually the Government took control of the coalfield on 29 November to forestall another strike. As Graeme Holmes has noted, Government control did not entail substantial changes in the way the industry was run.[38] However, the miners gained materially as their wage demands were largely accommodated. Jim Evans recalled his high pay due to the war wages. 'I was earning one pound two and nine say when I was fourteen, and when I was fifteen I was earning four pounds two and nine with the awards.'[39]

The position of the Ruhr miners differed markedly from those in South Wales. Despite the unions' participation in the Burgfrieden and their propaganda efforts they received little recognition from the German employers. In 1915 the four unions produced a proposal for a joint-conciliation board.[40] Much like the COMC it aimed at 'the peaceful mediation and settlement of disputes.'[41] However, the attitude of the various mining offices and Government-Presidents was negative. The Government-President of Arnsberg commented that it was a 'highly dangerous experiment.'[42] Von Sydow, Minister of Commerce, fearing that it would disrupt production, ordered the issue dropped.[43]

Similarly, the various proposals for wage rises submitted by the unions to the Zechenverband repeatedly met with rejection, or counter-claims that production must first be increased.[44] Such rejections led the *Bergarbeiterzeitung* to question why there was no mutual understanding in the mining industry. 'We have to ask this after more than three years of war! Everywhere the will to accommodation is present. In the mining industry the old spirit of lordship (*Herrengeist*) reigns as before!'[45] Similarly, the Gewerkverein complained that:

> while in other professions employers and employees build working communities and settle emerging question through joint work, the owners in the mining industry refuse every meeting and every negotiation with the workers' organisations. The efforts of the workers to establish a joint conciliation board failed due to the resistance of the owners. Many strike questions, which could be settled through joint work, therefore continue to exist and contribute to the deterioration of the atmosphere.[46]

On why this was so both the employers and unions agreed. In 1915 the Alter Verband pointed to the MFGB successful wage demand and claimed that this depended upon the strength of that organisation. If the German miners were as organised as the English then their position would be very different.[47] Similarly, the employers were claiming as late as 1918 'that the number of organised workers is too small for them to be recognised as the representatives of the entire workforce.'[48] When the unionists raised the issue of direct wage negotiations between their representatives on the works' committees and management, von Gayl supported the employers' view that the number of organised workers was too small to justify that course. The unions complained that while the employers took that view, they also made it as difficult as possible to organise the workers.[49] The owners also emphasised the different nature of the British and German unions. The British unions were characterised as being solely economic while the latter were Social Democratic.[50] Therefore, political fears still impinged on industrial relations in the Ruhr, despite the SPD support for war credits.

The trade unions in the Ruhr were also undermined by the importation of foreign and POW labour. The deployment of Belgian civilian workers and Russian-Polish workers seems to have reached its peak in 1917. In January and July 1917 there were 16,300 Russian-Poles and 17,000 Belgians in the Ruhr pits respectively,[51] while 70,000 POWs were employed by the armistice.[52] In some mines the proportion of foreign and POW labour was quite high. At Wehofen pit, and the Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser 3/7 and Rönsberghof shafts, for example, they made up 46 percent of the workforce.[53] The latter company stated, however, that 'the readiness of the workers, especially those from the occupied areas, gives cause to complain. The absenteeism at individual pits with a large workforce new to mining (*bergfremd*) amounts to 20 percent of the total workforce. The overtime shifts do not suffice to make up the loss through absenteeism.'[54]

Some recognition of the trade unions' role in the war effort came in 1916 with the introduction of the Auxiliary Service Law. The Law formed part of the Hindenburg Programme, which was designed to increase production. The Law's architect, General Groener, recognised the need for trade union co-operation if targets were to be met and labour used most efficiently. SPD representatives in the Reichstag were, therefore, able to incorporate some important concessions, such as the exclusion of company unionists from works' committees.[55] The Law seemed to force the

employers into recognising the unions. As a result the Alter Verband's reaction to the Law was generally positive.[56] However, by April 1917 the *Bergarbeiterzeitung* felt obliged to publish an article defending its position since the Independent Social Democratic Party (*Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, USPD) had circulated leaflets in the region. The USPD accused the SPD and Free Trade Unions of placing the German working class in a 'straitjacket' by accepting the Law. Accusing the Law's opponents of being fanatics, the paper justified its position by pointing to the war situation and claimed that it was a moral victory for the unions. 'It has been shown at the beginning of the war, but more expressly during the consultation of the Law, that the Government recognises the trade unions as the professional representation of the workers.'[57] In fact, the Law proved a double-edged sword for, as Karin Hartewig has noted, it limited the miners' ability to move between miners, which was a common means of redress in the Ruhr. The Law largely, but not entirely, closed this avenue.[58]

Furthermore, industrialists colluded with the military authorities to have troublesome employees removed. Three union representatives upon the workers' committee of the Welheim mine were drafted soon after their election. Similarly, at the Schlägel und Eisen pits, an Alter Verband candidate was elected only to be drafted less than a month later, the only man in the mine to be conscripted.[59] The Essen No. 3 Mining Office claimed in the first case that the 'mine saw them (the draftees) as a danger to the peace of the workforce.'[60]

The relatively better position of the Welsh miners compared with their counterparts in the Ruhr is revealed by a comparison of wages and wartime consumption. As graphs 1 and 2 show, after an initial drop, British miners' real earnings declined gradually from the outbreak of the war, but rose above their pre-war level by the end of the war. German miners' earnings, on the other hand, fell much more steeply and never rose to their pre-war level for the duration of the war.

Although the extent of the food shortages and their effect upon German morale has been recently questioned,[61] it seems clear that the Welsh miners suffered less privation than the Ruhr miners did.

Graphs 1 & 2: Miners money and real wages in Germany and Britain, 1914-1918

Source: Bry, *Wages*, pp.318-321.

In 1917 the Gewerkverein produced a pamphlet on the causes of the wildcat strikes that had begun to affect the Ruhr from 1916. The majority of their twenty-four points dealt with the issue of food shortages and distribution.[62] These strikes tended to be short, localised affairs, aimed at securing better rations and increased wages, although strike waves towards the end of the war began to make political demands.[63] The unions claimed that the strikes were the work of unorganised miners,[64] but other evidence suggests that many were organised and points to a loss of control by the unions over their members.[65] By contrast social disorder over food in South Wales was more limited and became apparent only from the end of 1917.[66]

Furthermore, the issue of food supply and distribution provided an issue upon which the labour movement in South Wales could coalesce. Following his appointment as Food Controller, D. A. Thomas, by then Lord Rhondda, established a system of Food Control Committees (FCCs) throughout the country to oversee rationing and price controls.[67] The members of these committees were usually Liberal and Tory local notables, such as shopkeepers, precisely the individuals who were alleged to be profiteering. Shopkeepers were also criticised for allegedly favouring their wealthier customers over working-class families.[68] These sentiments developed into demands for increased working-class representation upon the FCCs. Workers in Tredegar, for example, passed a resolution requesting the resignation of the local FCCs due to its 'unrepresentative composition from the standpoint of the working class.'[69] The growing recognition that the Liberal notables did not adequately

represent their interests increased the pressure for independent representation. Trades and Labour Councils (TLCs) began, therefore, to grow in importance and prestige as guardians of the interests of the working class.[70] The Tredegar TLC became involved in campaigns to increase labour representation on local political bodies, as well as the FCCs.[71] Meanwhile, on the other side of the coalfield, T. D. Williams, a miner and chairman of the Ammanford TLC, personally took charge of the distribution of margarine following a fracas that left a shop window broken.[72]

Interestingly, the previous year Williams had sought appointment to the Ammanford Urban District Council (UDC). Williams had been selected by the TLC and was supported by its members on the UDC. However, William Evans, a Liberal, building contractor and UDC member since 1910, threw his support behind the second candidate James Henry Lawley. His decision followed extensive questioning over the composition of the TLC and its links with the ILP. He concluded that 'as regards the two gentleman proposed, one was quite as good as the other, and personally he should be very pleased to see them both on the Council, but there was this difference between them, one carried the Red Flag, and the other the Red, White and Blue, and it was always safe to follow the Union Jack.'[73] Although generalisations should not be made of this local example (Lawley was also a miner), it does illustrate TLC attempts to promote Labour representation on local bodies and hints at a growing distance between Liberal and Labour parties. The increasing significance of the Ammanford TLC was further illustrated by its organisation, in conjunction with the Llandybie TLC, of the first May Day celebration in the town in 1918.[74]

Meanwhile, in the Ruhr, the labour movement was becoming increasingly fragmented. Although the SPD had voted for war credits in 1914, its left wing became uneasy as the war progressed. Opposition to and criticism of the SPD leadership became increasingly vocal, as demonstrated by the attacks of the Auxiliary Service Law. One small anti-war group was centred on Karl Minster in Duisburg.[75] Minster had an outlet for his anti-war sentiments in the *Niederrheinische Volkstimme*. However, Minster was removed from the editorship in early 1916.[76] This removal of opposition tendencies from the party press was repeated elsewhere in Germany and ultimately the operation of the press bureau for the Rhineland and Westphalia was suspended on 1 July 1916 because there lay 'inside the social-democratic movement an ever sharper political antagonism.'[77]

The importance of the control of the party organs is highlighted by the example of August Erdmann. Erdmann was Reichstag deputy for Dortmund. Following the split in the SPD in 1917 he joined the USPD. Following his defection to the USPD, Erdmann became a non-entity in the Majority Social Democratic Party (*Mehrheits sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, MSPD) press. This tactic seems to have been effective as the local Dortmund organisation was not deeply affected by the schism.[78] In fact, USPD organisation in the area remained weak. The divisions within the USPD movement itself were illustrated by the actions of the Dortmund faction's leaders, Hermann Linke and Adolf Meinberg in the post-war years. While the former ultimately rejoined the SPD, the latter became a member of the German Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*, KPD).[79]

In Gelsenkirchen the USPD faction was more successful. On 18 May and 12 November 1916 conferences were held in the area which condemned the nationalist tone of the *Volksblatt* and registered opposition to the war. The latter conference prompted Hue to resign as SPD candidate for the Bochum-Gelsenkirchen constituency. On the 6 May 1918 a USPD association for the electoral district of Bochum-Gelsenkirchen-Hattingen-Witten was established.[80]

From 1917 the anti-war movement in South Wales also began to grow and tensions within the labour movement heightened. Brace, by then a junior minister, received a stormy reception at Gwaun-cae-Gurwen and was extensively questioned about the war.[81] A conference of the British Council of Soldiers and Workers Delegates was held in Swansea in July 1917, but was disrupted by pro-war supporters.[82] Up-and-coming leaders also demonstrated opposition to the war. James Griffiths turned the White House in Ammanford into a bastion of pacifism,[83] and was supported by S. O. Davies, checkweigher at the Great Mountain Colliery.[84] A. J. Cook also began to adopt an increasingly anti-war stance from 1915.[85] However, unlike the Ruhr, these tensions in South Wales were largely contained within the existing labour movement.

Despite between the anti- and pro-war movements, an overview of the effect of the Great War upon the mining communities of South Wales and the Ruhr reveals that it had a divisive effect upon the latter, while serving to strengthen labour organisations in the former. Admittedly, the war did see some advances for the Ruhr miners' unions. The four unions drew closer together,[86] as demonstrated by their common front against the company unions in the safetymen elections of 1915.[87] The

Auxiliary Service Law also granted the unions a degree of recognition and there was an increase in trade union membership in the latter years of the war.

However, in comparison with the miners' movement in South Wales, the Ruhr miners had not been able to force significant concessions out of the employers or government during the conflict. First, the individual miner was financially worse off. Second, miners' contact with the state had generally been unfavourable. Not only did they suffer from continued food shortages, but they also faced the draft if they were deemed too troublesome. Third, the recognition granted to the unions by the employers was grudging. Fourth, the mining workforce itself experienced a process of restructuring through the introduction of female, youth, foreign and POW labour. As a result the Ruhr miners' experience of the war was one of 'decline in real wages, hunger and increasing numbers of accidents.'[88] These factors, coupled with the union's decision to give up the right to strike, undermined their ability to present themselves as the protectors of the miner's interests. As a result alternative forms of action, such as wildcat strikes and workforce meetings, began to increase as evidenced by the strike waves of 1917 and 1918. These strikes were in fact building upon older forms of interest articulation.[89] These conditions provided fertile ground for the left-wing industrial organisations that had existed in the Ruhr prior to the war. Finally, although the Centre Party emerged from the war largely unscathed, those miners represented by the SPD were split between the MSPD and USPD.

The Welsh miners, by contrast, came out of the war with a sense of confidence. Significant victories had been won in terms of wages and organisation. Although there were unofficial strikes in South Wales, these did not pose an organisational threat to the SWMF and should perhaps be seen in terms of prodding the union leadership towards a more aggressive policy. Most important for subsequent events was the experience of state control. For the Welsh miners this was positive and fed into their determination to win nationalisation of the industry in the post-war years. Although there were tensions between pro- and anti-war supporters in the labour movement, these lacked the intensity of comparable divisions in the Ruhr and did not take organisational form. Just as before the war, potentially divisive discourses were contained within the existing structure of the labour movement. In the post-war years nationalisation provided a key concept for the union's discourse; one that could unite the different factions through its demonstrable benefits to the miners as a whole. The movement itself was in fact strengthened through the revitalisation of the TLCs

and the role SWMF officials played in the local communities during the conflict. Their activities also raised the profile of the Labour Party, while participation on the FCCs revealed the division of interest between the Liberal 'shopocracy' and the working class.

The pressures of war served to accentuate the processes of fragmentation and homogenisation outlined in the previous chapters. Consequently, the lifeworld of the Ruhr became less synchronous. Working conditions had deteriorated as a substantial proportion of the workforce had been drafted into the army to be replaced by forced labour and POWs. Although the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein moved closer together they found it increasingly difficult to control the wild-cat strikes during the second half of the conflict. Furthermore, fragmentation occurred along new lines. Both the SPD and the Alter Verband, for example, now faced a challenge on their left in the form of the USPD and syndicalists. In South Wales, on the other hand, the lifeworld of the Welsh miners appears to have become more synchronous. Their improved bargaining position consolidated the SWMF. Incorporation of the craft unions further strengthened the union. In the political sphere, Labour organisations gained credibility through their work on community matters, such as food shortages. This sowed the seeds for the replacement of the Liberal dominance with a Labour hegemony, although this was not to come to full fruition until the 1920s.

The Post-war Years, 1919-1926

The dramatic events of the first half of the 1920s in South Wales and the Ruhr have been extensively covered. The very different histories of the two regions during this period make a narrative comparison difficult. Therefore, rather than providing a detailed account of these events, this section will concentrate on some of the main features of post-war industrial relations and politics and upon their effect on the lifeworld and implications for civil society.

Industrial Relations and Trade Unionism

Although the German mining unions had been unable to win full recognition during the war, they were able to do so in its aftermath. Talks had been held in August and October 1918 between the employers and trade union functionaries, but at each session the former sought to limit concessions. The revolution changed the context of

negotiations. The trade unions informed employers that without certain concessions regarding wages and hours they would be unable to control their members. Following tough negotiations an eight-hour day including winding time, increased bonuses for overtime and a minimum wage was agreed on 14 November 1918. On 23 November 1918 an agreement was signed that effectively recognised the trade unions.[90] Wage negotiations would now take place within the context of the *Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft* (Central Works Community, ZAG).

In South Wales the industry remained under state control until 1921. The positive experience of Government control was clear in the miners' demand for nationalisation. In fact, the desirability of nationalisation had been raised in 1912. In 1918 the SWMF revived the concept in a proposal at the MFGB Southport conference.[91] Nationalisation became the leading policy goal of the MFGB, and the Sankey Commission gave the impression that its hopes might be realised. However, Eddie May, in his case study of the Gwaun-cae-Gurwen pits, argues that by 1919 there was already a change in Government policy regarding the mining industry. A tendency to side with the employers was emerging. He concludes that the relationship between the state, capital and labour was conditional.[92] This view corresponds with that of Tien-Lung Liu's in his analysis of the British and German Labour Ministries generally. Liu disputes cultural explanations of policy making (i.e. that the British state was liberal/non-interventionist, while the German state was authoritarian/interventionist). Instead, he argues that contingency was the shaping factor behind the state's approach to industrial relations in both countries.[93] For example, the occupation of the Ruhr and the subsequent inflation and political unrest prompted the Stresemann government to give the Labour Minister, Brauns, a free hand in industrial relations and he repeatedly imposed arbitration.[94] In fact, due to their continued weakness, the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband came to rely on state intervention.[95] On the other hand, Liu sees successive British governments as siding with the employers through their support for the Supply and Transport Organisation (STO), which was to run emergency services in the event of a large-scale strike.[96]

Whatever the approach of the two states, it is clear that the mining unions in South Wales and the Ruhr were in very different positions. In nationalisation the SWMF had a rallying point for its members and leaders. Industrial conflict could, therefore, be largely simplified to a struggle between the union and the employers.

The trade unions in the Ruhr, on the other hand, lacked this focus. The ZAG provided the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband with the recognition that they had so dearly wanted and on that ground they felt obliged to protect it. Unlike the SWMF, the Ruhr unions faced pressure not only from the employers, who sought to win back the concessions granted during the revolution, but also from their own membership. Individual workforces continued the pattern of localised strikes during the war, striking for increased wages, a six-hour shift, socialisation and the formation of mine councils. The Thyssen mines in Hamborn were particularly prominent in this respect and their strikes in late 1918 and 1919 had a domino effect upon neighbouring pits.[97]

Furthermore, although the company unions had largely been eliminated by the agreement, the Gewerkverein and Alter Verband faced a new challenge in the form of syndicalist-communist unions, which were able to capitalise on the workers' discontent. Two main oppositional unions can be identified, although the boundaries between them were often fluid. The FVdG re-emerged after the war. Its leader Fritz Kater conducted a tour of the area between 10 and 17 December 1918 and syndicalists played a role in strikes in the Hamborn area in 1919.[98] The Rhenish-Westphalian FVdG merged with several other syndicalist unions at a conference in Düsseldorf on 15 and 16 September 1919 to form the *Freie Arbeiter-Union* (Free Workers' Union Germany, FAU).[99] The most important of these unions for the mining industry was the *Allgemeine Bergarbeiter Union* (General Miners' Union). Formed on 30 March 1919, the organisation was decentralised and modelled on the basis of the council system (*Rätesystem*).[100] At the end of 1919 the FAUD had some 30,000 Ruhr miners among its membership.[101] By 1923, however, the FAUD had some 57,127 members and 143 branches in the Ruhr and metalworkers formed the majority, comprising 34,183 or 59.8 percent of total membership. Miners made up 19,358 or 33.9 percent, although at its founding conference 47,060 miners from the Ruhr were represented. Furthermore, while the metalworkers had 52 branches with an average size of 657, the miners had 70 with an average membership of 277, suggesting that the latter were more thinly spread.[102] The years 1919 and 1920 represented a peak for syndicalism in the Ruhr,[103] while in South Wales its anti-state doctrines, if not its fighting spirit, were largely abandoned in favour of state collectivism.[104]

Tensions between communist and syndicalist elements within the FAUD led to a split in 1920 and the formation of *Freie Arbeiter Union (Gelsenkirchen)* (Free Workers' Union Gelsenkirchen, FAU (G)). The FAU (G) was more inclined towards

communism than syndicalism and in September 1921 it merged with two other unions, the *Verband der Hand und Kopfarbeiter* (Association of Hand and Head Workers) and the *Freie Landarbeiter Verbandes* (Free Agricultural Workers' Association) to form the communist *Union der Hand- und Kopfarbeiter* (Union of Hand and Head Workers).[105] It appears that the majority of miners previously organised in the FAUD made the move to the FAU Gelsenkirchen and later the Union. By the end of 1920 the Union organised approximately 66,000 miners in the Ruhr.[106] Eric Weitz claims that, in the mining sector, most of the communists were organised in the Union although it proved an undisciplined body.[107] It is clear that even within the newer trade unions there were divisions on questions of ideology and policy. The pattern of unionisation in the early 1920s was then characterised by increased fragmentation. Yet, that these organisations posed a real challenge to the established trade unions is revealed by the results of the works councils and Knappschaft elections (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). Yet, these results disguise the extent of the leftist union's challenge in individual mines. The Dortmund police authorities reported in 1924 that the 'the Free Trade Unions state that they have lost more than 40 percent of their earlier votes. Especially evident is the decline of the mining association.' As table 4.3 illustrates, in Dortmund the Alter Verband came second to the syndicalists in all but one mine.

The radical unions were able to capitalise on the discontent of the miners with the policy of the four established organisations. An example was the eventual rejection of six-hour shifts by the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband and their acceptance of overtime.[108] The FAU believed 'that the members of the four miners' associations, because of the last action of their leaders, will leave their organisations en masse and will fill the syndicalist ranks.'[109] The combined effects of disappointment with the ZAG, the emergence of syndicalist-communist unions and the demographic fluctuations in the workforce can be clearly seen in the membership of the three main pre-war unions (see table 4.4).

After an initial surge in support towards the end of the war, the pre-war trade unions saw a steady decline in membership after 1919/1920. Unfortunately, figures for the Gewerkverein are fragmentary, but it appears that it proved better at retaining its members than did the Alter Verband or the ZZP.

Table 4.1: Result of Elections to the Knappschaft, 1921 and 1924

Year	1921	1924
Votes	205,959	213,330
Alter Verband	96,806 (47%)	93,082 (43.6%)
Gewerkverein	61,264 (29.7%)	61, 918 (29.0%)
ZZP	8,766 (4.3%)	3,195 (1.5%)
Hirsch-Duncker	2,213 (1.1%)	2,795 (1.3%)
Left Radicals	36,910 (17.9%)	52,340 (24.5%)

Source: Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 47.

Table 4.2: Percentage of seats won on works council election in the Ruhr mining industry by the trade unions, 1921-1926

	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
Percentage Participation				71.9	75.6	76.0
Free Trade Union (including Alter Verband)	45.7	41.2	41.7	32.2	40.5	66.5
Christian Trade Unions (including Gewerkverein	18.9	18.0	20.6	21.2	23.2	25.5
Hirsch-Duncker	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.6
ZZP	7.5	5.9	3.0	1.2	0.7	0.7
Union	27.0	26.0	32.9	34.3	29.1	--
Syndicalists	--	4.7	--	7.3	3.0	2.9
Company	0.1	0.4	--	0.4	0.5	1.7

Source: Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 49.

Table 4.3: Results of works council elections to some Dortmund mines, 1924

	Free Union		Christian Unions		Syndicalist		Union		Not Organised		Hirsch Duncker	
Mines	Vote	S	Vote	S	Vote	S	Vote	S	Vote	S	Vote	S
Minister Stein	462	2	277*	1	945	5	317	2	190	-	71	-
Dorstfeld I/IV	460	5	246	2	515	5	418	4				
Dorstfeld II/III	395	3	130	1			505	5				
Tremonia	460	3	147	-	1,201	8						
Hansa	451	1	450	2	740	6						
Hardenberg	638	5	207	1	1,300	7						
Glückauf	333	2	220	1	1,017	8						
Kaiserstuhl I/II	423	2	133	1	1,384	8						
Hohenzollern	255	2	233	2	633	5						
Hansemann	357	5			1,113	8						
Kaiser Friederich	720	3			920	7						

Source: Polizeiverwaltung to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 28 April 1924, STAM OBA 14481. * At Minister Stein the Gewerkverein and the ZZP candidates stood on a joint ticket. Key: S = seats.

Table 4.4: Membership of the Alter Verband, Gewerkverein, ZZP and SWMF, 1919-1926

Year	Alter Verband	Gewerkverein	ZZP	South Wales Miners' Federation
1919	159,136		46,261	185,044
1920	163,356	73,859	45,000	197,668
1921	152,255	73,420	45,018	117,610
1922	107,174		33,200	87,080
1923	97,251			147,611
1924	67,305		5,000*	148,496
1925	65,585		3,500*	129,155
1926	60,821		3,000*	136,250

Source: Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 339; Williams, *Capitalism*, pp. 88-9. * Approximate figures.

This impression is reinforced by analysis of the Knappschaft and works' council elections. In the former the Gewerkverein was successful in retaining its vote, while in the latter it increased its percentage between 1921 and 1926.[110] The Alter Verband and the ZZP, on the other hand, recorded a decrease. The syndicalist-communist nature of the FAUD and Union would suggest that they had greater success in attracting members from the social-democratic Alter Verband than the religious Gewerkverein. Although caution must be exercised in drawing too direct a link between Alter Verband losses and FAUD/Union growth, there is some evidence to movement from one to the other. Former Alter Verband official Johann Spaniol, for example, became leader of the *Föderation der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands (Syndikalisten)* (Federation of German Miners, Syndicalist). Its membership in the Oberhausen area was almost twice that of the Alter Verband.[111] The agents of the *Büro Kolpin* also reported on the Communist agitation within the members' meetings of the Alter Verband and other unions, so that the associations felt obliged to warn their members against such actions.[112]A KPD member in Hamborn hinted at the depth of rivalry between the old unions and the syndicalist-communist organisations arising from the revolution. 'When he is in the pit, he always notices the relentless enmity between the SPD and the KPD. Co-operation with the SPD is impossible. Our dead comrades must shame us if we went along with the SPD.'[113] Conflict between the unions was not only played out within the context of works council and Knappschaft elections, but also through physical confrontation. Following the negotiation of an overtime agreement communists and syndicalists at the Westerholt mine forced their way into the works council room and threatened the Alter Verband and Gewerkverein representatives. Since the Union rejected the agreement, the management believed that it had become a test of strength between the Union and Alter Verband.[114] The management of the Helene and Amalie mines reported that during the February 1919 strike 'at the Amalie shaft around 150 miners, who for the most part belonged to the Gewerkverein, refused to join this movement. A dispute arose between those willing to work and the strikers. Armed, the strikers moved to the Amalie mine, occupied the shaft and forced the workers to come up. The workers were lined up at the shaft and were to be led through Essen in dirty condition (i.e. in their work clothes).' Two months later 142,000 miners out of a total workforce of 250,000 struck work in favour of a six-hour shift. The Helene and Amalie management reported that the Gewerkverein members were content with the seven hours eventually negotiated by

the ZAG and Reich Labour Minister Bauer, but 'the section of the workforce, which belongs to the Communist Party, is not content with the course of the strike.'[115] Meanwhile confrontation with the Alter Verband could be quite violent. The *Westfälische Volkszeitung* reported the formation of security units to protect the mines during the February 1919 strike. A miner was injured at an incident at the Alter Verband building in Bochum between these units and armed miners.[116]

The divisive nature of trade unionism in the Ruhr during this period is highlighted by their different conceptions of socialisation. Initially, there appeared to be unanimity on the issue within the region. On 10 January 1919 the local SPD, USPD and communists spontaneously formed a nine-man commission in Essen. With equal representation given to each group, this Commission of Nine was to prepare the ground for socialisation. Furthermore, on 13 January 1919 a conference of Workers and Soldiers Council representatives, union and Government representatives unanimously adopted a resolution supporting socialisation, although Jürgen Tampke hints that the large crowd that had gathered outside may have intimidated some of the delegates.[117]

However, the diverse understandings of socialisation were clear to both union leaders and outside observers. Imbusch commented at the time that the word had become a slogan (*Schlagwort*) that hid many different meanings. For some it meant the abolition of private property, for others workers' control, for yet more nationalisation.[118] Bergassessor von Lowenstein commented the following year that 'the slogan of socialisation possesses however too great an attraction, has become too indispensable a means of recruitment (*Werbemittel*) for the socialist party and the free trade unions to drop it in their struggle for existence against the radical movements of the Unionists and Communists.'[119]

Although the Government initially refused to recognise the Commission, it did establish its own Socialisation Commissars. The miners accepted the Commissars in a second conference on 20 January and the Government eventually recognised the Commission on 14 February. In the meantime tensions between the Commission members were increasing due to spontaneous attempts to occupy some mines.[120] But it was events in Hervest-Dorsten that precipitated the split between the SPD and left-wing representatives. The murder of the president of the colliery clerks' association, Kohlmann, provided the army with the excuse to occupy the area. The violence and death of forty miners, which followed the arrival of the *Freikorps* Lichtschlag, was

condemned by a conference in Mülheim on 16 February and a general strike proclaimed. At the miners' conference two days later the USPD and KPD delegates supported the proclamation, while the SPD representatives attempted to pass a resolution condemning it. The refusal to allow a vote to be taken on the resolution led the SPD members to leave the hall and resign from the Commission.[121] This effectively ended the co-operation between the three socialist parties in the Ruhr on the issue of socialization.

The SWMF did not suffer the same degree of organisational fragmentation. Admittedly there were differences of opinion within the union regarding nationalisation. Although the SWMF delegates to the MFGB had been at the forefront of the decision to adopt nationalisation, there were dissenting voices within the organisation.[122] Government sources reported 'support of nationalisation is not unanimous. In South Wales and Lancashire there is a good deal of opposition.'[123] Unrest was further attributed to younger miners.

> The situation with regard to nationalisation is on the whole unchanged, but recent reports from South Wales indicate that certain sections of miners in that coalfield are hostile to the demand of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain for nationalisation. In that district there is said to be widespread and definite reaction against extremist elements, consisting for the most part of young men, inspired by the doctrines of the Plebs' League. The older miners are becoming irritated at the constant stoppages of work on all sorts of pretexts, and the consequent serious losses in wages. In last week's Report a meeting at Gilfach Goch was mentioned at which a resolution was passed protesting against the nationalisation of the mines. A similar resolution was passed at a largely attended meeting at Pontypridd, and it is stated that this attitude was to be emphasised by the holding of three great demonstrations of protest in representative centres of the South Wales coalfield. These examples of opposition to nationalisation, however, must at present be regarded as a district exception to the general miners' attitude.[124]

It was in this vein that some miners led by the Unionist candidate for Rhondda West, Gwilym Rowlands, gathered at Mountain Ash Pavilion in April 1920 to protest against nationalisation.[125]

Resistance to nationalisation in South Wales actually came from two directions, as noted by the same Government sources.

> In addition to the unofficial campaign in South Wales against nationalisation of the mines conducted by conservative elements within the Miners' Federation it may be noted that there is another unofficial movement of a different kind in existence in South Wales. This is the Syndicalist movement, which is reported to have a large following in the

> South Wales area. The Syndicalist one is, of course, against the nationalisation of the mines on the ground that it is incompatible with the conduct of the industry on the principle of 'The Mines for the Miners'. Neither of these unofficial campaigns, however, appears to be of very great importance, and the great body of miners in South Wales will certainly be loyal to the programme of the MFGB.[126]

Despite these differences of opinion, in general the miners' movement in South Wales was supportive of nationalisation. It is also significant that policy differences did not lead to the establishment of separate organisations. In fact, in 1919 and 1920 the SWMF was successful in merging some of the smaller craft unions into its structure. The South Wales Enginemen, for example, voted to merge with the SWMF in 1920,[127] while the South Wales and Monmouthshire Colliery Officials Union passed a resolution in favour of amalgamation at the end of 1919.[128] William Hopkins, leader of the Enginemen, complained that enginemen who joined the SWMF had their demands met, but those in the Association did not.[129] He explained that the 'reason for [the amalgamation] is because of your (the employers') persistent refusal to do anything when we try to get you to improve the position of our lower paid men.'[130] The employer's intransigent attitude led Hopkins to declare angrily, 'We are simply nonentities!'[131] Meanwhile, the SWMF ambition to absorb the smaller unions was succinctly put by J. D. Morgan at the 1919 May Day demonstration at Ystradgynlais. 'It was unfortunate that they had more than one Union in the coal mining industry. There were small Unions, which he believed were working to the disadvantage of the men as a whole. The days of the small Union were numbered. He believed that the whole of the men in the coal mining industry should come into the Miners' Federation - whether they worked underground or on the surface.'[132] Table 4.3 illustrates how SWMF membership increased in this period.

The defeat of 1921, however, began to reverse this process of amalgamations that had occurred since the war. Claude Stanfield, a checkweigher and ILP member, recalled that following the defeat there was a lack of interest in unionism among the men.[133] Moreover, the Enginemen, Stokers and Craftmens' Association was resurrected after the strike as the South Wales and Monmouthshire Mechanical and Surface Workers' Union, before reverting to its original name in 1924. The Mechanical Union's leader D. B. Jones claimed that its members sought more co-operative, peaceful relations with employers.

> There are many men who are saying that they will not pay to the Miners' Federation again and who are turning their attention to us. Some of them - I say it quite openly - are not in accord with the spirit of the Miners' Federation and object to having conflicts; they want what Mr Bonar Law expressed as peace and tranquility; and they think they will get less eruptions in our organisation.[134]

Occupational differences and the concept of skilled work were also used to distinguish the Mechanical Union from the SWMF. Its General Secretary claimed the miners had 'no conception of their work; it was of paramount importance to get men to conduct the affairs of mechanics and surface workers who had direct knowledge and experience of the skilled work they were called upon to perform. The Federation catered for those employed at the coal face, forgetting that a strong arm and a thick head could cut coal, whilst it required brains to drive an engine.'[135] Although employers did not make the re-establishment of the craft union easy,[136] the SWMF took its formation seriously and conducted a vigorous, but unsuccessful campaign to destroy it.[137] The sense that the SWMF had lost both a degree of cohesiveness and power since the 1921 lockout was put succinctly by an unnamed craftsman writing in the communist pit paper *Red Dawn.*

> I believe the time had come when a move should be made in a direction that would appeal to all mechanical sections in such a way that they would immediately leave D. B. Jones and his scab organisation, who are nothing but poached members from the Miners' Federation. We would then see again in South Wales an organisation that would be a power, catering for all sections similar to what was experienced prior to the 1921 lock-out.[138]

The 1926 strike, however, saw a further fragmentation of the SWMF. Toward the end of the strike the South Wales Miners' Industrial Union was formed. The following years saw a long-drawn struggle both against this 'scab' union and non-unionism in an effort to rebuild the SWMF.

For both regions the period between 1919 and 1926 were turbulent years. However, for the Ruhr miners' unions, they were generally marked by increased fragmentation. In the ZAG the older unions saw their first major concession from the employers. It provided a focal point for co-operation between the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein and offered the opportunity to overcome the differences that had undermined the unions in the past. Unfortunately, this co-operation became increasingly negative in scope. Hopes that the ZAG could be used as a stepping stone to further concessions and a genuinely tripartite system of industrial relations were

dashed. Instead both unions were forced into defending it against both radical unions and employers. The events of the Revolution left a bitter and enduring legacy of resentment between the left-wing trade unions. Violence and death were not uncommon and the victims became martyrs for their respective sides. Finally, the confusion that surrounded what socialisation actually meant illustrates the fragmented nature of the miners' lifeworld. The term was used by all the trade unions, but its actual meaning varied enormously between organisations.

The issue of nationalisation in South Wales represented a strong contrast to this confusion. Although there was not unanimous support for nationalisation, the attitude of the majority of the miners was positive. The meaning of nationalisation was also immediately understood. It meant state control. Some, as will be shown in the next chapter, sought to go beyond nationalisation. But even these individuals recognised the need for state control as a first step. Nationalisation, unlike socialisation in the Ruhr, provided a common frame of reference for the Welsh miners.

Work Processes and Miners' Communities

The inter-war period saw changes in the work process in both regions. As experienced miners were returning from the front, the Ruhr mines lost their POW and foreign labour. The system of *Raubbau* (robbing) during the war meant that many of the best seams had been worked, while shortages had led to regression in mechanisation that continued in the immediate post-war years.[139] Employers, therefore, sought to maintain and increase production by expanding the workforce. The number of underground workers increased from 261,348 in 1918 to 384,833 by 1921, surpassing its pre-war level. Meanwhile, the surface workforce increased from 90,770 in 1918 to 141,388 in 1922.[140]

From the mid-1920s, however, the Ruhr coal companies sought to tackle rising costs through rationalisation and mechanisation. By 1924 the workforce was 80,000 less than it had been in 1922.[141] Bergassessor Mathias wrote of the industry in 1924:

> The overall picture of German mining technology today differs considerably from the past. In the mining industry [there now] operate machines, which win coal, while the pre-war clumsy structure, which required many men and [was] only too often paralysed as a result of damage, is no more. Today one encounters in great numbers the light, and easily handled, one-man, pneumatic pick...[142]

The records of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG confirm this impressionistic evidence of widespread mechanisation. In 1925 52.9 percent of its production was machine cut, 24 percent was won by shot-firing, while the remaining 23.1 percent was won by hand. Of the machine won coal the overwhelming majority (91.9 percent) was cut using pneumatic pick. However, the distribution of mechanisation across the company's mines was uneven, as shown in table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Methods of mining in some Gelsenkirchener-Bergwerks AG mines, 1925

	Handwork/ *Keilhauenarbeit*	Shotfiring/ *Schießarbeit*	Machinecutting/ *Machinelle*
Wilhelm			100
Thies		2.3	97.7
Zollern I	9.3	6.6	84.1
Westhausen	8.9	16.7	74.4
Germania II	23	30.6	46.4
Rhein-Elbe	23.6	33	43.4
Alma	5.7	51.5	42.8
Minister Stein	49.9	13.8	41.9
Fürst Hardenburg	50	14.7	35.3
Hansa	49	43	7.4

Source: Bergrat Funcke to Dr Jüngst, 5 October 1925, BBA 625.

Mechanisation undoubtedly made a strong impact, both in terms of coal winning and hauling, on the Ruhr coal industry, but did not totally eliminate handworking. Stenbock-Fenmor's description of his work underground in the early 1920s illustrates the continued existence of the Kameradschaft style of working.[143]

The South Wales workforce also expanded in 1919 and 1920. The Housing Committee of the Ogmore and Garw UDC anticipated a total increase of 7,810 at the collieries in the area in 1918/19.[144] In terms of mechanisation, however, South Wales lagged behind the Ruhr. Coombes remembers the first coal-cutting machinery being introduced to his area during the war,[145] and, compared with the Ruhr, South Wales remained under-mechanised in the 1920s. Trevor Boyns, however, has questioned the fairness of accusations that the Welsh owners were slow to introduce machines to their mines. He argues that, while geological factors limited the introduction of coal cutters, Welsh owners were quick to utilise advances in conveyor technology. More importantly, Boyns indicates that the introduction of conveyors largely avoided conflict with the hewers and left their small-group style of working relatively untouched.[146] Tenfelde has argued that changes in the working methods before the war led to a loss of autonomy and solidarity among the miners through deskilling. However, as chapter one has shown, work processes in South Wales and the Ruhr

were not dissimilar before the war. It was in the 1920s, with the widespread mechanisation of the Ruhr mines, that the experience of work really began to differ between the two regions. While the hewers of South Wales largely continued to work in small groups, the German miners had to adapt to new techniques and machinery with all the consequences for autonomy, skill and solidarity that Tenfelde suggests. When considered in the terms of the comparison, it appears then that the process of deskilling in the Ruhr is better located in the 1920s, rather than in the pre-war period as Tenfelde does.[147]

In the wake of the trade depression and rationalisation came unemployment. Interestingly, German historians have regarded the experience of unemployment during the Weimar Republic as divisive. The unemployed were increasingly isolated, not only from the workplace, but 'also from the organisational and cultural traditions of the Social democratic labor movement.' Those who were still employed enjoyed the benefits of what wage increases there were as well as social welfare schemes such as municipal housing. As a result, there developed 'something of a "respectable" working-class culture distinct from the "rougher" street culture.'[148] Historians have identified such divisions in the pre-war British working class.[149] The inter-war years, on the other hand, saw a lessening of the stigma attached to drawing relief in those areas of endemic unemployment. Instead unemployment was 'experienced collectively.'[150] Unemployed miners could, for example, remain members of the SWMF and were therefore not segregated from their employed colleagues. The regionalised nature of unemployment in Britain and the more diverse industrial base in the Ruhr suggests that divisions between employed and unemployed were not as great in South Wales as in the Ruhr. The Llanbradach Workmen's Hall, for example, established a committee to devise a scheme allowing the unemployed and their families to use the facilities.[151] However, divisions were not completely absent. In 1923 the hall's committee passed a resolution refusing free entry to the unemployed, apart for a few elderly men who had failed to find work.[152]

The unions, especially those in the Ruhr, also had to contend with demographic changes. As shown above, the Ruhr workforce expanded in the early 1920s. Many of these new miners were young, unmarried and new to the job.[153] This new workforce was more amenable to ideas of direct action than the discipline of trade union work. Tenfelde characterises the turbulent circumstances in the Ruhr during the early years of the Weimar Republic as a '*Generationskonflikt*'. Yet this

movement also drew on older traditions in the mining movement through its use of workforce meetings and direct democracy.[154] Lucas, in his study of Hamborn and Remscheid, also places the appeal of direct action in the former down to the relatively youthful proletariat, whose experiences of discontinuity and insecurity in life made direct action seem the best means of immediate redress.[155] In fact, some Bergämter complained that, in their rush to recruit, some companies often made no attempt to distinguish between peaceful and restless workers.[156]

Yet, while the employers were trying to increase the workforce, there is also evidence suggesting that many were seeking to leave the Ruhr. In 1919 several of the Bergämter reported on active advertising for emigration to South America. Dortmund No. 3 office, for example, reported the establishment of an office to organise emigration under the direction of Karl Kura, a member of the Mont Cenis 1/3 workforce.[157] Meanwhile, the Hamm office reported on migration to the less sunny climes of Holland.[158]

One pre-war milieu particularly affected by this out-migration was the Polish sub-culture. As is evident in the above tables, the Polish miners' union, an important part of the pre-war milieu, went into terminal decline in the mid-1920s. Kleßmann notes that the ZZP experienced a certain radicalisation after the war, but found it difficult to maintain its membership due to the emigration of the Poles to the resurrected Polish State.[159] The Recklinghausen Bergamt reported that the Poles tended to return to their homeland rather than emigrate to foreign countries,[160] but many also left for the industrial regions of France. The Bochum police claimed that 'as far as can be observed here a distinct calmness has set in. The organisational activity has at any rate essentially slackened. The Polish population acts completely indifferently. The emigration of Poles to the French industrial regions continues...25,000 have arrived, up to now, in those regions.'[161]

Such out-migration tended to undermine the Polish milieu and Kleßmann sees it as facing an existential dilemma in the 1920s.[162] However, the Polish sub-culture did not completely break-up. Polish organisations continued their efforts to maintain their Polish identity. The Polish Workers' Party, for example, continued to raise the issue of Polish language education, although much time was taken up at meetings with expressions of support for the Polish State.[163] Furthermore, in some areas, such as Bottrop, Polish communities formed part of Communist strongholds.[164] While contemporaries regarded the colonies as an obstacle to organisation before the war,

Brüggemeier argues that after the war both the SPD and KPD were able to make inroads. Some even became 'red' strongholds.[165] On one hand, the Polish milieu had to contend with the loss of its constituent members, while on the other hand, other sections were being integrated into other sub-cultures. The Polish milieu that remained was divided between socialist and nationalist variants.

South Wales, on the other hand, experienced a more general loss of population, prompted by the downturn in the fortunes of the coal industry. There was also a decline in the Welsh language.[166] These demographic changes served to further homogenise the mining communities. The process of secularisation prior to the Great War also continued in the 1920s. The various denominations recognised that they had to engage in interdenominational social work, but, in general, their main focus remained on the education and salvation based on individual development.[167] However, the effects of the decline of the industry and the large strikes of 1921 and 1926 placed the emphasis on collective rather than self-help. It is probably over stating the case to claim that the chapels lost influence simply because 'the chapel people didn't believe in anything outside it.'[168] During the strikes, the chapels performed important relief work. Ultimately, however, they were unable to convert their principles into enduring practicalities.[169]

Secularisation was a feature of both regions and was aided by the continuing spread of secular forms of entertainment. In the 1920s the number of miners' cinemas in South Wales increased despite the industrial defeats.[170] The workers' appreciation for sport remained undiminished. The football teams of the coastal cities were a focus for regional identities for the South Wales miners.[171] Sporting teams, however, did not escape the effects of deprivation. The Ammanford rugby club suffered following the 1925 and 1926 strikes as many of its players left the area in search of work.[172] This was despite the relative success of the first strike and the fact that the anthracite coalfield was less affected by the decline in coal exports than the rest of the Welsh coalfield.[173]

Similarly, the Schalke 04 football team was until 1924 dominated by miners.[174] Schalke 04 had only 90 members on the eve of the war, but after the conflict its membership surged to 1,000.[175] Although the Schalke team was regarded as politically neutral, other teams and sporting associations in the Ruhr were linked to certain political parties.[176] The links between sport and socialist politics were more marked in the Ruhr than in South Wales. In fact, British government reports argued

that 'the British working man's innate love of sport is the healthiest antidote to extremist teaching.'[177] Although sports associations in the Ruhr were not simply regarded as recruitment schools for the parties, during the 1920s some associations became the foci for power struggles between Communists and Social Democrats.[178] Especially after the dissolution of the Union, the Communists were reported as 'gouging' Social democratic organisations from within.[179] However, in general, there was a trend towards the commercialisation of leisure that increasingly created a mass culture.[180]

In South Wales the long strikes also provided ample leisure time for the establishment of workers' cricket and other sport teams.[181] For some 'sport' became a means of survival. Rees Davies and his brothers, for example, worked as boxers to supplement their income.[182] In fact the miners adopted a wide variety of survival techniques. During the 1926 strike the Social and Entertainment Committee of the Garw Valley put on 130 free concerts, fourteen road races, seven whist drives, ten dances, two gymnastic displays, eight boxing tournaments, five drama performances and a carnival.[183] Soup kitchens, fund-raising events, stealing from the workplace, looting of shops and the working of outcrop coal, all formed part of the miners' repertoire of self-help.[184] Despite similarities in the ways the miners tried to make ends meet during the industrial disputes of the 1920s, the actual impact of those strikes upon the communities differed markedly. Francis and Smith have argued that the collective effort of the 1926 strike in particular helped create an alternative society within the coalfield.[185] Whether this is the case or not, it seems clear that the industrial defeat led the miners to turn increasingly to Labour to satisfy their interests. Other historians have stressed how the labour movement captured positions of authority from the pre-war elite. Gilbert, therefore, sees the local miners' lodge and Labour Party as edging out the influence of the chapels and employers in Ynysybwl.[186] Similarly, the socialist Query Club in Tredegar is depicted as waging a concerted campaign to establish control of local institutions.[187] Charlie Gibbons' resolution that 'appeals from Industrial, Political and educational bodies will not be considered or entertained unless such bodies are exclusively controlled by the workers',[188] might represent an extreme, but it does illustrate the labour movement's commitment to extending its influence independent of other groups. It would appear that, despite the fragmentation on the industrial level through the re-emergence of craft unionism, on the political level a new Labour hegemony was reinforced.

In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the strikes of 1919 and 1920 and the Ruhrkampf of 1920 were not a cohesive experience and led to increased political and union fragmentation. The British strikes of 1921 and 1926 occurred under Coalition and Tory governments respectively, leaving Labour's political reputation relatively untainted and allowing its representatives to play a supportive role to the miners.[189] The 1919/20 strikes and the Ruhrkampf of 1920, however, occurred under a Government headed by the SPD, the self-proclaimed workers' party. The bitterness aroused by the use of troops and *Freikorps* during these disputes further fractured the labour movement in the region and reinforced the formation of a Communist milieu. The Union and the formation of Communist organisations to rival those of the SPD underpinned this milieu. Admittedly, in 1924 the KPD, following Comintern instructions, ordered Communists to join existing unions rather than establish radical alternatives and the subsequent break with the syndicalist-communist Union led to the decline of that organisation. In contrast to South Wales, where industrial events reinforced Labour's position, in the Ruhr political events would seem to have actually lessened the fractured nature of the union movement. However, this proved short-lived and in 1928 the idea of Communist unions was revived in the form of the *Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition* (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition, RGO).[190]

This section has tried to highlight the fragmented lifeworld the Ruhr miners as opposed to a greater continuity in South Wales. In the pit, mechanisation changed the nature of work in the Ruhr, while the work of the hewers was less affected in South Wales. While sporting teams continued to provide a focus for the community in the latter region, in the former different political groups contested them. The older milieux that characterised the Ruhr may have begun to break down in the 1920s, but their force was far from spent. And new alignments and divisions were also appearing in the Ruhr. For example, social divisions opened up between the unemployed and those still in work. The opposite was true of South Wales, where the common experience of unemployment and long industrial disputes lessened the stigma that had been attached to claiming relief before the war. Finally, the erosion of the milieux may suggest that a more 'fluid' civil society was beginning to appear, but new social alignments underpinned different political movements. The Communists in the Ruhr were overwhelmingly unemployed, while those in South Wales could find a niche in the Labour Party.

Politics

The changed electoral system in Germany and the extended franchise in Britain opened up new opportunities for the political parties in the coalfield. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 expanded the British electorate to include many more workers. There has been debate on the implications of electoral reform for the fortunes of the Labour.[191] Whichever position is adopted it is clear the parties were now chasing more votes. In Germany reform was more wide-ranging. Adult suffrage was introduced for the over 20s, the three-class system abolished and a proportional representation list system introduced.

An overview of the political developments in the two regions illustrates a continuation in the trends of homogenisation and fragmentation. In South Wales, the Labour Party was eventually able to build on its pre-war successes in local government and usurp the Liberal dominance, transforming the mining constituencies of South Wales into a Labour stronghold. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the socialist labour movement was split. Initially the SPD were successful in winning almost forty percent of the vote, while the USPD could only manage four percent. By the 1920 Reichstag election, however, the SPD vote had collapsed; they were overtaken by the USPD and faced a new challenge from the KPD, which had now decided to participate in elections. By the 1924 elections the USPD had dwindled to a splinter party, the majority of its moderate members rejoining the SPD, its radicals the KPD.

Labour's success in the South Wales mining constituencies was partly based on advances it made both in terms of organisation and prestige during the war. The confidence of the SWMF and the revitalised TLCs provided a sound basis for Labour to expand its political activity, although appeals were made to expand its organisational base in other directions. William Harris appealed for the formation of local Labour Parties and better organisation among women.[192] To this effect the *Colliery Workers' Magazine*, established by the SWMF in 1923, carried a regular women's column that sought to involve them in both industrial and political concerns. Often written by Elizabeth Andrews, the Labour Party's Women's Organiser in Wales, the column focused on themes that were regarded as having a special salience for women, such as housing and pithead baths.[193] Thus while seeking to involve women the magazine also revealed a gendered conception of their role, one that revolved around domestic and welfare concerns. Despite his appeal Harris too

revealed a somewhat chauvinist view of women's meetings. He complained 'in the smaller villages there is a tendency to depend too much on one or two to carry on the work, and if they are absent from the meetings, the whole atmosphere becomes too much of the "gossipy" character, whilst if they meet jointly with men, this weakness does not exist.'[194]

Despite Labour's organisational advances victory was not guaranteed. In Ammanford, for example, the local TLC decided to field six candidates in the local elections, four of whom were employed in the mines, for the 1919 UDC elections. All six were defeated. At the post-mortem the TLC decided it had made a tactical blunder in putting up candidates for every seat.[195] It was another two years before Labour finally captured the Ammanford UDC.[196] On the other hand, Labour controlled the nearby Cwmamman UDC from 1919.[197] The labour movement's dominance was such that one contributor to the *Amman Valley Chronicle* complained during the 1925 anthracite strike that 'the attitude of the Cwmamman Urban District Council of late towards matters that are anti-Labour prompts one to ask whether the local Trades and Labour Councils is not ruling the destiny of the area.'[198] Complaints over Labour dominance were also raised in Maesteg. The Independents on the UDC repeatedly accused Labour of using its dominant position to elect chairmen from their own ranks, while passing over non-Labour individuals with more experience. John Evans, the Labour chairman, was castigated as an 'ambassador of Lenin' and of using the 'methods of Russia'.[199]

Apart from the continued strength of Liberalism on some local authorities in 1919 and 1920 there was also some resistance to Labour politics from within the labour movement. Die-hard syndicalists like Charlie Gibbons opposed political action as an unwelcome diversion. In 1922 Gibbons claimed the 'last election cost £100 to this lodge. It was time to turn our attention to the Industrial field, and the money of the organisation should be used on the industrial field. The Miners Organisation had failed to give us a bread and cheese basis of life, and if we had failed to force the Government, what hopes had Local Authorities to do so.' That Noah Tromans, Gibbons' main opponent in the Ferndale lodge, was successful in his counter resolution by 35 votes to 15 reflects the importance attached to political action, especially after the SWMF's first heavy post-war defeat.[200]

Local elections in the Ruhr, on the other hand, reflected the fragmentation of the socialist movement after 1919. In 1919 the SPD formed the second largest party,

just behind the Centre, in the Bochum city elections. By 1924 the SPD had slipped into joint third place behind the Centre and KPD, although it was able to regain a lead over the Communists by 1926 (see table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Results of the elections to the Bochum city council 1919-1926

Party	March 1919		May 1924		June 1926	
	% votes	Seats	% votes	Seats	% votes	Seats
Centre	37.6	25	27.3	15	27.7	18
SPD	35.4	24	13.2	7	22.4	14
Bürgerliche Parteien	22.6	15	27.4	13	22.5	13
KPD			23.7	13		9
Polish Party	4.4	2			14.2	
Other			8.4	3	13.2	6

Source: Gerhard Stein, Die Wahlen zum Stadtparlament, zum Preussischen Landtag und zum Reichstag in der Stadt Bochum in den Jahren 1924 bis 1933, Bochum, July 1970, pp. 15 and 22.

At the parliamentary level Labour successfully dominated the majority of the mining constituencies from 1918. However, Pontypridd, Neath and Merthyr Tydfil initially fell to Coalition Liberal candidates, while Aberdare re-elected former radical Charles Stanton. Stanton, who had joined the National Democratic Party in 1916, largely based his appeal on a patriotic, anti-Bolshevik basis and sought to mobilise ex-servicemen. Such support was transitory and, following the decline of the British Workers' League, Stanton was forced to rely on Conservative support. This proved inadequate to secure his re-election in 1922 and the Labour candidate George Hall defeated him.[201] Since the miners formed a majority, or at least a substantial part, of the electorate in the constituencies shown in table 4.7, it is reasonable to assume that most gave their vote to Labour, although some continued to support the Liberals and the Conservatives at all electoral levels.[202]

Table 4.7: Seats contested by Labour, 1918-1924: Percentage of Labour vote in South Wales mining and semi-mining constituencies.

	1918	1922	1923	1924
Caerphilly	54.8	57.2	58.7	59
Gower	54.8	54.2	59.1	57.2
Neath	35.2*	59.5	62.3	Unopposed
Ogmore	Unopposed	55.8	Unopposed	Unopposed
Pontypridd	42.8*	47.2	54.9	55.9
Aberdare	21.4*	57.2	58.2	61.6
Merthyr Tydfil	47.3*	53	60.1	59.8
Rhondda East	Unopposed	55	71.9	Unopposed
Rhondda West	Unopposed	62.1	65.4	Unopposed
Abertillery	Unopposed	Unopposed	Unopposed	Unopposed
Bedwellty	53.6	63	67.6	Unopposed
Ebbw Vale	Unopposed	65.4	65.6	Unopposed
Pontypool	39.0	40.6	50.6	52.6

Source: D. Tanner, 'The Pattern of Labour Politics' in Tanner, Williams and Hopkin (eds.), *Labour*, p. 119. * Labour lost these elections.

Due to the plurality of parties in the Ruhr and the more diverse socio-economic structure of the region it is much more difficult to draw direct links between the miners and a particular party. Some contemporaries and historians seem to suggest that the miners were well represented among left-wing organisations.[203] Hans Spethmann, for example, sees the miners as particularly involved with the Ruhr Red Army.[204] This approach is supported by Tschirbs, who sees the 80,000 strong force as being predominantly made up of miners.[205] Others, however, have questioned the miners' involvement.[206] Of the sixteen leaders that Lucas mentions in his study of the Army only two are described as miners.[207] Fragmentary evidence from court-martials following the conflict reveals that in Recklinghausen 50 out of 67 prisoners were described as *Bergmann*, one as *Steiger*. In Essen, on the other hand, miners made up only 45 out of 182 court-martialled prisoners, although they seemed to form the single largest occupational group.[208] The different proportion of miners, 76 percent against 25, probably reflects the greater occupational diversity in Essen as opposed to Recklinghausen. It seems, therefore, that miners were not over-represented among the Army. Moreover, participation in the Army does not automatically equate with political radicalism and could be partly viewed as a defensive reaction to the perceived threat posed by the *Freikorps* and Reichswehr troops.

There is some impressionistic evidence that points to wider KPD support from the miners. Stenbock-Fermor met several committed Communists in the mine, but these were the exception rather than the rule. He found the miners generally apathetic

and believed they harboured a strong distrust of 'intellectuals', a term which encompassed the KPD leadership. He believed that the miners supported the KPD as the lesser of other evils. Interestingly, he also hints at a generational difference among the workforce, for while he sees the Communists as the most strongly supported group, some of the older workers retained SPD sympathies.[209] Other evidence suggests that the miners, while an important source of Communist support, were not overly represented among activists. Only in three areas were Communist city councillors predominantly miners (see 4.8). Furthermore, reports on the strength of KPD cells in the mines suggest that they were in decline in 1924 (see table 4.9).

Table 4.8: Communist Members of City Councils

City Council	1924	Miners	1926	Miners	Members
Bochum	13	1	9	3	53/60*
Dortmund	20/13	4/2			68
Duisburg	14	1			63
Essen	20	5			78
Gelsenkirchen	20	5			58
Herne	12	3			44
Mülheim	12	1			51
Oberhausen	11	4			48
Recklinghausen	10	7	7	3	44/47*
Wanne-Eickel	11	8			47
Wattenscheid	7	7	6	5	28/44*

Source: Beatrix Herlemann, Die kommunalpolitik Aktivitäten der KPD im Ruhrgebiet, 1914-33, Ph.D, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Appendix. Not all cities had elections in 1926. * The councils were expanded for the 1926 elections.

Table 4.9: Size of Communist Cells in some mines in the Gelsenkirchen Area

Mines	Workforce	Size of KPD cell
Stinnes 3/4	2,500	70
Bismarck 3/4	3,100	30
Dahlbsuch 2/5	2,500	15
Dahlbusch 3/4	2,200	15
Brassert	2,800	100
Bergmannsglück	4,200	50

Source: Oberpräsident to Minister des Innern, 10 October 1924, STAD 16910.

Of the thirty-eight shafts in the Gelsenkirchen area only six were reported to have KPD cells. Membership in the area had fallen from 1,876 to 558, while in Buer it had declined from 1,850 in 1923 to 300 in 1924. Membership in Bochum had shrunk from 1,200 in May 1923 to 450 in 1924. The police report concluded that the decline in KPD support was due to fear of the police and French occupation authorities.[210]

The report also reveals some of the difficulties the KPD had to operate under. The party's main newspaper in the region the *Ruhr-Echo* was periodically banned,

while demonstrations were broken up and leaders arrested and victimised. As a result the party became increasingly isolated from the workplace and took its activities on to the streets. Moreover, the party's basis of support came increasingly from the unemployed.[211] In fact, the KPD made efforts to organise the unemployed.[212] A police report on a meeting of the Essen KPD recorded the leadership's view that 'the factories are controlled not by the Communists, but the Social Democrats and the Centre. The majority of the membership is at the moment unemployed; the KPD is actually the party of the unemployed.' Its membership stood at 7,600, but out of 29,230 miners in the area only 339 were KPD members.[213]

Table 4.10 reveals that the decline in the SPD vote very roughly equalled the increase in the USPD/KPD vote. The Centre's votes, on the other hand, remained fairly even between 1919 and 1924. Admittedly, this is a somewhat crude analysis as it does not account for first time voters, nor does it provide a breakdown of votes by occupation. It would appear that the KPD did draw a substantial current of support from the miners which had previously voted SPD, but it is also clear that the SPD maintained a core of support and that, by the second election in 1924, was beginning to recover some ground (see table 4.10).

Table 4.10: Results of Reichstag elections in the Ruhr, 1919-1924

	1919	1920	1924	1924
Participation	86.1	81.8	79.5	78.5
SPD	37.2	14.7	11.3	17.4
USPD	4.1	17.7	1	0.5
KPD		3.7	21	12.8
Centre	24.4	23.3	19.6	21.6
Bürgerliche Parteien*	20.1	18.4	17.9	21.5
NSDAP			2.1	1

Source: Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 30. Under Bürgerliche Parteien Jäger includes the DNVP, DVP, DDP, WP and CSVD.

While the KPD represented a formidable challenge to the SPD, the Communists in South Wales did not become a major challenge to Labour. Several reasons can be cited for this difference. First, divisions between pro- and anti-war figures in the South Wales labour movement did not have the same degree of acrimony as they did in the Ruhr and did not linger on into the 1920s. Morgan Jones, for example, had served eighteen months as a conscientious objector during the war, yet became Labour MP for Caerphilly in 1921 and held the seat until his death in 1939.[214] Secondly, although South Wales certainly experienced a certain degree of

violence during the 1920s it was not comparable to the armed conflict in the Ruhr. Violence in South Wales occurred not between rival political groups, but was directed against the blacklegs who broke the norms of the labour movement. The small Communist minority participated in the strike of 1921 and 1926 alongside their Labour counterparts. The psychological gulf that emerged between the SPD and KPD as a result of political violence was avoided in South Wales. Third, Communists in South Wales did not seek to establish counter-organisations that posed a direct threat to the SWMF and Labour Party. Arthur Horner remembered that 'the Communist Party was never, in my mind, a breakaway from either the Trade Union Movement or the Labour Party. In the early years, Communists remained members of the Labour Party. The Party was designed as a spearhead of the working class, with a Marxist philosophy and a readiness to defend at all times the real interests of the working class.'[215] The powerful position of the SWMF immediately after the war made the notion of a separate union movement a non-starter. Instead, like the syndicalists in the pre-war movement, the communist activists in South Wales sought to work through the existing labour organisations.

The extent to which the Welsh Communists remained rooted within the traditions of the pre-war labour movement can be exaggerated. Tension between more moderate and radical activists on both the industrial and political level should not be overlooked. An example of this tension can be seen in Hartshorn's resignation due to 'an atmosphere of hate and suspicion which has been created against leaders who believe in steady revolutionary reform.'[216] Following the 1918 election he was also at pains to distinguish Labour from Communist. He complained about the manner in which the party had been labelled Bolshevik. This was 'a charge so sweeping as that brings within its effects not only the few men who are preaching revolution, but the far greater number of sober Labour leaders.'[217] Tom Richards, SWMF Secretary, expressed a similar view when he criticised Communist policy, 'you can destroy capitalism only by destroying the people of this country. When we have sense enough to take hold of the reins of government of this country, depend upon it there will be no need to shout class warfare or advocate revolution.'[218]

Yet, despite these tensions, the most striking aspect of the Communists' relationship with Labour, in comparison to the KPD and the SPD, is the degree of openness. As will be shown the *Colliery Workers' Magazine* provided a forum both

for those who opposed and supported Communist ideas. Such reasoned debate was more difficult in the acrimonious atmosphere in the Ruhr.

Summary

The Great War accentuated the pre-war trends visible in political and industrial developments in South Wales and the Ruhr in the period 1919 to 1926. First, there was greater continuity in the lifeworld of the Welsh miners than in that of the Ruhr miners. Secondly, despite an observable erosion of the old milieux that characterised Wilhelmine society, the emergence of new social divisions meant that civil society in the Ruhr remained comparatively more segmented than in South Wales.

In the terms of trade unionism, the strength of the SWMF coupled with the importance of Welsh steam coal for the war effort gave the union a superior position in its negotiations with employers. When employers sought to resist wage increases the Government interfered to the benefit of the union. As a result the union was able to expand its membership and absorb the smaller craft unions in the industry. The SWMF came out of the war with an overwhelming sense of confidence, which was expressed by its support for nationalisation. By the end of 1922 this confidence severely dented and the position of the SWMF began to deteriorate as the craft unions broke away. It suffered a more debilitating blow at the end of the 1926 strike with the formation of the South Wales Miners' Industrial Union.

However, even the defeats the SWMF suffered in 1921 and 1926, and the consequent unemployment and hardship, added to the synchronous nature of the lifeworld of the Welsh miners. The commonality of these experiences generally helped to draw the mining communities closer together. Moreover, there was greater continuity in the way the Welsh miner experienced work. Although the introduction of conveyors affected the hauliers, the hewers' small working groups were largely untouched.

Unlike the SWMF the mining unions in the Ruhr were unable to use the war to expand their influence and the ordinary miners were subject to a far greater degree of deskilling through mechanisation. The employers were able to use the argument that the mining unions did not represent the whole of the workforce. The structure of the mining workforce in the Ruhr also underwent substantial change during the war. The employment of female, youth, foreign and POW labour further undermined trade

union attempts to exert influence over the employers and the state. Since the unions were unable to protect their members' interests, and the majority of miners were not members anyway, the workers turned to short-lived strikes to force higher wages and better rations from management. The strikes, through their use of workforce meetings and direct democracy, tapped into an older tradition of miners' protest and were particularly amenable to syndicalist tactics. The flood of young workers into the area immediately after the war further strengthened the appeal of direct action. Thus, while Alter Verband and Gewerkverein drew closer together, the miners' movement was split on the left by the emergence of syndicalist-communist unions. Strikes were generally divisive affairs that set one group of miners against another (or one generation against another). Finally, inter-union dialogue was undermined by the myriad, competing interpretations of socialisation. By 1924 the threat posed by these radical organisations had changed. While rationalisation and stabilisation weakened the syndicalists, the KPD tried to take their struggle against the Social Democrats into the Free Trade Unions in 1924.

On the political level, the war strengthened Labour in the mining constituencies. Through their efforts on local authorities and on the TLCs Labour was able to demonstrate its ability to see to the needs of the working class and support their interests. The party also benefited from the growing strength of the SWMF and the close links between the two was mutually beneficial. Labour also escaped an enduring schism between pro- and anti-war camps. Indicative of the comparatively fluid civil society in South Wales is the relationship between the Communists and Labour. For most of this period double membership was tolerated. Although there were tensions between Labour and the small groups of Communist activists, both groups worked together during the strikes. The community endeavour of these strikes coupled with the decline or incorporation of the older elite based on the chapel, allowed a strongly pro-Labour political culture to emerge in the mining valleys.

This toleration of multiple group membership is in sharp contrast to the Ruhr. In Germany the war caused an enduring and acrimonious split in the SPD. The war was a much more controversial issue for the SPD than for the Labour Party and the pretence that it was a defensive conflict became increasingly hard to sustain after the defeat of Russia. The comparatively more segmented nature of civil society and the leadership's desire to impose harmony on the organisation meant that the SPD found it more difficult to tolerate plural discourses within its own organisation. An example

of this was the party's decision to shut down social-democratic papers, which began to criticise the war effort. The dissidents were forced to split from the SPD if they were to air their own discourse. Although many of the USPD eventually rejoined the SPD, the radical majority filled the KPD ranks. For this group memories of the Revolution were raw and immediate and co-operation with the SPD scarcely an option. The KPD sought to create, or capture organisations, to create its own milieu to rival those of the SPD and the Centre. Part of the KPD strength came from the older Polish milieu, which was increasingly dividing into nationalist and socialist camps, despite the emigration of many Polish workers. In the 1920s the KPD became increasingly a party of the unemployed and streets rather than the workforce, but the process of rationalisation in the mines provided a large potential electorate. As Weitz argues, a consequence of increasing unemployment was a social-cultural division in the German working class. Unemployment was a collective experience in South Wales and served to strengthen Labour, but in the Ruhr it further divided the German miners. Divisions in the Ruhr stretched across the social, cultural and political, strengthening splits in each and in turn being strengthened. By contrast, in South Wales, the collective experience of the miners in each area was mutually reinforcing.

These experiences, however, had to be interpreted and reinforced by the trade unions and the political parties. The identities they created were crucial as attempts to interpret the events around them. Issues such as nationalisation, socialisation, national identity and class were the key concepts that made up the stuff of those identities.

---

[1] Carl Severing, *1919 - 1920: Im Wetter und Watterwinkel. Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen des Saatsministers A. D. Carl Severing, ehemaligen Reichs und Staatsminister in Befehlsbereich des VII Armeekorps*, Bielefeld, Greven, 1927, p. 1927.
[2] Revd. J Vyrnwy Morgan, *The War and Wales*, London, Chapman and Hall Ltd, 1916, p. 291.
[3] *WM* 7 August 1914.
[4] *SWDN* 8 August 1914.
[5] See Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War*, London, Penguin, 1998, pp. 174-212 and John Horne, 'Labor and Labor Movements in World War 1', in Jay Winter, Geoffrey Parker and Mary R. Habeck, *The Great War and the Twentieth Century*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 188.
[6] *SWDN* 7 August 1914.
[7] *WZ* 1 August 1914.
[8] Ibid, 3 August 1914.
[9] The SWMF established a levy on its members to support the unemployed, while the Alter Verband claimed to have giving out 1 million in support of members' families. See *SWDN* 25 August 1914 and *BZ* 29 May 1915.
[10] *SWDN* 8 August 1914.
[11] *Vb* 7 August 1914; *T* 2 August 1914.
[12] *SWDN* 7 August 1914. See also Anthony Mor-O'Brien, 'Keir Hardie, C. B. Stanton, and the First World War', *Llafur*, 4, 3, 1986, pp. 31-42.

[13] Gerald D. Feldman, *Army, Industry and Labour in Germany 1914-1918*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 28.
[14] Geary, 'bourgeoisie', pp. 149-51.
[15] Weitz, Conflict, p. 68
[16] *BZ* 12 December 1914.
[17] Polizeiverwaltung Gerthe to Landrat Bochum, 8 November 1915, STB, LA 1323
[18] Polizei Präsident Bochum to Oberbergamt, 13 November 1917, STAM OBA 1792
[19] Hermann Vogelsang, *Der Weltkrieg: Deutschlands Bergarbeiter im Kriege*, Essen, Sekretariat Sozialer Studentenarbeit, 1917.
[20] Ferguson, *War*, pp. 248-81.
[21] Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria cited in Feldman, *Army*, p. 32.
[22] Ibid, pp. 31-34.
[23] G. D. H. Cole, *Labour in Coal Mining Industry, 1914-1921*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923, p. 16.
[24] Barry Supple, *The History of the British Coal Industry 1913-1946: The Political Economy of Decline*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 48.
[25] Maximillian Stanislau Goldberg, Adult Education Study, SWML, AUD 347, p. 3.
[26] Tampke, *Ruhr*, p. 34.
[27] Ferguson, *War*, p. 267
[28] Werksgeschichte - Gewerkschaft des Steinkohlenbergwerks vereinigte Helene & Amalie während des Krieges und der Revolution bis zur Reichsmark, 1914-1924, pp. 6-13, BBA Bestand 20 565.
[29] Feldman, *Army*, p. 68.
[30] See Arthur Marwick, *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1991; Cole, *Labour*; Richard Redmayne, *The British Coal-Mining Industry During the War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923; Feldman, *Army*; Hans Spethmann, *Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau. Aus seiner Geschichte von Kriegsanfang bis zum Franzosenabmarchen 1914-1925. Bd. 1: Aufstand und Ausstand vor und nach dem Kapp-Putsch bis zur Ruhrbesetzung*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1929.
[31] Redmayne, *Industry*, p. 13
[32] Ibid, p. 16 and p. 19.
[33] *WM* 20 March 1915.
[34] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 2, pp. 23-84.
[35] J. L. Williams, Bedlinog Community Study, SWML, AUD 396, p. 15.
[36] Runciman to F. Davis, 21 July 1915, NLW, MSWCOA records, MG 13.
[37] See *WM* 3 June 1916 for owners' objection. See also Cole, *Labour*, pp. 44-5.
[38] Graeme Holmes, 'The First World War and Government Coal Control', in Barber and Williams (eds.), *Wales*, pp. 206-21.
[39] Jim Evans, Abercraf Community Study, SWML, AUD 221, p. 2.
[40] *BZ* 20 February 1915.
[41] *Arbeiterzeitung* 18 February 1915, clipping STAM OBA 1855.
[42] Regierungspräsident Arnsberg to Oberbergamt, 1 December 1914, STAM OBA 1814
[43] Feldman, *Army*, pp. 84 –5.
[44] *BZ* 10 August 1916 and 7 October 1916.
[45] Ibid, 11 August 1917.
[46] Hauptvorstand des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, *Denkschrift über die Ursachen der Arbeits-Einstellungen in Ruhrkohlenbergbau*, Essen, 1917, p30.
[47] Ibid, 27 March 1915.
[48] Oberbergamt to Minister for Trade and Industry, 23 February 1918, STAM OBA 1792
[49] Oberbergamt to Minister für Handel und Gewerbe, 23 February 1918, STAM OBA 1792.
[50] Zechenverband to Oberbergamt, 10 August 1910, STAM OBA 1814.
[51] Bergbauverein to Reichskommissar für Kohlenverteilung, 20 February 1918, STAM OBA 1159
[52] Ibid, 19 December 1918, STAM OBA 1160
[53] Workforce of the Schachtanlagen Wehofen 1 May 1917 and Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser 3/7 and Rönsberghof, June 1917, STAM OBA 1159.
[54] Ibid.
[55] See Feldman, *Army*, Ch. 4 for the full story of the laws' passage. See pp. 535-41 for the full draft of the law.
[56] *BZ* 9 December 1916.
[57] *BZ* 7 April 1917.
[58] Hartewig, *Jahrzehnt*, p. 47.

[59] Verband des Bergarbeiter Deutschlands to Oberbergamt, 17 November 1916, STAM OBA 1853.
[60] Essen 3 Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 4 December 1916, ibid.
[61] Ferguson, *Pity*, pp. 276-81
[62] Hauptvorstand, *Denkschrift*.
[63] Jürgen Reulecke, 'Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Arbeiterbewegung im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet', in Reulecke (ed.), *Arbeiterbewegung*, pp. 205-39.
[64] Polizei Präsident Bochum to Oberbergamt, 13 November 1917, STAM OBA 1792; Zechenverband, 22 August 1918, BBA Bestand 20 563.
[65] Zeche Helene und Amalie reported that seventy-percent of its striking workforce was organised and that the strike was led by a works' committee and Alter Verband member, Herzfeld. Zeche Helene und Amalie to Zechenverband, 26 August 1918, BBA Bestand 20 563.
[66] The *SWDN* reported on the 20 December 1917 that a large but peaceful crowd had broken shop windows by sheer weight of numbers, while on the 17 January 1918 it was reported crowds had raided shops in Tonypandy.
[67] José Harris, "Bureaucrats and Businessmen in British Food Control, 1916-19" in Kathleen Burk (ed.), *War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, p. 141.
[68] See article by Hartshorn in *SWDN* 29 December 1917.
[69] *SWDN* 14 January 1918.
[70] Eddie May, A Question of Control: Social and Industrial Relations in the South Wales Coalfield and the Crisis of Post-War Reconstruction, (University of Wales Ph.D.), 1995, pp. 108-41.
[71] S. E. Demont, Tredegar and Aneurin Bevan: A Society and its Political Articulation, 1890-1929, (University of Wales Ph.D.), 1990, Ch. 3.
[72] *LV* 26 January 1918.
[73] *AVC* 5 July 1917.
[74] Ibid, 2 May 1918
[75] Reulecke, 'Weltkrieg', p. 229.
[76] Tampke, *Ruhr*, p. 54.
[77] Oberbürgermeister to Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, 7 August 1916, STAD 15984.
[78] See Ibid, p. 55 and Lützenkirchen, *Verein*, p. 99.
[79] Inge Marßolek, 'Sozialdemokratie und Revolution im östlichen Ruhrgebiet: Dortmund unter der Herrschaft des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrates', in Reinhard Rürup, *Arbeiter und Soldatenräte im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet*, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1975, p. 245.
[80] Goch, *Arbeiterbewegung*, pp. 187-90.
[81] *AVC* 8 November 1917.
[82] David Egan, 'The Swansea Conference of the British Council of Soldiers and Workers Delegates, July 1917: Reactions to the Russian Revolution of February 1917 and the Anti-War Movement in South Wales', *Llafur*, 1, 4, 1975, pp. 12-37.
[83] Ioan Matthews, 'James Griffiths and the First World War', unpublished paper, Llafur AGM 2001.
[84] Robert Griffiths, *S. O. Davies*, Gomer Press, 1983, pp. 36-8.
[85] Paul Davies, *A. J. Cook*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, pp. 21-32; idem, 'The Making of A. J. Cook: His Development within the South Wales Labour Movement, 1900-1924', *Llafur*, 2, 3, 1978, pp. 46-8.
[86] Erhard Lucas, *Märzrevolution 1920. Vom Generalstreik gegen den Militärputsch zum bewaffneten Arbeiteraufstand*, Frankfurt, Roter Stern, 1970, p. 23.
[87] Witten Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 22 October 1915, Essen 2 Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 23 October 1915 and Oberhausen Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 22 October 1915, STAM 1853.
[88] Rudolf Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik im Ruhrbergbau 1918-1933*, Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986, p. 32.
[89] Tenfelde, 'Strömungen', p. 223.
[90] Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik*, pp. 37-46.
[91] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 2, pp. 152-3
[92] Eddie May, 'Labour, capital and the State in the South Wales Coalfield 1912-1921: the case of Gwaun-cae-Gurwen', in Ian Blanchard (ed.), *New Directions in economic and social history*, Avonbridge, Newless Press, 1995, pp. 47-55.
[93] Tien-Lung Liu, *The Chameleon State: Global Culture and Policy Shifts in Britain and Germany, 1914-1933*, Oxford, Berghahn, 1999, p. 140.
[94] Liu, *State*, pp. 112-6.
[95] Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik*, pp. 232-40.

[96] Liu, *State*, pp. 89-90.
[97] See Erhard Lucas, *Zwei Formen von Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Frankfurt am Main, Roter Stern, 1976, pp. 160-81; Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik*, pp. 52-3; Spethmann, *Jahre*, vol. 1, pp. 132-72; Hartewig, *Jahrzehnt*, pp. 247-51.
[98] Karl Friederich Gesau, Syndikalismus in der Ruhrbergarbeiterschaft zu Beginn der Weimarer Republik, 1918-1925, Hausarbeit, Münster, 1983, pp. 135-43.
[99] Hartmut Rübner, *Freiheit und Brot. Die Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Anarchosyndikalismus*, Köln, Libertad Verlag, 1994, pp. Erhard Lucas, *Märzrevolution 1920. Vom Generalstreik gegen den Militärputsch zum bewaffneten Arbeiteraufstand*, Frankfurt, Roter Stern, 1970, p 58; Gesau, Syndikalismus, p. 182. The other organisations were the *Allgemeiner Arbeiter Verband, Allgemeine Bergarbeiter Union, Allgemeine Arbeiter Union Essen, Allgemeine Deutsche Bergarbeiter-Union (Düsseldorf)*.
[100] Hartewig, *Jahrzehnt*, p. 253.
[101] Gesau, Syndikalismus, Anhang, p. 121. The *Freie Arbeiter Union Deutschlands* (FAUD), of which the FAU and FVdG were a part, was founded following a conference in Berlin on the 27 and 30 December 1919, Rübner, *Freiheit*, p. 36.
[102] Bock, 'Anarchosyndicalism', p. 68.
[103] Ibid, p. 63.
[104] May, 'Labour', p. 55.
[105] *Freie Arbeiter Union, Organ der Schacht- und Betriebsorganisation der Hand- und Kopfarbeiter Deutschlands/Wirtschaftsbezirk Rheinland-Westfalen*, 15 September 1921; Oertzen, Betriebsräte, pp. 212-3; Rübner, *Freiheit*, p. 42.
[106] Gesau, Syndikalismus, Anhang, p. 123.
[107] Eric Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890-1990. From Popular Protests to Socialist State*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, p. 151.
[108] The six-hour shift placed the unions in a dilemma. They needed to maintain rank and file support, but were also under Government pressure to satisfy the demands of reconstruction. The course of negotiations that eventually led the unions to reject the concept is traced in Jochen Henze, *Sechsstundenschicht im Ruhrbergbau 1918-1920. Ursachen und Verlauf eines Arbeitszeitkonflikts*, Freiburg, Burg-Verlag, 1988, pp. 149-59. On the overtime agreement see Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik*, pp. 95-100.
[109] Bochum, 4 February 1920, STAM BüK 192.
[110] See tables 4.1 and 4.2.
[111] Gesau, Syndikalismus, pp. 176-7.
[112] Der Staatskommissar für die Überwachung der öffentliche Ordnung to Wehrkreiskommando VI, Münster, 16 March 1920, STAM BüK 324.
[113] Polizeiverwaltung Hamborn to Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, 9 May 1925, STAD 16932.
[114] Staatliche Berginspektion 3 to Staatliche Bergwerksdirektion, Recklinghausen, 7 September 1922, BBA Bestand 32, 4289.
[115] Zechen Helene und Amalie, 1919, BBA Bestand 20 563. For the course of the strike and negotiations see Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik*, pp. 60-5.
[116] *WVZ* 19 February 1919.
[117] Tampke, 'The Rise and Fall of the Essen Model, January-February 1919', *IWK*, 13, 2, p. 166.
[118] *WVZ* 10 January 1919.
[119] 62nd ordentliche Generalversammlung, Vbl, 28 June 1920.
[120] *GAZ* 15 January 1919.
[121] Ibid. pp. 160-72, Spethmann, *Jahre*, pp. 218-39.
[122] See Eddie May, 'Charles Stanton and the limits to "patriotic labour"', *WHR*, 18, 3, 1996, pp. 145-66, for the attitudes of the Llanhilleth and Fforchaman lodges.
[123] Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the UK, Cab 24/87 GT 8036, 21 August 1921.
[124] Ministry of Labour, Cab 24/86 GT 8000, 13 Aug 1919.
[125] *WM* 7 April 1920.
[126] Ministry of Labour, PRO Cab 24/94 CP 285, 10 Dec 1919.
[127] Ibid, PRO Cab 24/98 CP 686, 19 February 1920.
[128] Ibid, PRO Cab 24/94 CP 218, 26 Nov 1919.
[129] Minutes of Proceedings at a Meeting between Representatives of Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association and Representatives of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Colliery Enginemen, Stokers and Craftsmen's Association, 6 June 1919, NLW, MV274.
[130] Ibid, 16 February 1920, NLW, MV277, p. 3.

[131] Ibid, p. 6.
[132] *LV* 10 May 1919.
[133] Claude Stanfield, Local Labour Leader Study, SWML, AUD 205.
[134] Minutes of Proceedings at a meeting between Representatives of Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association and Representatives of the South Wales and Monmouthshire Mechanical and Surface Workers' Union, 27 November 1922, NLW, MV494, pp. 7-8.
[135] *LV* 17 September 1921.
[136] There were questions raised about whom the union actually represented. See ibid, 7 December 1921, NLW MV488 and 21 July 1922, NLW MV492.
[137] For examples of the campaign and resolutions against the Mechanical Union see *GG* 23 March 1923; Cambrian Lodge Minutes, 27 March and 8 May 1923, SWCA, MNA/NUM 1/2/20/A4; Oakdale Lodge Minutes, 12 September and 10 May 1921, SWCA, MNA/NUM L/59/1.
[138] *RD* 16 October 1925, SWCA, SC 453.
[139] Burghardt, *Mechanisierung*, pp. 253-5.
[140] Brüggemeier, *Leben*, p. 280.
[141] Burghardt, *Mechanisierung*, p. 289.
[142] *Wirtschaftlichen Nachrichten*, 28 May 1924, clipping, BBA 569.
[143] Graf Alexander Stenbock-Fermor, *Meine Erlebnisse als Bergarbeiter*, Stuttgart, J Engelhorns, 1928, pp. 44-5.
[144] Ogmore and Garw UDC Minutes, 18 October and 8 November 1918, GRO UG/OG 14.
[145] Coombes, *Hands*, p. 103.
[146] Trevor Boyns, 'Jigging and Shaking Technical Choice in the South Wales Coal Industry between the Wars', *WHR*, 17, 2, 1994, pp. 230-50.
[147] See Ch. 2 for Tenfelde's argument.
[148] Weitz, *Communism*, p. 121.
[149] Eric Hobsbawm, *Worlds of Labour. Further Studies in the History of Labour*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984, Ch. 13.
[150] James E. Cronin, *Labour and Society in Britain 1918-1979*, London, Batsford Academic and Educational, 1984, p. 82.
[151] Llanbradach Workmen's Hall, Minute Book, 7 October 1921, GRO D/D X 816.
[152] Ibid, 13 June 1923, GRO D/D X 816.
[153] Ronald J. Shearer, 'Shelter from the Storm: Politics, Production and the Housing Crisis in the Ruhr Coal Fields, 1918-24', *JCH*, 34, 1, 1999, pp. 30-1.
[154] Tenfelde, 'Strömungen', pp. 220-3. See also Tenfelde, 'Die Bergarbeiter, ihre Gewerkschaften und der Kapp-Putsch', in Johannes Gorlas and Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Ruhrkampf 1920*, Essen, Klartext, 1986, pp. 45-8.
[155] Lucas, *Zwei*, pp. 280-1. Remscheid is a city outside the Ruhr, whose history stretches back to the Middle Ages.
[156] Dortmund 1 Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 14 January 1919 and Recklinghausen East Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 11 January 1919, STAM OBA 1160.
[157] Dortmund 3 Bergamt to OBA, 3 June 1919, STAM OBA 1795.
[158] Hamm Bergamt to OBA, 3 June 1919, STAM OBA 1795.
[159] Kleßmann, *Bergarbeiter*, pp. 116-21.
[160] Recklinghausen Ost Bergamt to Oberbergamt, 3 June 1919, STAM OBA 1795.
[161] Polizeidirektor Bochum to Landrat Bochum, 7 May 1922, STAB LA 1315.
[162] Kleßmann, Bergarbeiter, p. 191.
[163] See reports on various meetings of the Polnische Arbeiterpartei in STAM Reg. Arnsberg 14054.
[164] Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 154.
[165] Brüggemeier, "Volle", pp. 172-3.
[166] Deian Hopkin, 'Social Reactions to Economic Change', in Herbert and Jones, *Wales Between the Wars*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, pp. 53-5.
[167] Pope, *Jerusalem*, pp. 224-5.
[168] Henry Lewis, Abercraf Community Study, SWML AUD 201.
[169] Ibid, pp. 241-9.
[170] Bert Hogenkamp, 'Miners' Cinemas in South Wales in the 1920s and 1930s', *Llafur*, 4, 2, 1985, p. 65. Peter Stead, 'Wales and Film', in Herbert and Jones (eds.), *Wales between the Wars*, p. 161.
[171] Martin Johnes, That Other Game: A Social History of Soccer in South Wales, c1906-1939, University of Wales, Cardiff, PhD, 1998, p. 228.

[172] Ammanford Rugby Club, Sixty Years of Rugby 1881-1947: Ammanford R. F. C. Diamond Jubilee, 1947, p. 29.
[173] Hywel Francis, 'The Anthracite Strike and the Disturbances of 1925', *Llafur*, 1, 2, 1973, pp. 53-66; Church and Outram, *Strikes*, pp. 122-7.
[174] Siegfried Gehrmann, 'Fußball in einer Industrieregion. Das Beispiel F. C. Schalke 04', in Reulecke and Weber (eds.), *Fabrik*, p. 385.
[175] Abrams, *Culture*, p. 171.
[176] Gehrmann, 'Fußball', pp. 397-8.
[177] Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the UK, 25 September 1919, PRO Cab 24/89 GT8228.
[178] Volker Schmidtchen, 'Arbeitersport - Erziehung zum sozialistischen Menschen? Leitwiese und Jugendarbeit in zwei Ruhrgebietsvereinen in der Weimarer Republik', Jürgen and Weber (eds.), *Fabrik*, pp. 345-76.
[179] Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Minister des Innern, 11 February 1925, STAD 16910.
[180] Abrams, *Culture*, p. 171.
[181] Coombes, *Hands*, pp. 144-7; *AVC* 2 June 1921.
[182] Rees Davies, Abercraf Community Study, SMWL, AUD 207.
[183] *GG* 19 November 1926.
[184] For the various forms of protest and survival in the Ruhr see Hartewig, *Jahrzehnt*, pp. 215-76. Looting of shops was more a feature of the turbulent Ruhr. In Essen, for example, miners raided the city breeding pens, Oberbürgermeister Essen to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 1 October 1923, STAD 16845. See other examples in Hans Spethmanns' three-volume work, *Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau. Aus seiner Geschichte von Kriegsanfang bis zum Franzosenabmarchen 1914-1925*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1929/30 and Stenbock-Fermor, *Erlebnisse*. The working of outcrop coal seems to have more prevalent of South Wales, probably due to its particular geology. However, it was not always looked up favourably by strike leaders. See Aneurin Bevan's robust reaction in Michael Foot, *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography 1897-1945*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1962, p. 73. Organised entertainment and arrangement of alternate work during the strikes was widely reported in the press. See, for example, *AVC* 9 June and 16 June1921 respectively.
[185] Francis and Smith, *Fed*, pp. 54-69.
[186] Gilbert, *Class*.
[187] Foot, *Bevan*, pp. 50-62.
[188] Ferndale Lodge Minutes, 4 June 1920, SWCC MNA/NUM L/33/A2.
[189] Relatively because the actions of some labour leaders, such as the miners' leader Frank Hodges and railwaymens' leader J. H. Thomas, were vilified for their roles in the 1921 and 1926 strikes.
[190] Weitz, *Communism*, pp. 152-3.
[191] Ross McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, Ch. 3. Duncan Tanner, 'The Parliamentary Electoral System, the "Fourth" Reform Act and the Rise of Labour in England and Wales', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 1983, pp. 205-19.
[192] *CWM* January 1923, pp. 9-10.
[193] See ibid, March 1923 and September 1923.
[194] Ibid, January 1923, p. 10.
[195] *CJ* 20 February 1920; Ammanford, UDC Minutes, 7 April 1919, CCRO.
[196] *AVC* 7 April 1921; Ammanford UDC Minutes, 5 April 1921, CCRO.
[197] Cwmamman UDC Minutes, 7 April 1919, CCRO.
[198] *AVC* 3 September 1925.
[199] *GG* 20 April 1923. See also *GG* 28 April 1922 and 2 May 1924.
[200] Ferndale Lodge Minutes, 21 February 1922, SWCC MNA/NUM L/33/A4.
[201] May, 'Charles Stanton', pp. 145-66.
[202] See Michael Lieven, 'A fractured working-class consciousness? The case of the Lady Windsor Colliery Lodge', *WHR* (forthcoming).
[203] DDR historian Otto Hennicke describes the political breakdown of the Ruhr Red Army as KPD 30.9%, USPD 58.4% and SPD 10.7%. Hennicke, *Die Rote Ruhrarmee*, Berlin, Ministry for National Defence, 1956, p. 54.
[204] Hans Spethmann, *Die Rote Armee an Ruhr und Rhein. Aus Kapptagen*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1930, pp. 50-9.
[205] Tschirbs, *Tarifpolitik*, p. 101.
[206] Tenfelde, 'Bergarbeiter', in Gorlas and Peukert (eds.), *Ruhrkampf 1920*, pp. 42-55.

[207] Erhard Lucas, *Märzrevolution 1920. Der bewaffnete Arbeiteraufstand im Ruhrgebiet in seiner inneren Struktur und in seinem Verhältnis zu den Klassenkämpfen in den vershiedenen Regionen des Reiches*, vol. 2, Frankfurt, Roter Stern, 1973, pp. 72-3.
[208] Third Kav. Division, 29 April 1920 and 22 April 1920, STAM BüK 179.
[209] Ibid, pp. 78-9.
[210] Oberpräsident to Minister des Innern, 10 October 1924, STAD 16910.
[211] Weitz, *Communism*, Ch. 5.
[212] KPD Rundschreiben, 3 June and 19 September 1924, STAD 16934.
[213] Polizeipräsident Essen to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 7 April 1926, STAD 16934.
[214] Dylan Rees, 'Morgan Jones, Educationalist and Labour Politician', *Morgannwg*, 31, 1987, pp. 66-83.
[215] Arthur Horner, *Incorrigible Rebel*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1960, p. 50.
[216] *WM* 15 November 1920.
[217] *LV* 28 December 1918.
[218] *AVC* 17 September 1925.

Chapter Five

Miners' Trade Unionism and Political Identities, 1918-1926

> 'He used to think that Liberalism stood for that once [the welfare of the majority of the people]. When he first took an interest in politics, the great voices of Gladstone, Tom Ellis and the young Lloyd George still rang...In those days he felt like Wordsworth that it was a blessing to be alive, but; 'Oh! For a touch of the vanished hand/And the sound of that voice which is/ still.' They did not find the idealistic note there was in those days. Regretfully he said it [the Liberal Party] was a hard, commercialised party. He had ceased to hope for the coming of the golden age he longed and yearned and prayed for.' Rev Waldo Lewis explaining his conversion to Labour during electioneering at Carmarthen.[1]

> 'We're cheated by everyone, but by the KPD the least, that's why we vote for them.' A miner's comment to Stenbock-Fermor during his sojourn in the mines.[2]

Introduction

The preceding chapter sought to illustrate the effects that total war had upon the lifeworld and civil society in the South Wales and Ruhr coalfields. This chapter turns back to the discursive practices of the trade unions and the political parties as they sought to interpret the turbulent events in which they found themselves enmeshed. In South Wales, the Fed was strengthened, while the Labour party eventually superseded the Liberals. In the Ruhr, new syndicalist-communist organisations challenged the older unions. The SPD vote, following the highpoint of the 1919 *Nationalversammlung* campaign, was devastated in the subsequent Reichstag elections. However, the question remains as to how this intensification of homogenisation and fragmentation consolidated through the discourse of the organisations, both industrial and political. How was the Labour party able to usurp the position of the Liberals in the mining valleys, while the Fed amalgamated the smaller craft unions immediately after the war? On the other hand, why did the socialist labour movement in the Ruhr split between the Communists and the Social Democrats?

Of special interest is the degree to which the issue of nationalisation or socialisation acted as a rallying point for both the political and industrial organisations. In post-war South Wales, the Labour party continued to incorporate elements of Liberalism, such as concerns with Disestablishment and nationalism, into its discourse, while at the same time strengthening its image as the party of the

working class during the strikes and lockouts. In the context of conflict between labour and capital in the 1920s, the party was thus able to adopt the mantle of progressivism from Liberalism. In the Ruhr, the Centre party largely continued to propound a discourse similar to that used in Wilhelmine Germany, although it dropped its monarchism. The SPD meanwhile found itself in the difficult position of being the party of the Republic. The USPD, and later the KPD, partly inherited from the SPD the mantle of the anti-capitalist party. The SPD, therefore, found its position as the party of the left seriously challenged. This situation had not existed under the Empire. If, as Ross McKibbin has suggested, 1920s British politics was essentially the extension of an ossified Edwardian form of politics,[3] then Weimar politics represented new and turbulent territory.

Socialisation and Nationalisation

As pointed out in the previous chapter the issue of socialisation was symptomatic of the divisions in miners' trade unionism in the Ruhr. The term had become a slogan that was exploited by all the trade unions. It became yet another as a means of recruitment.[4] Yet, beneath the slogans very different conceptions and values were attached to the idea of socialisation. Although several variants and numerous plans existed, three broad approaches can be distinguished: socialisation as nationalisation, socialisation through small share ownership and socialisation as workers' control.

The fragmentary nature of the various radical trade unions in the Ruhr makes identifying a common approach to workers' control of the mines difficult to pin down. The cases of 'wild' socialisation in 1919 have been portrayed as a response to the economic difficulties that faced the miners in the Ruhr. In this interpretation the occupation of individual mines represented the most obvious form of redress in a country whose economy was characterised by shortages and had little to do with a loftier sounding, but less materialistic, growth of class consciousness.[5]

This view is certainly justified when applied to the 'wild' socialisation. However, the Commission of Nine, the body elected following the seizure of the *Zechenverband* offices in 1919, did attempt to provide an ideological basis for socialisation. Its particular conception of socialisation was set out in the pamphlet *Die Sozialisierung des Bergbaues und der Generalstreik im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet*. The pamphlet began with the economic background to the unrest that

characterised the region in 1919. Of all the workers the miners were portrayed as suffering most under the war economy. Admittedly wages had risen, but not in relation to prices and 'a wage demand was not to be thought of. First the mines were full of forced workers, POWs and civilian prisoners, and the skilled miner, who could not be so easily replaced, was kept in place by the threat – slave away and keep your head down or the trenches.' Under these circumstances it was not surprising that, following the end of the war, there was a flood of wage demands. However, 'the capitalists countered the wage demands with the sharpest resistance, insisted on the profits and their 'Herr-im-Hause' standpoint. So it came to 'wild' strikes, which threatened in December to cripple the whole economy.'

It was in this situation that the idea of socialisation found fertile soil. However, the Commission was careful to draw a distinction between its idea of socialisation and the 'wild' socialisation. The establishment of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils is seen as a positive step towards socialisation, but 'unfortunately confusion still reigned on how socialisation was actually to be understood.' The pamphlet argued that socialisation was not to be understood with the simple phrase 'the pit belongs to us' and that coal could be exchanged for food supplies. This 'childishness', propagated by the Syndicalists, made less and less impression on the miners.[6] Instead there, 'soon came the clarity that of the control of the mines by the workers must precede socialisation, that it is a prerequisite of socialisation and at the same time its important component. And not only control of the individual works, but also the employers' organisations.'[7]

The Commission, therefore, perceived socialisation as meaning workers' control of not only the mines, but also the whole administrative apparatus of the industry. The Commission modelled its socialisation plans on the *Rätesystem* (council system) established during the Revolution. Peter von Oertzen sees the two, socialisation and the *Rätesystem*, as inseparable.[8] The Commission explained the *Rätesystem* as:

> the workers, the industrial workers and employees (*Angestellten*), the agricultural workers and the farmers, the soldiers, administrating their affairs themselves. It means, through its full application (like in Russia), the complete transformation of the state, in which the rule of bureaucracy and parliamentarianism is to great degree superfluous. Through only its partial application it means an advance against capital's power and bureaucracy, in which control of the capitalist works and authorities is brought about – not through Parliament, whose control becomes

completely illusionary in the course of time because of the complication (*Komplizierung*) of the state machine – but by the workers.[9]

The system was made up of a pyramid of councils divided into four levels:

i) *Steigerrevierräte*, which was responsible for safety in the individual districts in the mine. Echoing the Alter Verband's pre-war concern with the safetymen, and thereby illustrating some of the continuities between the organisations, the Commission argued that these new councils would not prove a 'white ointment', but would be able to properly enforce health and safety regulations.
ii) *Zechenräte*, which oversaw the whole mine
iii) *Bergrevierräte*, which represented the common interests of mines in certain geographical areas
iv) *Zentralzechenrat* (Central Mines Council), which was to oversee the entire condition of the industry in the region [10]

Interestingly, it was suggested that the Central Council would have the toughest job as it would have to watch over the various employers' organisations, suggesting that those organisations would still exist. However, the scheme was seen very much as part of a process of working towards workers' control and ultimately there would be no role left for the owners.

The slow introduction of socialisation further distinguished the Commission from the Syndicalists. Expanding on the ideas of childishness, the Commission sought to portray the Syndicalists as simple or unreasonable. All 'thinking workers' were to resist efforts at wild socialisation, while 'no reasonable person believed, that socialisation could be immediately enforced.' The councils were to exercise control as a check to the encroachment of the mineowners' power. 'The miners are then ready to tolerate the yoke of private capitalism a while [longer], but they insist that the right of control, which is in their interest, as in the interest of the commonality (*Allgemeinheit*), absolutely necessary, [and] must be immediately introduced. The councils shall serve this control and only this control.'[11]

If the council system represented a transitional stage, a milestone on the way to socialisation, the Commission was in no doubt of the legitimacy of its demands. In response to the Government's refusal to recognise the Commission, the pamphlet stated:

> The gentlemen of the Government can indeed concede or refuse the authority of this Commission. That is their affair. But they cannot decide, whether it continues to exist or not. **The Commission of Nine is an organ of the revolutionary workforce**. They have created this Commission and alone decide [its future]; the Government has then

> nothing at all to say and the workforce can cry to it: Hands off! The revolutionary workforce itself has created this organ to prepare the socialisation of the mining industry. This socialisation will come, whether it is enforced by the Government or against it; that is still the question. In any case it will be enforced by the workforce...**So long as the miners of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial areas believe that [the industry] must be socialised, they will require an organ that prepares this socialisation and only people, who have the full trust of the revolutionary workers, can form this organ** [12]

For the Commission its legitimacy was located in the perceived revolutionary nature of the working class, and of the miners in particular. The Commission itself stood outside the normal structures of authority. Indeed, the insistence that the elected Government had no authority over the Commission raised the issue of dual control, if only in the mining industry. The Commission clearly perceived itself as the nucleus of a new society: a society that would be realised through the transformation of the existing order. As already mentioned Russia was seen as an example of how this transformation might work out in practice, although within the document as a whole the Soviet-style of Government was not taken as a model to be imitated. It has been suggested that the *Rätesystem*, of which socialisation was an integral part, offered a third way between communist dictatorship and bourgeois democracy.[13] However, if Soviet Russia was not a model, the Commission too placed the interests of the working class first and above the more diverse social interests represented by the *Nationalversammlung*. Such heavy emphasis on the revolutionary working class, coupled with the radical left-wing political composition of the Commission after 16 February 1919, was unlikely to expand the appeal of socialisation beyond the working class, or beyond even a certain section of the working class. There also existed competing conceptions of socialisation. It therefore seems unlikely that the issue of socialisation could have attracted broad enough support among the working class, let alone across German society as a whole, to provide a viable 'third way'.

Yet if the Commission rejected the authority of the SPD dominated government, it was conscious that its theoretical basis was still to be found within social-democratic ideology. Criticism of the SPD minister was harsh and the Commission felt compelled to point out that, in its original form, it had included SPD representatives.[14] In fact, the Commission played upon its social-democratic heritage.

> Until now socialisation was for every Social Democrat a clear and unambiguous concept. It means 'expropriation of the expropriators', as Karl Marx classically expressed it. It means: revocation of private

> property in the means of production, expropriation of the previous owner, the transfer of this means of production to the ownership of society, the communality. The ruling Social Democrats appear with the acceptance of their offices to have thrown this social-democratic view over board, because in their ordinance the bracketed socialisation is still only synonymous with 'influence through the Reich' and a 'share of the people's community (*Volksgesamtheit*) in its profits'. Instead of the social-democratic, robust view, 'socio-political' blather! Instead of the struggle against the power of capital, a shameful pact with the capitalist rulers![15]

In this sense the Commission members, and by implication their wider supporters, were being portrayed as the keepers of the old faith. It was they who had remained true to the principles of the SPD as adopted by the Erfurt conference of 1891. The MSPD, especially those that had accepted office, were seen as at best as individuals who had lost their way, at worst traitors. Later the pamphlet described the Alter Verband, Gewerkverein and ZZP decision not to support the call for a general strike in February 1919 under the heading of betrayal.[16] The Alter Verband was, owing to its MSPD sympathies, singled out for special criticism. 'Once – long, long ago – [the Alter Verband] carried forward the red pennant of the fighting proletariat, today its leaders have made it into a strike-breaking organisation.' Such language echoed pre-war accusations directed at the Gewerkverein by the Alter Verband. Expanding the betrayal/faith metaphor the Alter Verband leaders were described as 'genuine Judases.'[17] In other words, the MSPD and Alter Verband had lost their position as the vanguard of the class struggle; that honour now fell to the Commission who were continuing the decade's long fight against capitalism.

The conclusion of the pamphlet clearly distinguished the Commission's idea of socialisation from others. 'Socialisation [was] not mere nationalisation (*Verstaatlichung*) of the mining works, but the transfer of mining property to the community and the administration of the industry to the workers' councils. Ultimately then control was to rest with the workers themselves, the state playing only a subsidiary role.

Although the primary evidence is somewhat fragmentary, it is clear that the diverse syndicalist-communist trade unions also supported a notion of socialisation that was predicated on the idea of relentless class conflict between the workers and the owners. In fact, the antagonistic attitude towards employers was even more clearly expressed by these organisations than by the Commission. *The Union der Hand und*

Kopfarbeiter, despite tensions between syndicalist and communist wings, was clear on the relationship between employers and employed. The Union claimed in its organ that 'resistance to socialisation is grounded in the class instinct of the exploiters (*Ausbeutertums*), which is nurtured and maintained by the interests of property.' On the other hand, 'socialisation itself is sustained by the class interest of the exploited [and] is dictated by inalienable, natural human rights. Measured against the strengths of these two camps, [the realisation of] socialisation means an extremely hard and stubborn struggle.'[18]

The emphasis on class, struggle and betrayal by the Social Democrats also provided the main themes within the discourse of the other syndicalist-communist unions and left-radical parties. An Allgemeine Arbeiter Union leaflet distributed at the General mine addressed the 'revolutionary workers' and condemned the treachery of the SPD. The 'working class must take up the struggle against the whole of capitalist society, overthrow the ruling authority and erect [their] own power.' The workers of the Ruhr, miners and metalworkers were characterised as the 'vanguard' of the German and West European revolutionary workers' movement. 'They must see the clearest, travel the furthest down the route of revolution; they must most keenly recognise their enemies.' Among those enemies were the other trade unions. The FAUD were criticised for not accepting the importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the FAU (G) was seen as not accepting the basic nature of the struggle. True revolutionaries were to leave these bodies and join the AAU. 'The revolutionary working class must recognise that they [can] never co-operate in the organs of the capitalist economy.' The only way the workers could realise their true freedom was through 'uncompromising class conflict.' For the AAU, like the Union, there was no middle ground in this conflict. It was a question of being for or against the revolution.[19]

The syndicalist FAUD, while accepting the unavoidable conflict between capital and labour, also believed that the other unions needed to be fought as they were 'after all only institutions of bureaucracy. Where bureaucracy rules little is achieved, therefore our task must be to educate and enlighten the miners.' On the other hand, an invitation to affiliate with the Communists was rejected since the FAU was 'a purely economic fighting organisation and not a political organ.'[20] Parliamentarianism and political parties were also condemned because they were tainted by the interest of capital.[21] A pamphlet entitled 'What do the Syndicalists

want?' differentiated the movement from the 'Marxist parties.' The SPD, USPD and KPD were supposedly obsessed with the conquest of political power, which drew attention away from what really mattered, the economic struggle.[22] What was lacking in German society was a spirit of solidarity among the working class. It could be created through a general strike.[23]

It is clear then that there were differences in the discourses of the communist and syndicalist groups. At the same time the boundaries between these discourses were permeable, especially immediately after the Revolution. Both sides eventually published leaflets and booklets in an effort to demarcate their organisational identity.[24] Yet the various left-wing trade unions, be they syndicalist or communist, shared a common view of industrial relations. Both employers and workers were depicted as being in inevitable conflict, two monolithic forces struggling for the control of the industry. Any system of bargaining was therefore seen as an unwelcome compromise, a 'stale peace between capital and labour.'[25] Where the unions differed was in how the conflict was to be resolved. All agreed on the importance of the strike as a weapon. This is made clear in the numerous calls for general strikes, which characterised industrial relations during the 1920s. Where the unions differed was in their understanding of the role politics played in the final liberation of the proletariat. The syndicalists, as illustrated in the FAUD's rejection of the Communist invitation to engage in joint political action, saw the true site of struggle as the pit itself. For the FAUD, the general strike itself would ultimately destroy the forces of capitalism, all other strikes being skirmishes in the war. For the Communist trade union members, the strike was an adjunct to political action. Ultimately, as the AAU leaflet shows, it was the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat that would break the chains that were seen as fettering the workers. For the Syndicalists the miner was seen as fighting on one front. He was an economic warrior pure and simple. Too much engagement with politics could only provide a distraction and prove a weakness. Meanwhile, for the Communists, the miner was the 'vanguard' of the revolutionary workforce in both the industrial and political spheres. The general strike, the armed insurrection and the ballot were all weapons in the armoury of the proletariat, their usefulness fluctuating according to circumstance.

As already pointed out, the Union was a rather diverse, confused body, embracing syndicalists and communists, a characteristic that proved a constant headache for the KPD leadership.[26] Their differences were enough to keep the

activists, who drove the unions forward and determined their direction apart. Ultimately this contributed to the weakness of miners' unionism in the Ruhr and made resistance to the employer's offensive from the mid-1920s onward more difficult. Unlike the pre-war period, during which ethnicity and religion had generally prevented trade union co-operation,[27] it was now more clearly ideology and those responsible for its manufacture and dissemination, which prevented the trade unions from finding a common ground.

Despite these differences, the similarities between the language used by the left-wing unions and that used by the Alter Verband before the war are striking. The relationship between employers and employed is defined in terms of conflict and socialisation reduced to a trial of strength. Indeed, the emphasis and importance placed on the strike as a weapon echoes the belligerent attitude of the Alter Verband during the early 1890s, before Möller and Hue forged a more restrained image.[28] In some respects the language employed by the syndicalist and communist unionists represented a reassertion of that more aggressive strain in the discourse of the Alter Verband and complemented the re-emergence of the tradition of pit-head meetings and direct democracy. As described in the previous chapter the USPD, KPD and syndicalists often drew their strength from the old left-wing currents of Social Democracy. As shown above, the Commission at least was very conscious of its social-democratic heritage and sought to establish a lineage linking itself to the SPD of the Wilhelmine Empire. Similarly, within the meetings and publications of the Union, AAU and FAUD, there is a sense that they saw themselves as the true bearers of the workers' revolution, while the Alter Verband and SPD were betraying it.

In much the same way the Communists regarded themselves as the true inheritors of the revolutionary tradition. The old link with Social Democracy was not forgotten and could be shown in a positive light. For example, during the 1925 presidential election a potted biography of the communist candidate and KPD leader, Ernst Thälmann appeared in the *Westfälischer Kämpfer*. Like pre-war SPD propaganda it concentrated on the fact that Thälmann was a working-class candidate. Among his credentials was his membership of the SPD from the age of sixteen. His break with the SPD occurred during the war when he challenged the 'treacherous policy of the Social Democrats.' Yet his previous party membership was still included as part of his '20 years in the labour movement.'[29] The idea of treachery implied that, unlike the remaining SPD activists, Thälmann had kept the faith. During the campaign

Thälmann spoke at both Essen and Dortmund. Symbolising the internationalism of the movement unnamed representatives of both the English and French Communists spoke at his meetings. Thälmann himself stressed how the KPD had taken the mantle of defenders of the working class. He conflated the forces of the Republic and the monarchy, represented respectively by their flags, and depicted them as united against the working class. Worse, those who ruled in the Republic were also those who had run business under the monarchy. The blame was laid squarely on the shoulders of the SPD. Even here in the Ruhr, 'the historic land of the German class struggle', the SPD had betrayed the workers in the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch.[30]

An earlier article in the paper had also focused on the betrayal of the Bielefeld agreement. For the authors the Red Ruhr Army had held victory in its hands, but had allowed it to slip away because it lacked a strong, centralised communist party and had believed the promises of the Social Democrats. 'Through the duplicity of the social democratic leaders the mass action of the Ruhr proletariat was choked.' Four years later the situation was different. Now just such a party existed, but first the workers had to be clear, 'that only one party represented their interests in Germany.' Again mixing republican and monarchist imagery, the paper saw a united front of 'black-white-red-gold workers' traitors' storming against the KPD. However, once the revolutionary workers were united under the KPD banner the 'cadaver of Social Democracy' could be removed.[31]

The idea that the SPD had betrayed the revolutionary workers and were a spent force was a constant theme within KPD discourse during this period. This was often represented as an alliance between the SPD and the bourgeoisie.[32] No distinction was made between the Republic and the old regime. One pamphlet posed the question, 'Ebert or Ludendorff?', but suggested that there was no difference. 'One year of the middle-class Republic has shown you that it is nothing more than the old dictatorship of capital.'[33] Unsurprisingly, leaflet literature advocated revolution instead of Republic. Seizing on the enthusiasm of Revolution early leaflets contrasted the Council Republic (*Räterepublik*) with the middle-class Republic proposed by the SPD. This was often bound up with the issues of workers' control and socialisation.[34] Many also had an internationalist tone, calling on the workers of the world to unite, often in defence of Soviet Russia.[35]

In contrast to left-wing parties and unions, the Alter Verband, whose ideological approach was still very much shaped by Hue until his death in 1922,

regarded socialisation as something akin to nationalisation. It is important to note here that the Alter Verband characterised its conception of socialisation as *Vergesellschaftung* (socialisation), rather than *Verstaatlichung* (nationalisation). In fact Hue, like the Commission of Nine, rejected the latter, although he admitted that there were many Socialist Democrats who had not realised that the union's demand was not *Verstaatlichung*.[36] However, the *Bergarbeiterzeitung* commented in 1919 that previously the union had used the word nationalisation, rather than socialisation, as it was better understood. In fact, nationalisation was a goal it had sought since its foundation.[37] Furthermore, of all the various concepts of socialisation that circulated in the Ruhr during the early 1920s, the Alter Verband's notion was more akin to the MFGB's blueprint for nationalisation of the British coal industry. Therefore, in order to distinguish the Alter Verband's proposals from those of the syndicalists, they shall be referred to as nationalisation here.

Nationalisation had been an issue discussed by both the MFGB and the Alter Verband before 1919. The MFGB had proposed it in 1912, while, during the war an article had appeared in the *Bergarbeiterzeitung* promoting the idea of nationalisation and seeking to refute the idea that state mines were less profitable than their private counterparts.[38] In fact, a common tactic in the debate over nationalisation, both in Germany and Britain, was to compare the position of the existing German state mines with the private mines in the Ruhr. Unsurprisingly, the employers in both countries would claim lower production and wages, while the trade unions would claim greater efficiency and more humane treatment.[39]

The MFGB 1919 proposals for nationalisation, however, differed from the 1912 plan in that control of the industry would lie with both the workers and the state.[40] Initiated by the SWMF, the proposals called for the 'transfer of the entire industry from Private Ownership and Control to State Ownership with joint control and administration by the Workmen and the State.' The miners were not to be the passive subjects of nationalisation, but active in the management of the mines. This point was further elaborated by the former SWMF Executive member and current MFGB Secretary, Frank Hodges, who stated:

> The principal point to me in this resolution is one that has not yet been elaborated, that is the question of control. For the last two or three years a new movement has sprung up in the labour world which deals with the question of joint control of the industry by representatives from the side which represents, for the most part, the consumer and representatives of

> the workmen who are producers. Nationalisation in the old sense is no longer attractive. As a matter of fact you can have nationalisation but still be in no better position than you are now under private ownership. That is the experience of institutions which have been State owned and State controlled for many years...Now is it any good to have these mines nationalised unless we are going to exercise some form of control as producers? If not, the whole tendency will be towards the power of the bureaucracy. We shall be given no status at all in the industry, except to be the mere producers, as we have been in the past years. Under State ownership the workmen should be desirous of having something more than the mere question of wages or mere consideration of employment; the workmen should have some directive power in the industry in which they are engaged.[41]

The SWMF proposals envisaged a continuation and extension of the *de facto* bipartite system of industrial relations established during the war.[42] Ultimately there was no place for private capital within this system. The new rules adopted by the SWMF in 1917 declared its goal to be the 'complete abolition of capitalism.'[43] This removal of capitalism was often justified on the grounds of efficiency. Hodges argued at a meeting of officials in the Garw that removing the owners and their profits would lower coal prices.[44]

The argument for nationalisation was put most succinctly in Hodges's book, *Nationalisation of the Mines*. The book is symptomatic of the feeling of strength the SWMF had immediately after the war. SWMF publications and meetings during 1919 were imbued with an overwhelming sense of confidence. Nationalisation, it was repeatedly claimed, was almost inevitable. Hartshorn, for example, commented that 'there is no question of whether the Government will agree to nationalisation or not; the adoption of that principle in the very near future is absolutely inevitable.'[45] Not only was nationalisation inevitable, but it was also right for the working class had now reached such a stage of education that it could take over the direction of the industry. Hodges commented in the preface to his book that 'we are confronted with an increasingly educated working class; a class which more and more rejects the imposition of external will and authority over it; a class which yearns for the status of responsible manhood in industry and rebels against any cramping institution which thwarts its aspirations for freedom.'[46]

Although much of the book is taken up with attacks on the inefficiencies of capitalist production, the image of the educated, responsible miner was one that

permeated Hodges's argument. The idea of labour as a simple commodity to be bought and sold in the market place was rejected. Hodges claimed:

> improved education has made the continuance of such a status impossible. The labourer, besides having labour power to sell is also possessed of a human soul which is feeling the urge of strong aspirations...He wants a greater share in the direction of industry. The miner wants to be in his job as a complete human being...His new status will be that of a partner in industry. Manual labourer and technician will engage together in the mine, and sell their commodity, labour, not to a non-labouring shareholder, but to all men in their calling, as their contribution to the production of the finished article.[47]

This new status would mean new responsibilities, which would have a cumulative effect. Hodges believed that over time the miners' social outlook and sense of social responsibility would grow. 'Interest will be the father of still greater interest' and slowly the irresponsible would be reduced in number.[48] This emphasis on responsibility, education and partnership would superficially seem to echo the discourse of a pre-1910 generation of miners' leaders, such as Mabon. However, the identity that Hodges was trying to create differed from Mabon's in that the miners were seen as in partnership with other workers rather than employers. While the labourer and technician are present in the above extract, the owner is conspicuous by his absence. Earlier in the book Hodges denied that there could ever be an identity of interest between the employers and the workers. Pointing to the increasing number of working days lost to disputes between 1916 and 1919, Hodges wrote:

> But the antagonism is not of recent growth, for the pre-war figures are no better; if anything, they are worse. It is not so much the effect that these strikes have upon output that is important, but that gradual formation of a permanent psychology of antagonism, which is created as a result. There is no co-operation between workmen and employers; there is no common motive in industry; no conscious attempt to attain the highest efficiency; no elimination of waste; no internal economies. Both pursue opposite aims.

Against Mabon's conception of workers and owners sharing the fortunes of the industry, Hodges claimed that the attitude of the miners was now – '"production for private profit is wrong, but as long as it exists, we will fight for a larger and larger share of it, regardless of the amount or kind of work performed." As long as the workman sees that a margin of private profit exists he will struggle to secure it.'[49] Therefore, in direct contrast to Mabon, Hodges denied the owners' right to profit. The very existence of profit could only ensure continuous industrial unrest. Much like the

discourse of the Alter Verband and post-war left-wing unions, Hodges accepted that relations between owners and workers could only be understood in terms of struggle. Only by removing the employers and the profit motive, could peace be restored.

In a subsequent chapter Hodges made it clear that the aspirations of the miners could only be met when the obstacle of capitalist influence was removed.

> We now see the secret of the claim for the Nationalisation of the Mines. It will be the reason for claims in the future by the workers in other industries for the nationalisation of all industries, because only through the removal of the influence of the capitalist in the industry can the workers experience the gratification of that impulse or freedom for expansion, and for self-expression, which they feel in their innermost beings. Whether he be politician or priest, whether he is scholarly economist or ignorant capitalist, none can prevent the realisation of those aspirations.[50]

But the miner was not only to find individual and class realisation through nationalisation. He was also to act as a model for other workers. Just as *The Miners' Next Step* had sought to portray the miners as the vanguard of the British working class, so too Hodges envisaged them as setting an example for other workers to follow once nationalisation was achieved.

It is clear from Hodges's book that the more collaborationist trend within the SWMF discourse was weakening during the war and in the post-war period it was submerged by a more aggressive tone. By the post-war period, Hodges was not regarded as being on the extreme left of the movement, although in the pre-war years he had been an ILP member and was briefly identified with Ablett and the URC.[51] At the February 1919 MFGB conference in London, for example, more radical members of the South Wales delegation such as Noah Ablett and S. O. Davies attacked the proposed acceptance of the Sankey Commission, while Hartshorn and Hodges supported it.[52] Moreover, looking back over his career following the vilification of his role in the 1921 strike, and five years after the publication of *Nationalisation of the Mines*, he claimed that he always sought to avoid conflict and preferred negotiation to the strike action.[53] The book is illustrative of how acceptance of nationalisation and the removal of capitalist influence became the mainstream position in the SWMF and provides a good example of how the more radical, combative identity of the miners, succoured by wartime industrial relations, began to marginalise more co-operative conceptions.

Meanwhile, in the Ruhr, the unrest and attempts at 'wild' socialisation initially brought the leaders of the various unions and political parties together. At first the Alter Verband organ seemed supportive of the proposed council system, although critical of the USPD and Spartakists lack of patience.[54] However, following the break between the left-wing parties in 1919 the Alter Verband propagated its own plan of nationalisation in opposition to the radical unions. Hue, like Hodges, was keen to justify nationalisation on the grounds that it would make the industry more efficient. The majority scheme produced by the Socialisation Commission in 1919, to which Hue was a signatory, proposed that the industry be so reorganised that it was put in the service of the community rather than profit, thereby ending the exploitation of the miners and the consumers. The ownership of existent state and private mines would be transferred to a *Deutsche Kohlengemeinschaft* (German Coal Community). At the top of this stood a five-man directorate elected from the *Reichskohlenrat* (Reich Coal Council) which was made up of representatives of the Government, owners, workers and consumers.[55]

Clearly, Hue's conception of nationalisation differed somewhat from Hodges's. The concern to involve all sections of the industry as well as Government and the consumers must be seen in terms of the socio-political background in which the Alter Verband was operating. First, the Alter Verband was in a very much weaker position than the SWMF. Not only was its influence on industrial relations very weak, but its organisation was threatened by the new radical unions. The fragmented nature of unionism meant that even if joint Government-worker administration was introduced the Alter Verband was not guaranteed to be the sole or even main representative of the miners' side. A more far-reaching plan might also hand the initiative to the Syndicalists or the KPD and make it difficult to differentiate the Alter Verband, which was already losing members, from the other unions. The SPD also found much of its electoral support eroded following the 1920 Reichstag election. Secondly, the Alter Verband leaders as Social Democrats recognised the precarious position of the SPD-led Government. Not only were they aware of the needs of reconstruction, they were also undoubtedly wary of the effect any attempt to implement a more radical scheme might have on the agreement made with the German military or upon the Allies.

Despite these differences in the details, there are some striking similarities in the discourse used by SWMF/Labour and the Alter Verband/SPD. Nationalisation in both regions was presented as not solely the miners' problem, but one for the nation. The

MFGB publicity campaign, for example, was entitled 'The Mines for the Nation' and, as will be shown later, often used highly emotive language designed to appeal to other groups in British society. The Alter Verband and SPD discourse, reflecting the problems facing both the party and union, emphasised the national dimension even more than the SWMF. Hermann Löffler placed nationalisation within the context of the extension of the miner's right to co-determination in the industry. Nationalisation was portrayed as the culmination of a path that had begun with the foundation of the union and passed through the introduction of workers' committees and safetymen. Löffler emphasised that nationalisation would place the industry in the service of the nation and democracy.[56] Pointing to Russia, Löffler argued that the type of socialisation introduced by the Communists had destroyed the economy and brought foreign military forces on to Russian soil. This type of socialisation was rejected by the Social Democrats in the interests of the German people (*Volk*). 'The nationalisation of the coal industry shall not serve an occupation or a class, but the people's community (*Volksgemeinschaft*). That is why the whole public must support Social Democracy in its struggle. If it has the support of the people, then it can also achieve the victory.'[57]

Moreover, although the MFGB slogan 'Mines for the Nation' may have not been replicated by the Alter Verband, Hue did stress in his *Die Sozialisierung der Kohlenwirtschaft* that the nationalisation of the industry was not simply a workers' question, but one for the wider community. Yet underpinning this appeal was a similar idea that the miners would be able to achieve their full potential through nationalisation. 'Under private capitalist rule the human is degraded to a soulless work machine.' Hue also seized on Imbusch's words to expand on the idea that humanisation of work was the end goal of nationalisation. 'The economy should in reality serve humanity. We do not live merely to produce; we produce in order to live.'[58] This conscious use of Gewerkverein discourse was partly due to a certain thawing of relations between the two old unions. In organisational terms this was represented by their co-operation in the ZAG. However, Hue also aimed at bringing the Gewerkverein on side and cited Imbusch several time in the pamphlet in order to legitimise his argument. Hue's references to the Christian trade unionist can be regarded as a continuation of a trend evident before the war of emphasising the similarities in the two union's bread and butter demands in order to strengthen the case for amalgamation.

Relations between the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein had improved during the war. This new co-operative attitude was seemingly consolidated by their membership of the ZAG. However, the Gewerkverein consistently protected its own organisational identity and any suggestions of amalgamation were met with a blunt negative, just as they had been before the war. Echoing Imbusch's 1906 pamphlet an article entitled 'Is an amalgamation of the miners' unions possible?' appeared in *Die Bergknappe* in 1918. The demand for amalgamation allegedly originated from 'irresponsible radical agitators' (*Schreier*) and 'idealists'. Just like Imbusch's earlier work, the article looked back over the history of the two unions. Again it was their different world-views that distinguished the unions and made amalgamation impossible 'In the last decade the fundamental position of the different trade union movements have not changed.' A strong Christian union was required to counterbalance the materialism of the Free Trade Unions. Drawing on fears of Bolshevism, the article suggested that the lack of such a balance could tip the SPD into communism and the Alter Verband itself could come under the influence of radicals. On the other hand, co-operation on practical occupational questions was desirable. In fact, the question of amalgamation was seen as damaging the possibility for co-operation as it destroyed trust between the unions.[59] Subsequent articles took a similar line. The Gewerkverein was continually represented as a Christian movement and its religious nature contrasted to the materialistic and socialistic qualities of the SPD and Alter Verband.[60] This sense of continuity in the values of the Gewerkverein was further reinforced at their annual conferences. Speaking on the goals of the union, Imbusch stated 'they remain in the future as before.' Their attitude to the employers also remained 'in the new Germany as in the old.'[61]

Despite the commitment to co-operation, the relationship between the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband was often strained, and occasionally conflict broke out. For example, the language used during the 1922 strike was reminiscent of pre-war inter-union relations. While the Alter Verband supported the strike, the Gewerkverein rejected it. The *Bergknappe* carried the headline 'we are opponents of the revolutionary class struggle' and reprinted a speech given by the Gewerkverein youth leader, Wiedfeld, at a conference in Bochum.

> The social-democratic trade union movement stands on the basis of the revolutionary class struggle. Their greatest gaol is the socialisation of all means of production. The means to that goal is the revolutionary class struggle. According to the principles of our brother on the left the

> antagonism between the working class and the upper classes is unbridgeable. In the German employer they see only their oppressor, in the foreign worker their class comrade...We say in contrast 'admittedly there exist conflicts of interest, but these antagonisms are bridgeable...We Germans are a great peoples' family (*Volksfamilie*), we all step up to the great table of the peoples' economy. The first effort of Germans must, therefore, therefore be directed to bringing many goods to this table. Then can the distribution of goods for the individual be bettered...The distribution at the table of our peoples' economy must occur according to the laws of Christian justice and love; then the sharing will not come to a hostile you or I, but to a brotherly you or I.

The Gewerkverein represented in this speech is virtually indistinguishable from it pre-war guise. Although the use of the word 'brother' hinted at warmer relations between the two unions than prevailed before the war, the rest of the speech categorically rejects any similarity in principles. Class conflict is rejected in favour of a collaborative approach. Capitalism as an economic mode of production is implicitly embraced and contrasted with the socialisation proposed by the Alter Verband. The fruits of the economy were, however, to be shared and the best way to ensure the most equable distribution of goods was by the application of Christianity. Moreover, just as in pre-war Gewerkverein, conflict was not ruled out. The speaker did admit that sometimes the elite did not act in fairness and kept an unjustifiably large amount for themselves. Under these circumstances the strike was legitimate once all peaceful means had been exhausted. But, in contrast to the Alter Verband, Gewerkverein 'struggles [were] free from the spirit of the revolutionary class struggle.'[62]

Unsurprisingly, the Gewerkverein was even more critical of the Unionists and KPD. Syndicalists and Communists were the 'dangerous opponents of the trade union policy.' The Gewerkverein contended that the Union, unlike itself, was political and aimed to overthrow democracy. Therefore, the Union was not an economic organisation, 'but a revolutionary fighting troop.'[63] For the Gewerkverein the left-radical leaders operated under a 'mask of being friends of the workers' (*Maske der Arbeiterfreundlichkeit*) for their own political purposes. Yet despite this rejection of materialist discourses, both in social-democratic and communist form, the Gewerkverein also had its own version of socialisation. Like Hue, Imbusch saw socialisation as putting the industry in the service of the community. He argued that socialisation did not necessarily mean State Socialism or Communism. Instead he saw it as introducing a moral dimension to capitalism. Private property should not be abolished; rather it should be made subservient to the needs of the community. The

'economic egoism of the individual and the nation' had to be overcome. Such egoism involved the exploitation of one individual by another and led to imperialism at a national level. Socialisation, therefore, represented not merely a change in ownership, but also an ethical transformation. 'The technical socialisation of the enterprise alone is not adequate; it does not tailor the economy to the service of human beings. There must also be a change in spirit. Socialisation is only possible through a corresponding spirit and ethical attitude.'[64]

Since coal production impacted on all other aspects of life it should be at the service of the community. Unfortunately, the industry had for years been in the hands of 'profit-hungry capital'. However, Imbusch rejected state ownership. He believed this form of socialisation did not create the social spirit required and pointed to the existing state mines to prove it.[65] Instead, the consumers and workers had to be given more rights to balance the power of the employers.[66] One method of increasing the rights of the workers was to introduce small share ownership among the workforce. For Imbusch this meant that the miners would have a direct interest in the health of the industry and would literally share its fortunes. Moreover, it would not result in the loss of initiative he feared would occur under state ownership.[67]

It is clear that the Gewerkverein saw itself as steering a middle course between 'extreme capitalism and revolutionary socialism'. Its policy remained 'struggle for a christian-social community ideal.'[68] Its leaders welcomed the proposals of the Socialisation Committee and they defended the ZAG as a vehicle for improving co-operation between capital and labour,[69] although they, like the Alter Verband, maintained that these organs needed to be backed by strong trade unions.[70] However, a change in the Gewerkverein's attitude towards the employers is identifiable after 1923. The Gewerkverein undoubtedly regarded the French Occupation as a chance for the owners and miners to show solidarity. At a protest meeting in January 1923 Imbusch admitted that the unions and employers had had their differences, but that they also had things in common. 'We have in common with them the interest of our economy. We have in common with them our German language and culture.'[71] The MICUM agreement and the subsequent employer's offensive on hours and wages had an effect on Gewerkverein discourse. Hopes of a new morality in industrial relations dashed, the union became more aggressive in its attitude towards employers from late 1923. Articles in the *Bergknappe* began to complain that the owners had not changed and that they held true to their 'Herr-im-Haus' philosophy.[72] The 1924 lockout was

portrayed as an act of capriciousness, an attempt to repress the workers.[73] By 1925 even the Gewerkverein had to admit that the conflict between labour and capital had taken on ever-sharper forms. 'Capital, the economy, is everything for the employers, labour only a ware.' Yet despite this more critical attitude the Gewerkverein still saw itself as balanced between proletarian and capitalist dictatorships.[74]

As might be suspected the Alter Verband maintained a consistently more critical attitude towards the employers than the Gewerkverein. But a difference of opinion existed within the social-democratic movement as a whole. The SPD politician, Rudolf Hilferding, for example, struck a more aggressive tone than Hue in his address to the first works' council congress in October 1920. Like Hue he rejected the notion that nationalisation would simply mean bureaucratisation of the industry. Instead he envisaged the creation of industrial parliaments in which the workers, technicians and consumers would be represented.[75] His exclusion of the owners was more forthright. He claimed 'socialism cannot mean a co-operation with the capitalists in any common organisational forms, but can only mean the elimination of the capitalists from production, the elimination of capitalists as owners.'[76] Hilferding portrayed the majority proposal of the Socialisation Commission as *Vollsozialisierung*, full or complete socialisation. 'It demands that the capitalist as such disappears from the coal industry and that leadership of the industry be transferred to a coal parliament, in which the director of the works, the workers, the officials, the consumers and the representatives of the public are present.'[77]

Unsurprisingly, Hilferding approved of this plan, but regarded it as a minimal demand (*Mindestforderung*). Like Hodges, Hilferding saw the nationalisation of the coal industry as the first step in a wider programme of collectivisation. The German miners, or at least the SPD/Alter Verband section, were to be pioneers of nationalisation, setting an example to other industries. In a passage that illustrates the continuing importance of a working-class identity to the SPD and Alter Verband, Hilferding claimed

> We want to lead the struggle for nationalisation of the coal industry, because through it we can hope to once again unite the whole proletariat in a great, united action. This slogan is uniting and this struggle will be decisive. First, because it must and will be a true, completely undisguised class struggle: on the one side the proletariat, on the other the bourgeoisie. We know that the bourgeoisie will employ every force so as not to be defeated; [nationalisation] will therefore be treated as a genuine measure of power between the two classes. As such we can only be armed when

> we enter the struggle united. The struggle is also decisive because we know that, when it is successfully fought, it places us in a position of power, which no one can snatch from us, and from which we can more easily win other positions. Do not think that we will be content with the nationalisation of an individual industrial branch, for we would not be socialists! But when we have fought the struggle in the most important area, then the further battles will be made easier, not least because the fighting proletariat have seen what it is capable of when it is united.[78]

Hilferding repeatedly emphasised in the published speech that nationalisation was a question of power (*Machtfrage*). His discourse reveals how the Social Democrats continued to regard the relationship between employers and employed as one based on conflict rather than co-operation. Just as before the war, the complexities of class formation were simplified down to the proletariat and bourgeoisie, while nationalisation of coal is presented as an issue capable of rallying the working class.

In emphasising the opposition of the forces of labour and the forces of capitalism, the Alter Verband and SPD ideologues had to tread a fine line. On the one hand, the activists wished to hold on to their identity as opponents of capitalism. Thus Hilferding's pamphlet refers to class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. On the other, they needed clearly to differentiate their ideological ground from the Communists. This was especially important given the numerous interpretations of socialisation/nationalisation. Therefore, Hue's assertion that nationalisation meant the transfer of industry to the community was not merely aimed at creating a wider body of support outside the union, but was also a conscious attempt to marginalise the Communists and Syndicalists. For example, the Commission of Nine was described as trying to introduce a dictatorship, which would rob the miners of what freedoms they had, including the right to strike.[79] Moreover, the left-radicals were accused of weakening the trade union movement. In an article entitled 'against the association destroyers', the *Bergarbeiterzeitung* rather optimistically claimed that, had the Communists not countered the efforts of the Alter Verband, its membership would now have numbered half a million. The paper believed that Communists 'struggle has directed itself not against the employers, but against our association, which has certainly shown in its thirty year existence that it understands how to protect the interests of the miners.' Through its barren agitation the Unionists had succeeded only driving many away from the unions.[80] Meanwhile, syndicalism was also presented as a sectional doctrine. 'The socialisation of the coal industry is no special workers' question. Whoever labels it so maliciously confuses

the situation and works consciously or unconsciously into the hands of syndicalism, which wants to transfer 'the mines to the miners.''[81]

The SPD politician Dr. Franz Lütgenau, the former deputy for the Dortmund seat, also sought to marginalise the Syndicalists by presenting them, not wholly unfairly, as a mass of incoherent, competing groups. 'The Syndicalists in their numerous splinter groups do not know what they want. One group is for participation in the election, the other fights most vehemently every parliamentary activity. The opinions inside the syndicalist movement are so confusing, that a thinking man does not know where to begin with them.'[82] Aside from the implication that thinking men were not involved in syndicalism, Lütgenau also believed that it meant a 'new splintering of strength and a great danger' for the working class.[83] Lütgenau's attack on the Syndicalists was aimed at establishing a discursive dichotomy based on the sectional interests of one side and the national interests of the other. Overt or implicit, a common feature in Alter Verband discourse is the portrayal of the left-wing opposition as un-national. In some respects the social-democratic trade unions had adopted a national discourse.

The discourses of nationalisation and socialisation in South Wales and the Ruhr provide an illustrative example of how identities were differently constructed in the two regions. Nationalisation, as suggested in the previous chapter, provided a focal point for the miners' movement in South Wales. It was mixed into the more inclusive, 'community-fixated' identities that the SWMF and Labour sought to create. Before the Great War there was a trend within SWMF discourse which regarded the employers as opponents rather than partners. The very idea of nationalisation, resisted by the employers, promised by the Government, but then snatched away, fitted perfectly within a discourse predicated on a labour vs. capital dichotomy. The issue was continually presented in this manner and stretched so that the miners' struggle became symbolic of the fight against capitalism in general. In this manner, even those who preached socialisation could see nationalisation as the important first step. Finally, the experience of the industrial disputes of 1921 and 1926 seemed to dovetail well with the exclusion of the employers from the concept of the community evident in Labour's discourse prior to 1914. This was especially so since trade union and Labour activists were often one and the same. The lock-outs and wage cuts made it easy to portray the employers and the Government as determined to destroy the mining communities. Nationalisation, it was implied, was their salvation. As notions

of community and nationalisation became intricately bound together, Labour was thus able to project itself as the guardian of the former.

In the Ruhr socialisation did not enjoy this wide appeal. The term itself was contested. In different versions it envisaged no role for capital, a limited role for capital or co-operation between labour and capital. Due to these competing visions it could not be constructed into a discourse that claimed to represent the hopes of an entire community. Instead each version was linked to a particular political view point. As Imbusch himself noted it became a *Schlagwort*, used not to unite but to mobilise a certain group of miners, often against another. As a result the very concept reinforced the divided nature of the miners' movement in the Ruhr.

National Identity and Class

As noted above, the SPD and Alter Verband sought to characterise the Syndicalists as un-national. This patriotic element had been evident in SPD discourse in the 1900s, but during the Republic it became more pronounced and fully displayed during elections. Whereas before the war the SPD had presented itself as a working-class party, it now increasingly used the more inclusive term *Volkspartei*. The *EAZ* and *RWAZ*, for example, rhetorically asked which party was the people's party. Discounting the other parties on the grounds of religion or class, the paper presented the SPD as the only true *Volkspartei*. In fact, during 1919 the SPD attempted to create a *Volkssozialismus* (people's socialism)[84]. The claim was linked to the founding of the Republic and the extension of the vote.[85] The SPD made efforts to attract the newly enfranchised female electorate, play down any anti-religious tendencies and broaden its appeal to white-collar occupations. Numerous pieces appeared in the social-democratic press stressing the importance of the female vote. Rather chauvinistically Husemann suggested women needed educating in the democratic process and called on his female comrades to help.[86] It was stressed that the franchise for women was 'the work of the social-democratic party.'[87] Similarly, many of the leaflets produced by the party appealed not solely to the workers but also to the officials (*Beamten*).[88] The *Volksblatt* claimed rather optimistically that the state officials were now praising the SPD.[89] The trade union pamphlets on nationalisation noted the important role the technical staff would continue to play. Hilferding noted the need for co-operation between the brain and manual worker.[90] A priest from Cologne even spoke at a SPD meeting in Essen as part of their 1920 campaign. In a speech that would have perhaps

been familiar to voters in South Wales, but was a rarity in the Ruhr, the links between socialism and Christianity were stressed.[91]

This identification with the Volk was perhaps natural since much of the SPD pre-war class discourse had been occupied by the USPD and KPD. Before the war the SPD had largely enjoyed a hegemonic position in its claim to represent the 'worker'. Admittedly, the Centre had also had a strong working-class element to its discourse, but more often than not this was qualified by an explicit adherence to Christianity. The construction of the SPD as the guardian of the German community and its rights forged during the Revolution also left the party in a position to attack Communist policies perceived as damaging to the Volk. In the early years of the Republic this was often expressed as a fear of civil war. Later the focus was on their lack of respect for human rights. Events in Russia provided the SPD with ample propaganda material. In May 1922, for example, the *RWAZ* reported the expulsion of Mjasnikov from the Central Committee for daring to express his own opinion. The piece concluded that 'in European countries [they] preach the united front – although not for the purpose of common action, but in order to infiltrate other camps – demand wide-ranging freedoms, but in Russia [they] repress everything which is not sworn to the party dictatorship of a few lunatics.'[92]

In presenting itself as a Volkspartei the SPD was impinging on the discourse used by the other parties, including the Centre. In the 1920s the Centre continued to present itself as the true people's party. This, alongside its Catholicism, remained a characteristic feature of the Centre. In fact, religiosity remained the defining feature of Centre Party discourse so much so that some historians have charged the Centre Party with retreating to a narrow clericalism during the Weimar Republic.[93] In fact, many of the party's pre-war concerns disappeared in the 1920s.[94] An examination of the pro-Centre newspapers in the Ruhr seems to bear out this charge. Repeatedly, the editors of *Tremonia*, *Essener Volkszeitung* and *Westfälische Volkszeitung* produced articles that propagated the Christian identity of the party. A favourite concern was the issue of education. This was given impetus in 1919 when the SPD culture minister, Adolf Hoffmann, pursued a policy of interdenominational schools and abolition of state aid for Churches. One contributor described this policy as stripping ethics from the young (*Entsittlichung*).[95] Another called for an alliance between the Catholics and Protestants to ensure the victory of a 'Christian idea of the state', rather than a 'socialist German Republic.'[96] Two years later at a meeting of the Volksverein in

Bochum it was argued that religion was the basis of the cultural life of the country and should be the basis on which electors voted.[97] Representatives of the Westfalen Centre Party stressed that the party had been founded as a 'Christian people's party', which sought to base policy on 'principles of Christianity.' It refuted accusations that the party had abandoned religion, claiming 'we are and remain the old Centre.'[98]

However, although both the SPD and Centre claimed to be *Volksparteien* there was no blurring of their ideological differences. Indeed there was an intrinsic tension between their attempts to appear as *Volksparteien* and the 'milieu-fixated' nature of their discourse. Both the SPD and the Centre had very precise ideas of what the concept of the *Volk* encompassed and this tended to hold back their attempts to widen their appeal. For example, for the Centre Christianity and the *Volk* were inseparable. The *Volkspartei* label was more often than not preceded by the delimiting adjective Christian. Meanwhile SPD attempts to extend the party's appeal beyond the traditional working class did not mean that concerns with issues of class lost their vibrancy. For example, the emphasis on the expansion of the franchise was intimately linked to the overarching theme of defence of the Republic. From the beginning the SPD defined this Republic in socialist terms and the defence of the Revolution was placed within the context of long-term social-democratic aims. It was claimed that 'the social-democratic party was always revolutionary in the sense that it strove for the complete transformation of the state to democracy, the economy to socialisation...We want to give the German people the freest republican constitution of any people in the world. The people as the masters of their own fate. That is our solution.'[99]

Since the Republic was essentially seen as a socialist creation by the SPD, they were still able to utilise the older class elements of their discourse. Thus, during the Nationalversammlung election in 1919 the *Volksblatt* carried the slogan 'not a capitalist, but a socialist Republic.'[100] Similarly, in 1921 the main question during Prussian Landtag elections was 'for or against socialism.' In differing forms this choice between capitalism and socialism was repeatedly offered to the voters. Even six years after the founding of the Republic *EAZ* still called the 1925 presidential election a struggle between Republic and monarchy.[101] The paper called on 'republicans' to rally around the SPD candidate Otto Braun and defend Ebert's legacy.[102] Their opponents on the right were still referred to as the *bürgerliche Parteien* (middle-class parties). These parties, it was claimed, included everybody's

wishes within their programme, but 'which wishes and promises were fulfilled? Only those of the capitalists.'[103] The bürgerliche parties were also depicted as representing sectional capitalistic interests. In SPD propaganda the Centre was becoming more and more under the influence of heavy industry, while the DVP was the party of the managers.[104]

A sense of the difficulty the SPD faced in navigating between these two imperatives is given in an article in the *Volksblatt* on the nature of the *Klassenkampf* (Class Struggle). It noted that, on the one hand, the middle-class parties accused the party and trade unions of preaching class conflict, on the other, the Communists claimed they had abandoned it. 'While the first condemn our class conflict activity and describe it as a disaster for the German people, the other credits it a crime and a betrayal of the German proletariat that we have shed our character of class struggle.' In trying to clarify the situation the article produced a systematic analysis of class struggle that was indistinguishable from pre-war discourse. At a bird's-eye level, it was claimed, the German people appeared united. Beneath the surface, however, there were many divisions, not only in terms of wealth, but also in terms of legal rights and intellectual resources. The knowledge of this inequality ultimately led to the creation of a class consciousness. Class consciousness led to the class will to improve the situation. Improvement was resisted by the owning classes. This inevitably led to conflict because:

> when two opposing wills run one against another, a conflict is unavoidable. Class conflict is therefore also a necessity, a harsh, bitter necessity. It is not some artistic evocation generated by agitation, it is the product of class antagonism and will only end when this opposition is [removed] form the world or when the under classes are lulled or addled to such an extent that class consciousness and class will is dead in them.

This quote illustrates the continued relevance of class and the struggle between classes. Despite its attempts to recruit among the lower middle classes the SPD clearly still identified with those of no or little property. The party might have tried to present itself as a *Volkspartei*, but this *Volk* was placed in a similar juxtaposition to the capitalists, domestic and international, that working class had been before the war. It would be wrong to claim that conceptions of the Volk and the working class were elided. In their references to *Beamten* and *Angestellte* the SPD was self-consciously extending its electoral embrace. Yet within the discourse the 'Other' clearly remained

those who owned the means of production. The issue of nationalisation therefore became a totemic demand, proving the SPD's continued opposition to capitalism.

But how did the SPD deal with that new, alternate 'Other' – the KPD? The SPD answer to the KPD accusation of treachery was to claim that the Communists misunderstood the nature of class conflict.

> Like every struggle the class struggle can also be fought in different ways: it is an economic and a social, a legal and a political, an intellectual and a cultural struggle, it is also, under certain circumstances a violent struggle. It is unfortunately the ominous error of the left-radicals, that they see the class struggle as merely a conflict with violent methods, while in reality the violent struggle may only be applied when all other means of struggle have failed.

Under the Republic, it was argued, the proletariat was in a totally different position than under the Kaiser.[105] The abolition of the three-class electoral system, the extended franchise and freedoms of speech and association meant that violence was no longer necessary. Class could be motivated and expressed through the ballot rather than the bullet. In fact, as noted, the KPD was seen as endangering those rights by their advocacy of violence. Thus the SPD did not deny class conflict but sought to contain it within the political structures of the Republic. Armed actions would break these structures. Similarly, wild socialisation could only serve to destabilise the country. The Republic was thus poised between the twin threats of capitalism and communism, the SPD its sole guarantor.

In the context of the mining industry this dual threat was coherently expressed in an Alter Verband pamphlet published in reaction to the 1924 dispute. In the first section the employers were regarded as the aggressors in the dispute. Their demand for longer hours and lower wages and the lockout they initiated to enforce these demands enabled the Alter Verband to portray them as out to destroy unionism. Such was the employers' desire to remove the unions that they were willing to co-operate with the French occupying authorities. As soon as the common front propped up by passive resistance was ended the employers had negotiated the Micum agreement without involving the unions.[106] The wage award granted after the four-week lockout was regarded as a victory for the united front of the miners.[107] However, the struggle was not over as some mines had tried to prevent the re-election of works councils by arguing the lockout counted as an interruption in the six months continuous work clause of the works council law, thereby making those locked out ineligible to vote.[108]

The picture then is of unscrupulous employers, prepared to use any means to break the ZAG and the unions.

The Communists, considered in the second part of the pamphlet, were also caricatured as out to destroy unionism. It alleged that the Communists, having failed to realise their general strike strategy, had attempted to present the lockout as just such a strike. This was a 'great danger' since it influenced the press perception of the dispute and alienated the public. In recognition of the weak position of the unions, the Alter Verband stressed the importance of gaining public sympathy in any dispute. The combative language of the Union and KPD actually weakened the miners. The constant denunciations of Alter Verband leaders are shown as destructive. 'The "struggle to the bitter end" (*Kampf bis aufs Messer*) reaches its recognisable high point against the leaders of the miners' union.'[109] The Communists are even accused of inciting followers to murder.[110] In fact, the whole ideological basis of their discourse is thrown into doubt by the authors, who claim that it has nothing to do with Karl Marx and everything to do with the anarchist Bakunin. A distinction is drawn between the 'historical-materialism' of Marx and the 'anarchist-bakunist sect.'[111] Having 'uncovered' the 'emptiness' and 'confused nature' of their discourse, the Alter Verband does distinguish between the ordinary members, who join the Union and the KPD out of the 'most noble motives', and the 'power hungry clique' which leads them.[112] The employers represented the enemy without, the Communists the enemy within the miners' movement.

Returning to South Wales, although the particular conception of nationalisation outlined by Hodges was the most widely accepted by the SWMF, and the MFGB as a whole, there existed dissenting voices. Sometimes these voices came from outside the coalfield. For example, John Maclean, the revolutionary Glasgow workers' leader, spoke at Pontypridd to condemn nationalisation and, echoing contemporaneous debates in the Ruhr, support socialisation.[113] In South Wales itself support for socialisation came from some that had been involved in the URC and the drafting of *The Miners' Next Step*. Often this opposition was centred on the belief that the plans for nationalisation did not go far enough. Continuing to follow the themes of industrial unionism and syndicalism that had circulated before, these activists, much like the FAUD and Commission of Nine in the Ruhr, sought to exclude both the influence of capitalism and the state from the industry and establish workers' control.

The most cogent exposition of this argument was put forward by a pamphlet entitled *Industrial Democracy for the Miners: A Plan for the Democratic Control of the Mining Industry*.[114] The boundless confidence of the activists was again expressed in the pamphlet's foreword written by William Ferris Hay, then President of the South Wales Socialist Society, the successor organisation to the URC. 'Nationalisation', he claimed, 'of the mining and other basic and key industries is obviously bound to come almost immediately.' However, for Hay this did not represent the final step in the miners' struggle against capitalism. Rather it was the penultimate one,

> because as scientific Socialists we know that nationalisation or State Capitalism, **the last permutation of which Capitalism is capable**, is bound to be short lived. It is therefore all the more important that we should force our demand for democratic control upon the Capitalist State when nationalising any industry. We need under **Nationalisation** to work out and become thoroughly acquainted with the administrative mechanism, which will ultimately function under **Socialisation**.[115]

For Hay, then nationalisation was not the end of capitalism in the coalfield, but merely its last stage. Undoubtedly, this stage represented a more acceptable one than unrestrained capitalism, if only in that it allowed the miners the opportunity to learn how to run the industry. Nationalisation, therefore, represented an interim or transitional phase. Once the miners were acquainted with the administration any last vestiges of state control could be removed leaving the industry solely in the hand of the miners. In a plan again reminiscent of the Commission of Nine, the pamphlet proposed a hierarchy of committees. The Coal Controller, responsible for the sale of coal at home and abroad, stood at the top. Authority then devolved downwards through the MFGB Executive, local area executives (i.e. South Wales, Scotland, Northumberland and Durham, etc.), colliery lodges, colliery committees and, finally, pit committees.[116]

The supporters of socialisation shared much the same criticisms of capitalism as the 'nationalisers'. They were also as concerned that the miner should be able to fulfil his full potential. The main critique of nationalisation centred on the issue of 'officialisation'. While Hodges believed that disputes would disappear in the industry once the profit motive was removed, Hay believed that control would still remain a contentious issue. 'It would afford no consolation to the miner to know that he was exploited to relieve national taxation instead of for private profit.'[117] Only when the miner had the greatest possible control over his work would that cease to cause

disputes.[118] The solution to this problem was to turn control over to the MFGB, with whom the Government-appointed Coal Controller would place production orders. Hay was critical of the MFGB, believing it to be a crude instrument for the exercise of democratic control. However, Hay thought that the MFGB provided a 'skeleton structure' which could provide the basis of democratic control. 'It is co-extensive with industry; it has the forms and machinery – albeit imperfect – for democratic control, and with the alterations and improvements we suggest, could well become the steward to administer the nation's coal resources.'[119]

Although the plan for socialisation of the British industry bore many similarities to proposals in the Ruhr there were three fundamental and interrelated differences between the Welsh and German 'socialisers'. First, just as the URC members saw no need to establish a union to rival the SWMF before the war, so too did the 'advanced' men of the post-war period see reform of the MFGB from the inside as their best option. This was in sharp contrast to the Syndicalists in the pre- and post-war Ruhr, who saw counter-organisations as the only way to advance their cause. A more flexible attitude from both the advocates of nationalisation, on the one hand, and supporters of socialisation, on the other, contributed to the containment of tense relations and points of disagreement and helped ensure that they did not turn into organisational rivalry in South Wales. Just as before the war, both sides were willing to tolerate a plurality of approaches within the same organisation, rather than seeking to impose harmony by excluding rivals. Both sides were equally seen as trying to represent the miners as a whole rather than a particular section.

Second, the similarities in their discursive identity conditioned the containment of disputes and the flexible attitude of activists. This is not to suggest that disagreements between SWMF activists were without acrimony. This was especially evident during the 'Datum Line' strike of 1920.[120] Radical leaders, such as S. O. Davies, A. J. Cook, Ablett and George Barker supported a stronger stance by the MFGB, while Brace, Tom Richards and Hartshorn sought a more conciliatory line.[121] Brace was critical of the 'direct actionists', stating:

> when they attempt to adopt the airs of the superior person, and to act as if their higher mental equipment conferred upon them the right and authority to order masses of their fellow-workers to cease work without their having been consulted as to their views and wishes upon the question, I feel bound to call attention to the danger involved in the adoption of any such policy. A strike or lock-out is war, and a civil war at that. It should, therefore not be undertaken, unless as a last desperate resort.[122]

Such was Hartshorn's anger at the extremists he resigned his post on the SWMF Executive after the strike, claiming 'an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion [had been] created against leaders who believe in steady revolutionary reform.' This atmosphere was, according to Hartshorn, the work of 'dangerous revolutionaries.'[123] In fact, despite his early attendance at URC meetings Hartshorn had grown increasingly critical of the Committee's radicalism. This is illustrated in his response to the URC's planned down-tools policy in 1918. He disparagingly termed the Committee 'self-elected and self-appointed' and argued that few had stood in ballot against SWMF officials and where they had they had been defeated. Hartshorn believed the URC to be a danger to democracy. 'It is fortunate that the secret scheming and the base slanders of the Unofficial Reform Committee have made it necessary for the elected leaders of the Federation to have to defend themselves against men, who instead of winning the right to speak in the name of the rank and file, proceed by methods which are the negation of democratic control.'[124] He also raised the fear of extremist elements in his election campaigns. He complained that during the 1918 election the Labour party had been damaged by the accusations of Bolshevik control. This was 'a charge so sweeping as that brings within its effects not only the few men who are preaching revolution, but the far greater number of sober Labour leaders.'[125] Bitter recriminations were also made after the 1921 lockout. Hodges was critical of what he termed the 'Ablett type', who were 'responsible for prolonging the stoppage.' Ablett's response was to portray Hodges as a man 'pitchforked into a position of responsibility before experience had prepared him for it.'[126] Moreover, these struggles over the issue of tactics stretched down to the lower levels of the miners' organisation. The minutes of the Ferndale lodge, for example, bear testimony to the struggle between Noah Tromans and Charlie Gibbons on the issue of political as opposed to industrial action.[127]

However, these disputes were often representative of personal rivalries and were generally of short duration. Hartshorn, for example, eventually returned to the SWMF Executive in 1922. Ultimately, both the leading supporters of nationalisation and socialisation in the SWMF propagated an identity based on the dichotomy of miners versus employers. This common opposition to capitalism provided an effective rallying cry in a way it could not in the Ruhr, since the Gewerkverein was firmly committed to private property. A pamphlet written by the miners' agent John Thomas

following the 1921 dispute ended with just such a call. Even in defeat Thomas found hope. 'The rank and file must set their minds, more steadfastly than ever, on these ideals, which they attempted to have incorporated in the Coal Mining Industry, as a result of their magnificent example of solidarity, during the Lock-out.' He admitted that it would be hard to hold the organisation together, but

> parallel with this overhauling process there must proceed forthwith a steady, rousing propaganda amongst themselves and amongst their leaders, to an understanding of what they are up against as wage earners, and what war on Capitalism means. The propaganda must be extensive and intensive. Lodge meetings must be turned into lecture rooms and classes, centres of discussion and planning, about the next phases of the struggle, to win the control of their Industry for the workers.

To facilitate this propaganda work and ensure the widest possible dissemination of the union's discourse, Thomas advocated the production of a newspaper. 'The rank and file must aim at making their members in the lodges class conscious, fully alive to the defects of the Coal Mining Industry under Capitalism, and fully aware of their ability and power, as organised workers, to take the place of Capitalism and substitute workers' control.'[128]

Undoubtedly Thomas would have been pleased with the production of *The Colliery Workers' Magazine* in 1923. Its pages consistently reinforced the basic miners versus employers' dichotomy of SWMF discourse. It would be repetitive to examine every permutation of this discursive practice, but perhaps Oliver Harris can be regarded as typical of the general view of the miner when he described the industry as being 'in the claws of Capitalism, with its wasteful, inefficient and unscientific administration.'[129] The immutable nature of the conflict was also constantly stressed. Ironically, W. H. Mainwaring's argument, while rejecting the idea that class itself was a formation of ideas, was also strengthened the class nature of the union's discourse. Rather class was formed by economics, by the sale of one man's productive labour to another. 'They [the workers] stand on one side as sellers of their capacity to labour. Opposed to them are the would-be buyers of this labour power.'[130]

Yet while the *Colliery Workers' Magazine* was unequivocal in its opposition to private ownership, in other respects the paper provided a surprisingly open forum for debate. In fact the magazine was a prime example of how the SWMF allowed pluralist debate to be expressed within its organisation. All shades of the nationalisation/socialisation debate were represented in its pages. Seemingly the only

proviso was that the contributors were opposed to private enterprise. This openness also extended to other areas. One example was the open debate on affiliation to the Red International of Labour Unions.[131] Characteristically, the *Colliery Workers' Magazine* presented both sides of the debate on a single issue. John Thomas, miners' agent for the Anthracite District, presented the case for affiliation. He described the International Federation of Trade Unions as a bulwark of capitalism, but the SWMF by joining the RILU would be moving a step closer towards its goal of abolishing capitalism as well as living up to its 'pioneer' role. Arthur Jenkins, miners' agent for the Eastern Valleys District, presented the counter argument. The crux of his argument centred on the split that affiliation would create. This could only weaken the labour movement.[132] The contours of the debate are here perhaps less important than their presentation. Printed side-by-side the two pieces demonstrated the magazine's commitment to providing an opportunity for all to voice their opinion. Thus the magazine acted as an important safety valve. Ideological differences between 'nationalisers' and 'socialisers' were aired rather than suppressed, preventing discontents from festering and helping maintain the organisational unity of the SWMF.

In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the issue was far more charged. In contrast to the SWMF, the more pillared civil society in the Ruhr precluded such wide-ranging debate on the issue. Instead, affiliation or non-affiliation to the RILU was used to distinguish one union from another. For the communist-syndicalist unions membership of the RILU symbolised the truly revolutionary nature of their organisations. At the founding congress of the Union der Hand und Kopfarbeiter affiliation was seen as part and parcel of struggle against the 'dictatorship of bureaucracy' which dominated the social-democratic unions.[133] In October 1922 the Union published a letter asking the Alter Verband to join it in common action. The Alter Verband rejected the request. One reason it cited for this was Union membership of the RILU, because, as far as the Alter Verband was concerned, the RILU was dedicated to its destruction.[134] Thus, rather than being a tactical question, affiliation or non-affiliation was seen as affecting the very existence of miners' unions. Under these circumstances the 'fair' debate style of discourse that characterised the contributions to the *Colliery Workers' Magazine*, was a rarity rather than the norm in the trade union press of the Ruhr.

A similarly more open attitude was taken by the *Magazine* on the issue of Russia. Although committed Communists were a tiny minority within the SWMF and Labour Party supporters such as Hartshorn were very wary and critical of any Bolshevik tendencies, Soviet enthusiast S. O. Davies was still permitted to write gushing articles about the workers' paradise that had been created in Russia. Davies contrasted the 'cherished ideal' of Russia with the 'sordid conditions' in Britain. The Russian workers could 'stand confidently and exultantly facing the future', while the British worker was 'ground down in penury at his uninspiring toil.'[135] In contrast, the pieces published in the *Bergarbeiterzeitung* were highly critical of Bolshevism and paralleled SPD anti-Communist propaganda. In 1922 a series of articles reported on the conditions of the Russian miners. Despite the heavy nature of their work the miners suffered from food shortages and lack of clothes and shoes. Production was correspondingly low, sometimes barely enough to cover the requirement of the mines themselves.[136] A later article focused on the terrible living conditions, alleging wooden barracks were being built and wagons turned into homes. Worse, however, was the fact that, despite these squalid conditions the miners were not allowed to strike and 'their complaints are mostly unsuccessful.'[137]

The *Bergknappe* also sought to undermine the idea of the Soviet Union as a worker's Utopia. In keeping with its religious-based ideology the Gewerkverein focused on the danger that communism posed for the family unit. The communist *Ruhr Echo* printed an article in which it deplored the decline in female work due to unemployment. The Gewerkverein organ considered this as an attack on the family and pointed out to the miners' wives that, 'for revolutionary reasons it is necessary for them [the Communists] to destroy the family and for the wives to go to the factory, workshop and mine next to the man. That is how the Communist paradise looks! Indeed, the Communists and revolutionary Socialists are the fiercest opponents of an orderly family life. In the socialist social order the working class family would be ruthlessly drawn into drudgery (*Fronarbeit*).'[138] For the Gewerkverein Russia did not represent a freeing of human potential but a destruction of traditional, religious institutions and the reduction of men and women to working machines.

While rivals within the SWMF might castigate each other as foolish or naïve, and use derogatory terms such as the Ablett-type or 'Hodgean Mind',[139] in general neither side sought to label their opponents as the deliberate enemies of trade unionism or of the working class itself. It is noticeable, for example, that, despite his

criticisms of the 'direct actionists', Brace did not reject the idea of the strike as a weapon, merely its timing. Similarly, although he believed *The Plan for the Democratic Control of the Mining Industry* misguided and an 'intellectual conceit', he admired the enthusiasm of its authors. He was in no doubt that this enthusiasm was of use to the movement as long as it was 'controlled, organised and founded on loyalty to the movement.'[140] This respect for the effort underlying these ideas, but rejection of their plans is perhaps best illustrated by Hodges's pamphlet *Workers' Control in the Coal Mining Industry*. While the pamphlet contains much of the same material present in Hodges's book, the pamphlet also touches on Hay's plan for democratic control. Hodges commented,

> Recently a very remarkable scheme was propounded by some South Wales miners for the future control of the industry. It was the work of extremely thoughtful men, and one could perceive in it a spirit of bitterness, because of the complete detachment from the control of the industry by the men engaged in it. I studied that scheme, but could not accept it. At the same time, however, it was an expression in a more or less concrete form of the desires of men who have quite a distinct ambition for an effective control in the industry itself.[141]

Although Hodges rejected Hay's plans, and later went on to describe the 'futility' of syndicalism and its 'anti-social' characteristics,[142] he accepts the psychological background of antagonism that lies behind this plan as the defining characteristic of the industry. Hodges then, while disagreeing with the blueprint for control, validates the Syndicalists' concerns and even pays them a compliment. It is implied that the syndicalist plan is one among many, but, given due consideration, is not the best one. Its authors are, therefore, not identified as enemies, but are included within those trying to work for the betterment of the miner's position (even if they had got it wrong). Nowhere in the document is there the hyperbole that, more often than not, characterises dialogue between the unions in the Ruhr. Even in his criticism of the 'Ablett-type', Hodges does not claim that the strike was unjustified or blame it on those individuals. He restrains his criticism to their role in prolonging the conflict, which he believed would weaken the SWMF by draining its funds. The whole disagreement has the feeling of a disagreement between activists over tactics, rather than fundamentals.

In the Ruhr, on the other hand, supporters of differing conceptions of socialisation were construed as opponents or, as in the case of the Alter Verband, betrayers of the working class as a whole. Admittedly individuals in SWMF were

labelled dangerous or extremist, but they were not systematically pilloried as conscious enemies. Opponents were not regarded as constructing an alternate identity of the miner in their rhetoric. Indeed, they did not create alternatives to place in juxtaposition to the prevailing labour vs. capital model. More often than not rivals were seen as merely misguided, while the sense of frustration and dislike of capitalism underlying their work was met with understanding.

The shared opposition to capitalism of the 'Ablett-types' and 'Hodgean Minds' fed into the third difference between trade unionism in South Wales and the Ruhr. For although they differed over whether nationalisation represented an end goal or a stepping stone to socialisation, Welsh trade union activists were, in the final analysis, agreed on the desirability of its immediate introduction. In the Ruhr the various plans for nationalisation and socialisation were mutually exclusive. As the AAU pamphlet laid out it was a question of either-or; either workers' control or nationalisation; either small share-ownership or socialisation. In South Wales, on the other hand, the different plans were not mutually exclusive. The more pragmatic culture of the SWMF meant that rather than a question of either-or, it was a question of nationalisation now and (for some) socialisation later. In light of the employers' determination to retain the industry in private hands and the Government's perceived betrayal of the miners in relinquishing control in 1921, the issue of nationalisation gave both the 'nationalisers' and the 'socialisers' a common platform on which to fight.

The unequivocal rejection of nationalisation by the employers and by Government after Lloyd George's speech in the Commons in August 1919 also meant that the SWMF activists could indulge in a clear, unambiguous 'othering' of their opponents.[143] In other words, the battle lines between those opposed to nationalisation (the Government and the employers) and those in favour (the miners) could be clearly drawn in the discourse of both sides. The TUC decision not to pursue nationalisation through a general strike, but through a publicity campaign, and the flood of pro- and contra- literature that was subsequently produced by both camps, heightened this employer/Government – miners dichotomy. The MFGB, for example, produced a series of twelve leaflets to support their case. Many of these pamphlets, drawing on evidence submitted to the Sankey Commission, focused on the supposed wastefulness of capitalism. Others struck a humanitarian and moral note, carrying headings such as 'Every day four Miners are killed!' and 'Nationalise the mines and save the lives of

men!'[144] Others, in keeping with the 'The Mines for the Nation' slogan, sought to underline the benefits of nationalisation to the wider community. Pamphlet ten argued that nationalisation would remove the middlemen resulting in lower prices for consumers, while number nine appealed directly to the middle class by stressing how the official would also benefit.[145] A similar line was adopted by the pamphlets *Facts from the Coal Commission* and *Further Facts from the Coal Commission.* The latter especially made emotive use of notions of betrayal. Robin Page Arnot, its editor, cited Hartshorn's reaction to sum up this feeling. 'Was it a huge game of bluff? Was it never intended that if the reports favoured nationalisation we were to get it? [The miners] will say "we have been deceived, betrayed, duped."'[146]

Militaristic Discourse and 'Enemies'

Perhaps the most emotive claim used by the unions was that of profiteering. In a reworking of Government recruitment propaganda, pamphlet two carried the heading 'what did you do in the Great War Mr. Coalowner?' It claimed that the owners' profits had risen by 270 percent.[147] Naturally, nationalisation meant an end to this profiteering.[148] Instead, the industry would be put at the service of the nation, just as it had been during the war. As Sankey had pointed out, it was the war that had shown that State ownership was a practical possibility. In this context, the constant reminders of the dangerous nature of minework can, therefore, be linked to notions of sacrifice and selflessness that arose from the war. Hartshorn drew a direct comparison between the conflict and the industry in his evidence before the Sankey Commission. 'In the mining industry the casualties are more like those of the battlefield than anything else. The only difference between the soldier and the miner is that the miner can never ask for an armistice. He cannot even treat for terms of surrender. The casualties go on every day.'[149] Meanwhile A. J. Cook claimed at a meeting in Gwaun-cae-Gurwen that the 1921 lockout was:

> a war of attrition and starvation that the Government were waging to conquer...Our battle is the battle of the workers of the world ...If the mines cannot pay under the present system, then we must sooner or later lock-out the capitalist. The root of all evil was with capitalism. Make up your minds to destroy it. Unless you do, the struggle will go on until freedom and justice reign supreme. He wanted peace, but the right peace. The writing is on the wall.[150]

Notions of war appeared again during the 1926 dispute. Cook described the conflict as an 'industrial war' and claimed the MFGB 'executive is now a council of war.'[151] On one level such war imagery was used to construct feelings of solidarity among the men. However, it also accentuated the notion that industrial relations were essentially based on conflict and helped further bury more collaborationist trends.

Another problem for collaborationist thinking was the attempt to depict the industrial disputes of 1920, 1921 and 1926 as not merely an issue affecting the miners, but as symptomatic of the essential conflict between labour and capital. It was in this vein that S.O. Davies claimed in 1921 that,

> he could not comprehend how any worker, whatever the industry he found employment in, being able to circumscribe the crisis as being merely a conflict between the mineowners and the miners of this country...The organised forces of capital were momentarily confronting the organised ranks of the miners, but the defeat of the miners, if it could be consummated, would never satisfy organised capital. The other workers were asked to come into the fight not because the mining forces were disintegrated, but because the fight was one of organised Capital versus the whole of organised Labour.[152]

Such monolithic characterisation of labour and capital made it difficult to find a common basis for negotiation. Conflict was seen as the existential core of the relationship between the two sides. Within this discourse centred on the idea of 'capital versus labour' any agreement would ultimately seem more like a temporary truce in an inevitable conflict than a step toward lasting co-operation.

The miners' leaders in South Wales were not the only ones to feed this discursive construct in speeches and publication. The employers too drew analogies between the industrial disputes and the Great War. For example, in 1919 the *Colliery Guardian* commented, in an article provocatively entitled 'Take the Gloves Off!' that,

> the question has long since ceased to be a coalowners' question; they merely occupied the front trench. It is now for all the interests, small and great, to rally to the standard in the fight against unprincipled disorder, which will surely, if this picket is overrun, spread to every branch of the national life. Every tradesman and householder must be brought to see that the portent of these preliminary skirmishes is that England will change hands, not merely the land but everything on it and under it, and that the ultimate possession, after a brief and disastrous hegemony, will be an oligarchy embracing many of those whose earnest endeavour has been to surrender the country to its enemies.[153]

Ross McKibbin has argued that the war militarised the mentality of much of the middle class,[154] thereby making the imagery of trench warfare and heroic defence of

the nation highly evocative. Like the union activists the employers were intent on widening the terms of the conflict beyond the industry. The miners, or more often their leaders, were placed beyond the pale, described as un-national and equated implicitly with Britain's wartime enemies. This language was evident both in the external and internal organisational discourse of the employers' organisations. Evan Williams, head of the MSWCOA, also believed that nationalisation threatened the nation. He told other Welsh owners that it is 'in the interests of the Country [that] Nationalisation should be opposed most strongly as it would be disastrous to the Country's export trade and ultimate existence...There would be nothing to give in exchange for the food on which the people live with the probable result of anarchy and revolution.'[155] Thus, it was not simply in the interest of the employers to resist nationalisation, but also of the country at large. In this way the employers became protectors of the nation. This portrayal of the miners fed on fears of Bolshevism and Syndicalism. At the annual general meetings of the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company, the Chairman, John Shaw, repeatedly extorted the shareholders to canvas their MPs to reject nationalisation.[156] Following the 1921 dispute he warned the shareholders not to become complacent. 'Do not think for a moment, ladies and gentlemen, that we are out of the wood yet. The Communists and Bolshevists are just as lively as they ever were.' To emphasis the ever-present nature of this threat he pointed to the engineering strike and the Irish troubles. He could only hope that the men had begun to realise 'that their leaders have not been leading them aright.'[157] Hugh Bramwell, director of the Great Western Collieries Co., also believed that 'unrest in South Wales was mainly due to the fact the extremists had got possession of the lodges.'[158] Meanwhile, the *Colliery Guardian* conflated syndicalism and communism. 'Syndicalism does not welcome nationalisation except as a means to an end, and it is quite unscrupulous in the attainment of its selfish aims. After all, Bolshevism is nought else but Syndicalism under another of its many names.'[159] Like the SWMF, the MSWCOA and other employers' organisations also represented the conflict as having wider implications for the nation.

The coal owners of South Wales also had an outlet for their discourse in the form of the employer-friendly *Western Mail*. In the course of 1919 the paper reproduced the proceedings of meetings of various coal companies which all ultimately ended with resolutions against nationalisation.[160] It also expressed the view that the strike wave that afflicted Britain was due to the influence of Central Labour

College classes, which spread Bolshevik and syndicalist ideas.[161] A recent suggestion that the miners generally disliked the *Western Mail* has been countered by the assertion that it was available in all miners' libraries.[162] Whatever the miners' attitude to the paper generally, trade union activists at least regarded it as an employers' paper, so much so that it was used to reinforce their own arguments. Cook, as part of the RILU campaign stated, 'take note, Welsh miners, the coalowners' paper the *Western Mail*, warns you against the Red International – that should be sufficient for you to decide.'[163] Meanwhile, the *Labour Voice* was certain that the *Western Mail* had been invaluable in securing the election of George Barker at the 1921 Abertillery bye-election. 'An invaluable aid to Mr Barker was the opposition of the Western Mail. The miners saw a journal, which is avowedly and openly conducted in the interests of the coalowners vigorously attacking their leader, and they felt it their moral duty to come to his aid.' The paper went on to claim that the miners may criticise their own leaders, but like a family quarrel they don't want anyone from outside to interfere.[164] This attitude seems characteristic of the South Wales miners' movement in the early 1920s.

War imagery was even more widespread in the Weimar Republic and was given special resonance by the high degree of political violence. Benjamin Ziemann has noted how the experience of the Front destabilised Germany's political culture, whereas in France it strengthened the republican synthesis.[165] Battles between the Ruhr Red Army, Free Corps and police provided martyrs and legends for both sides.[166] Generally, the Communists made most use of images of war and martyrdom. The memories of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, for example, were transformed into alternative, communist celebrations.[167] A Hamborn Communist constructed an altar to Liebknecht and Luxemburg.[168] More locally, disasters such as the Minister Stein explosion, which killed 136 miners, provided material for propaganda attacking both the employers and the other unions. Much like the SWMF activists, the Ruhr Communists sought to widen the struggle to encompass the whole of the working class.[169] The Alter Verband, however, was critical of using these tragedies for such purposes, although it also took the opportunity to attack the profit interest in the mines.[170] Eric Weitz has noted the KPD's need for enemies. He argues that in the vitriolic attacks the Communists made on their enemies the party was tapping into real working-class experiences of humiliation by officials or harassment by the police.[171] Furthermore, Weitz has highlighted the militaristic ethos, which

pervaded communist literature. For example, cartoons and photographs depicted identifiably working-class men bearing arms in defence of the Soviet Union.[172]

However, although SWMF activists may have largely accepted internal disagreement and closed ranks when faced with criticism from outside the organisation, this toleration was not extended to those who broke away from the union. Although, in the years immediately after the war, the SWMF had been successful in absorbing some of the smaller craft unions, after the defeat in 1921 some broke away to form their own organisations.[173] Opprobrium was heaped on the South Wales and Monmouthshire Mechanical and Surface Workers' Union and a vigorous campaign waged against it. The clearest example of the abuse meted out the Mechanical Union appears in a leaflet produced regarding its use of Mardy Hall for meetings. The leaflet began by castigating the Mechanical Union as a 'parasite organisation', before listing the disadvantages of craft unions.

> This Meeting of Subscribers is normally called to decide whether the new Organisation is to be granted the use of a Room in Mardy Hall. But really, from a Federationist point of view, the issue is whether we are going to assist any section of the workers to revert back to petty Craft Unionism... Craft Unionism breeds disloyalty, disunity, disorganisation, and chaos, and we mean to obstruct and sabotage all attempts to steer for such a cause.

The leaflet continued by arguing that while craft unionism may have been appropriate when employers were smaller now they were inadequate. 'To Face the solidly organised Employing Class of to-day, the Craft Union is about as evenly matched as the 'Bow and Arrow' would be against the modern 'Machine Gun'. It ended with a threat for the Mechanical Union and a rallying cry for the SWMF.

> Let us point out to them that the fact [that] their belonging to a 'Scab Organisation' will make no difference in our Strike Policy... Whatever any combination of Blacklegs may decide to do in the interests of their masters, the Federation will have something to say on the question as to whether those men shall be allowed to work to not. Let them not build for themselves a 'Fool Paradise'... Let the Mineworkers of Mardy realise that the Federation is not dead. It was only temporarily stunned by the blows of its enemies. The Assassin Knife of Craft Unionism, now being used in the attempt to finish off the Giant, will also fail to accomplish the deed. Staggered though it was by the blow, and the reverse of the late Lock-out, the Federation still lives, and its power and vigour is returning. Before long, by loyal service from all workers in the Industry, we shall yet attain one Union for the Mining Industry, and thus build up the Machinery which will make for the emancipation of our Class.[174]

The use of the terms 'scab' and 'blackleg' to 'other' the splinter union had roots stretching back into the pre-war period. Furthermore, the idea of dealing a deathblow to sectional unions had been raised soon after the formation of the SWMF. However, the discourse employed in the pre-war period was certainly not so vitriolic. Evident in the criticisms of craft unions and reference to one union are the echoes of syndicalism. Rather new was also the implicit accusation of betrayal in the notion of the assassin's knife. It may be argued that such language was unsurprising in Mardy, that 'Little Moscow' of the coalfield. But criticisms and even the interruption of Mechanical Union meetings also occurred elsewhere.[175] The Mardy leaflet may represent an extreme form of SWMF discourse regarding the Mechanical Union, but it also demonstrates both the more aggressive tone the organisation had adopted since the war and the odium that any attempt to form, or reform, alternative union structures would attract.

The Labour Party in Wales also maintained a flexible and broad-based discourse. McKibbin has argued that politics during the 1920s bore a strong resemblance to Edwardian politics. The most significance change in the immediate post-war era was the breakdown of the progressive alliance between the Labour and Liberal parties.[176] The example of the South Wales coalfield seems to bear out McKibbin's assertion. Certainly, the increasing emphasis on the working class identified in the immediate pre-war discourse was accentuated in the 1920s. Paralleling the weakening of the class collaborative trend in the SWMF discourse, so the Labour Party's juxtaposition of the working class against the employers became even more pronounced in South Wales. Unlike the SPD, which had adopted and adapted the idea of the Volk to its identification with the Republic, the Labour Party in South Wales increasingly moved away from the gwerin, supplanting it instead with the Welsh working class.[177]

Elements of that older discourse did survive however. An article in the liberal journal, *The Welsh Outlook*, in 1919 seemed to commit the Labour Party to greater autonomy for Wales. Comments from prominent Labour leaders from across Wales reinforced the point.[178] Election material and political speeches also contained traces of old Liberal concerns. One such example was T.I. Mardy Jones. In the 1922 election he defended his Pontypridd seat against Sir Rhys Williams. Williams was castigated not only as 'a brewer, [but also] a landlord, and a coalowner.' Here Labour sought to combine the older concerns of temperance and agricultural grievances with the

problems of the modern proletariat. More typical of Labour's discourse at the time was the elision of the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Both were represented as the political representatives of capitalism.[179] Similarly, in Ammanford James Griffiths accused the Liberal Coalitionists of betraying 'those principles of Free Trade and Welsh Disestablishment which they had hitherto championed.'[180] A week later it was claimed 'the Liberal Party and the Tories had united together, and they were opposing Labour, and there was now a fight between Capital and Labour.'[181]

This juxtaposition of Labour, as the party of the workers, and of the Liberals and Conservatives, as the parties of capitalism, was also evident at the other end of the coalfield at Pontypool. Tom Griffiths's election declaration elided political and industrial issues.

> To be a Trade Unionist and fight your fellow during a strike, and to be a Tory or a Liberal and fight against your fellows at an Election is folly. During a strike there are no Tories or Liberals amongst the strikers; they are all workers. At Election time many of the workers forget they are Trade Unionists; others even forget they are members of the Co-operative Society, and are only Liberals of Tories. During an Election there are Tory and Liberal employers, and all of them are friends of the workers. During a strike there are no Tories or Liberals amongst the employers; they are all Capitalists and enemies of the workers. A Trade Unionist voting the Boss to Parliament! Is there any logic, or common-sense in such action?

A potted biography of Griffiths stressed his working-class origins. Unlike, the Lib-Labs, Griffiths was clear on the merits of the capital levy contained in the Labour Party platform. 'The Capital Levy would not affect [the workers] in any way, but it would affect the millionaires and the profiteers who made four thousand millions of wealth during the period of the war, and also the two knights who were opposing him, who also amassed fabulous fortunes during the war.'[182] At a later election the sentiment was even less ambivalent. 'Let a Labour majority dictate to the mineowners.'[183] There is little sense of a co-operative relationship in these statements. Interestingly, however, the latter was attributed to one Rev David Richards. Another preacher, James Griffin, also supported Griffiths' candidature. The mixed reaction of Nonconformity towards the labour movement still characterised the political culture of South Wales and undoubtedly contributed to Labour's hegemony despite the increasing secularised culture of the Valleys. Indeed, Morgan has noted the high proportion of lay preachers and deacons among Labour's Welsh MPs, and suggests that Nonconformity had now become more of an asset for Labour than Liberalism.[184]

Unsurprisingly, the CPGB shared this elision of Liberalism and Conservatism. Significantly, unlike the KPD in Germany, the CPGB more often than not supported Labour candidates rather than challenged them. Relations between Labour and the CPGB could be tense. The *Cymmer Searchlight* complained,

> how can the National E.C. of the Labour Party instruct Local Labour Parties to expel Communist[s] with the threat that they will expel them from the Labour Party if they will not carry in to effect their decision, when at the same time prominent members of the E.C. are feasting, drinking and holiday making with the Boss Class. Comrades we ask you who are the workers friends? The Communist now arrested or these so called Labour leaders?[185]

Yet despite these criticisms the pit paper encouraged its readers to vote for David Thomas, the Labour candidate for the Cymmer ward in the local election. It identified a class bias in the local elections, the Conservatives and the Liberals having sunk their differences, just as at parliamentary level, to vote against Labour.

Part of Labour's replacement of the *gwerin* with the Welsh working class involved claiming the Liberal's mantle of progressivism. In fact, one criticism focused on the idea that Liberal policies had become out-dated. In 1924 the Liberals produced a pamphlet entitled *Coal and Power* which set out its policies regarding the coal industry. The review of the pamphlet by D. J. Williams in the *Colliery Workers' Magazine* can be regarded as characteristic of the general view of the Liberal discourse by South Wales Labour activists. The pamphlet itself argued that industry and commerce were the basis of prosperity. Royalties, however, were the chief evil as this represented unearned wealth and made the industry less competitive on the world market. Williams rightly saw this pamphlet as an attempt to revive enthusiasm for the old Liberal shibboleth of anti-'landlordism'. He believed the historical platform of Liberalism, based on Free Trade and land reform was largely irrelevant to contemporary politics. Liberals were guilty of blaming the landowners alone for the troubles of the industry, while ignoring the pernicious effects of private enterprise itself. 'The miner will be consulted, but not trusted. There is, of course, the usual platitudinous wail about miserable housing conditions in the mining villages, and the blames for this is placed everywhere but at the door of private enterprise.'[186]

The notion that Liberal discourse largely remained based upon the same ideas that it had been before the war is also borne out once the electoral language of the candidates is examined. For example, Griffiths' opponent for Pontypool, Major

Beaumont Thomas, followed the well-established 'friend of the workers' track. Admitting he was an employer, he added 'he happened to count among his best friends wage-earners and he said that no employer was worth his salt if he could not say he could also represent his employees.'[187] Others, like Captain R.T. Evans at Llanelli, emphasised their working-class origins. In 1923 he claimed that 'his father was a collier, and he was one of six kids, so that he knew something of the atmosphere of a collier's home.'[188] In a more direct allusion to the tradition of Lib-Labism, David Rees supported the labourism of Mabon. 'I am not here to fight Labour as such...When Mabon stood for the Rhondda I voted for him. Therefore, I am not unfriendly to Labour. Why do I fight Mardy Jones? Because he is for Socialism, and I am against it.'[189] Liberals were not the only ones to claim working-class credentials. David Evans, the Unionist candidate for Pontypridd, 'claimed he had a greater right than his opponent to describe himself as a working man candidate. On the night of his adoption he changed into his working clothes and was at work that night. If he were defeated in the fight, he would not be afraid to return to the collieries again.'[190]

The 'people' and Welsh identity also remained important aspects of Liberal discourse. Many Liberals lamented the passing of the progressive alliance. Clark Williams, Captain Evans' predecessor as Liberal candidate for Llanelli, explicitly tried to rally Liberals around 'the Old Flag.' 'He referred to the struggle between the Liberal and the Labour Party. He wondered how it had come about, for time was that Liberalism stood for no class, but for the welfare of the people as a whole.'[191] McKenna, who stood as a non-Coalition Liberal for Pontypool in 1918, also stressed the idea that Liberalism could encompass all classes. When asked why he did not join the Labour Party, since he refused to be part of the Coalition, he replied 'the Labour Party...was sectional but the Liberal Party represented all, and were out to secure equal rights for all.' In an odd attempt, reminiscent of the way labels such as Tory had been suffused with derogatory meaning by pre-war Liberals, McKenna tried to undermine Labour by describing it as the 'left wing of Conservatism.'[192] In the more rural constituencies 'Welshness' remained important. Sir Ellis J. Griffiths at Carmarthenshire, for example, admitted that he was 'not a Carmarthenshire boy, but he was a thorough Welshman who loved the language and ideals of Wales and he had yet to learn that a Welshman was a foreigner in the county of Carmarthenshire.'[193] Yet national identity was also evident in Liberal discourse in the more industrial,

western constituencies. At Caerphilly S. R. Jenkins 'emphasised that he was a son of Wales, was one of the people, for the people, and had striven through life for Liberalism as a creed for the advancement of human happiness.'[194] David Rees was even more impassioned. His election address stated:

> He is a Welsh-speaking Welshman, and his feelings are strongly nationalistic. He even hopes to live to see the day when there will be a Welsh Parliament at Cardiff that will deal with distinctly Welsh questions. He is a strong supporter of the Welsh language, and the 'language of Paradise' is the language he uses in this own home. He believes that Liberalism will give to the worker all and more than Socialism would give him, and that personal incentive would remain, whereas under Socialism it would vanish.[195]

The continuities between the features of this discourse and pre-war Liberalism are plain to see. Yet despite their claim to represent the 'people' it is clear that Liberal discourse had lost much of its ability to encompass the widest-cross section of the community possible. The erosion of the gwerin ideal that was already evident in the 1900s was accelerated after the war. Several interrelated factors contributed to this decline. In one respect the Liberals can be regarded as a victim of their own success. The disestablishment of the Church, for example, robbed religious motifs of their immediacy. It is noticeable that in all the examples given above the pre-war Nonconformity/Welsh-Anglican/English discursive dichotomy does not appear. Moreover, as shown, Labour had successfully adopted much of Liberalism's progressive rhetoric. Finally, a discourse based on the co-operation of labour and capital seemed hardly to correspond with the reality of bitter, months-long industrial disputes.

If Liberalism was a stagnating force in the mining valleys of South Wales during the early to mid-1920s, there was another alternative discourse to the Labour-SWMF hegemony. This discourse had its roots in Conservatism. Like pre-war Conservatism, much of its appeal focused on a distinctly British identity. During the 1918 'Coupon' election there was some overlap with Coalition Liberals, as the Government sought to capitalise on its success in conducting the war. Much of Coalition electioneering in 1918 was shot through with an anti-German, 'Hang the Kaiser' mentality. Captain Seaton, the Conservative candidate for Pontypridd, began his campaign on this basis. He believed 'there were some who wanted them to treat the Germans kindly and give them a fresh start. He was strongly opposed to anything of the kind. Germany should be made to pay for the mischief she had done.'[196] Later

Seaton withdrew and threw his support behind the Coalition Liberal T. Arthur Lewis, who also campaigned on the basis of victory over Germany. He contrasted the victorious Coalition to the ILPers, implying that the latter would have led the country to defeat. 'The Coalition Government destroyed Prussian Militarism which would have been victorious if the ILPers and conscientious objectors had had their way and it is the Coalition Government that should have the carrying out of the peace settlement.'[197] Leonard Llewelyn the Coalition candidate for Pontypool also stressed the need to punish Germany.[198] C. B. Stanton at Aberdare also laid heavy emphasis on Britishness. For him the war had apparently represented an epiphany as 'he discovered for the first time that he was British.' He pledged to conduct himself in Parliament 'by the memory of a million dead and a million maimed and carry on as a Britisher.'[199] But while such a discourse had helped him to victory in 1918, by 1922 much of the 'transitory war mood' that underpinned his earlier victories (and those of Coalition candidates) had evaporated. Instead, the class identity expounded by Labour and the SWMF ultimately proved stronger than appeals based on national duty.

Within the industrial sphere there also existed a minority trend, which proved more resilient than political Liberalism and Conservatism. Since much of the press was either pro-liberal or pro-labour, the specific contours of this discourse are difficult to access. References to the existence of a Labour-Unionist movement appeared in the pages of the *Glamorgan County Times*. Meetings focused on the issue of 'sane trade unionism.' Moreover, an Economic Study Club aimed at countering the Marxist economic teaching disseminated by the CLC classes. Here a discursive dichotomy was drawn between extremism and constitutionalism, which was understood as respect for the existing social order. Gwilym Rowlands, Conservative councillor, believed that 'you either have to be a Constitutionalist or an extremist. Politically, Liberalism was dead.'[200]

This conservative trend also had links within the SWMF. As already noted, several lodges initially rejected nationalisation. Moreover, Mike Lieven has used the example of the Ynysybwl lodge to highlight the plurality of political beliefs in the mining valleys. Here the local Tories were able briefly to gain control of the lodge committee.[201] D. B. Jones and his Mechanical Workers had been, however briefly, members of the SWMF. Undoubtedly, the shattering effects of the 1926 dispute weakened the SWMF position, sapping its financial and human resources, but the activists who formed the breakaway industrial union in 1926 did not emerge from the

ranks of the unorganised. George Spencer had been an official in the Nottinghamshire Miners' Association.[202] In South Wales, it was former SWMF members led by William Gregory who broke away to form the organisation that eventually became the SWMIU.[203] The SWMIU rejection of politics and industrial action can be regarded as a reassertion of a more collaborative and conservative strain of discourse that had existed within the SWMF. From 1926, however, this discourse was being used against the SWMF. SWMF discourse, hegemonic for so long by virtue of its flexibility, had lost its ability by the end of 1926 to flatten out the differences between the miners. It remained dominant, but, temporarily at least, the process of homogenisation that characterised its discourse from 1898 was broken. However, as a corollary the loss of industrial strength caused a shift to the political, reinforcing the mining valleys as a Labour stronghold.

Summary

In the early 1920s both continuities and changes are identifiable in the discursive practices of the miners' trade unions and the parties. For the SWMF the war had been a confidence building experience and passed the initiative to the more combative discourse that existed before the war. The more collaborative discourse within the SWMF was submerged, but not banished, by a more aggressive tone that saw the differences between capital and labour as irrevocable. The solution to the conflict could be found in nationalisation, which entailed the abolition of capitalism. In fact nationalisation provided the perfect platform for this language. The employers' strong resistance to state control meant that it could be easily held up as an example of the essential conflict of interest between labour and capital. Leaders and activist made the issue symbolic of this wider struggle. Admittedly, some individuals sought a more radical solution in socialisation, but even they believed that nationalisation was a necessary first step. Nationalisation, therefore, provided a common basis around which to rally the miners. Moreover, despite the more aggressive discourse of the SWMF, it remained pragmatic. Its toleration of different ideas was represented by the editorial policy of the *CWM*. Issues such as nationalisation, socialisation and affiliation to the RILU were freely debated in its organ. However, the debilitating effects of the 1921 and 1926 lockout ultimately sapped this confidence and the more collaborative trend was eventually able to reassert itself in the form of the SWMIU.

The Labour Party's commitment to nationalisation provided a political parallel to the industrial sphere. Labour was not totally successful in 1918, but by the mid-1920s had gained control of the mining constituencies. But support for nationalisation was not Labour's only prerequisite for success in South Wales. The party benefited by taking on some features of Liberal discourse. Moreover, just as the collaborative strain in SWMF discourse declined in the 1920s, so too the co-operation between labour and capital advocated by the Liberals seemed equally unconvincing in the light of the bitter industrial disputes of the 1920s. On the other hand, Labour's political language, which excluded the industrialists from the community in the same way that Liberalism had excluded the landowners, fitted well with the atmosphere of industrial conflict. The idea of the community and the working class were increasingly elided. While Liberalism could only offer a modified version of its *gwerin*-landowner dichotomy through the abolition of royalties, Labour's support for nationalisation allowed it to use this elision of community and class to project itself as the guardian of the community and the proletariat. By combining this with the acceptance of some Liberal concerns, Labour was able to usurp the mantle of the progressive party. Finally, although the Communists remained among Labour's fiercest critics, they regarded themselves more as a watchdog than a rival organisation and usually threw what influence they had behind Labour. In another example of the greater 'fluidity' of civil society in South Wales Communists and Labour generally regarded themselves as members of the same 'family' for much of this period and dual membership of the CPGB and other Labour organisations was tolerated. Thus, unlike the Ruhr, where divisions between Communists and Social Democrats were sharply drawn, relations between Communists and Labour activists in South Wales were highly fluid before 1927. Although the process of homogenisation had faltered in the industrial sphere, it continued in politics.

In the Ruhr the fragmentation identified during the *Kaiserreich* was accentuated by the war. Unlike Labour, the SPD was unable to contain the tensions generated by the war. This split in the social-democratic milieux was to prove crucial. Whereas Labour was able to largely monopolise a working-class discourse in South Wales, in the Ruhr, the SPD found itself challenged by the USPD and later the KPD. The fluid relations evident in South Wales were impossible between the KPD and SPD as each simply rejected the others claim to represent the working class as illegitimate. Similarly, although the Alter Verband had grown closer to the

Gewerkverein, it had also splintered on the left and now had to deal with the various syndicalist and communist unions. In some respects the KPD and Syndicalists represented an assertion, or reassertion, of a discourse that already existed in the labour movement. The Commission of Nine, for example, was aware of its social-democratic roots, while the Syndicalists drew on the even older tradition of pit-head meetings. The SPD found that to some extent its claim to be the workers' party had been hijacked. It sought to adapt to this challenge and the changed political environment by embracing a more inclusive discourse represented by the *Volk*. However, the *Volk* used by the SPD was intimately linked to the socialist Republic. This differentiated it from the Centre, which clung to a political language based on Christian belief. For both parties there were tensions between their attempts to reach out to a broader electorate and their older 'milieux-fixated' discourses. The discourses of both the Centre and the SPD underwent modification, which saw new force given to some older elements (e.g. patriotism for the SPD) or the introduction of new ideas (e.g. republicanism for the Centre). But essentially both remained predicated on the overarching themes which had dominated their pre-war identities: class and religion.

Finally, while nationalisation was a broadly understood and supported concept in South Wales, in the Ruhr socialisation was a confused and shifting idea. Each group had its own version of socialisation and each was ultimately incompatible. It was used to mobilise a certain constituency, not the miners as a whole. The organisations' intolerance of dissent meant that they were unable to integrate their different versions of socialisation. To do so risked losing their existing support among the miners. The RILU provides an example of how dual membership was often not tolerated. Affiliation or non-affiliation to the RILU was not subject to debate, but became a defining characteristic that distinguished one trade union from another. The doctrinaire understanding of such issues precluded any enduring attempt at co-operation and perpetuated the fragmented nature of the labour movement.

---

[1] *CNWWGA* 7 December 1923.
[2] Stenbock-Fermor, *Erlebnisse*, p. 77.
[3] Ross McKibbin, 'Classes and Cultures: A Postscript', *Mitteilungsblatt* 27, 2003, pp. 153-66.
[4] See Ch. 4, pp. 25-6.
[5] Dick Geary, 'The Myth of the Radical Miner',
[6] Neunerkommission für die Vorbereitung der Sozialisierung des Bergbaues, *Die Sozialisierung des Bergbaues und der Generalstreik im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet*, 1919, p. 3.
[7] Ibid, pp. 3-4.

[8] Peter von Oertzen, *Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution. Eine politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der betrieblichen und wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19*, Berlin/Bonn-Bad Godersberg, J. H. W. Nachf. GmbH, 1976, p. 128.
[9] Neunerkommission, *Sozialisierung*, pp. 8-9.
[10] Ibid. p. 9.
[11] Ibid. p. 12.
[12] Ibid. p. 19.
[13] Peter von Oertzen, 'Die Grossen Streiks der Ruhrbergarbeiterschaft im Frühjahr 1919. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über die revolutinäre Entstehnungsphase der Weimarer Republik', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 6, 3, 1958, pp. 231-6.
[14] Neunerkommission, *Sozialisierung*, p. 5.
[15] Ibid. p. 20.
[16] Ibid, pp. 24-8.
[17] Ibid, pp. 25.
[18] *Freie Arbeiter-Union. Organ der Schacht- und Betriebsorganisation der Hand- und Kopfarbeiter Deutschlands/Wirtschaftsbezirk Rheinland-Westfalen*, 30 October 1920. The Union claimed that its paper had 126,000 subscribers, Polizeipräsident Bochum - Regpräsident Arnsberg, 8 October 1921, STAM Reg. Arnsberg 14442.
[19] *An die revolutionären Arbeiter*, 21 October 1921, STAB, LA 1314
[20] Polizei Direktor Bochum to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 2 July 1921, STAM Reg. Arnsberg, 14442. Individual members were, however, permitted to affiliate within any party.
[21] Polizei Direktor Bochum to Regierungspräsident Arnsberg, 21 June 1921, STAM Reg. Arnsberg 14442. The Bolsheviks were also condemned for their suppression of Russian Syndicalists.
[22] Fritz Oerter, *Was wollen die Syndikalisten?*, 1920, p. 11.
[23] Ibid, p 16.
[24] See for example, Franz Barwich, *Der kommunistische Aufbau des Syndikalismus im Gegensatz zum Partei-Kommunismus und Staatsozialismus*, Berlin, Der Syndikalist, 1920; Oerter, *Syndikalisten?*; F. Brandt, *Syndikalismus und Kommunismus*, August 1919.
[25] Oerter, *Syndikalisten?*, p. 11.
[26] See Ch. 4.
[27] Although arguably communism represented a substitute religion for some KPD activists.
[28] See Ch. 2.
[29] *WK* 15 March 1925
[30] Ibid, 26 March 1925
[31] Ibid, 24 March 1924
[32] See *An das arbeitende Volk Deutschlands*, 14 March 1925, *Ihr müßt wahlen?*, 1925, *Arbeiter! Parteigenossen! Proletariat von ganz Deutschlands!*, 1919, IZF, Mappe 10.
[33] *Ebert oder Ludendorff?*, 1919, Mappe 10.
[34] *Gegen das Betriebsrätegesetz. Für revolutionäre Betriebsräte*, 1919, IZF, Mappe 10.
[35] *An die Arbeiter der ganzen Welt* and *Die russische proletarische Revolution Sowjet-Rußland ist in Gefahr!*, 1919, IZF, Mappe 10.
[36] Otto Hue, *Die Sozialisierung der Kohlenwirtschaft*, Berlin, Vorwärts Verlag, 1921, p. 14.
[37] *BZ* 1 February 1919.
[38] *WM* 14 February 1919; *BZ*, 7 October 1916
[39] Fachgruppe Bergbau, press release, 20 November 1920, BBA 230; Minutes of Directors Meetings Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company Ltd, 18 March 1924, GRO D/D PD 1/8, p. 20; *CG*, 17 January, 23 March and 19 December 1919; Ferndale Lodge Minutes, 27 January 1926, L/33/A7; *AL*, 25 October 1924.
[40] Minutes of MFGB, Executive Committee Meeting, 13 January; Special Conference, Southport, 14 – 16 January 1919, p. 9 and p. 47.
[41] Cited in Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 2, p. 153.
[42] See Ch. 4.
[43] Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 2, p. 143.
[44] *WM* 17 February 1919
[45] *WM* 10 October 1919
[46] Frank Hodges, *Nationalisation of the Mines*, London, Leonard Parsons, 1920, p. ix.
[47] Ibid, p. 111.
[48] Ibid, p. 131.
[49] Ibid, p. 81.

[50] Ibid, p. 130.
[51] Frank Hodges, *My Adventures as a Labour Leader*, London, George Newnes, 1925, p. 23.
[52] MFGB Minutes, Special Conference, London, 26 February 1919, pp. 135-47.
[53] Ibid, p. 66. For a sympathetic account of Hodges see Chris Williams, 'The Odyssey of Frank Hodges', *Transaction of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion*, 5, 1999, pp. 110-30.
[54] *BZ* 14 January 1919
[55] Bericht der Sozialisierungskommission über die Frage der Sozialisierung des Kohlenbergbaues vom 31. July 1920, Berlin, Engelmann, 1920, pp. 36-40.
[56] Protokoll der Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, XXI. Generalversammlung, Bielfeld, 15 – 21 June 1919, pp. 389-400.
[57] Hermann Löffler, 'Die Sozialiserung des Bergbaues', Nachlaß Löffler, Div. 2 Mappe 10, 1920.
[58] Hue, *Sozialisierung*, p. 15.
[59] *Bk* 30 November 1918
[60] See *Bk* 22 and 29 March 1919, 20 March 1920.
[61] Bericht über das 25 jährige Jubelfest und Potokoll der 15. Generalversammlung des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 24 to 27 August 1919, Essen, p. 141 and p. 144.
[62] Ibid, 19 August 1922
[63] Ibid, 15 May 1920
[64] Imbusch, 'Sozialisierung des Bergbaues', *DA*, 1919, p. 64.
[65] Ibid, p. 65.
[66] Ibid, p. 66.
[67] *WVZ* 10 January 1919
[68] *Bk* 18 February 1922
[69] See Imbusch, 'Sozialisierung', pp. 304-9; Bericht über das 25 jährige Jubelfest, pp. 170-81; Hermann Vogelsang, *Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für den Bergbau*, Essen, Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1920.
[70] *Bk* 12 April 1919.
[71] Ibid, 27 January 1923
[72] See *Bk* 1 December 1923, 26 January, 1 March, 15 March, 12 April 1924.
[73] Ibid, 17 May and 24 May 1924
[74] Ibid,
[75] Rudolf Hilferding, *Die Sozialisierung und die Machtverhältnisse der Klassen*, Berlin, 1920.
[76] Ibid, p. 10
[77] Ibid, p. 20.
[78] Ibid, p. 27.
[79] Hue, *Sozialisierung*, p. 11.
[80] *BZ* 13 September 1919.
[81] Hue, *Sozialisierung*, p. 8.
[82] Dr. Franz Lütgenau, *Was wollen die Syndikalisten?*, Berlin, Verlag für praktische Politik und geistige Erneuerung, 1920, p. 11.
[83] Ibid, p. 9.
[84] Detlev J. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, Penguin, London, 1991, p. 151.
[85] *EAZ* 18 January 1919, *RWAZ*, 16 January 1919.
[86] *Vb* 2 January 1919
[87] Ibid, 4 January 1919
[88] See Mappe 11, IZF.
[89] *Vb* 15 January 1919
[90] Hilferding, *Sozialisierung*, pp. 15-6.
[91] Ibid, 3 June 1920
[92] *RWAZ* 4 May 1922.
[93] Evans, *Centre*, pp. ix-xi.
[94] Ibid, pp. 262-3.
[95] *EVZ* 7 January 1919
[96] Ibid, 4 January 1919
[97] *WVZ* 31 January 1921
[98] *Tremonia*, 1 May 1924
[99] *Vb* 4 January 1919
[100] Ibid, 11 January 1919

[101] *EAZ* 14 March 1925
[102] Ibid, 21 March 1925
[103] *Vb* 14 February 1919
[104] Ibid, 16 February 1919
[105] *Vb* 29 April 1924
[106] Alter Verband, *Unternehmer und Kommunisten während der Bergarbeiterkämpfe im Mai 1924*, Bochum, August 1924, p. 10.
[107] Ibid, pp. 27-8. For details of the dispute see Hans Spethmann, *Der Maistreik 1924 im Ruhrbergbau. Ein grundsätzlicher Arbeitskampf*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1932, Tschribs, *Tarifpolitik*, pp. 262-6 and Liu, *State*, pp. 128-9, and Mommsen, 'Konflikte', p. 82.
[108] Ibid, pp. 35-6.
[109] Ibid, p. 56.
[110] Ibid, pp. 56-7.
[111] Ibid, pp. 61-2.
[112] Ibid, p. 76.
[113] *WM* 24 April 1919
[114] The pamphlet was designed as a sequel to *The Next Miners' Next Step.*
[115] W. F. Hay, *Industrial Democracy for Miners: A Plan for the Democratic Control of the Mining Industry*, Porth, D. A. Davies, 1919, p. 2. Bold in original.
[116] Ibid, p. 4.
[117] Ibid, p. 7.
[118] Ibid, p. 5.
[119] Ibid, p. 8.
[120] For details of the dispute see, Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 2, pp. 189-95; Cole, *Labour*, pp. 157-61.
[121] MFGB Minutes, Special Conference, London, 30 September 1920, pp. 1249-68.
[122] *LV* 15 May 1920.
[123] *WM* 15 November 1920. Peter Stead, 'Vernon Hartshorn: Miners' Agent and Cabinet Minister', *Glamorgan Historian*, 6, 1969, p. 93.
[124] *LV* 13 April 1918.
[125] Ibid, 28 December 1918.
[126] *WM* 5 and 6 July 1921, and 9 July 1921
[127] See Ch. 4.
[128] John Thomas, *The Miners' Conflict with the Mineowners*, Personal Papers: Dan Evans SWCC: MNA/PP/21/3, pp. 68-9.
[129] *CWM* February 1923, p. 27.
[130] Ibid, March 1924, p. 63.
[131] See Arnot, *Miners*, vol. 2, pp. 224-6; Francis and Smith., *Fed*, p. 30-1; Paul Davies, *A. J. Cook*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, pp. 60-3; Griffiths, *Davies*, pp. 65-7. Davies attended the Second World Conference of the RILU.
[132] *CWM* September 1923, pp. 213-7.
[133] *Union. Zentral-Organ der Union der Hand- und Kopfarbeiter*, 15 September 1921. See also Oertzen, *Betriebsräte*, p. 214.
[134] *BZ* 2 December 1922.
[135] *CWM* February 1923, p. 33.
[136] *BZ* 9 December 1922.
[137] Ibid, 23 December 1922.
[138] *Bk* 19 March 1921.
[139] For the latter see Ness Edwards contribution, 'Call to the Miners', *All Power*, February 1923.
[140] *LV* 29 May 1920.
[141] Frank Hodges, *Workers' Control in the Coal Mining Industry*, The Mines for the Nation Campaign Committee, London, 1920, p. 2.
[142] Ibid, p. 3.
[143] *WM* 19 August 1919
[144] For examples see pamphlet no. 1, 'How The Miner Pays!' and no. 7, 'The Coal Industry: Its Rise ad Decline', 1919, TUC Library, HD 9551.6.
[145] The Mines for the Nation, pamphlet no. 10 'The Coal Scuttle', and no. 9 'Coal Nationalisation and the Middle Class', TUC Library HD 9551.6.
[146] See *Further Facts from the Coal Commission being a history of the second stage of the coal industry commission with excerpts from the evidence*, 1919, pp. 17-18, TUC Library, HD 9551.5.

[147] The Mines for the Nation, pamphlet no. 2, 'Wages...Prices...Profits', 1919, TUC Library, HD 9551.6.
[148] The Mines for the Nation, pamphlet no. 4, 'How Nationalisation will promote Enterprise', 1919, TUC Library, HD 9551.6.
[149] The Mines for the Nation, pamphlet no. 1, 'How the Miner Pays!', TUC Library, HD 9551.6.
[150] Ibid, 14 May 1921
[151] *The Times* 6 September 1926 and 16 October 1926, clippings, PRO, Lab 27/5.
[152] *MP* 7 May 1921
[153] *CG* 27 June 1919
[154] McKibbin, 'Classes', p. 157.
[155] General Minute Book of MSWCOA, 22 March 1919, NLW, MG 14, p. 87.
[156] Minutes of the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company Ltd., AGM, 20 March 1920 and 18 March 1924, GRO D/D PD 1/7 and D/D PD 1/8, p. 140 and p. 30 respectively.
[157] Ibid, AGM, 14 March 1922, GRO D/D PD 1/7, p. 254.
[158] *WM* 23 May 1919
[159] *CG* 24 January 1919
[160] *WM* 12 May 1919 (Consolidate Cambrian Ltd), 2 July 1919 (Newport-Abercarn Black Vein Steam Co Ltd), 3 July 1919 (Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company Ltd.), 8 July 1919 (Tredegar Iron & Coal Co.).
[161] *WM* 28 January 1919
[162] See Stefan Berger, 'Working-class Culture', p. 30 and Mike Lieven, 'A 'New History' of the South Wales Coalfields', *Llafur*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2002, p. 94.
[163] *All Power,* August 1923.
[164] *LV* 1 January 1921
[165] Benjamin Ziemann, 'Das Fronterlebnis des Ersten Weltkrieges - eine sozialhistorische Zäsur? Deutungen und Wirkungen in Deutschland und Frankreich', in Hans Mommsen (ed.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, Böhlau, Köln, 2000, pp. 79-80.
[166] See for example the legend of the Essen water tower, Erhard Lucas-Busemann, 'Kapp Putsch und Rote Ruhrarmee', in Gorlas and Peuket, (eds.), *Ruhrkampf*, p. 69-70.
[167] Manfred Gailus, '"Seid bereit zum roten Oktober in Deutschland." Die Kommunisten', Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, *Politische Identität und nationale Gedenktage. Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, p. 88. Weitz, *Communism*, pp. 178-85.
[168] Oberbürgermeister Hamborn to Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, 1 June 1921, STAD 26120.
[169] *An die Bergarbeiter des Ruhrgebietes*, 1925, STAM, 14455.
[170] *BZ* 28 February and 7 March 1925.
[171] Weitz, *Communism*, pp. 263-70.
[172] Ibid, pp. 196-202.
[173] See Ch. 4.
[174] Horner Personal Papers, SWCC, MNA/PP/46/35.
[175] For the example of the Gwaun-cae-Gurwen area see, *LV* 15 September 1921 and 28 January 1922.
[176] McKibbin, 'Classes', pp. 157-8.
[177] Williams, *Wales*, p. 238.
[178] *WO* April 1918, pp. 113-4.
[179] *PO* 11 November 1922. Ironically Williams was a Liberal candidate.
[180] *AVCECN* 5 December 1918
[181] Ibid, 12 December 1918
[182] *FPM* 3 November 1922
[183] Ibid, 24 October 1924
[184] Morgan, *Rebirth*, p. 193.
[185] *Cymmer Searchlight*, 23 October 1925, SWCC, SC 461.
[186] *CWM* November 1924, p. 275.
[187] *SWA* 21 October 1924
[188] *AVCECN* 29 November 1923
[189] *GFPRL* 30 November 1923
[190] *GCT* 18 October 1924
[191] *AVCECN* 9 November 1922
[192] *FPM* 6 December 1918
[193] *CJ* 30 November 1923

[194] *GFPRL* 30 November 1923
[195] *PO* 24 November 1923
[196] *GCT* 7 December 1918
[197] Ibid, 14 December 1918
[198] *MEP* 7 December 1918; *FPM*, 3 December 1918
[199] *AL* 4 November 1922
[200] *GCT* 17 September 1921
[201] Mike Lieven, 'A fractured working-class consciousness? The case of the Lady Windsor Colliery Lodge 1921', *WHR*, 21, 4, 2003, pp. 729-56.
[202] See Alan R. Griffin, *The Miners of Nottinghamshire 1914-1944. A History of the Nottinghamshire Miners' Unions*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1962.
[203] See Francis and Smith, *Fed*, pp. 91-2; Horner, *Rebel*, pp. 130-1.

Conclusion

This study of trade unionism and political development ends following the defeat of the MFGB at the end of 1926. This is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary point at which to conclude. Civil society continued to function and the trade unions and political parties examined here continued to reproduce the identities they had created through newspapers, magazines and speeches beyond this point. Perhaps a more obvious finishing point would be 1933 and the Nazi *Gleichschaltung* (Co-ordination) which set about destroying civil society and suppressing other identities. This, however, would ignore the SWMF and Labour Party's continued efforts to create an identity in the South Wales mining valleys. In fact, any endpoint seems unsatisfactory. Rather than being marked by sharp breaks, the construction of identity in both regions was an ongoing process.

This study concludes in 1926 because the hypothesis that drove it no longer seems wholly applicable after this point. From 1890 up until the mid-1920s the development of the miners' movements in the two regions had demonstrated divergent tendencies. In the Ruhr, the miners' movement was generally characterised by fragmentation, in South Wales by homogenisation. The *Verband zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännischen Interessen im Rheinland und Westfalen* initially united the miners of the Ruhr, but over the next two decades the union movement fractured on lines of religion and ethnicity. By 1914 the Alter Verband, as the old union became known, competed with the Gewerkverein and Polish ZZP. The Great War encouraged greater co-operation between the two largest unions, but the revolutionary period saw further fragmentation as various syndicalist and communist unions emerged. In South Wales, miners' trade unionism began from a more fragmented base. Under the Sliding Scale various local associations were in existence, but following the 1898 strike a united union in the form of the SWMF was established. Unlike, the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband, the SWMF was also able to bolster its position during the First World War and become almost an industrial union.

Similarly, in political terms this characterisation of homogenisation in South Wales and fragmentation in the Ruhr is generally applicable. In the 1890s, the two-party system prevalent in the Ruhr became a three-party one as the SPD emerged from the restrictions imposed on it by the Anti-Socialist Law. During the war, the

socialist movement split, laying the foundations for the struggle between the Communists and Social Democrats under Weimar. Before the war the Liberals largely dominated the South Wales mining valleys. However, cracks in the control were becoming evident at local level in the 1900s, while the concern with 'labour' and 'class' as an independent political entity was also growing at parliamentary level. The war boosted the political labour movement both organisationally and psychologically. It revitalised institutions such as the TLCs, while demonstrating that those from working-class origins were competent administrators. This provided the basis for the Labour breakthrough in the 1920s, when it superseded the Liberals as the party of the mining valleys.

After 1926, however, the process of homogenisation in industrial terms broke down. The SWMIU was formed and until late in the 1930s the SWMF struggled to remove its rival. On the other hand, Labour consolidated its hold on the mining valleys. Thus homogenisation on both political and industrial levels no longer paralleled each other. In the Ruhr the picture was more complicated. The disbanding of the Union in the Ruhr appeared to mark an end to the progressive fragmentation in miners' trade unionism there. But in reality the disappearance of the Union did not mean the acceptance of the Alter Verband. The dissolution of the Union coincided with the Communists' decision to infiltrate social-democratic bodies, a practice that had been pursued in an unsystematic way before 1924. The picture of a relatively more united movement was therefore deceptive. The adoption of the 'Third phase' policy towards the Social Democrats exposed the enduring nature of the divisions in the socialist labour movement. This division found organisational expression in the appearance of the *Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition* (RGO, Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition). By 1931 the RGO succeeded in winning 29 percent of the vote in the works' council elections.[1] Meanwhile, in the political sphere, fragmentation continued, especially as the National Socialist began to make their first inroads into the region.

However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to examine why these processes broke down after by 1926. Instead it sought to answer why they existed at all and why they differed. This study has tried to account for these differences between the South Wales and Ruhr coalfields by using a three-fold framework. First, it has argued that the lifeworld of the Welsh miners was more synchronous than that of the Ruhr miners. In doing so it has sought to integrate some of the conceptual theories used to

explain solidarity and strike propensity among miners with the concept of milieux widely applied in German historiography. The comparison of South Wales and the Ruhr reveals that the former conforms more closely to the Bulmer's 'ideal-type traditional mining community'. This difference is apparent on several levels. First, although one must be cautious not to overestimate the physical isolation of the mining communities, it is clear that the Ruhr as the premier industrial district in Germany, was in a different position to South Wales, which was one of several significant coalfields. The Ruhr also contained several important cities, while in South Wales the largest conurbation lay outside the coalfield at the point of export. Secondly, mining was economically predominant in South Wales, while the industrial base in the Ruhr was more varied. In the latter region, steel, iron and armaments factories represented alternative sources of employment. For example, Essen, despite its many mines, was known as the *Kannonenstadt* (Cannon City), due to the dominance of the Krupp armaments factory. Thirdly, mining in both areas was dangerous, but the memory of their previous privileged position under state control reinforced perceptions among the Ruhr miners that mining as an occupation had been downgraded since the liberalisation of the industry. In South Wales, on the other hand, it appears the occupation was regarded more positively as many miners refused promotion to deputy level even when they had gain the necessary qualifications. Fourthly, the dominance of mining made the occupational structure of South Wales more uniform than in the Ruhr. It also appears that the Ruhr miners had somewhat less autonomy at work and were greatly affected by mechanisation and rationalisation in the 1920s. By contrast, in South Wales there was a greater continuity to the experience of work pre- and post-war. Fifth, the communal activities of the miners differed. The Welsh miners did engage in activities that were community focused such as rugby and choral singing. The Ruhr miners also had a rich club life, but rather than represent the community it was often intimately linked to a certain milieux or subculture. Sixth, both coalfields shared a sharp gender segregation/division of work, but the 'hereditary' nature of mining as an occupation was greater in South Wales. Bulmer's seventh point, an economic/political conflict of interest between owners and miners applies to both regions, but it is evident that the SWMF was more successful in achieving its aims than either the Alter Verband or Gewerkverein were. Finally, taking these points together it is clear that South Wales conforms more closely to the 'ideal-type'. Undoubtedly, this will displease many practitioners of micro-history, but this thesis is

ostensibly aimed at comparing two regions and for that a broader, regional view is a prerequisite.

The idea of milieu further illustrates the fragmented nature of the Ruhr miners lifeworld. German historiography has made much use of this concept to differentiate between different sections of the mining workforce and it would seem possible to integrate this with Bulmer's model, especially points five and seven. Social-democratic, Catholic and Polish milieux have been described. Each was made up of a network of associations that variously included churches, political parties, trade unions, educational societies, sporting teams, co-operatives and drinking clubs. Apolitical or neutral associations (i.e. not integral to a particular subculture) did exist, but during this period these milieux fractured the lifeworld of the Ruhr miners. Of course, various competing or antagonistic associations existed in South Wales, but they did not equal the almost all-embracing nature of the milieux in the Ruhr. Indeed, the SPD set out to create a subculture that could serve its members' needs from 'cradle to grave'.

In fact, the concept of milieux as applied to German history seems inappropriate for South Wales during this period. The theoretical literature is clear on the pivotal role state pressure played in consolidating milieux. The *Kulturkampf*, the Anti-Socialist Law and the 'Germanisation' policy represent prime examples of this process as they served to make certain groups (Catholic, Social Democrat, Pole) more conscious of their interests and encouraged them to establish bodies dedicated to protecting them. Any clear distinction between the milieux and the parties would be a false dichotomy. The parties were integral parts of the milieu; they were its political expression. The Centre party, for example, emerged to counter the effects of the *Kulturkampf*. As already noted, the Centre represented the 'classic' milieu party. The SPD was less successful in its attempts to create its own milieu, but it did establish a sub-culture made up of former Protestant cottage miners and some sections of the immigrants.[2] Despite this SPD was able to challenge the Centre and National Liberals to form a three-party political system in the 1890s. In the 1920s the political landscape became even more fragmented by the emergence of the KPD. Like the SPD in the 1890s, the KPD also sought to build its own network of ancillary organisations (or to usurp them from the SPD).

Such 'top-down' pressures were not evident in South Wales during the same period. Political, ethnic and religious divisions were not unknown in South Wales.

The mining valleys were not free from ethnic tensions, as illustrated by anti-Irish and anti-Jewish riots. There were also physical confrontations between English and Welsh. Ethnic and religious associations were also established. Significantly, these rivalries did not lead to organisational rivalry. Admittedly, the Irish formed their own societies But by the late 1890s the Irish community was more integrated into the Welsh communities. In any case, the mining workforce in South Wales was less ethnically diverse than in the Ruhr. Miners were generally Welsh or English. English in-migrants were easier to assimilate than non-German speaking Poles. The large number of English in-migrants also adapted the existing communities to their needs. While Poles in the Ruhr found it difficult to find Polish-speaking priests to administer services, many chapels switched from using Welsh to English. The acceptance of English as the *lingua franca* in much of the Welsh coalfield is illustrative of the comparative ease with which migrants were accepted into (and changed) the mining communities. That it occurred without laws purposively designed to 'anglicise' the Welsh was probably its strength. Official attempts to 'germanise' the Poles backfired and merely reinforced their milieu. Furthermore, unlike the Ruhr, where the population was roughly equally divided between Protestantism and Catholicism, in South Wales the people were overwhelmingly Nonconformist. Thus divisions on religious lines also lacked the same force they had in the Ruhr.

The issue of milieux (or the lack of them) relates to the second explanation used to explain the differences between the two coalfields, civil society. It is clear that civil society in the Ruhr conforms to the rigid, segmented societies described by Rosenblum and Post. There are numerous examples of how dual membership of organisations was not tolerated. For example, membership of the Gewerkverein was dependent on an acceptance of Christianity and the open rejection of social democracy. Indeed, many in the Catholic Church saw the Christian trade union movement as an antidote to social democracy. Naturally, Polish organisations expected their members to be Poles. The Alter Verband claimed to be neutral on political and religious issues, but it is questionable how seriously the miners would have taken such protestations since one of the trade union's leading lights, Hue, stood as an SPD deputy for Bochum. Similarly, Heinrich Imbusch stood for the Centre after the war. The organs of the two largest trade unions, *Der Bergknappe* and *Die Bergarbeiterzeitung*, printed articles that clearly favoured the political positions of Christian-socialism and social democracy respectively. Finally, after the war and the

Revolution dual membership of the SPD and the KPD was incompatible. Both parties were locked in a struggle that fatally undermined the labour movement in the Weimar Republic.

By contrast, in South Wales dual group membership was generally accepted and tolerated. Individual members of the SWMF could, for example, support whichever political party they desired, despite the affiliation to Labour. Although many ministers were hostile to socialism, opposition from the religious establishment was not monolithic. A significant (and vocal) minority of ministers was supportive of Labour or even socialism. It is significant that Nonconformist journals and even Labour press itself debated the pros and cons of socialism. Even employers were allowed to put their viewpoint forward, as did D. A. Thomas in the *South Wales Worker*. Finally, after the war, plural membership of the CPGB and Labour was also accepted during this period. Communists like Arthur Horner did not regard the CPGB as rival to Labour, but as a watchdog, dedicated to ensuring that the party did not became complacent or co-opted into the establishment. In the *Colliery Workers' Magazine* articles praising the Russian experiment stood alongside appeals to strengthen the organisation of Labour.

This summary of civil society naturally leads to the third and final part of the framework: discursively constructed identities. The foregoing account may seem an adequate explanation for the differences in trade union and political development. The various trade unions and parties could be explained away as expressions of the various milieux and sub-cultures, or in South Wales the lack of a milieu. Undoubtedly, this represents part of the answer. The lifeworld and civil societies provided the background against which the trade unions and political parties examined here worked. But if these organisations were merely the expression of different social structures, how can incidences of co-operation in the Ruhr be explained? Strikes like those that occurred in 1889 and 1905 demonstrated the capacity for the Ruhr miners to show solidarity. Moreover, in South Wales the lack of milieux did not automatically mean a united labour movement. Indeed, the early 1890s were characterised by local unions and conflict between the supporters of the Sliding Scale and the MFGB. Even after the formation of the SWMF tensions centred on older leaders, who advocated collaboration with employers, and a younger generation of leaders, or 'advanced' men, who believed that the union and the owners were inevitably locked in conflict. Why were the Alter Verband and the

Gewerkverein unable to sustain co-operation, while the SWMF was able to contain potential divisions?

The SWMF sought to base its identity on the miners as a whole. Its identity was 'community-fixated' in that it focused on the miner as a working man rather than on a particular ideal. Therefore, its activists, whatever, their differences sought continually to emphasise solidarity within their discourse, even when there was bitter division among leaders over policy. It was policy (i.e. what was best for the union and the miners) that was at the crux of conflict, rather than what the miners should be. During times of industrial conflict this identity would be placed in juxtaposition to the employers, not to other miners, unless blacklegs. During times of industrial peace the union focused on contrasting the dignity and honest of those who were members with the 'feckless' nature of those who were not. Since this discursive practice was essentially focused on a miner/employers or organised/unorganised dichotomy it could incorporate a wide range of elements, provided they maintained the central paradigm. This coupled with a more fluid civil society that accepted plurality meant a more inclusive identity could be constructed. The identity of the miner constructed by the SWMF was, therefore, comparatively unproblematic.

Conversely, the Alter Verband, Gewerkverein and ZZP based their identities on specific conceptions of the miner. The 'milieux-fixated' identities created by the unions, based on Christian-socialism, Marxism and Polish ethnicity respectively, were comparatively doctrinaire. By joining these unions a miner was declaring he was a certain kind of man. Even the names of the Gewerkverein and ZZP demonstrated that they sought not to represent the miner, but a type of miner. The unions also based their organisational discourse on demonstrating what they were not. As already noted, the Gewerkverein explicitly saw part of its function as the combating of social democracy. This separation and juxtaposition of the identities of Christian and social-democratic miners was crucial. To abandon it would seem to represent an end to the union. This fear determined the Gewerkvereins reaction after any period of co-operation and it vigorously rejected any suggestion of amalgamation. Thus discursive identities could condition the trade unions' actions. The discursive practices of the trade unions therefore not only drew upon pre-existing social divisions, but also served to reinforce them. Thus, although the unions sought to broaden their appeal to embrace as much of the workforce as possible, their ability to recruit was intrinsically limited by their inflexible identities.

The political parties differed slightly from the unions. Their identities were even more explicitly drawn as each sought to distinguish itself from its rivals. The Liberals based their appeal on an emotive mixture of nationalism, Nonconformism and community identity. The Liberals combined these elements to form a 'community-fixated' discourse that contrasted their idealised notion of the *gwerin* with the anglicised, Anglican landowners. Within Liberal political language the landlords were excluded from the community. On the other hand, by voting Liberal the miners could demonstrated that they belonged to particular Liberal vision of the community.

Generally, the Liberals did not use the concept of 'class' in the early 1890s. When it was used it was done so in a pejorative sense. When employed it was usually meant to imply sectionalism and vested interests and contrasted to the more encompassing idea of the 'people'. The Lib-Labs, however, introduced a positive idea of class, one that referred to the workers. As the example of Alfred Thomas demonstrates Liberal discourse was also able, up to a point, to accommodate the growing concerns with the representation of 'labour' and 'class' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Unfortunately for the Liberal party, the discourse of class became increasingly focused on its independent representation. Liberal discourse emphasised co-operation between labour and capital and its vision of the community encompassed both the miners and the coalowners. Within Labour discourse, on the other hand, concepts of community and the working class were increasingly elided. This was especially evident in Keir Hardie's rhetoric. He used many elements of Liberal political language to great effect, but for him it was mainly the workers who made up the community. Capital was excluded and portrayed as a threat. This trend was reinforced by the First World War, which also demonstrated that Labour was a competent administrator. The industrial disputes of the 1920s strengthened this tendency and the issue of nationalisation allowed a particularly apt expression of this labour/capital dichotomy. Yet, part of Labour's success in the inter-war period was down to its adoption of elements of Liberal discourse. In the elections immediately after the war older radical issues such as Disestablishment remained prominent. By accepting these ideas into its own political language Labour was able, not merely to emerge as a potential challenger to Liberalism, but to adopt the mantle of 'progressivism' and eventually dominant the mining valleys.

In the Ruhr, the National Liberals and Centre parties, like the Liberal party in Wales, also combined nationalism and religion within their discourse. They sought to portray themselves as *Volkspartei*, representing the community as a whole. Both adopted a 'friend-of-the-workers' approach. However, like the trade unions in the Ruhr, their discourse was 'milieu-fixated'. The extent of their appeal was limited by their concentration on a specific religious group. Furthermore, like the British Liberals, both the Centre and the National Liberals were reluctant to adopt candidates from working-class backgrounds. The struggle between the worker Gerhard Stötzel and a middle-class member of the Centre party in 1877 mirrored the electoral contest that Mabon faced against a Liberal mineowner in 1885. But class for the Centre was bound up with issues of confession. Since the party had been formed to protect Catholic interests it could not move away from its essentially Catholic image either during the *Kaiserreich* or during the early years of the Republic. Just like the Gewerkverein the Centre party in the Ruhr predicated its discourse on the idea of the Christian, specifically Catholic, miner. This necessarily undermined its attempt to appear as a broad people's party.

The SPD self-consciously adopted a different approach. It did not predicate its identity on a specific religious community. Indeed, it was castigated by both the Centre and the National Liberals as being both irreligious and a party of *Reichsfeinde* (enemies of the state). Unlike their opponents, the SPD adopted an identity that was explicitly predicated on the working class. On this basis they accused the Centre and National Liberals of being employers' parties. This identity was partially successful in drawing support from Protestant, *Kötterbergleute* (cottage miners), disaffected with the effects of economic liberalisation, and some of the immigrants to the region. But it was undermined by its very attitude towards religion. Hue, for example, constantly maintained that religion was a private matter, not a political one. But for the Centre and many Catholics the issue was anything but private. It was a public matter and issues such as denominational schools repeatedly surface. The irreligious element in the SPD's political language hampered its appeal, just as Catholicism limited that of the Centre. Also its heavy emphasis on class meant the SPD was largely unsuccessful in reaching out to other groups in Wilhelmine society. In the 1900s the party struck a more patriotic note, but its primary identity remained based on class. This was evident in the way in which it constantly rejected the idea that the Centre could do anything of note for the workers. In its own language the SPD was the only workers' party. Using

this identity SPD was able to win several electoral contests in the Dortmund and Bochum seats, but was unable to dominate the region due to the entrenched nature of Centre and National Liberal support.

Ultimately, the SPD made its breakthrough in 1919 under a very different electoral system. Unfortunately, for the SPD this triumph proved short-lived. While the Great War had strengthened the Labour party, it had accentuated divisions within the SPD, which split into the USPD and MSPD. In 1919 the USPD attracted little electoral support, but in 1920 their share of the vote increased at the expense of the SPD. Later, following the re-unification of the MSPD and part of the USPD, the KPD inherited much of this support. Moreover, the KPD usurped much of the class discourse that had been the sole preserve of the SPD before 1914. In effect it was drawing on older, more radical notions of class that the SPD had abandoned for a more reformist path in the 1900s. The KPD discourse was also 'milieu-fixated' in that it drew the majority of its membership from the unemployed. Excluded from the workplace, the KPD increasingly focused on violent confrontation and the struggle to protect Soviet Russia.

The SPD meanwhile found itself in the unfamiliar position of facing a serious challenger on the left. It also had to contend, on the one hand, with the dictates of power and, on the other, with the expectations of its followers. The disillusionment that many felt in the 1920s benefited the KPD, who capitalised on notions of betrayal of the revolution. Thus, the idea of the *Arbeiterpartei* that had been the SPD's mainstay before the war became contested. Yet the SPD could not abandon class as a defining feature of its discursive identity. Its very idea of the Republic was a socialist one. Its attempt to build upon the patriotic element evident before the war was not wholly successful for the same reason that the Centre was unable to convincingly claim that it was a *Volkspartei*. Class was too ingrained in its identity to be easily ejected. To do so risked losing more of the party's core constituency to the Communists.

In summary, an understanding of the discursive practices of the trade unions and political parties in both coalfields is crucial for explaining the differences between the two regions. Within a context of a comparatively more synchronous lifeworld and a fluid civil society, the SWMF, Liberal party and later Labour developed more inclusive identities. It was the inclusiveness of these identities that allowed these organisations to achieve the dominant positions they did. Indeed, Liberalism began to

falter when it reached the limit of its ability to encompass different discourses. Its ability to accommodate 'labour' and 'class' did not extend to independent representation and the increasing emphasis laid on these terms undermined the Liberals' position. This trend was paralleled by changes in what the community was perceived to include. Coalowners, who had been seen by Liberalism as an integral part of the community, were firmly excluded in Labour's political language. Thus although Labour focused on class, class by now meant much the same as the community.

In the Ruhr, the 'milieu-fixated' nature of discursive identities meant that they were exclusive. A fragmented lifeworld and segmented civil society made it difficult for a community discourse to be formed. Instead each identity, forged through discourse, claimed to represent a certain group. The trade unions and the parties placed each other's identities in juxtaposition. This contrasting of one identity to another became necessary for the very survival of the organisations involved. Although modifications were made, large changes were difficult as they risked undermining the core constituency. These discursive practices limited co-operation and negated amalgamation. It was the trauma of National Socialism and war that eventually broke these barriers down.

---

[1] Jäger, *Bergarbeitermilieus*, p. 49.
[2] Rohe, 'Sozialdemokratie', pp. 333-4.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

A. British Archives

1. South Wales Coalfield Collection, Swansea University

Personal Papers
Dan Davies (SWCC MNA/PP/21/2-5)
Mrs Beatrice Davies (SWCC MNA/12/9 and 21)
W. G. Derrick (SWCC MNA/PP/18/4/2-10)
Arthur Horner (SWCC MNA/PP/46/35)
Len Williams (SWCC MNA/PP/129/9)

Lodge Minutes
Rhondda No.1 District Minutes
Abergorky Lodge Minutes
Blaenavon Lodge Minutes
Coegnant Lodge Minutes
Caerau Lodge Minutes
Cambrian Lodge Minutes
Ferndale Lodge Minutes
Llanhilleth Lodge Minutes
Mardy Lodge Minute
Oakdale Lodge Minutes
Tylorstown Lodge Minutes

Miners' Eight Hours Bill. South Wales Miners' Federation Open Session, 17 March 1908 (SWCC MNA/NUM/3/10/19)

2. Glamorgan Records Office

Aberdare UDC Minutes 1895-1926
Maesteg UDC Minutes 1926
Ogmore and Garw UDC Minutes 1924-1926

Reports of H. M. Inspector of Mines for the South Wales/Southwestern District, 1887-1926 (GRO D/D NCB 67/2/1-22)

Minute Book Crynant Collieries Co. Ltd. (GRO D/D PD 27/2).

Minute Book Cwmaman Co. Ltd. (GRO D/D PD 33-4).

Reports of the manager of the Locket Merthyr Collieries (GRO D/D NCB 16/35).

Minutes of directors meetings Powell Duffryn (GRO D/D PD 1/1-8).

Minute Book of the Managing Committee of Powell Duffryn (GRO D/D PD 2/3-5).

Diaries of Mr T. H. Bailey, General Manager of the Plymouth Colliery Co. (GRO D/D NCB 16/37).

Brecon Road Liberal Association, Correspondence (GRO D/D Xes 1-20)

Handbills and political pamphlets, A. C. Fox Davies, 1910 (GRO D/D Vau 23/1-10)

Handbills and political pamphlets, Keir Hardie, 1910 (GRO D/D Vau 24/1-16)

Handbills and political pamphlets, W. Pritchard Morgan, 1910 (GRO D/D Vau 25/1-11)

Keir Hardie election address, 3 December 1910 (SWCC SC 491)

Abercynon Workmens' Institute Records (GRO D/D X 910/2-16)

Diary of Chief Constable Lionel Lindsay, 1898 & 1911 (GRO D/D Con 77/78)

Elwood, Peter, *A History of Temple*, 1987 (GRO D/D Bap 44/1)

Minute Book of Llanbradach Workmens' Hall, 1920-25 (GRO D/D X 816)

Minute Book of the Society for Establishing and Supporting English Congregational Churches In South Wales 1877-1893 (GRO D/D E Cong 1/1)
Rhys, Trefor J., *A History of Capel Rhondda*, 1953 (GRO D/D W Bap 12/1)

3. Carmarthen County Records Office

Ammanford UDC Minutes 1903-1927
Cwmamman UDC Minutes 1919-1927

3. South Wales Miners' Library

South Wales Miners' Federation Minutes

Transcript of Interviews undertaken by the South Wales Coalfield History Project
Will Coldrick (SWML AUD 339)
Idris Cox (SWML AUD 171)
Rees Davies (SWML AUD 207)
Trevor Davies (SWML AUD 165)
Edgar Evans (SWML AUD 213)
Glyn Evans (SWML AUD 346)
Mrs J. Evans (SWML AUD 172)
Jim Evans (SWML AUD 221)
Max Goldberg (SWML AUD 347)
James Griffiths (SWML AUD 90)
Harry Howells (SWML AUD 302)
Henry John (SWML AUD 220)
Morgan Jones (SWML AUD 227)
Henry Lewis (SWML AUD 201)

Archie Lush (SWML AUD 276/338)
Tommy Nicholas (SWML AUD 97)
Cyril Parry (SWML AUD 333)
Will Picton (SWML AUD 193)
George Prothero (SWML AUD 309)
Claude Stanfield (SWML AUD 205)
Norman Thomas (SWML AUD 235)
Frank Williams (SWML AUD 169)
John Williams (SWML AUD 228)
J. L. Williams (SWML AUD 396)
William Henry Williams (SWML AUD 290)

4. National Library of Wales

General Minute Book of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coalowners' Association, 1890-1926 (NLW MG5-20)

Minutes of proceedings at meetings between Representatives of Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association and Representatives of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Colliery Enginemen, Stokers and Craftsmen's Association, 1919-20, 1924-16 (NLW MV274-318)

Minutes of proceedings at meetings between Representatives of Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association and Representatives of the South Wales and Monmouthshire Mechanical and Surface Workers' Union, 1921-24 (NLW MV488-97)

5. Trade Union Congress Library

Mines for the Nation Campaign Leaflets (TUC HD9551.6)

6. Public Records Office

Cabinet Papers (PRO Cab/24)
Ministry of Labour Files (PRO Lab 27/1-5)
Industrial Unrest, Commission of Inquiry (Reports) No.7 Division, 1917-18

B. German Archives

1. Institut für Sozialebewegungen

Personal Papers
Nachlaß Heinrich Imbusch (IfSB)
Nachlaß Heinrich Löffler (IfSB)
Nachlaß Weeke (IfSB)

Trade Union Records

Alter Verband

Protokoll des Bergarbeiter-Delegiertentages zu Dorstfeld, 18 August 1889, Dorstfeld.
Protokoll der 1. Generalversammlung, Verband zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännischen Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen, 20 October 1889, Bochum.
Protokoll der 2. Generalversammlung, Verband zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännischen Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen, 27 October 1889, Bochum.
Protokoll der 3. Generalversammlung, Verband zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännischen Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen, 8 March 1890, Bochum.
Protokoll der 4. Generalversammlung, Verband zur Wahrung und Förderung der bergmännischen Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen, 11 May 1890, Bochum.
Protokoll der 1. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 1 November 1890, Bochum.
Protokoll der 2. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 19 July 1891, Bochum.
Protokoll der 3. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 31 July 1892, Bochum.
Protokoll der 4. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 20 August 1893, Dortmund.
Protokoll der 5. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 26 August 1894, Bochum.
Protokoll der 6. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 25 August 1895, Bochum.
Protokoll der 7. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 2 August 1896, Bochum.
Protokoll der 8. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 18 April 1897, Helmstadt.
Protokoll der 9. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 9 April 1898, Dortmund.
Protokoll der 10. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 1 April 1899.
Protokoll der 11. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 14-16 April 1900, Altenburg.
Protokoll der 12. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 26-28 May 1901, Kassel.
Protokoll der 13. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 17-19 May 1902, Essen.
Protokoll der 14. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 1-3 June 1903, Zwickau.
Protokoll der 17. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 5-9 May 1907, Dortmund.
Protokoll der 18. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 16-21 May 1909, Eisenach.
Protokoll der 19. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 21-26 May 1911, Bochum.
Protokoll der 20. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 27 April to May 1912, Hannover.
Protokoll der 21. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 15-21 July 1919, Bielefeld.
Protokoll der 22. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 24-26 January 1920, Bochum.

Protokoll der 23. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 29 May to 4 June 1921, Gleßen.
Protokoll der 24. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 15-19 June 1924, Dresden.
Protokoll der 25. Generalversammlung deutscher Bergarbeiter Verband, 4-8 July 1926, Saarbrücken.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands 1904.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1905-06.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1907-08.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1909-10.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1911-12.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1913-14.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1915-16.
Geschäftsbericht Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1917-18.

Material zur Lage der Bergarbeiter während des Weltkrieges. Eine Sammlung von Eingabe der vier Bergarbeiterverbände, besonders des Vorstandes des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, an die Regierungen sowie Zivil-, Militärbehörden Werkbesitzer, usw. Herausgegeben vom Vorstand des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, Bochum, 1919.

Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands

Geschäftsbericht des Vorstandes des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschland für Jahre 1905 und 1906 und Protokoll der 11. Generalversammlung 29 June – 1 July 1907, Gelsenkirchen.
Geschäftsbericht des Vorstandes des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschland für Jahre 1907 und 1908 und Protokoll der 12. Generalversammlung 27-30 June 1909, Saarbrücken..
Geschäftsbericht des Vorstandes des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschland für Jahre 1909 und 1910 und Protokoll der 13. Generalversammlung 9-12 July 1907.
Bericht des Hauptvorstandes des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1911 und 1912.
Protokoll der 14. Generalversammlung 6-9 July 1913, Aachen.
Bericht des Hauptvorstandes des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1913 to 1918.
Bericht über das 25jährige Jubelfest und Protokoll der 15. Generalversammlung des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 24-27 August 1919, Essen.
Bericht des Hauptvorstandes des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1921 to 1925.
Protokoll der 18. Generalversammlung 13-15 May 1913, Saarbrücken.

Bericht der Sozialisierungskommission über die Frage der Sozialisierung des Kohlenbergbaues, Berlin, Hans Robert Engelmann, 1920.

Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Bergarbeiter-Delegiertentagen für Preußen (einberufen von er Siebener Kommission), 28-30 March 1905, Berlin.

Protokoll des 2. Bergarbeiter-Delegiertentagen für Preußen (einberufen von er Siebener Kommission), 11-12 February 1906, Berlin.

Verhandlung der Sozialisierungskommission über den Kohlenbergbau im Jahre 1918/1919, Berlin 1921.

Protokoll vom 1. Reichsbetriebsrätekongress für den Bergbau, Verband des Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 6-7 November 1921, Magdeburg.

2. Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf

Regierung Düsseldorf/Arnsberg:
Police: Monthly and Activity Reports 1920-26 (STAD 26119-26125)
Präsidialbüro (STAD 583, 588, 596)
Political Files:
Political Associations (STAD 15817-18)
Communist Party and Works' councils (STAD 15689, 15690, 15693, 16910, 16922, 16932, 16934, 16940, 16961)
Council Organisations (STAD 15279)
Unrest March to April 1921 (STAD 15822)
Rathenau Murder (STAD 16893)
Miners' strikes (STAD 15032)
Miners' unrest (STAD 16868)
Strikes 1922-1927 (STAD 16863-6)
Unemployment (STAD 16845, 16847, 16850)
Social-democratic and anarchist movement (STAD 9028, 9039-44, 9046, 42809)
Miners' strike 1905 (STAM 9056)
Social-democratic women's movement 1905-1913 (STAD 42789)
Confessional workers' associations and Christian trade unions 1901-1913 (STAD 15921)
National Workers' Associations 1910-1913 (STAD 15923)
Wiarus Polskie (STAD 42815)

3. Staatsarchiv Münster

Oberbergamt:
Wages (STAM OBA 1390, 1392, 1396-7)
Works Safety (STAM OBA 372, 373, 1781, 1778, 1792, 1793, 1795, 1811, 1813, 1815, 1849, 1850-5, 1862, 1864, 1866)
Co-operatives (STAM OBA 1799, 1800)
Schnappskasinos (STAM OBA 1834)
1905 Strike (STAM OBA 1843-48)
1912 Strike (STAM OBA 1857-9)
Foreign Labour during World War 1 (STAM OBA 1159-60)
Knappschaft (STAM OBA 258-61)

Regierung Münster:
Syndicalists (STAM 14442)
Polish Movement (STAM 14044-45, 14064, 14063)
Evangelical Associations (STAM 14391-93)

Revolutionary Movements (STAM 14427)
Communist Movement (STAM 14447-9, 14452, 14454, 14455)
Ruhr Occupation (STAM 14515, 14520)
Works Council Elections (STAM 14481)
Büro Kolpin (STAM 18, 36, 104, 128, 159, 179, 192, 197, 210, 215, 327, 337-40, 342-3, 355)

4. Stadtarchiv Bochum

Landrat Bochum:
SPD (STAB LA 1303-9, 1323)
KPD, USPD (STAB LA 1314-5)
Miners' movement (STAB 1269, 1274, 1282, 1284-5)
Alter Verband (STAB B314-5, 317)

5. Bergbau Museen, Bochum (Bochum Mining Museum)

Records of the Zechenverband/Verein für bergbauliche Interessen:
Collective Agreements and Wage negotiations 1919-1933 (BBA 90/4-91/4)
Newsletters 1911-1927 (BBA 3/14-7/14)
Reports 1924-1932 (BBA 235/15-1083/15)
Working time 1921-1940, 1919-1923, 1924-1940, (BBA 180/15,194/15, 197/15)
Working time propaganda 1919-1939 (BBA 181/15)
Working time in the mining industry 1921-1928 (BBA 186/15)
Working time in 'hot' places 1919-1940 (BBA 189/15)
Production in German and foreign, private and state mines 1919-1940 (BBA 231/15)
Works Council Law 1919-1922 (BBA 1085/15)
Social Questions 1920-1944 (BBA 296/15)
Food Supply 1923-1944 (BBA 302/15)
Reichknappschaft Committees 1921-1944 (BBA 320/15)
Market and Economic Conditions 1920-1940 (BBA 428/15)
Coal Prices 1919-1935 (BBA 437/15)
Central Coal Council 1919-1938 (BBA 505/15)
Negotiations and Correspondence 1919-1930 (BBA 131/15)
Administration 1919-1944 (BBA 854/15)
Improvement in mining 1906-1938 (BBA 569)
Mechanisation 1925-1926, 1926-1940 (BBA 625, 626)
Coal Cutters 1905-1938 (BBA 634)
Conveyors 1907-1943, 1901-1943 (BBA 817, 818)
Horses 1909-1944 (BBA 821)

State mines:
Collective Agreements July 1922-November 1925 (BBA 442/72)
Wage statistics November 1924-February 1935 (BBA 445/72)
Labour Issues November 1918-August 1922 (BBA 512/72)
Works Councils August 1922-December 1925 (BBA 513/72)
Strikes 1924-1925, 1926-1931 (BBA 517/72, 518/72)
Housing August 1919-December 1925 (BBA 607/72)
Reparations July 1924-February (BBA 676/72)

Activity of the Vereins für bergbauliche Interessen July 1924-February 1926 (BBA 1031/72)

Krupp mines:
Strikes 1907-1925 (BBA 563/20)
Works History 1914-1923 (BBA 565/20)
Workers' Committee 1918-1919, 1919-1921 (BBA 992/20, 993/20)
Works' Councils 1919-1920, 1920-1923 (BBA 994/20, 995/20)

Shamrock and Hibernia mines:
Strikes at Shamrock 1912-1918 (BBA 42731/32)
Strikes at Hibernia November 1918-March 1919, April 1919-January 1922 (BBA 4283/32, 4284/32)
Agitation at Hibernia (BBA 4288/32)
Strikes at Hibernia March 1920-1926 (BBA 4290/32)

6. Institut für Zeitungsforschung, Dortmund

Centre Party Handbills and Leaflets (IZF Mappe 24)

KPD Handbills and Leaflets (IZF Mappe 10)

SPD Handbills and Leaflets (IZF Mappe 11)

7. Essen City Library

Die Arbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet. Eine Gabe an den Parteitag 1907 vom Sozialdemokratischen Verein Kreis Essen, 1907.

C. Newspapers and Journals

Aberdare Leader
Amman Valley Chronicle and East Carmarthen News
Bergarbeiter Zeitung
Bergknappe
Carmarthen Journal
The Celtic News and West Wales General Advertiser
Colliery Guardian
Colliery Workers' Magazine
Cymmer Searchlight
Deutsche Arbeit
Dortmunder Zeitung
Emscher Zeitung
Essener Allgemeine Zeitung
Essener Arbeiter Zeitung
Essener Volkszeitung
Free Press of Monmouthshire
Gelsenkirchener Allgemeine Zeitung
Glamorgan County Times
Glamorgan Free Press and Rhondda Leader
The Glamorgan Gazette: Bridgend and Neath Chronicle and Central Glamorgan Gazette, Incorporated
Y Geninen
Glückauf. Berg- und Hüttenmännische Zeitschrift
The Labour Voice
Märkischer Sprecher
Merthyr Express
Merthyr Pioneer
Monmouthshire Evening Post
Monmouthshire Merlin and South Wales Advertiser
Neath Gazette and Mid-Glamorgan Herald
Die Neue Zeit
Pontypool Free Press
Pontypridd Chronicle
Pontypridd Observer
Porth Gazette
Red Dawn
Rheinisch-Westfälische Arbeiter Zeitung
Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung
The Rhondda Leader
Rhondda Socialist
Ruhr Echo
Seren Gomer
Sozialistische Monatshefte
South Wales Argus
South Wales Daily News
South Wales Daily Star
South Wales Daily Telegraph
South Wales Worker
Tarian y Gweithiwr
Tremonia
Y Traethodydd
Western Mail
Westfälischer Kämpfer
Westfälische Volkszeitung
Welsh Outlook
The Workers' Dreadnought
Volksblatt

D. Contemporary Works and Pamphlets

Alter Verband, *Die Kämpfe um Knappschafts-Reformen im Allgemein Knappschaftsverein Bochum*, Bochum, 1910.

Barwich, Franz, *Der kommunistische Aufbau des Syndikalismus im Gegensatz zum Partei-Kommunismus und Staatssozialismus*, Berlin, Der Syndikalist, 1920.

Bezirkskommission der Sozialdemokratischen Partei für das Westliche Westfalen, *Der Essener Meineidsprozeß gegen Schröder im Wiederaufnahmeverfahren*, Dortmund, A Gerisch, 1911.

Bredenbeck, Anton, *1889: Die Erste Erhebung der Bergarbeiter. Zur Erinnerung an den Grossen Bergarbeiterstreik vor 20 Jahren*, Dortmund, A. Gerisch, 1909.

Brust, August, 'Der Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrrevier', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Tübingen, J. C. B. Monr, 1905, 480-506.

Christlicher Arbeiterbewegung, *Sozialdemokratischer Wahlschwindel vor Gericht. Ein Beweis für die skrupellose Bekämpfung des Gewerkvereins Christlicher Bergarbeiter*, Cöln, Chritlicher Gewerschaftsverlag, 1910.

Cook, A. J., *Is it peace?*, London, Workers' Publications Ltd., 1926.

Engel, Konrad, *Zum Ausstande der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrbezirke*, Berlin, Julius Springer, 1905.

Effert, Johannes, *Zur Geschichte der Bergarbeiterbewegung im Ruhrrevier*, Essen, 1906.

Erdmann, August, *Die Christlichen Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, J. H. W. Dietz, 1908.

Evans, David, *Labour Strife in the South Wales Coalfield 1910-1911*, Cardiff, Educational Publishing Co. Ltd., 1911.

Freie Vereinigung deutsches Gewerkschaften, *Das Programm des freien Vereinigung deutsches Gewerkschaften*, Berlin, 1906

Harries, F. J., *History of Conservatism in the Rhondda*, Pontypridd, Glamorgan County Times Office, 1912.

Hartshorn, Vernon, *Mr. Baldwin attacks miners' hours and wages*, London, The Labour Party, 1926.

Hauptvorstand des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, *Denkschrift über die Ursachen der Arbeits-Einstellungen in Ruhrkohlenbergbau*, Essen, 1917.

Hay, W. F. and Ablett, Noah, 'A minimum wage for miners: What it means, and how to get it' in Thomas Mann, *Miners, Wake Up* (The Industrial Syndicalist), 1911.

Hay, W. F., *Industrial Democracy for Miners: A Plan for the Democratic Control of the Mining Industry*, Porth, D. A. Davies, 1919.

Hay, W. F., *Education and the Working Class*, Liverpool, Liverpool and District Council for Independent Working-class Education, 1920.

Hilferding, Rudolf, *Die Sozialisierung und die Machtverhältnisse der Klassen*, Berlin, Verlagsgenossenshcaft Freiheit, 1920.

Hodges, Frank, *Workers' Control in the Coal Mining Industry*, London, Mines for the Nation Campaign Committee, 1920.

Hodges, Frank, *Nationalisation of the Mines*, London, Leonard Parsons, 1920.

Horner, Arthur, *One Mineworkers' Union – Why?*, London, National Minority Movement, 1926.

Horner, Arthur and Watkins, Nat, *British Mineworkers' Union: A Constitution*, London, 1926.

Hue, Otto, *Neutrale oder parteiische Gewerkschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Gewerkschaftsfrage, zugleich eine Geschichte der deutschen Bergarbeiterbewegung*, Bochum, Möller, 1900.

Hue, Otto, *Mehr Bergarbeiterschutz*, Bochum, Möller, 1900.

Hue, Otto, *Unsere Taktik beim Generalstreik*, Bochum, Hansmann & Co., 1905.

Hue, Otto, *Die Bergarbeiter. Historische Darstellung der Bergarbeiter-Verhältnisse von der Ältesten bis in die neueste Zeit*, Berlin, J. H. W. Dietz, 1913, reprinted 1981.

Hue, Otto, *Die Sechsstundenschicht im Bergbau*, Bochum, Vorstand des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1920.

Hue, Otto, *Die Sozialisierung der Kohlenwirtschaft*, Berlin, Vorwärts, 1921.

Imbusch, Heinrich, *Ist eine Verschmelzung der Bergarbeiter-Organisationen möglich?*, Essen, Fredebeul, 1906.

Imbusch, Heinrich, *Arbeitsverhältnis und Arbeiter-Organisationen im deutschen Bergbau. Eine geschichtliche Darstellung*, Berlin/Bonn, J. H. W. Dietz, 1908, reprinted 1980.

Imbusch, Heinrich, *Bergarbeiter-Streik im Ruhrgebiet in Frühjahr 1912*, Köln, Christl. Gewerkschaftsverlag, 1912.

Imbusch, Heinrich, *Die Gelben in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegungen*, Köln, 1912.

Imbusch, Heinrich, *Die Tätigkeit und Erfolge des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands*, Verlag des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, Essen, Verlag des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1915.

Imbush, Heinrich, *25 Jahre Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter*, Essen, Verlag des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1919.

Imbusch, Heinrich, *August Brust. Ein Lebensbild des Gründers der ersten christlichen Gewerkschaft*, Berlin, Christlicher Gewerkschafts-Verlag, 1924.

Industrial Committee of the South Wales Socialist Society, 'A Plan for the Democratic Control of the Mining Industry', 1919.

Jevons, H. Stanley, *The British Coal Trade*, London, Kegan Paul, 1915.

Jones, T. I. Mardy, *Mining Royalties and all about them*, London, ILP, 1908.

Liberal Publication Department, *The Coal Mining Industry: Recent History, Causes of Unrest and The Liberal Remedy*, London, 1925.

Lensing, Lambert, *Der Große Bergarbeiter-Streik des Jahres 1889 im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlenrevier. Ein Wort zur Abwehr*, Dortmund, 1889.

Levenstein, Adolf, *Die Arbeiterfrage mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sozialpsychologischen Seite des modernen Grossbetriebes und der psycho-physischen Einwirkungen auf die Arbeiter*, München, Ernst Rheinhardt., 1912.

Lütgenau, Dr Franz, *Was wollen die Syndikalisten?*, Berlin, Verlag für praktische Politik und geistige Erneuerung, 1920.

Müller, Otto, *Die christliche Gewerkschaftsbewegung Deutschlands mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bergarbeiter- und Textilarbeiter-Orgnisationen*, Karlsruhe, G Braunschen Hofbuchdruckerei, 1905.

Natorp, Gustav. *Der Ausstand der Bergarbeiter im niederrheinisch-westfälischen Industriebezirk*, Essen, G. D. Bädeker, 1889.

Neunerkommission für die Vorbereitung der Sozialisierung des Bergbaues im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet, *Die Sozialisierung des Bergbaues und der Generalstreik im rheinisch-westfälischen Industrigebiet,* 1919.

Oldenburg, Dr Karl, *Studien zur Rheinisch-Westfälischen Bergarbeiterbewegung*, Leipzig, Duncker and Humbolt, 1890.

Osterroth, Nikolaus, *Otto Hue. Ein Lebensbild für seine Freunde*, Bochum, 1922.

Osthold, Paul, *Die Geschichte des Zechenverbandes 1908 - 1913. Ein Beitrag Zur Deutschen Sozialgeschichte,* Berlin, Elsner, 1934.

Pieper, Lorenz, *Die Lage der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrrevier*, Stuttgart and Berlin, J. G. Cotta'sche, 1903.

Price, Evan, *The History of Penuel: Calvanistic Methodist Church*, Wrexham, Hughes and Son, 1925.

Redmayne, Richard, *The British Coal-Mining Industry during the War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923.

Schriften der Gesellschaft fur Soziale Reform, *Aufsätze bei den Streik der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet*, Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1905.

Seippel, Max, *Bochum einst und jetzt. Ein Rück- und Rundblick Bei der Wende des Jahrhunderts*, Bochum, Schürmann und Klagges, 1901 (reprinted 1991).

Severn, M., *The Miners' Evangel. A Text Book for All Manual Workers*, Pontypridd, John W. Ford, 1895.

Spethman, Hans, *Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau. Aus seiner Geschichte von Kriegsanfang bis zum Franzosenabmarchen 1914-1925. Band 1: Aufstand und Ausstand vor und nach dem Kapp-Putsch bis zur Ruhrbesetzung*, Berlin, 1929.

Spethmann, Hans, *Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau. Aus seiner Geschichte von Kriegsanfang bis zum Franzosenabmarchen 1914-1925. Band 2: Aufstand und Ausstand vor und nach dem Kapp-Putsch bis zur Ruhrbesetzung*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1929.

Spethmann, Hans, *Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau. Aus seiner Geschichte von Kriegsanfang bis zum Franzosenabmarchen 1914-1925. Band 3: Der Ruhrkampf 1923 bis 1925 in seinen Leitlinien*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1929.

Spethmann, Hans, *Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau. Aus seiner Geschichte von Kriegsanfang bis zum Franzosenabmarchen 1914-1925. Band 4, Der Ruhrkampf 1923 bis 1925. Das Ringen um die Kohle*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1930.

Spethmann, Hans, *Die Rote Armee an Ruhr und Rhein. Aus Kapptagen*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1930.

Spethmann, Hans. *Der Maistreik 1924 im Ruhrbergbau. Ein grundsätzlicher Arbeitskampf*, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1932.

Thomas, D. A., *Some Notes on the Present State of the Coal Trade in the United Kingdom with special reference to that of South Wales and Monmouthshire together with a proposal for the prevention of undue competition and for maintaining prices at a remunerative level*, Cardiff, 1986.

Unofficial Reform Committee, *The Miners' Next Step. Being a suggested scheme for the reorganisation of the Federation*, 1912, reprinted with a foreword by R. Merfyn Jones, London, Pluto Press, 1973.

Vincent, James Edmund, *John Nixon: Pioneer of the Steam Coal Trade in South Wales*, London, John Murray, 1900.

Vogelsang, Hermann, *Verfassung und Verwaltung des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands*, Cöln, Christlicher Gewerkschafts-Verlag, 1910.

Vogelsang, Hermann, *Geschichte, Verfassung und Verwaltung des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands*, Essen, Verlag des Gewerkvereins christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1915.

Vogelsang, Hermann, *Der Weltkrieg: Deutschlands Bergarbeiter im Kriege*, Essen, Sekretariat Sozialer Studentenarbeit, 1917.

Vogelsang, Hermann, *Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für den Bergbau*, Essen, Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1920.

Volksverein für das katholische Deutschlands, *Bergarbeiterschutz und Zentrum. Eine aktenmäßige Darstellung der Tätigket des Zentrums im Deutschen Reichstage und im Preußischen Landtage zugunsten der Bergarbeiter*, M.Gladbach, Volksverein-Verlag Gmbh., 1908.

Vorstand des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, *Die Streikjustiz im Ruhrrevier oder Madame Justitia in "verbundenen" Augen*. Bochum, H. Hansmann, 1913.

Vorstand des Verband der Bergarebtier Deutschlands, *Material zur Lage der Bergarbeiter während des Weltkrieges. Eine Sammlung von Eingabe der vier Bergarbeiterverbände, besonders des Vorstandes des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, an die Regoerungen sowie Zivil-, Militärbehörden, Werksbesitzer, usw.*, Bochum, 1919.

Vorstand des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, *Unternehmer und Kommunisten während der Bergarbeiterkämpfe im Mai 1924*, Bochum, Hansmann & Co., 1924.

Werner, Georg, *Was kann der deutsche Bergbau von England lernen?*, Essen, Fredebeul & Koenen,1910.

Werner, Georg, *Wie die Wetter schlagen. Ein Kulturbild aus dem Ruhrrevier*, Essen, Deutschen Steigerverbandes, 1913.

Werner, Georg, *Unfälle und Erkrankungen im Ruhr-Bergbau*, Essen, Fredebeul, 1920.

Werner, Georg, *Müssen die Wetter schlagen?*, Berlin, Verlag des Verfasser,1921.

E. Autobiographies and Memoirs

Coombes, Bert L., *These Poor Hands: The Autobiography of a Miner Working in South Wales*, London, Gollancz, 1939.

Davies, Walter Haydn, *The Right Place, the Right Time: Memories of Boyhood Days in a Welsh Mining Community*, Swansea, Christopher Davies, 1975.

Davies, Walter Haydn, *Ups and Downs*, Swansea, Christopher Davies, 1975.

Edwards, Wil Jon, *From the Valley I Came*, London, Angus and Robertson, 1956.

Faust, Otto, *Vom Bremsjungen zum Betriebesinspektor. Ein Leben im Ruhrbergbau (1867-1914)*, Essen, Klartext, 1989.

Griffiths, James, *Pages from Memory*, London, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1969.

Hodges, Frank, *My Adventures as a Labour Leader*, London, George Newnes Ltd, 1925.

Horner, Arthur, *Incorrigible Rebel*, London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1960.

Jones, Bill and Williams, Chris (eds.), *With dust still in his throat: A B. L. Coombes Anthology*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999.

Marchwitza, Hans, *Meine Jugend*, Berlin, Tribüne, 1952.

Morgan, Revd J. Vyrnwy, *The War and Wales*, London, Chapman and Hall Ltd, 1916.

Mor-O'Brien, Anthony (ed.), *The Autobiography of Edmund Stonelake*, Aberdare, Mid-Glamorgan Education Committee, 1981.

Paynter, Will, *My Generation*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1972.

Severing, Carl, *1919 - 1920: Im Wetter und Watterwinkel. Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen des Saatsministers A.D. Carl Severing Ehemaligen Reichs und Staatsminister in Befehlsbereich des VII Armeekorps*, Bielefeld, Greven, 1927.

Sommerlad, Philip, *Vom 'Hessebub' Zum 'Bochumer Jungen': 70 Jahre Sozialistische Bewegung in Bochum (1878-1948)*, ed. Peter Friedemann and Edgar Heinevetter, Essen, Klartext, 1990.

Stenbock-Fermor, Graf Alexander, *Meine Erlebnisse als Bergarbeiter*, Stuttgart, J Engelhorns, 1928.

Stewart, William, *J. Keir Hardie: A Biography*, London, ILP, 1921.

Werner, Georg, *Ein Kumpel. Erzählung aus dem Leben der Bergarbeiter*, Berlin, 1929.

F. Reference Works

Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopäde

Dictionary of Labour Biography

Digest of Welsh Historical Statistics

The Labour Who's Who 1927

Rheinisch-Westfälische Wirtschaftsbiographien

Sozialdemokratische Parlamentarier in den deutschen Reichs- und Landtagen, 1867-1933

G. Secondary Literature

Abrams, Lynn, *Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany: Leisure and Recreation in the Rhineland and Westphalia*, London and New York, Routledge, 1992.

Abrams, Lynn, 'Zur Entwicklung einer kommerziellen Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet (1850-1914)'. In *Kirmes - Kneipe - Kino. Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet zwischen Kommerz und Kontrolle (1850-1914)*, ed. Dagmar Kift, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1992, 33-59.

Ackers, Peter, 'Colliery Deputies in the British Coal Industry before Nationalization', *International Review of Social History* 39 (1994), 383-414.

Adams, Tony, 'Market and Institutional Forces in Industrial Relations: The Development of National Collective Bargaining, 1910-1920', *Economic History Review* L, no. 3 (1997), 506-30.

Adelman, Gerhard, *Die soziale Betriebsverfassung des Ruhrbergbaus vom Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Industrie- und Handelskammerbezirks Essen*, Bonn, Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag, 1962.

Alderman, Geoffrey, 'The Anti-Jewish Riots of August 1911 in South Wales', *Welsh History Review* 6, no. 2 (1972), 190-200.

Ammanford Rugby Club, *Sixty Years of Rugby 1881-1947: Ammanford R.F.C. Diamond Jubilee*: Ammanford Rugby Club, 1947.

Anderson, Margaret Lavinia, 'Interdenominationalism, Clericalism, Pluralism: The Zentrumsstreit and the Dilemma of Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany', *Central European History* 21, no. 4 (1988) 350-78.

Anderson, Margaret Lavinia, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.

Armeson, Robert B., *Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor: A Study of the Military-Industrial Complex in Germany during World War 1*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

Arnot, R. Page, *South Wales Miners, Glowyr de Cymru: A History of the South Wales Miners' Federation, 1898-1914*, vol. 1, London, Allen & Unwin, 1967.

Arnot, R Page, *South Wales Miners, Glowyr de Cymru: A History of the South Wales Miners' Federation, 1914-1926*, vol. 2, Cardiff, Cymric Federation Press, 1975.

Asteris, Michael, 'The Rise and Decline of South Wales Coal Exports, 1870-1930', *Welsh History Review* 13, no. 1 (1986), 24-42.

Atkinson, Michael, 'The Supply of Raw Materials to the South Wales Iron Industry, 1800-60.' In *Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History*, ed. Colin Baber and L. J. Williams, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1986, 24-42.

Aubel, Felix, 'The Conservatives in Wales, 1880-1935.' In *The Conservatives and Modern British Society*, ed. Martin Francis and Ina-Maria Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1996, 96-110.

Aurand, Harold, *From Molly Maguires to the United Mineworkers*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1971.

Baggs, Christopher M., 'Well Done, Cymmer Workmen! The Cymmer Collieries Workmen's Library, 1893-1920', *Llafur* 5, no. 3, (1990), 20-7.

Bahne, Siegfried, 'Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in Der Weimar.' In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 315-53.

Bajhor, Frank, 'Kampf ums alte Recht? Bergbau und Bergarbeiterschaft im Industriedorf Gladbeck 1871-1889.' In *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik Und Wilhelminische Gesellschaft*, ed. Karl Ditt and Dagmar Kift, Hagen, Westfälisches Industriemuseum, 1989, 33-53.

Barclay, Martin, '"The Slaves of the Lamp": The Aberdare Miners' Strike, 1910', *Llafur* 2, no. 3 (1978), 24-42.

Bassett, T. M., *The Welsh Baptists*, Swansea, Ilston House, 1977.

Beddoe, Deirdre, *Out of the Shadows: A History of Women in Twentieth-Century Wales*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000.

Belchem, John, 'Reconstructing Labour History', *Labour History Review* 62, no. 3 (1997), 318-23.

Belchem, John and Kirk, Neville (eds.), *Languages of Labour*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997.

Benson, John, *British Coalminers in the Nineteenth Century: A Social History*, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980.

Berg, Werner, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland und Großbritannien im Übergang zum 'Oganisierten Kapitalismus'. Unternehmer, Angestellte, Arbeiter und Staat im Steinkohlenbergbau des Ruhrgebietes und von Südwales, 1850-1914*, Berlin, Duncker & Humbolt, 1984.

Berg, Werner, 'Zwei Typen industriegesellschaftlicher Modernisierung: Die Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet und in Südwales im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert'. In *Bergbau in Großbritannien und im Ruhrgebiet: Studien zur vergleichenden Geschichte des Bergbaus, 1850-1930*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, Bochum, Brockmeyer, 1985.

Berger, Stefan, *The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994.

Berger, Stefan, 'British and German Socialists between Class and National Solidarity.' In *Nationalism, Labour and Ethnicity, 1870-1939*, ed. Stefan Berger and Angel Smith, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, 31-64.

Berger, Stefan, 'Working-Class Culture and the Labour Movement in the South-Wales and the Ruhr Coalfields: A Comparison', *Llafur* 8, no. 2 (2001), 5-40.

Berghoff, Hartmut and Möller, Roland, 'Unternehmer in Deutschland und England 1870-1914: Aspekte eines Kollektivbiographischen Vergleichs', *Historische Zeitschrift* 256 (1993), 353-86.

Bessel, Richard, 'The Great War in German Memory: the Soldiers of the First World War, Demobilization, and Weimar Political Culture', *German History* 6, no. 1 (1988), 20-34.

Bessel, Richard, 'Why Did the Weimar Republic Collapse?' In *Why Did German Democracy Fail?*, ed. Ian Kershaw. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990, 120-52.

Bessel, Richard, *Germany after the First World War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

Biagini, Eugenio F. and Reid, Alastair J., 'Currents of Radicalism, 1850-1914'. In *Currents of Radicalism. Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914*, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 1-19.

Blackbourn, David. *Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany. The Centre Party in Württemburg before 1914*, New Haven and London, 1980.

Blackbourn, David, 'The Problem of Democratisation: German Catholics and the Role of the Centre Party'. In *Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, ed. Richard J. Evans, London, Croon Helm, 1978, 160-85.

Blackbourn, David, 'Progress and Piety: Liberals, Catholics and the State in Bismarck's Germany.' In *Populists and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History*, ed. David Blackbourn. London, Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Blackbourn, David, 'Catholics and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Center Party and Its Constituency'. In *Populists and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History*, ed. David Blackbourn, London, Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Blackbourn, David and Eley, Geoff, *The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1984.

Blatz, Perry, *Democratic Miners: Work and Labour Relations in the Anthracite Coal Industry 1875-1925, Albany New York, 1994*, New York, University of New York Press, 1994.

Blauner, Robert, 'Work Satisfaction and Industrial Trends in Modern Society'. In *Labor and Trade Unionism: An Interdisciplinary Reader*, ed. Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset, New York, London, John Wiley and Sons Inc, 1960, 339-60.

Bock, Hans Manfred, *Geschichte des linken Radikalismus in Deutschland. Ein Versuch*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1976.

Bock, Hans Manfred, 'Anarchosyndicalism in the German Labour Movement: A Rediscovered Minority Tradition'. In *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective*, ed. Marcel von der Linden and Wyne Thorpe, Aldershot, Scolar Press, 1990, 59-80.

Bohl, Erich, *50 Jahre SPD Borbeck, 1901-1951*, Essen, Webels, 1951.

Bollerey, F. and Hartmann K., 'Wohnen im Revier. Siedlungen vom Beginn der Industrialisierung bis 1933. Analyse - Bewertung - Chancen', *Stadtbauwelt*, 36, (1975), 85-108.

Borsdorf, Ulrich, *Essen - Geschichte einer Stadt*, Bottrop and Essen, Pomp-Verlag, 2002.

Boyns, Trevor, 'Work and Death in the South Wales Coalfield, 1874-1914', *Welsh History Review* 12, no. 4 (1985), 514-37.

Boyns, Trevor, 'Growth in the Coal Industry: The Cases of Powell Duffryn and the Ocean Coal Company, 1864-1913'. In *Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History*, ed. Colin Baber and L. J. Williams, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1986, 153-70.

Boyns, Trevor, 'Technical Change and Colliery Explosions in the South Wales Coalfield', *Welsh History Review* 13, no. 2 (1986), 155-77.

Boyns, Trevor, 'Powell Duffryn: The Use of Machinery and Production Planning Techniques in the South Wales Coalfield'. In *Towards a Social History of Mining in*

the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Klaus Tenfelde, München, Beck, 1992, 370-86.

Boyns, Trevor, 'Jigging and Shaking: Technical Choice in the South Wales Coal Industry between the Wars', *Welsh History Review* 17, no. 2 (1994), 230-51.

Brack, Rudol, *Deutscher Episkopat und Gewerkschaftsstreit 1900-1914*, Köln, Böhlau Verlag, 1976.

Brakelmann, Günter, 'Evangelische Pfarrer im Konfliktfeld des Ruhrbergarbeiterstreiks von 1905'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 297-314.

Brephol, Wilhelm, *Der Aufbau des Ruhrvolkes im Zuge der Ost-West-Wanderung*, Recklinghausen, Bitter and Co., 1948.

Breuilly, John, *Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Essays in Comparative History*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1992.

Brüggemeier, Franz Josef, 'Ruhr Miners and Their Historians'. In *People's History and Socialist Theory*, ed. R. Samuel, ? London, ?, 1981.

Brüggemeier, Franz Josef, 'Volle Kost Voll. Die Wohnungsverhältnisse der Bergleute an der Ruhr um die Jahrhundertwende'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen & Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 151-73.

Brüggemeier, Franz Josef, 'Soziale Vagabundage oder revolutionär Heros? Zur Sozialgeschichte Der Ruhrbergarbeiter 1880-1920'. In *Lebenserfahrung und Kollektive Gedächtnis. Die Praxis Der >>Oral History<<*, ed. Lutz Niethammer, Frankfurt am Main, Syndikat, 1980, 193-213.

Brüggemeier, Franz Josef, *Leben Vor Ort. Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau, 1889-1919*, München, Beck, 1984.

Brüggemeier, Franz Josef and Niethammer, Lutz, 'Schlafgänger, Schnapskasinos und schwerindustrielle Kolonie. Aspekte Der Arbeiterwohnungsfrage Im Ruhrgebiet vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 135-76.

Bry, Gerhard, *Wages in Germany, 1871-1945*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960.

Bücker, Vera, 'Der Kulturkampf im Ruhrgebiet'. In *100 Jahre Bismarck. Ein Stadtteil 'mit besondersm Erneuerungsbedarf'*, ed. Stefan Goch and Lutz Heidemann, Essen, Klartext, 2001, 67-82.

Budde, Heiner, *Christliche-Sozial an der Ruhr. Eine Volksbewegung im Zentrum der Industrie. Dokumentation Eines 150jährigen Wegen*, Köln, Orthen Druck, 1988.

Bulmer, M. I., 'Sociological Models of the Mining Community', *Sociological Review* 23, no. 1 (1975), 61-92.

Burge, Alun, 'Miners' Learning in the South Wales Coalfield 1900-1947', *Llafur* 8, 1 (2000), 69-96.

Burgess, Keith, *The Origins of British Industrial Relations: The Nineteenth Century Experience*, London, Croom Helm, 1975.

Burghardt, Uwe, *Die Mechanisierung des Ruhrbergbaus 1890-1930*, München, C. H. Beck, 1995.

Buschak, Willy, '"Vergessen wir keinen Augenblick, daß wir in Bochum sind" Gewerkschaften und Sozialdemokratie vor 1914'. In *Struktueller Wandel und Kulturelles Leben: Politische Kultur in Bochum 1860-1990*, ed. Peter Friedemann and Gustav Seebold, Essen, Klartext, 1992, 130-40.

Calhoun, C. J., 'Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for Comparative Research', *Social History*, 5 (1980), 105-29.

Campbell, Alan, 'Honourable Men and Degraded Slaves: A Comparative Study of Trade Unionism in Two Lanarkshire Mining Communities, c. 1830-1874'. In *Independent Collier: The Coal Miner as Archetypal Proletarian Reconsidered*, ed. Royden Harrison, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978, 75-113.

Campbell, Alan and Reid, Fred, 'The Independent Collier in Scotland'. In *Independent Collier: The Coal Miner as Archetypal Proletarian Reconsidered*, ed. Royden Harrison, Sussex, Harvester Press Ltd., 1978, 54-74.

Chickering, Roger. *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Childers, Thomas, 'The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic', *American Historical Review* 95, no. 2 (1990), 331-58.

Church, Roy, *The History of the British Coal Industry, 1830-1913: Victorian Pre-Eminence*, vol. 3., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986.

Church, Roy, 'Employers, Trade Unions and the State, 1889-1987. The Origins and Decline of Tripartism in the British Coal Industry.' In *Workers, Owners and Politics in Coal Mining. An International Comparison of Industrial Relations*, ed. Gerald D. Feldman and Klaus Tenfelde, Oxford, Berg, 1990, 12-73.

Church, Roy and Quentin, Outram. *Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in Britain, 1889-1966*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Claggett, William; Loesch, Jeffrey; Shively, W. Phillips; Snell, Ronald, 'Political Leadership and the Development of Political Cleavages: Imperial Germany, 1871-1912', *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (1982), 643-64.

Clarke, Michael, 'Die Anfänge des Zechensiedlungen in Herne und Wanne-Eickel'. In *'Nichts ist so schön wie...' Geschichte und Geschichten aus Herne und Wanne-Eickel*, ed. Michael Clarke, Frank Broßel, and Cornelia Objartel-Balliert, Essen, Klartext, 1991, 83-90.

Cleaver, David, 'Swansea and District's Labour Press, 1888-1914', *Llafur* 4, no. 1, (1984), 35-42.

Cleaver, David, 'Labour and Liberals in the Gower Constituency, 1885-1910', *Welsh History Review* 12, no. 3 (1985), 388-410.

Clingan, C. Edmund, 'Breaking the Balance: The Debate over Emergency Unemployment Aid in Weimar Germany, 1925-6', *Journal of Contemporary History* 29, no. 3, (1994), 371-84.

Cole, G. D. H., *Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry 1914-1921*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923.

Cowling, Maurice, *1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. The Passing of the Second Reform Bill*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Cragoe, Matthew, 'Conscience or Coercion? Clerical Influence at the General Election of 1868 in Wales', *Past and Present* 149, (1995), 140-69.

Craig, Gordon A., *Germany, 1866-1945*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978.

Crew, David, *Town in the Ruhr: A Social History of Bochum, 1860-1914*, New York, Colombia University Press, 1979.

Crew, David, 'Regionale Mobilität und Arbeiterklasse. Das Beispiel Bochum, 1880-1901'. In *Arbeiter in Deutschland: Studien zur Lebensweise der Arbeiterschaft im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*, ed. Klaus Schönhoven and Dieter Langwiesche, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1981, 81-97.

Crew, David F., '*Alltagsgeschichte*: A New Social History "from Below"?', *Central European History* 22, no. 3/4 (1989), 394-407.

Croll, Andy, *Civilizing the Urban: Popular Culture, Public Space and Urban Meaning in Merthyr, c. 1870-1914*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000.

Croll, Andy, 'People's Remembrancers' in a Post-Modern Age: Contemplating the Non-Crisis of Welsh Labour History', *Llafur* 8, no. 1 (2000), 5-17.

Cronin, James E., *Labour and Society in Britain 1918-1979*, London, Batsford Academic and Educational, 1984.

Croon, Helmuth and Utermann, Kurt, *Zeche und Gemeinde: Untersuchungen über den Strukturwandel einer Zechengemeinde im nördlichen Ruhrgebiet*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Moheer (Paul Siebeck), 1958.

Cwiklinski, Bernhard, *August Brust. Gründer und Vorkämpfer der Christlichen Gewerkschaftsbewegung Deutschlands*, Essen, Christlicher Bergarbeiterverband Deutschlands, 1961.

Daunton, M. J., 'Miners' Houses: South Wales and the Great Northern Coalfield, 1880-1914', *International Review of Social History* 25 (1980), 143-75.

Daunton, M. J., 'Down the Pit: Work in the Great Northern and South Wales Coalfields, 1870-1914', *Economic History Review* 34, no. 4 (1981), 578-97.

Daunton, M. J., 'Labour and Technology in South Wales, 1870-1914'. In *Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History*, ed. Colin Baber and L. J. Williams, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1986, 140-52.

David, Wayne, 'The Labour Party and the 'Exclusion' of the Communists: The Case of the Ogmore Divisional Labour Party in the 1920s', *Llafur* 3, no. 4 (1983), 5-15.

Davies, David James, 'Guardians of the Needy Found Wanting: A Study in Social Division during the Industrial Crisis of 1926', *Carmarthenshire Historian* XIX (1982), 54-69.

Davies, Keith, 'Rival Prophets? Williams Ferris Hay, Noah Ablett and the Debate over Working Class Political Action in the South Wales Coalfield 1910-1914', *Llafur* 7, no. 3 & 4 (1998/99), 89-100.

Davies, Meirion, *Glynogwr and Gilfach Goch: A History*. Cowbridge and Bridgend: D. Brown & Sons Ltd., 1981.

Davies, Paul, 'The Making of A. J. Cook: His Development within the South Wales Labour Movement, 1900-1924', *Llafur* 2, no. 3 (1978), 43-63.

Davies, Paul, *A. J. Cook*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987.

De-Long, Jutta, 'Sklaven oder Hausdrache? Frauen in Bergarbeiterfamilien'. In *Eine Partei in Ihrer Region. Zur Geschichte der SPD im westlichen Westfalen*, ed. Bernd Faulenbach and Günther Högel, Essen, Klartext, 1988, 45-50.

De-Long, Jutta, 'Wir müssen ja auch hungern, wenn ihr arbeitet!' Zur Rolle der Bergarbeiterfrauen in den grossen Streiks zwischen 1889 und 1912'. In *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik und Wilhelminische Gesellschaft*, ed. Karl Ditt and Dagmar Kift, Hagen, Westfälisches Industriemuseum, 1989, 69-86.

Dierkes, Herbert, 'Ruhrbergleute und ihre Welt in der Dichtung von Walter Vollmar'. In *Bauernzeit und Bergmannszeit in Bochum-Ost. Geschichte und Geschichten, Berichte und Dokumente, Erinnerungen und Erzählungen von Langendreer und*

Werne, Laer, Ümmingen und Havkenscheid, ed. Clemens Kreuzer, Bochum-Langendreer, Pöppinghaus, 1990, 375-400.

Dorow, Uwe; Jäger, Wolfgang, 'Sind die Schlauen alle nach Bottrop gekommen?'. In *Eine Partei in Ihrer Region. Zur Geschichte Der SPD im Westlichen Westfalen*, ed. Bernd Faluenbach and Günther Högel, Essen, Klartext, 1988, 162-7.

Doyle, Barry, 'Who paid the price of patriotism? The funding of Charles Stanton during the Merthyr Borough by-Election of 1915', *English Historical Review* 109 (1994), 1215-22.

Düwell, Kurt and Köllmann, Wolfgang (ed.), *Rheinland-Westfalen im Industriezeitalter*, vol. 2, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1984.

Düwell, Kurt and Köllmann, Wolfgang (ed.), *Rheinland-Westfalen im Industriezeitalter*, vol. 3, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1984.

Edwards, Ness, *The History of the South Wales Miners*, London, The Labour Publishing Company Ltd, 1926.

Edwards, Ness, *History of the South Wales Miners' Federation*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1938.

Egan, David, 'The Swansea Conference of the British Council of Soldiers and Workers Delegates, July 1917: Reactions to the Russian Revolution of February 1917 and the Anti-War Movement in South Wales', *Llafur* 1, no. 4 (1975), 12-37.

Egan, David, 'The Unofficial Reform Committee and the Miners' Next Step: Documents from the W. H. Mainwaring Papers with and Introduction and Notes', *Llafur* 2, no. 3 (1978), 64-80.

Egan, David, 'Noah Ablett 1883-1935', *Llafur* 4, no. 3 (1986), 19-30.

Egan, David, 'Wales at Work'. In *Wales 1880-1914*, ed. Trevor Herbert & Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 48-72.

Egan, David, 'A Cult of Their Own: Syndicalism and the Miners' Next Step'. In *Miners, Unions and Politics, 1910-47*, ed. Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and David Howell, Aldershot, Scolar, 1996 13-33.

Eisenberg, Christiane, 'The Comparative View in Labour History: Old and New Interpretations of the English and German Labour Movement before 1914', *International Review of Social History* 34 (1989), 403-30.

Eley, Geoff, 'Labor History. Social History, *Alltagsgeschichte*: Experience, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday - a New Direction for German Social History', *Journal of Modern History* 61, no. 2 (1989), 296-343.

Eley, Geoff, 'Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century'. In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Cambridge, Mass and London, MIT Press, 1992, 289-339.

Ellis, John S., 'The Prince and the Dragon: Welsh National Identity and the 1911 Investiture of the Prince of Wales', *Welsh History Review* 18, no. 2 (1996), 272-94.

Evans, Ellen Lovell, *The German Center Party, 1870-1933: A Study in Political Catholicism*, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1981.

Evans, E. W., *Mabon: William Abraham 1842-1922: A Study in Trade Union Leadership*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1959.

Evans, E. W., *The Miners of South Wales*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1961.

Evans, E W., 'Mabon and Trade Unionism in the South Wales Coalfield'. In *Men of No Property: Studies of Welsh Trade Unionism*, ed. Goronwy Alun Hughes, Caerwys, Gwasg Gwenffrwd, 1971, 51-9.

Evans, Neil and Jones, Dot '"A blessing for the miner's wife": the campaign for pithead baths in the south Wales coalfield, 1908-1950', *Llafur* 6, no. 3 (1994), 5-28.

Evans, Neil and Sullivan, Kate, 'Yn llawn o dân cymreig (Full of Welsh Fire): The Language of Politics in Wales 1880-1914'. In *A History of the Welsh Language: The Welsh Language and Its Social Domains 1801-1911*, ed. Geraint H. Jenkins, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, 561-85.

Evans, Richard J., 'Politics and the Family. Social Democracy and the Working-Class Family in Theory and in Practice before 1914'. In *The German Family. Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Richard J. Evans and W. R. Lee, London, Croom Helm, 1981, 256-88.

Evans, Richard J. (ed.), *The German Working Class 1883-1933: The Politics of Everyday Life*, London, Croom Helm Ltd, 1982.

Fagge, Roger, *Power, Culture and Conflict in the Coalfields: West Virginia and South Wales 1900-1912*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996.

Falter, Jürgen W., and Bömermann, Hartmut, 'Die Wählerpotentiale politischer Teilkulturen 1920-1930'. In *Politischer Identität und Nationale Gedenktage. Zur Politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989, 281-305.

Faulenbach, Bernd, 'Emil Kirdorf - Repräsentant der Schwerindustriellen Führungeschicht des Reviers'. In *Die Erfindung des Ruhrgebiets. Arbeit und Alltag um 1900*, ed. Ruhrlandmuseum Essen, Bottrop, Pomp, 2000, 121-28.

Feldman, Gerald D., *Army, Industry and Labour in Germany 1914-1918*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966.

Feldman, Gerald D., 'Die Wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen des Alten Verband in der Weimarer Repbulic'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 301-23.

Feldman, Gerald D., *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914-1924*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.

Ferguson, Niall, *Paper and Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897-1927*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Ferguson, Niall, *The Pity of War*, London, Penguin, 1998.

Fishman, Nina, 'Heroes and Anti-Heroes: Communists in the Coalfields'. In *Miners, Unions and Politics, 1910-1947*, ed. Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and David Howell, Aldershot, Scolar, 1996, 93-117.

Fisk, Malcolm J., *Housing in the Rhondda, 1800-1940*, Cardiff, Merton Priory Press Ltd, 1996.

Fletcher, Roger, 'History from Below Comes to Germany: The New History movement in the Federal Republic of Germany', *Journal of Modern History* 60, no. 3 (1988), 557-68.

Foot, Michael. *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography 1897-1945*, vol. 1, London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1962.

Fox, Kenneth O., 'Labour and Merthyr's Khaki Election of 1900', *Welsh History Review* 2, no. 4 (1965), 351-66.

Francis, Hywel, 'The Anthracite Strike and the Disturbances of 1925', *Llafur* 1, no. 2 (1973), 53-66.

Francis, Hywel, 'South Wales'. In *The General Strike, 1926*, ed. Jeffrey Skelley, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1976, 232-60.

Francis, Hywel, 'The secret world of the south Wales miner: The relevance of oral history'. In *A People and a Proletariat: Essays in the History of Modern Wales, 1780-1890*, ed. David Smith, London, Pluto Press, 1980, 166-80.

Francis, Hywel and Smith, Dai, *The Fed: A History of the South Wales Miners in the Twentieth Century*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998.

Fricke, Dieter, *Der Ruhrbergarbeiterstreik von 1905*. Berlin, Rütten & Loening, 1955.

Fritsch, Johann, *Eindringen und Ausbreitung des Revisionismus im Duetschen Bergarbeiterverband (Bis 1914)*, Leipzig, VEB Deutscher Verlag für Grundstoffindustrie, 1967.

Füßmann, Klaus, 'Die politischen Verhältnisse in Herne zur Kasierzeit'. In *'Nichts Ist So Schön Wie...' Geschichte und Geschichten aus Herne und Wanne-Eickel*, ed. Michael Clarke Frank Broßel, Cornelia Objartel-Balliert, Essen, Klartext, 1991, 45-53.

Gailus, Manfred, 'Seid bereit zum roten Oktober in Deutschland. Die Kommunisten'. In *Politische Identität und Nationale Gedenktage. Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989, 61-88.

Gates, Robert A., 'Von der Soziapolitik zur Wirtschaftspolitik? Das Dilemma der deutschen Sozialdemokratie in der Krise 1929-1933'. In *Industrielles System und Politische Entwicklung in der Weimar Republik*, ed. Dietmar Petzina Hans Mommsen, Bernd Weisbrod, and Dirk Stegmann, Düsseldorf, Dorste Verlag, 1974, 206-25.

Geary, Dick, 'The Industrial Bourgeoisie and Labour Relations in Germany 1871-1933'. In *The German Bourgeoisie. Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. David Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans, London and New York, Routledge, 1991, 140-61.

Gehrmann, Siegfried, 'Fußball in einer Industrieregion. Das Beispiel F. C. Schalke 04'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke & Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 377-98.

Gehrmann, Siegfried, *Fußball, Vereine, Politik. Zur Sportgeschichte des Reviers 1900-1940*, Essen, Reimar Hobbing, 1988.

Gilbert, David, 'Community and municipalism: Collective identity in late-Victorian and Edwardian mining towns', *Journal of Historical Geography* 17, no. 3 (1991), 257-70.

Gilbert, David, *Class, Community, and Collective Action: Social Change in Two British Coalfelds, 1850-1926*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992.

Gladen, Albin,'Die Streiks der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet in den Jahren 1889, 1905 und 1912'. In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 111-48.

Glaser, Anthony, 'The Tredegar Riots of August 1911'. In *The Jews of South Wales: Historical Studies*, ed. Ursula R. O. Henriques, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1993, 151-76.

Goch, Stefan, *Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel Gelsenkirchen, 1848-1975*. Düsseldorf, Dorste Verlag, 1990.

Goch, Stefan, 'Von der Braubauerschaft nach Bismarck. Anmerkungen zur Geschichte des Gelsenkirchener Stadtteils'. In *100 Jahre Bismarck. Ein Stadtteil 'mit*

besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf', ed. Stefan Goch and Lutz Heidemann, Essen, Klartext, 2001, 17-34.

Goll, Lothar, 'Liberalismus und Bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Zu Charakter und Entwicklung der Liberalen Bewegung in Deutschland', *Historische Zeitschrift* 220 (1975), 324-528.

Grant, Raymond, *The Parliamentary History of Glamorgan, 1542-1976*, Swansea, Christopher Davies, 1978.

Gregory, Roy, *The Miners and British Politics, 1906-1914*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968.

Griffin, Alan R. *The Miners of Nottinghamshire 1914-1944: A History of the Nottinghamshire Miners' Unions*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1962.

Griffiths, James, 'The Miners' Union in the Anthracite Coalfield'. In *Men of No Property: Studies of Welsh Trade Unionism*, ed. Goronwy Alun Hughes, Caersswys, Gwasg Gwenffrwd, 1971, ?

Griffiths, Robert, *S. O. Davies: A Socialist Faith*, Llandysul, Gomer Press, 1983.

Guttsman, W. L., *The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933: From Ghetto to Government*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984.

Gwyther, Cyril E., 'Sidelights on Religion and Politics in the Rhondda Valley, 1906-26', *Llafur* 3, no. 1 (1980), 30-43.

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984.

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987.

Haffert, Claus D., *Die katholischen Arbeitervereine Westdeutschlands der Weimarer Republik*, Essen, Klartext, 1994.

Hagenlücke, Heinz, 'Formverwandlungen der Politik in Deutschland im Übergang vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik'. In *Der erste Weltkrieg und die eurpäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung er Politik*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Köln, Böhlau, 2000, 107-24.

Hamer, D. A., *Liberal Parties in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972.

Harris, José, 'Bureaucrats and Businessmen in British Food Control, 1916-19'. In *War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919*, ed. Kathleen Burk, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982.

Hartewig, Karin, *Das unbrechenbare Jahrzehnt: Bergarbeiter und ihre Familien im Ruhrgebiet 1914-1924*, München, C. H. Beck, 1993.

Hartmann, Knut, *Der Weg zur gewerkschaftliche Organisation. Bergarbeiterbewegung und kapitalischer Bergbau im Ruhrgebiet, 1851-1889.* München, tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977.

Heitzer, Horstwalter, *Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland im Kaiserreich 1890-1918*, Mainz, Matthais Grünewald, 1979.

Hellkuhl, Antionette, *Empor zum Licht. Arbeitergesangvereine im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet 1878-1914*, Stuttgart and Witten, Bertold Marohl Musikverlag, 1983.

Hennicke, Otto, *Die Rote Ruhrarmee*, Berlin, Ministry for National Defence, 1956.

Henriques, Ursula R. Q. (eds.), *The Jews of South Wales: Historical Studies*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1993.

Henze, Jochen, *Sechstundenschicht im Ruhrbergbau 1918-1920: Ursachen und Verlauf eines Arbeitszeitkonflikts*, Freiburg, Burg-Verlag, 1988.

Herzig, Arno, 'Organisationsprobleme der Sozialdemokratie im Ruhrgebiet im 19. Jahrhundert'. In *Arbeit und Alltag im Revier. Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterkultur im Westlichen Ruhrgebiet im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Ludiger Heid and Julius H. Schoeps, Duisburg, Walter Braun Verlag, 1985, 6-21.

Herzig, Arno C., *Carl Wilhelm Tölckes Presseberichte. Zur Entwicklung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1848-1893*, Munich, Dokumentation, 1976.

Hickey, Stephen, 'The Shaping of the German Labour Movement: Miners in the Ruhr'. In *Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, ed. Richard J. Evans, London, Croom Helm, 1978, 215-40.

Hickey, Stephen, 'Bergmannsarbeit an der Ruhr vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen & Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 46-69.

Hickey, Stephen, *Workers in Imperial Germany: The Miners of the Ruhr*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1985.

Hiepel, Claudia, *Arbeiterkatholizismus an der Ruhr: August Brust und der Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter*, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1999.

Hilton, Kenneth, 'John Spargo, the Social Democratic Federation, and the 1898 South Wales Coal Strike', *Welsh History Review* 16 (1993), 542-50.

Hilton, Matthew, 'Tabs, Fags and the Boy Labour Movement in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain' *Journal of Social History* 28, no. 3 (1995), 587-608.

Hinton, James, *The First Shop Stewards' Movement,* London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1973.

Hobsbawm, Eric, *Worlds of Labour: Further Studies in the History of Labour*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984.

Hodges, T. Mansell, 'The Peopling of the Hinterland and the Port of Cardiff'. In *Industrial South Wales 1750-1914: Essays in Welsh Economic History*, ed. W. E. Minchinton, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1969, 3-18.

Hoffman, Werner, 'Politik in der Provinz: Kommunale Politisierung dargestellt an den sechs Industriedörfen im Landkreis Recklinghausen vom Beginn der Industrialisierung bis 1914', *Bochumer Historische Studien, Neuere Geschichte* 16 (1996).

Högel, Günther, 'Entstehung und Entwicklung des SPD-Bezirks westliches Westfalen 1890-1914'. In *Eine Partei in ihrer Region. Geschichte der SPD im Westlichen Westfalen*, Essen, Klartext, 1988, 71-79.

Hogenkamp, Bert, 'Miners' Cinemas in South Wales in the 1920s and 1930s', *Llafur* 4, no. 2 (1985), 20-35.

Holmes, Colin, 'The Tredegar Riots of 1911: Anti-Jewish Disturbances in South Wales', *Welsh History Review* 11, no. 2 (1982), 214-25.

Holmes, G. M., 'The South Wales Coal Industry', *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1976), 162-207.

Holmes, Graeme, 'The First World War and Government Coal Control'. In *Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History*, ed. C. Baber and L. J. Williams, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1986, 206-21.

Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, *Quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus im 19. Jahrhunderts. Eine Führungssektoranalyse*, Dortmund, Ardey-Verlag, 1973.

Holton, Bob, *British Syndicalism, 1900-1914*, London, Pluto, 1976.

Holton, Robert J., 'Revolutionary Syndicalism and the British Labour Movement'. In *The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany 1880-1914*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, 266-81.

Hopkin, Deian, 'Patriots and Pacifists in Wales 1914-1918: The Case of Captain Lionel Lindsay and the Rev. T. E. Nicholas', *Llafur* 1, no. 3 (1974), 27-41.

Hopkin, Deian, 'The Great Unrest in Wales 1910-13: A Question of Evidence'. In *Class, Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada, 1850-1930*, ed. Deian R. Hopkin and Gregory S. Kealey, Aberystwyth, Llafur/CCLH, 1985, 249-75.

Hopkin, Deian, 'Social Reactions to Economic Change'. In *Wales between the Wars*, ed. Trevor Herbert & Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 52-98.

Hopkin, Deian, 'The Rise of Labour: Llanelli, 1890-1922'. In *Politics and Society in Wales, 1840-1922*, ed. Geraint H. Jenkins and J. Beverley Smith, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 161-82.

Hopkin, Deian, 'Labour's Roots in Wales, 1880-1900'. In *The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000*, ed. Duncan Tanner, Chris Williams and Deian Hopkin, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, 40-60.

Horne, John, 'Labor and Labor Movements in World War 1'. In *The Great War and the Twentieth Century*, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Mary R. Habeck Jay Winter, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2000, 187-230.

Horváth, Árpád, *Sozialismus und Religion. Die Religion und ihre Funktionen im Spiegel sozialistischer Ideologien*, vol. 1., Bern, Peter Lang, 1987.

Howard, Christopher, 'Reactionary Radicalism: The Mid-Glamorgan Bye-Election, March 1910', *Glamorgan Historian* 9 (1973), 29-41.

Howard, Christopher, '"Expectations Born to Death": The Local Labour Party Expansion in the 1920s.' In *The Working Class in Modern British History: Essays in Honour of Henry Pelling*, ed. Jay M. Winter, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, 65-81.

Howard, Christopher, '"The Focus of the Mute Hopes of a Whole Class": Ramsay Macdonald and Aberavon', *Llafur* 7, no. 1 (1996), 68-77.

Howard, N. P., 'The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 1918-1919', *German History* 1, no. 1 (1993), 161-88.

Howell, David, *British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888-1906*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983.

Huck, Gerhard, 'Arbeiterkonsumverein und Verbraucherorganisation. Die Entwicklung der Konsumgenossenschaften im Ruhrgebiet 1860-1914'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 215-46.

Hughes, Colin, *Lime, Lemon and Sarsaparilla: The Italian Community in South Wales, 1881-1945*, Bridgend, Seren, 1991.

Hughes, Emyrs, *Keir Hardie*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1956.

Hyman, Richard, 'Rank and File Movements and Workplace Organisation, 1914-1939'. In *A History of British Industrial Relations, 1914-1939*, ed. Chris Wrigley, Brighton, Harvester Press Ltd, 1987, 129-59.

Jackson, James H., *Migration and Urbanization in the Ruhr Valley*, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1997.

Jäger,Wolfgang, *Bergarbeitermilieus und Parteien im Ruhrgebiet. Zum Wahlverhalten des katholischen Bergarbeitermilieus bis 1933*, München, C. H. Beck, 1996.

Jäger, Wolfgang, 'Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr'. In *100 Jahre Bismarck. Ein Stadtteil 'mit besonderm Erneuerungsbedarf'*, ed. Stefan Goch and Lutz Heidemann, Essen, Klartext, 2001, 127-34.

Jantke, Carl, *Bergmann und Zeche. Die sozialen Arbeitsverhältnisse einer Schachtanlage des nördlichen Ruhrgebiets in der Sicht der Bergbau*, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1953.

Jeremy, Paul, 'Life on Circular 703: The Crisis of Destitution in the South Wales Coalfield during the Lockout of 1926', *Llafur* 2, no. 2 (1977), 65-75.

Joerss, Ralf, 'Moralisch Vorkommen und politisch Gefährlich? Die Schnapskasinos im Ruhrgebiet am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts', *Beiträge zur Geschichte Dortmunds und der Grafschaft Mark*, Bd. 92/93 (2001/2002), 133-74.

John, Angela V., 'A miner struggle? Women's protests in Welsh mining history', *Llafur* 4, no. 1 (1984), 72-90.

John, Angela V. (ed.), *Our Mothers' Land: Chapters in Welsh Women's History, 1830-1939*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1991.

Jones, Dot, 'Did Friendly Societies Matter? A Study of Friendly Society Membership in Glamorgan, 1794-1910', *Welsh History Review* 12, no. 3 (1985), 324-49.

Jones, Dot, 'Serfdom and Slavery: Women's Work in Wales 1890-1930'. In *Class, Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada*, ed. Deian R. Hopkin and Gregory S. Kealey, Aberystwyth, Llafur/CCLH, 1989, 86-100.

Jones, Gareth Stedman, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Jones, Gareth Elwyn, 'Wales 1880-1914'. In *Wales 1880-1914*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 1-10.

Jones, Ieuan Gwynedd, 'Language and Community in Nineteenth Century Wales'. In *A People and a Proletariat. Essays in the History of Wales 1780-1980*, ed. David Smith, London, Pluto, 1980, 47-71.

Jones, J. Graham, 'Wales and the "New Socialism", 1926-29', *Welsh History Review* 11, no. 2 (1982), 173-99.

Jones, J. Graham, 'Alfred Thomas's National Institutions (Wales) Bills of 1891-92', *Welsh History Review* 15, no. 2 (1990/1), 218-39.

Jones, Philip N., *Colliery Settlement in the South Wales Coalfield, 1850-1926*, Hull, University of Hull, 1969.

Joyce, Patrick, *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Joyce, Patrick, 'Refabrication Labour History; or, from Labour History to the History of Labour', *Labour History Review* 62, no. 2 (1997), 147-52.

Keen, Michael and Richard, 'The Coal War in South Wales, 1893', *Glamorgan Historian* 10 (1974), 35-49.

Kerr, Clark and Siegel, Abraham, 'The Interdisciplinary Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison'. In *Patterns of Industrial Conflict*, ed. Robert Dubin, Arthur Kornhauser, Arthur M. Ross, New York, Toronto, London, McGraw Hill, 1954, 189-212.

Kershaw, Ian (ed.), *Why Did German Democracy Fail?*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990.

Kirchhoff, Hans Georg, *Die staatliche Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau 1871-1914*, Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1957.

Kirk, Neville, 'In Defence of Class. A Critique of Recent Revisionist Writing Upon the Nineteenth-Century English Working Class', *International Review of Social History* 32 (1987), 2-47.

Kirk, Neville, 'History and Post-Modernism: A Materialist View', *Social History* 19, no. 2 (1994), 221-40.

Kitchen, Martin, *The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918*, London, Croom Helm, 1976.

Kitchen, Martin, *The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914*, London, Croom Helm, 1978.

Klan, Ulrich and Nelles, Dieter. *'Es lebt noch eine Flamme'. Rheinische Anarcho-Syndikalisten/innen in der Weimarer Republik und im Faschismus*, Grafenau-Döffingen, Trotzdem-Verlag, 1986.

Klarman, Michael, 'The Trade Union Political Levy. The Osborne Judgement (1909) and the South Wales Miners' Federation', *Welsh History Review* 15, no. 1 (1990), 34-57.

Kleßmann, Christoph, *Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1945*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978.

Kleßmann, Christoph, 'Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet: Soziale Lage und Gewerkschaftliche Organisation'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und*

ihre Organisationen in Deutschland, ed. Hans Mommsen & Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 109-30.

Kleßmann, Christoph, 'Zjednoczenie Zawdowe Polskie (ZZP - Polnische Berufsvereinigung) und Alter Verband im Ruhrgebiet', *Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korresponden* 1 (1979), 68-71.

Kluge, Ulrich, 'Essener Sozialisierungsbewegung und Volkswehr Bewegung im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet 1918/19' *Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz* 16 (1972), 56-65.

Kluge, Ulrich, 'Militärrevolte und Staatsumsturz. Ausbreitung und Konsolidierung Der Räteorganisationen Im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet'. In *Arbeiter und Soldatenräte im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet*, ed. Rheinhard Rürup, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1975, 39-82.

Koch, Max Jürgen, *Die Bergarbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet zur Zeit Wilhelms II (1889-1914)*, Düsseldorf, Dorste-Verlag, 1954.

Kocka, Jürgen, *Facing Total War: German Society 1914-1918*, Leamington Spa, Berg, 1984.

Köllman, Wolfgang, 'Vom Knappen zum Bergarbeiter: Die Entstehung der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen & Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 23-48.

Köllmann, Wolfgang, 'The Process of Urbanisation in Germany at the Height of the Industrialisation Period', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 4, no. 3 (1969), 59-77.

Korff, Gottfried, 'Volkskultur und Arbeiterkultur. Überlegungen am Beispiel der Sozialistischen Maifestradition', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 5, no. 1 (1979), 83-102.

Korn, Monika, 'Die evangelischen Arbeitervereine in Rheinland und Westfalen und der Bergarbeiterstreik von 1889'. In *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik und Wilhelminische Gesellschaft*, ed. Karl Ditt & Dagmar Kift, Hagen, Westfälisches Industriemuseum, 1989, 129-50.

Koszyk, Kurt, 'Die sozialdemokratische Arbeiterbewegung 1890–1914'. In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 149-72.

Kotowski, Georg, 'Auf dem Boden der gegebenen vollendeten Tatsachen! Der politische Katholizismus'. In *Politische Identität und Nationale Gedenktage. Zur Politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989, 157-80.

Kozicki, Norbert, 'Die Novemberrevolution in Herne Und Wanne-Eickel'. In *'Nichts ist so schön wie...' Geschichte und Geschichten aus Herne und Wanne-Eickel*, ed.

Michael Clarke, Frank Broßel, and Cornelia Objartel-Balliert, Essen, Klartext, 1991, 102-8.

Kraus, Antje, 'Gemeindeleben und Industrialisierung. Das Beispiel des evangelischen Kirchenkkreises Bochum'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialigeschichte des Altttags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 273-96.

Kreuzer, Clemens, *Mit Kreuz und Hammer. Katholische Arbeiterschaft in Bochum und Hattingen 1863 bis 1933. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, Bochum, Schürmann & Klagges, 1979.

Kroker, Evelyn, 'Arbeiterausschüsse im Ruhrgebiet zwischen 1906 und 1914', *Der Anschnitt* 6, no. 30 (1978), 204-15.

Kroker, Evelyn and Werner, *Solidarität aus Tradition. Die Knappenvereine im Ruhrgebiet*, München, Beck, 1988.

Kroker, Evelyn; Farrenkopf, Michael, *Grubenunglücke im deutschensprachigen Raum. Katalog der Bergwerke, Opfer, Ursachen und Quellen*, Bochum, Deutsches Bergbau Museums, 1988.

Krus-Bonazza, '"Da waren die Hessen, die Polen und noch eine Sorte..." (Arbeits)-Einwanderer in Bochum-Dahlhausen zur Zeit des Kaiserreichs und der Weimarer Republik'. In *Struktureller Wandel und kulturelles Leben: Politische Kultur in Bochum 1860-1990*, ed. Peter Friedemann and Gustav Seebold, Essen, Klartext, 1992, 178-88.

Kühr, Herbert, *Parteien und Wahlen im Stadt- und Landkreis Essen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik*, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1973.

Kulczycki, John J., 'A Trade Union for Polish Miners in the Ruhr: 'Alter Verband', 'Gewerkverein' and 'Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie'. In *Towards a Social History of Mining in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, ed. Klaus Tenfelde, München, C. H. Beck, 1992, 610-7.

Kulczycki, John J., *The Foreign Worker and the German Labour Movement: Xenophobia and Solidarity in the Coal Fields of the Ruhr, 1871-1914*, Oxford, Berg, 1994.

Lambert, W. R., 'Some working-class attitudes towards organised religion in the nineteenth-century', *Llafur* 2, no. 1 (1976), 4-18.

Langeweische, Dieter, 'The Impact of the German Labor Movement on Workers' Culture', *Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 3 (1987), 506-23.

Lawrence, Jon, *Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Laybourn, Keith, *A History of British Trade Unionism 1770-1990*, Gloucestershire, Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1992.

Lehnert, Detlef, and Megerle, Klaus, 'Politische Identität und nationale Gedenktage'. In *Politische Identität und Nationale Gedenktage. Zur Politichen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989, 9-30.

Lehnert, Detlef, '"Staatspartei der Republik" oder "Revolutionaere Reformisten"? Die Sozialdemokraten'. In *Politische Identität und nationale Gedenktage. Zur Politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989, 89-113.

Lepsius, Rainer, 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft'. In *Die deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter, Köln, 1973, 56-80.

Lewis, E. D., *The Rhondda Valleys*, Cardiff, University College Cardiff Press, 1958.

Lewis, Richard, 'The South Wales Miners and the Ruskin College Strike of 1919', *Llafur* 2, no. 1 (1976), 57-72.

Lewis, Richard, 'The Central Labour College: Its Decline and Fall, 1919-29', *Welsh History Review* 12, no. 2 (1984), 225-45.

Lewis, Richard, *Leaders and Teachers: Adult Education and the Challenge of Labour in South Wales, 1906-1940*, Cardiff, University of Wales, 1993.

Lewis, Richard, 'Political Culture and Ideology, 1900-1918'. In *The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000*, ed. Duncan Tanner, Chris Williams and Deian Hopkin, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, 86-110.

Lidtke, Vernon L., *The Alternative Culture: Socialist Labor in Imperial Germany*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.

Lieven, Michael, *Senghennydd: The Universal Pit Village, 1890-1930*, Llandysul, Gomer, 1994.

Lieven, Michael 'A Fractured Working-Class Consciousness? The Case of the Lady Windsor Colliery Lodge 1921', *Welsh History Review*, 21, no. 4 (2003), 729-56.

Linden, Marcel van der, 'The National Integration of European Working Classes (1871-1914)', *International Review of Social History* 33 (1988), 285-311.

Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967.

Lipset, Seymour M., Trow, Martin, and Coleman, James, *Union Democracy: The inside Politics of the International Typographical Union*, New York, Free Press, 1977.

Liu, Tien-Lung, *The Chameleon State: Global Culture and Policy Shifts in Britain and Germany, 1914-1933*, Oxford, Berghahn, 1999.

Lösche, Peter, *Anarchismus*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977.

Lucas, Erhard. *Märzrevolution 1920. Vom Generalstreik gegen den Militärputsch zum bewaffneten Arbeiteraufstand*, vol. I, Frankfurt, Roter Stern, 1970.

Lucas, Erhard, *Märzrevolution 1920. Der bewaffnete Arbeiteraufstand im Ruhrgebiet in seiner inneren Struktur und in seinem Verhältnis zu den Klassenkämpfen in den verschiedenen Regionen des Reiches*, vol. 2, Frankfurt, Roter Stern, 1973.

Lucas, Erhard, *Märzrevolution 1920. Verhandlungsversuche und deren Scheitern Gegenstrategien von Regierung und Militär; Die Niederlage der Aufstandsbewegung; Der Weiße Terror*, vol. 3, Frankfurt, Roter Stern, 1978.

Lucas, Erhard, *Zwei Formen von Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Frankfurt am Main, Verlag Roter Stern, 1976.

Lucas-Busemann, Erhard, 'Kapp Putsch und Rote Ruhrarmee'. In *Ruhrkampf 1920*, ed. Johannes Gorlas and Detlev J. K. Peukert, Essen, Klartext, 1986, 59-70.

Lützenkirchen, Ralf, *Der sozialdemokratische Verein für den Reichstagswahlkkreis Dortmund-Hörde. Ein Beitrage zur Parteigeschichte*, Dortmund, Historischen Vereins Dortmund, 1970.

Lyman, Richard W., *The First Labour Government 1924*, London, Chapman & Hall, 1957.

Macintyre, Stuart, *Little Moscow: Communism and Working-Class Militancy in Inter-War Britain*, London, Croom Helm, 1980.

MacLeod, Hugh, 'Protestantism and the Working Class in Imperial Germany', *European Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (1982), 328-44.

Macmillan, Daniel A., 'Energy, Willpower and Harmony. On the Problematic Relationship between State and Civil Society in Nineteenth-Century Germany'. In *Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives on Modern German and British History*, ed. Frank Trentmann, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2000, 176-98.

Maier, Charles S., *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War 1*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988.

Mann, Bernhard, 'Die SPD und die preußischen Landtagswahlen 1893-1913'. In *Der Aufsteig der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Sozialdemokratie und freie Gewerkschaften im Parteiensystem und Sozialmilieu des Kaiserreichs*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter, München, R. Oldenburg, 1990, 37-48.

Marßolek, Inge, 'Sozialdemokratie und Revolution im östlichen Ruhrgebiet: Dortmund unter der Herrschaft des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrates'. In *Arbeiter und Soldatenräte im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet*, ed. Rheinhard Rürup, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1975, 239-96.

Martiny, Martin, 'Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr vom Scheitern der Räte und Sozialisierungsbewegung bis zum Ende der letzten parlamentarischen Regierung der Weimarer Republik (1920 - 1930)'. In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 241-73.

Marwick, Arthur, *Britain in the Century of Total War*, London, Penguin, 1970.

Marwick, Arthur, *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1991.

Mattheier, Klaus J., *Die Gelben. Nationale Arbeiter zwischen Wirtschaftsfrieden und Streik*, Düsseldorf, Schwann, 1973.

Mattheier, Klaus J., 'Werkvereine und Wirtschaftsfriedlcih-Nationale (Gelbe) Arbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet'. In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 175-204.

Matthews, Ioan, 'The World of the Anthracite Miner', *Llafur* 6, no. 1. (1992), 96-104.

Matthews, Ioan, 'Maes y Glo Carreg ac Undeb y Glöwyr 1872-1925'. In *Cof Cenedl: Ysgrifau Ar Hanes Cymru*, 8, ed. Geraint H. Jenkins, Llandysul, Gomer, 1993, 133-64.

May, Eddie, 'Labour, Capital and the State in the South Wales Coalfield 1912-1921: The Case of Gwaun-cae-Gurwen'. In *New Directions in Economic and Social History*, ed. Ian Blanchard, Avonbridge, Newless Press, 1995, 47-55.

May, Eddie, 'Coal, Community, Town Planning and the Management of Labour: South Wales, c.1900-1920', *Planning Perspectives* 11 (1996), 145-66.

May, Eddie, 'Charles Stanton and the Limits to "Patriotic Labour"', *Welsh History Review* 18, no. 3 (1996), 145-66.

May, Eddie, 'The Mosaic of Labour Politics, 1900-1918'. In *The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000*, edited by Duncan Tanner, Chris Williams and Deian Hopkin, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, 61-85.

McKibbin, Ross, *The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924*, London, Oxford University Press, 1974.

McKibbin, Ross, *The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990.

McKibbin, Ross, 'The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour Party'. In *The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, 66-100.

McKibbin, Ross, 'The "Social Psychology" of Unemployment in Inter-War Britain'. In *The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, 228-58.

McKibbin, Ross, 'Classes and Cultures: A Postscript', *Mitteilungsblatt* 27 (2003), pp. 153-66.

McIvor, Arthur J., 'Employers' Organization and Strikebreaking in Britain, 1880-1914', *International Review of Social History* 29, no. 1 (1984), 1-33.

Middlemas, Keith, *Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911*, London, André Deutsch, 1970.

Mommsen, Hans, 'Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr 1918 – 1933'. In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 275-314.

Mommsen, Hans, 'Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau'. In *Industrielle System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Dietmar Petzina, Hans Mommsen, Bernd Weisbrod and Dirk Stegmann, Düsseldorf, Dorste Verlag, 1974, 3003-21.

Mommsen, Hans, 'Soziale Kämpfe im Ruhrbergbau nach der Jahrhundertwende'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 249-72.

Mommsen, Hans, 'Soziale und politische Konflikte an der Ruhr 1905 bis 1924'. In *Arbeiterbewegung und industrieller Wandel. Studien zu gewerkschaftlichen Organisationsproblemen im Reich und an der Ruhr*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1980, 62-94.

Mommsen, Hans, *Aufstieg und Untergang der Republik von Weimar, 1918-1933*, München, Propyläen Taschenbuch, 2001.

Morgan, Jane, 'Police and Labour in the Age of Lindsay, 1910-1936', *Llafur* 5, no. 1 (1988), 14-20.

Morgan, Kenneth O., 'Democratic Politics in Glamorgan, 1884-1914', *Morgannwg* 4 (1960), 5-27.

Morgan, Kenneth O., 'D. A. Thomas: The Industrialist as Politician', *Glamorgan Historian* 3 (1966), 33-51.

Morgan, Kenneth O., 'The New Liberalism and the Challenge of Labour: The Welsh Experience, 1885-1929', *Welsh History Review* 6, no. 3 (1973), 288-312.

Morgan, Kenneh O., *Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975.

Morgan, Kenneth O., *Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979.

Morgan, Kenneth O., *Wales in British Politics 1868-1922*, 3rd ed., Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1980.

Morgan, Kenneth O., *Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981.

Morgan, K. O., *Modern Wales: Politics, Places and People*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1995.

Morgan, Kenneth O., 'David Lloyd George and Wales'. In *Wales 1880-1914*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 139-74.

Morgan, K. O., 'Welsh Politics 1918-1939'. In *Wales between the Wars*, ed. Trevor Herbert & Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 99-128.

Morgan, Kenneth O., 'Gladstone, Wales and the New Radicalism'. In *Gladstone*, ed. Peter J. Jagger, London & Rio Grande, The Hambledon Press, 1998, 123-36.

Morgan, K. O., 'Die Soziale und politische Mobilisierung Großbritanniens, 1918-1926'. In *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Köln, Böhlau, 2000, 125-44.

Morgan, Prys, 'Keeping the Legends Alive'. In *Wales: The Imagined Nation. Studies in Cultural and National Identity*, ed. Tony Curtis, Bridgend, Poetry Welsh Press, 1986, 17-42.

Morgan, Prys, 'The Gwerin of Wales: Myth and Reality'. In *The Welsh and Their Country*, ed. I. Hume and W. T. R. Pryce, Llandysul, Gomer Press, 1986, 134-52.

Morgan, Richard, 'Political History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries'. In *Merthyr Tydfil: A Valley Community*, ed. Merthyr Teachers Centre Group, Cowbridge, Merthyr Tydfil, 1981, 232-48.

Mor-O'Brien, Anthony, 'Patriotism on Trial: The Strike of the South Wales Miners, July 1915', *Welsh History Review* 12, no. 1, (1984), 76-104.

Mor-O'Brien, Anthony, 'The Merthyr Boroughs Election, November 1915', *Welsh History Review* 12, no. 4 (1985), 538-66.

Mor-O'Brien, Anthony, 'Kier Hardie, C. B. Stanton, and the First World War', *Llafur* 4, no. 3 (1986), 31-42.

Morris, Dylan, 'Sosialaeth i'r Cymry - trafodaeth yr ILP', *Llafur* 4, no. 2 (1985), 51-63.

Morris, J. H. and Williams, L. J., *The South Wales Coal Industry, 1841-1875*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1958.

Morris, J. H. and Williams, L. J., 'The South Wales Sliding Scale, 1876-79: An Experiment in Industrial Relations'. In *Industrial South Wales 1750-1914: Essays in Welsh Economic History*, ed. W. E. Minchinton. London, Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1969, 218-31.

Müller, Dirk H., 'Syndicalism and Localism in the German Trade Union Movement'. In *The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany 1880-1914*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, 289-49.

Murphy, Richard C., The Polish Trade Union in the Ruhr Coal Field: Labor Organization and Ethnicity in Wilhelmian Germany, *Central European History* 9, no. 4 (1978), 335-47.

Murphy, Richard C., 'Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet: Das Beispiel Bottrop'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf. Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 89-108.

Neumann, Walter, *Die Gewerkschaften im Ruhrgebiet. Voraussetzung, Entwicklung und Wirksamkeit*, Köln, Bund-Verlag GMBH, 1951.

Nipperdey, Thomas, 'Religion und Gesellschaft', *Historische Zeitschrift* 246 (1988), 591-615.

Nipperdey, Thomas, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918: Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist*, München, C. H. Beck, 1998.

Nolan, Mary, *Social Democracy and Society: Working Class Radicalism in Düsseldorf, 1890-1920*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Oenning, Ralf Karl, '"*Du da mitte polnische Farben...*" *Sozialisationerfahrungen von Polen im Ruhrgebiet 1918 bis 1939*', Münster/New York, Waxmann, 1991.

Oertzen, Peter von, 'Die grossen Streiks der Ruhrbergarbeiterschaft im Frühjahr 1919. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über die revolutinäre Entstehnungsphase der Weimarer Republik', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 6, no. 3 (1958), 231-62.

Oertzen, Peter von, *Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution. Eine Politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der betrieblichen und wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19.* Berlin/Bonn-Bad Godersberg, J. H. W. Nachf. GmbH, 1976.

Oertzen, Peter von, 'Von der Novemberrevolution zum Kapp Putsch'. In *Ruhrkampf 1920*, ed. Johannes Gorlas and Deltev J. K. Peukert, Essen, Klartext, 1986, 11-25.

O'Leary, Paul, *Immigration and Integration. The Irish in Wales, 1798-1922*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000.

Outhwaite, William, *The Habermas Reader*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996.

Parisius, Bernhard, *Lebenswege im Revier. Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen zwischen Jahrhundertwwende und Kohlenkrise - erzählt von Frauen und Männern aus Borbeck*, Essen, Rainer Henselocsky, 1984.

Parry, Jon, 'The Tredegar Anti-Irish Riots of 1882', *Llafur* 3, no. 4 (1983), 20-3.

Parry, Jon, 'Trade Unionists and Early Socialism in South Wales, 1890-1908', *Llafur* 4, no. 3 (1985), 43-54.

Parry, Jon, 'Labour Leaders and Local Politics 1888-1902: The Example of Aberdare', *Welsh History Review* 14, no. 3 (1989), 399-416.

Patch, William L., *Christian Trade Unions in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933. The Failure of 'Corporate Pluralism'*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1985.

Paul, Johann, *Alfred Krupp und die Arbeiterbewegung*, Düsseldorf, Schwam, 1987.

Paynter, Will, 'The Fed'. In *Men of No Property: Studies of Welsh Trade Unionism*, ed. Goronwy Alun Hughes, Caerwys, Gwasg Gwenffrwd 1971, 68-72.

Pelling, Henry, *Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-1900*, London, Macmillan, 1967.

Peukert, Detlev, 'Industrialisierung des Bewußtseins? Arbeitserfahrugen von Ruhrbergleuten im 20. Jahrhundert'. In *Arbeit und Arbeitserfahrung in der Geschichte*, ed. Klaus Tenfelde, Göttingen, Vandanhoeck and Ruprecht, 1986, 92-119.

Phillips, G. A., 'The Labour Party and the General Strike', *Llafur* 2, no. 2 (1977), 44-58.

Pierson, Stanley, *Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism. The Struggle for a New Consciousness*, Ithac and London, Cornell University Press, 1973.

Pies, Eberhard, 'Sozialpolitik und Zentrum 1924-1928. Zu den Bedingungen sozialpolitischer Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Zentrumspartei in der Weimarer Republik'. In *Industrielles System und Politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Dietmar Petzina, Hans Mommsen, Bernd Weisbrod and Dirk Stegmann, Düsseldorf, Dorste Verlag, 1974, 259-70.

Pitt, Robert, 'Educator and Agitator: Charlie Gibbons 1888-1967', *Llafur* 5, no. 2 (1989), 72-83.

Pope, Robert, *Building Jerusalem: Nonconformity, Labour and the Social Question in Wales, 1906-1939*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998.

Pope, Robert, 'Facing the Dawn: Socialists, Nonconformists and Llais Llafur, 1906-1914', *Llafur* 7, no. 3 & 4 (1998/99), 77-87.

Pounds, N. J. G., *A Historical Geography of Europe, 1800-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Pretty, David, A., 'David Morgan (Dai O'r Nant), Miners' Agent. A Portrait of Leadership in the South Wales Coalfield', *Welsh History Review* 20, no. 3 (2000), 495-531.

Pritchard, Katie Olwen, *The Story of Gilfach Goch, Wales*, Newport, Starling Press Ltd., 1973.

Pritchard, Katie Olwen, *Gilfach Goch in Cameo*, 2 vols., Newport, Starling Press Ltd., 1974/5.

Prizgoda, Stefan, *Unternehmenverbände im Ruhrbergbau. Zur Gesichichte von Bergbau-Verein und Zechenverband 1858-1933*, Bochum, Deutschen Bergbau-Museums, 2002.

Prizgoda, Stefan, 'Zwischen Arbeiterschaft und Unternehmern: Steiger im Ruhrbergbau (1850-1933)'. In *100 Jahre Bismarck. Ein Stadtteil 'mit besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf'*, ed. Stefan Goch and Lutz Heidemann, Essen, Klartext, 2001, 117-28.

Pulzer, Peter, *Germany 1870-1945: Politics, State Formation and War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.

Rees, Dylan, 'Morgan Jones, Educationalist and Labour Politician', *Morgannwg* XXXI (1987), 66-83.

Reid, Alistair, 'Dilution, Trade Unionism and the State in Britain during the First World War'. In *Shop Floor Bargaining and the State: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Reid, Alastair, 'The Impact of the First World War on British Workers'. In *The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918*, ed. Richard Wall and Jay Winter, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 221-34.

Reid, Alastair J., 'Old Unionism Reconsidered: The Radicalism of Robert Knight, 1870-1900'. In *Currents of Radicalism. Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914*, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 214-45.

Reid, Donald, 'Reflections on Labor History and Language'. In *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis*, ed. Lenard R. Berlanstein, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1993, 39-54.

Reid, Fred, 'Alexander MacDonald and the Crisis of the Independent Collier, 1872-1874'. In *Independent Collier: The Coal Miner as Archetypal Proletarian Reconsidered'*, ed. Royden Harrison, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978, 156-69.

Reulecke, Jürgen, 'Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Arbeiterbewegung im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet'. In *Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1974, 205-39.

Rimlinger, G. V., 'International Differences in the Strike-Propensity of Coal Miners: Experience in Four Countries', *Industrial and Labour Revolutions Review* (1959), 389-405.

Ritter, Gerhard A., *Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich. Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die freien Gewerkschaften 1890-1900*, Berlin-Dahlem, Colloqium Verlag, 1963.

Ritter, Gerhard A., *Arbeiterbewegung, Parteien und Parlamentarismus. Aufätze zur Deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976.

Ritter, Gerhard A., 'Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany: Problems and Points of Departure for Research', *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 2 (1978), 165-90.

Ritter, Gerhard A., 'Die Sozialdemokratie im Deutschen Kaiserreich in Sozialgeschichtlicher Perspektive', *Historische Zeitschrift*, no. 249 (1989), 295-528.

Rohe, Karl, *Vom Alten Revier zum heutigen Ruhrgebiet. Die Entwicklung einer regionalen politischen Gesellschaft im Spiegel der Wahlen*', Königstein/Ts, Anton Hain Meisenheim GmbH, 1979.

Rohe, Karl, 'Die Ruhrgebietssozialdemokratie im Wilhelminischen Kaiserreich und ihr politischer und kultureller Kontext'. In *Der Aufstieg der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung: Sozialdemokratie und freie Gewerkschaften im Parteiensystem und Sozialmilieu des Kaiserreichs*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter, Munich, R. Oldenburg, 1990, 317-44.

Rohe, Karl, 'Politische Kultur und ihre Analyse. Probleme und Perspektiven der Politische Kulturforschung', *Historische Zeitschrift* 250 (1990), 321-46.

Rohe, Karl; and Jäger, Wolfgang, 'Politische Gesellschaft und politische Kultur'. In *Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter. Geschichte und Entwicklung*, ed. Hermann Korte Wolfgang Köllmann, Dietmar Petzina and Wolfhard Weber, Düsseldorf, 1990, 419-507.

Rose, Jonathan, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2001.

Rosenblum, Nancy J. and Post, Robert C., (ed.) *Civil Society and Government*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Ross, Ronald J., 'Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of Coercion in Imperial Germany', *Journal of Modern History* 3 (1984), 456-82.

Rübner, Hartmut, *Freiheit und Brot. Die Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands. Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Anachosyndikalismus*, Köln, Libertad Verlag, 1994.

Rubinstein, W. D., 'The Anti-Jewish Riots of 1911 in South Wales: A Re-Examination', *Welsh History Review* 18, no. 4 (1997), 667-99.

Ruck, Michael, *Die Freien Gewerkschaften im Ruhrkampf 1923*, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1986.

Salaman, G., 'Some Sociological Determinants of Occupational Communities', *Sociological Review* 19, no. 1 (1971), 53-77.

Saldern, Adelheid von, '"Wer ging in die SPD?" Zur Analyse der Parteimitgliedschaft in Wilhelminische Zeit'. In *Der Aufstieg der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Sozialdemokratie und Freie Gewerkschaften im Parteiensystem und Sozialmilieu des Kasierreichs'*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter, München, R. Oldenburg, 1990, 161-83.

Saul, Klaus, 'Repression of Integration? The State, Trade Unions and Industrial Disputes in Imperial Germany'. In *The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany 1880-1914*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, 338-56.

Savage, Michael, *The Dynamics of Working-Class Politics: The Labour Movement in Preston, 1880-1940*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Schäfer, Michael, *Heinrich Imbusch: Christlicher Gewerkschaftsführer und Widerstandskämpfer*, München, C. H. Beck, 1990.

Schäfer, Michael, 'Das Milieu der katholischen Arbeiter im Ruhrgebiet (1890-1914)'. In *Kirmes-Kneipe-Kino. Arbeiterkultur im Ruhrgebiet zwischen Kommerz und Kontrolle (1850-1914)*, ed. Dagmar Kift, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1992, 196-225.

Schmidt, Claudia, '"Dieses einst so verlockende Ruhrland..." Migranten und Migrantenkultur der Polen und Masuren in Gelsenkirchen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg'. In *100 Jahre Bismarck. Ein Stadtteil 'mit besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf'*, ed. Stefan Goch and Lutz Heidemann, Essen, Klartext, 2001, 55-66.

Schmidtchen, Volker, 'Arbeitersport - Erziehung zum sozialistischen Menschen? Leitwiese und Jugendarbeit in zwei Ruhrgebietsvereinen in der Weimarer Republik'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgechichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Peter Hammer Verlag, 1978, 345-76.

Schneider, Michael, *Die christlichen Gewerkschaften 1894-1933*, Bonn, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1982.

Schneider, Michael, 'Religion and Labour Organization: The Christian Trade Unions in the Wilhelmine Empire', *European Studies Review* 12, no. 3 (1982), 345-69.

Schneider, Michael, 'The Christian Trade Unions and State Activity'. In *The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany 1880-1914*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, 253-301.

Schneider, Ute, *Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert. Die Rheinprovinz von der französischen Zeit bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (1806-1918)*, Essen, Klartext, 1995.

Schönhoven, Klaus, *Expansion und Konzentration. Studien zur Entwicklung der Freien Gewerkschaften im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890 bis 1914*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1980.

Schönhoven, Klaus, *Reformismus und Radicalismus. Gespaltene Arbeiterbewegung in Weimarer Sozialstaat*, Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989.

Schöttler, Peter, 'Historians and Discourse Analysis', *History Workshop: a journal of socialist and feminist historians* 27, spring (1989), 37-68.

Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann, Thomas, *The Structures of the Lifeworld*, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristam Engelhardt, London, Heinemann, 1974.

Shearer, J. Ronald, 'Shelter from the Storm: Politics, Production and the Housing Crisis in the Ruhr Coal Fields, 1918-24', *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 1 (1999), 19-48.

Sheehan, James J., *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Shepherd, John, 'Labour and Parliament: The Lib.-Labs as the first working-class MPs, 1885-1906'. In *Currents of Radicalism. Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914*, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 187-213.

Smith, Dai, 'Leaders and Led'. In *Rhondda Past and Future*, ed. K. S. Hopkins, Ferndale, Rhondda Borough Council, 1975, 37-65.

Smith, David (ed.), *A People and a Proletariat: Essays in the History of Wales 1780-198*, London, Pluto Press, 1980.

Smith, David and Williams, Gareth, *Fields of Praise: The Official History of the Welsh Rugby Union, 1881-1981*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1980.

Smith, Dai, 'Tonypandy 1910: Definitions of Community', *Past and Present* 87 (1980), 158-84.

Smith, Dai, *Wales! Wales?* London, Allen & Unwin, 1984.

Smith, David, 'From Riots to Revolt: Tonypandy and the Miners' Next Step'. In *Wales 1880-1914*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 107-138.

Smith, David, 'Wales between the Wars'. In *Wales between the Wars*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 186-278.

Smith, David, 'Writing Wales'. In *Wales between the Wars*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 186-278.

Smith, Dai, *Aneurin Bevan and the World of South Wales*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1993.

Spencer, Elaine Glovka, 'Employer Response to Unionism: Ruhr Coal Industrialists before 1914', *Journal of Modern History* 3, no. (1976), 397-412.

Spencer, Elaine Glovka, *Management and Labor in Imperial Germany: Ruhr Industrialists as Employers, 1896-1914*, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1984.

Sperber, Jonathan, 'The Transformation of Catholic Associations in the Northern Rhineland and Westpahlia 1830-1870', *Journal of Social History* 15, no. 2 (1981), 253-64.

Sperber, Jonathan, 'Roman Catholic Religious Identity in Rhineland-Westphalia, 1800-70: Quantitative Examples and Some Political Implications', *Social History*, no. 7 (1982), 305-18.

Sperber, Jonathan, 'The Shaping of Political Catholicism in the Ruhr Basin, 1848-1881', *Central European History* 16, no. 4 (1983) 347-67.

Stead, Peter, 'Vernon Hartshorn: miners' agent and cabinet minister', *Glamorgan Historian* 6 (1970), 83-94.

Stead, Peter, 'Working-Class Leadership in South Wales, 1900-1920', *Welsh History Review*, 6, no. 3 (1973), 329-53.

Stead, Peter, 'The Language of Edwardian Politics'. In *A People and a Proletariat: Essays in the History of Wales, 1780-1980*, ed. David Smith, London, Pluto Press, 1980, 148-65.

Stead, Peter, 'Establishing a heartland: The Labour Party in Wales'. In *The First Labour Party*, ed. Kenneth D. Brown, Beckenham, Croom Helm, 1985, 64-88.

Stead, Peter, 'Wales and Film'. In *Wales between the Wars*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 161-85.

Stearns, Peter N., *Lives of Labour. Work in a Maturing Industrial Society*, London, Croom Helm, 1975.

Steinisch, Irmgard, 'Der Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 273-99.

Steinisch, Irmgard and Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Technischer Wandel und soziale Anpassung in der Deutschen Schwerindustrie während des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 28 (1988), 27-74.

Stopler, Gustav, *The German Economy 1870-1940*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1940.

Sullivan, Kate, '"The Biggest Room in Merthyr". Working-Class Housing in Dowlais, 1850-1914', *Welsh History Review* 17, no. 2 (1994), 155-85.

Supple, Barry, *The History of the British Coal Industry 1913-1946: The Political Economy of Decline*, vol. 4, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987.

Suval, Stanley, *Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, London and Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

Sykes, Allan, *The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism, 1776-1988*, London and New York, Longman, 1997.

Symons, M. V., 'Coal-Mining in the Llanelli Area - Years of Growth, 1800-64'. In *Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History*, ed. Colin Baber and L. J. Williams, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1986, 42-52.

Tampke, Jürgen, 'The Rise and Fall of the Essen Model, January-February 1919', *Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz* 13, no. 2 (1977), 160-72.

Tampke, Jürgen, 'Die Sozialisierungbewegung im Steinkohlenbergbau an der Ruhr'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsen and Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 225-48.

Tampke, Jürgen, *The Ruhr and Revolution. The Revolutionary Movement in the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Region 1912-1919*, London, Croom Helm, 1979.

Tanner, Duncan, *Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900-18*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Tanner, Duncan, 'The Labour Party and electoral politics in the coalfields'. In *Miners, Unions and Politics, 1910-47*, ed. Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and David Howell, Aldershot, Scolar, 1996, 59-92.

Tanner, Duncan, 'The Pattern of Labour Politics, 1918-1939'. In *The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000*, ed. Duncan Tanner, Chris Williams and Deian Hopkin, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, 113-139.

Tanner, Duncan, 'Ideological Debate in Edwardian Labour Politics: Radicalism, Revisionism and Socialism'. In *Currents of Radicalism. Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914*, edited by Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 271-93.

Taylor, A. J. P (ed.), *Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson*, London, Hutchinson of London, 1971.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Bergmännisches Vereinswesen im Ruhrgebiet während der Industrialisierung'. In *Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 315-44.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Mining Festivals in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 2 (1978), 377-412.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Das Fest der Bergleute'. In *Arbeiterkultur*, Gerhard A. Ritter (ed.) Königstein, Anton Hain Meisenheim, 1978, 209-45.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Linksradikale Strömungen in der Ruhrbergarbeiterschaft 1905 bis 1919'. In *Glück Auf, Kameraden: Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland*, ed. Hans Mommsem and Ulrich Borsdorf, Köln, Bund-Verlag, 1979, 199-223.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Die "Krawalle von Herne" im Jahre 1899', *Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz* (1979), 71-104.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Der bergämmische Arbeitsplatz während der Hochindustrialisierung (1890 to 1914)'. In *Arbeiter im Industrialisierungspross. Herkunft, Lage und Verhalten.*, ed. Werner Conze and Ulrich Engelhardt, Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1979, 283-335.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Bergarbeiterkultur in Deutschland. Ein Überblick', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 5, no. I (1979), 12-53.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Probleme der Organisation von Arbeitern und Unternehmern im Ruhrbergbau 1890-1918'. In *Arebtierbewegung und industrieller Wandel*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1980, 38-61.

Tenfelde, Klaus, *Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr im 19. Jahrhundert*, 2nd ed. Bonn, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1981.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Die Bergarbeiter, ihre Gewerkachaften und der Kapp-Putsch'. In *Ruhrkampf 1920*, ed. Johannes Gorlas and Detlev J. K. Peukert, Essen, Klartext, 1986.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'On the History of Industrial Relations in Mining'. In *Workers, Owners and Politics in Coal Mining: An International Comparison of Industrial Relations*, ed. Gerald D. Feldman and Klaus Tenfelde, Oxford, Berg, 1990, 1-11.

Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Protest, Organisation, Emanzipation. Die Arbeitswelt und ihre Konflikte im Ruhrgebiet'. In *Die Erfindung des Ruhrgebiets*, Bottrop, Pomp, 2000, 105-20.

Thane, Pat, 'Labour and Local Politics: Radicalism, Democracy and Social Reform, 1880-1914'. In *Currents of Radicalism. Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914*, edited by Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 244-70.

Thomas, Brinley, 'Wales and the Atlantic Economy', *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 6, no. 3 (1959), 169-92.

Thomas, Brinley, 'The Migration of Labour into the Glamorganshire Coalfield 1861-1911'. In *Industrial South Wales 1750-1914: Essays in Welsh Economic History*, ed. W. E. Minchinton, London, Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1969, 37-56.

Thomas, Brinley, 'A Cauldron of Rebirth: Population and the Welsh Language in Nineteenth Century'. In *A Social History of the Welsh Language: The Welsh Language and its Social Domains 1801-1911*, ed. Geraint H. Jenkins, Cardiff, Cardiff University Press, 2000, 81-99.

Thomas, Dennis, 'Economic Decline'. In *Wales between the Wars*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 13-51.

Thompson, Alastair P., *Left Liberals, the State and Popular Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

Thorpe, Wayne, 'Keeping the Faith. The German Syndicalists in the First World War', *Central European History* 33, no. 2 (2000), 195-216.

Trentmann, Frank, 'Introduction'. In *Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British History*, ed. Frank Trentmann, Oxford and New York, Berghahn Books, 2000, 1-46.

Trentmann, Frank, 'Civil Society, Commerce, and the "Citizen-Consumer". Popular Meanings of Free Trade in Modern Britain'. In *Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British History*, ed. Frank Trentmann, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2000, 306-31.

Tschirbs, Rudolf, *Tarifpolitik im Ruhrbergbau 1918-1933*, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986.

Tschirbs, Rudolf, 'Die Ruhrunternehmer und der große Streik von 1889'. In *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik und Wilhelminische Gesellschaft*, ed. Karl Ditt & Dagmar Kift, Westfälisches Industriemuseum, 1989, 87-112.

Turner, Christopher B., 'Conflicts of Faith? Religion and Labour in Wales 1890-1914'. In *Class Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada 1850-1930*, ed. Deian R. Hopkin and Gregory S Kealey, Aberystwyth, Llafur/CCLH, 1989, 67-85.

Ullrich, Volker, 'Everyday Life and the German Working Class, 1914-1918'. In *Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy*, ed. Roger Fletcher, London, Arnold, 1987.

Ute, Daniel, 'The Politics of Rationing versus the Politics of Subsistence: Working-Class Women in Germany, 1914-1918'. In *Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy*, ed. Roger Fletcher, London, Arnold, 1987.

Waites, Bernard, *A class society at war: England 1914-1918*, Leamington Spa, Berg, 1987.

Wallraff, Hermann Joseph, 'Die Belastung einer Gewerkschaft durch ideologische Differenzen - Spannungen innerhalb der christlichen Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den Jahren 1900-1914'. In *Vom Sozialistengesetz zur Mitbestimmung. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Hans Böckler*, ed. Heinz Osker Vetter, Köln, Bund Verlag, 1975, 135-52.

Walters, R. H., 'Labour Productivity in the South Wales Coal Industry', *Economic History Review* 28 (1975), 280-303.

Walters, R. H., *The Economic and Business History of the South Wales Coal Industry*, New York, Arno Press, 1977.

Walters, Rhodri, 'Capital Formation in the South Wales Coal Industry, 1840-1914', *Welsh History Review* 10, no. 1 (1980), 69-9.

Weber, Wolfhard, 'Der Arbeitsplatz in einem expandierenden Wirtschaftzweig: Der Bergmann'. In *Fabrik, Famalie, Feierabend. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber, Wuppertal, Hammer, 1978, 89-114.

Wehler, Hans Ulrich, *The German Empire*, Leamington Spa, Berg, 1985.

Weisbrod, Bernd, 'Entrepreneurial Politics and Industrial Relations in Mining in the Ruhr Region: From Managerial Absolutism to Co-Determination'. In *Workers, Owners and Politics in Coal Mining: An International Comparison of Industrial Relations*, ed. Gerald D. Feldman and Klaus Tenfelde, Oxford, Berg, 1990.

Weisbrod, Bernd, 'Die Politik der Repräsentation. Das Erbe des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Formwandel der Politik in Europa'. In *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Köln, Böhlau, 2000, 13-41.

Weitz, Eric D., *Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997.

Welskopp, Thomas, *Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz*, Bonn, Dietz, 2000.

White, Carol and Williams, Siân Rhiannon (eds.), *Struggle or Starve: Women's Lives in the South Wales Valleys between the Two World Wars*, Dinas Powys, Honno, 1998.

White, Joseph, 'Syndicalism in a Mature Industrial Setting: The Case of Britain'. In *Revolutionary Syndicalism : An International Perspective.*, ed. Marcel von der Linden and Wyne Thorpe, Aldershot, Scolar Press, 1990, 101-18.

Williams, Chris, 'An Able Administrator of Capitalism? The Labour Party in the Rhondda, 1917-1921', *Llafur* 4, no. 4 (1987), 20-33.

Williams, Chris, 'The South Wales Miners' Federation', *Llafur* 5, no. 3 (1990), 45-56.

Williams, Chris, *Democratic Rhondda: Politics and Society, 1885-1951*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1996.

Williams, Chris, '"The hope of the British Proletariat": The South Wales Miners, 1910-1947'. In *Miners, Unions and Politics: 1910-1947*, ed. Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and David Howell, Aldershot, Scolar Press, 1996, 121-44.

Williams, Chris, 'Democracy and Nationalism in Wales: The Lib-Lab Engima'. In *Conflict and Coexistence. Nationalism and Democracy in Modern Europe. Essays in Honour of Harry Hearder*, ed. Robert Stradling, Scott Newton and David Bates, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1997, 107-31.

Williams, Chris, *Capitalism, Community and Conflict: The South Wales Coalfield, 1898-1947*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998.

Williams, Chris, 'The Odyssey of Frank Hodges', *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion*, 5 (1999), 110-30.

Williams, Chris, 'Labour and the Challenge of Local Government, 1919-1939'. In *The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000*, edited by Duncan Tanner, Chris Williams and Deian Hopkin, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000, 140-65.

Williams, Gareth, *1905 and All That*, Llandysul, Gomer Press, 1991.

Williams, Gwyn A., *When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985.

Williams, John, 'The Move from the Land'. In *Wales 1880-1914*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 11-47.

Williams, John, *Was Wales Industrialised? Essays in Modern Welsh History*, Llandysul, Gomer, 1995.

Williams, John, 'The Coalowners of South Wales, 1873-80: Problems of Unity'. In *Was Wales Industrialised? Essays in Modern Welsh History*, ed. John Williams, Llandysul, Gomer, 1995, 123-49.

Williams, John, 'The Fed: Birth and First Steps', *Llafur* 7, no. 3 & 4 (1998/9), 67-75.

Williams, L. J., 'The New Unionism in South Wales, 1889-92', *Welsh History Review* 1, no. 4 (1963), 413-29.

Williams, Norman, 'Evan Roberts and the 1904-5 Revival', *Glamorgan Historian* 5 (1968), 28-37.

Williams, Tim, 'Language, Religion, Culture'. In *Wales 1880-1914*, ed. Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1988, 73-106.

Williams, Tim, 'The Anglicisation of South Wales'. In *Patriotism*, vol. 2, ed. R. Samuel, London, Routledge, 1989, 193-203.

Winstanley, Michael J., *Gladstone and the Liberal Party*, London and New York, Routledge, 1990.

Woodhouse, M. G., 'Mines for the Nation or Mines for the Miners? Alternative Perspectives on Industrial Democracy, 1921-1921', *Llafur* 2, no. 3 (1978), 92-109.

Wrigley, Chris, 'The First World War and State Intervention in Industrial Relations, 1914-1918: A History of British Industrial Relations 1914-1939'. In *A History of British Industrial Relations, 1914-1939*, ed. Chris Wrigley, Brighton, Harvester Press Ltd., 1987, 23-70.

Ziemann, Benjamin, 'Das ‚Fronterlebnis' des Ersten Weltkrieges - Eine sozialhistorische Zäsur? Deutungen und Wirkungen in Deutschkand und Frankreich'." In *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Köln, Böhlau, 2000, 43-82.

Zimmerman, Michael, '"Parole heißt Sieg oder Todt". Der Bergarbeiterstreik von 1889 im Raume Recklinghausen.' In *1889: Bergarbeiterstreik und Wilhelminische Gesellschaft*, ed. Karl Ditt and Dagmar Kift, Hagen, Westfälisches Industriemuseum, 1989, 53-68.

Zimmerman, Michael, 'Hauer und Schlepper, Kameradschaft und Steiger. Bergbau und Bergarbeit um 1900.' In *Die Erfindung des Ruhrgebiets. Arbeit und Alltag um 1900*, ed. Ruhrlandmuseum Essen, Bottrop, Pomp, 2000, 67-86.

Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina-Maria, 'Miners' Militancy: A study of four south Wales collieries during the middle of the twentieth century', *Welsh History Review* 16, no. 3 (1992), 356-83.

13. Dissertations and Unpublished Papers

Cragoe, Matthew, Conservatism and Empire'. Paper presented at the Wales at War and Peace, Llafur Conference AGM, Glamorgan University, 6th Oct 2001.

Davies, D. K., The Influence of Syndicalism and Industrial Unionism on the South Wales Coalfield, 1898-1921: A Study in Ideology and Practice, PhD, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1991.

Demont, S. E., Tredegar and Aneurin Bevan: A Society and its Political Articulation, 1890-1929, Ph.D, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1990.

Gesau, Karl Friederich, Syndikalismus in der Ruhrbergarbeiterschaft zu Beginn der Weimarer Republik, 1918-1925, Magisterarbeit, Münster, 1983.

Herlemann, Beatrix, Die Kommunalpolitik Aktivitäten der KPD im Ruhrgebiet, 1924-33, PhD, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1980.

Johnes, Martin, That Other Game: A Social History of Soccer in South Wales, c. 1906-1939, PhD, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1998.

Mathews, Ioan, 'James Griffiths and the First World War.' Paper presented at the War and Peace, Llafur AGM Conference, Glamorgan University, 6th Oct 2001.

May, Eddie, A Question of Control: Social and Industrial Relations in the South Wales Coalfield and the Crisis of Post-War Reconstruction, Ph.D, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1995.

Parker, Alis, What Mam Said Went: A Study of Women in Mining Families in South Wales before the Second World War and Their Access to Power in the Home', Msc. Econ, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1996.

Schwaderer, Claus, Die Reichstagswahlen und die Wahlen zur Nationalversammlung im Landkreis und der Stadt Bochum 1912-1920, Hausarbeit der ersten Staatsprüfung für das Lehramt an Gymnasien, Gymnasien, Bochum, 1980.

Stein, Gerhard, Die Wahlen zum Stadtparlement, zum Preußischen Landtag und zum Reichstag in der Stadt Bochum in den Jahren 1924 bis 1933, vorgelegt zur Fachprüfung in Geschichte für Lehramt an Realschulen, Bochum, 1970.

Tiedtke, Hans-Werner, Die Reichstagswahlen und die Reichstagswahlkämpfe in südlichen Teil des Ruhrgebiets von der Gründung des Nord-Deutschen Bundes bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges, Hausarbeit der Fachprüfung für das Lehramt am Gymnasium, Bochum, 1976.

Weitz, Eric, Conflict in the Ruhr: Workers and Socialist Politics in Essen, 1910-1925, PhD, Boston University, 1983.